[CONFIDENTIAL.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, July 9, 1846. SIR: The proclamation which you were directed to spread among the Mexican people, will have put you in possession of the views of the government in relation to the mode of carrying on the war, and also in relation to the manner of treating the inhabitants. The war is only carried on to obtain justice, and the sooner that can be obtained, and with the least expenditure of blood and money, the better. One of the evils of war is the interruption of diplomatic communications between the respective authorities, and the consequent ignorance under which each party may lie in relation to the views of the other. The natural substitute of these interrupted diplomatie communications, is the military intercourse which the usages of war allow between contending armies in the field, and in which commanding generals can do much towards re-opening ne-1 gotiations, and smoothing the way to a return of peace.

The President has seen, with much satisfaction, the civility and kindness with which you have treated your prisoners, and all the inhabitants with whom you have come in contact. He wishes that course of conduct continued, and all opportunities taken to conciliate the inhabitants, and to let them see that peace is within their reach the moment their rulers will consent to do us justice. The inhabitants should be encouraged to remain in their towns and villages, and these sentiments be carefully made known to them. The same things may be said to officers made prisoners, or who may visit your head-quarters according to the usages of war; and it is the wish of the President that such visits be encouraged; and, also, that you take occasions to send officers to the head-quarters of the enemy for the military purposes, real or ostensible, which are of ordinary occurrence between armies, and in which opportunity may be taken to speak of the war itself as only carried on to obtain justice, and that we had much rather procure that by negotiation than by fighting. Of course authority to speak of your government will be disavowed, but a knowledge of its wishes will be averred, and a readiness will be expressed to communicate to your government the wishes of the Mexican government to negotiate for honorable peace, whenever such shall be their wish, and with the assurance that such overtures will be met in a corresponding spirit by your government. A discreet officer, who understands Spanish, and who can be employed in the intercourse so usual between armies, can be your confidential agent on such occasions, and can mask his real under his ostensible object of a military interview.

You will also readily comprehend that in a country so divided into races, classes, and parties, as Mexico is, and with so many local divisions among departments, and personal divisions among individuals, there must be great room for operating on the minds and feelings of large portions of the inhabitants, and inducing them to wish success to an invasion which has no desire to injure their country; and which, in overthrowing their oppressors, may benefit themselves. Between the Spaniards, who monopolize the

wealth and power of the country, and the mixed Indian race, who bear its burdens, there must be jealousy and animosity. The same feelings must exist between the lower and higher orders of the clergy; the latter of whom have the dignities and the revenues, while the former have poverty and labor. In fact, the curates were the chief authors of the revolution which separated Mexico from Spain, and their relative condition to their superiors is not much benefited by it. Between the political parties into which the country is divided, there must be some more liberal and more friendly to us than others; the same may be said of rival chiefs, political and military; and even among the departments there are local antipathies and dissensions. In all this field of division-in all these elements of social, political, personal, and local discord -there must be openings to reach the interests, passions, or principles of some of the parties, and thereby to conciliate their good will, and make them co-operate with us in bringing about an honorable and a speedy peace. The management of these delicate movements is confided to your discretion; but they are not to paralyze the military arm, or in any degree to arrest or retard your military movements. These must proceed vigorously. Policy and force are to be combined; and the fruits of the former will be prized as highly as those of the latter.

It is seen from the Mexican papers, that great attempts are made to prejudice and exasperate the minds of the people against us. The war is represented on their part as one of "national existence;" as if it was our wish to destroy the Mexican nation! It is represented as a war of "rapine and plunder;" as if we intended to rob and oppress the people? It is represented as a war of "impiety;" as if we were going to rob churches and pull down altars! The conduct of yourself, your officers, and men, has shown to all Mexican citizens that you have met, and as far as you have gone, the injustice and absurdity of all these imputations; but they are still systematically propagated through the country, and must find believers in a country where ignorance is so great, and the means of disseminating truth so small. The counteraction of these injurious imputations will be your particular duty; first, by a continuation of your just and honorable conduct towards the people, their property and religion, and kindness to prisoners; and next, by making it a point in your interviews with the commanders of the army of the enemy to speak of these unjust imputations, for the purpose of correcting them. It is the President's wish not only to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, but so to conduct it as to leave no lasting animosities behind to prejudice the future friendship and commerce of the two countries; nor to permit injurious reports to go forth to excite the ill will of the other republics, of Spanish origin, against us.

Availing yourself of divisions which you may find existing among the Mexican people-to which allusion has been made-it will be your policy to encourage the separate departments or States, and especially those which you may invade and occupy, to declare their independence of the central government of Mexico, and either to

become our allies, or to assume, as it is understood Yucatan has done, a neutral attitude in the existing war between the United States and Mexico. In such of the departments or states as may take this course, you will give the inhabitants assurances of the protection of your army until the return of peace, so far as may be consistent with your military plans of operation. When peace is made, they may decide for themselves their own form of government. In such departments as may be conquered, or assume a neutral attitude, you may, at your discretion, observe the same course of conduct as that presented in the instructions given to General Kearny by the department on the 3d day of June, 1846. A copy of the instructions to General Kearny is herewith transmitted to you.

No reply has yet been received to the inquiries contained in my letter addressed to you on the 8th of June last. From your superior opportunities of acquiring correct information of the country to be invaded, and the facilities or difficulties of conducting a successful campaign through it, much reliance will be placed on your opinions. If, from all the information which you may communicate to the department, as well as that derived from other sources, it should appear that the difficulties and obstacles to the conducting of a campaign from the Rio Grande, the present base of your operations, for any considerable distance into the interior of Mexico, will be very great, the department will consider whether the main invasion should not ultimately take place from some other point on the coast-say Tampico, or some other point in the vicinity of Vera Cruz. This suggestion is made with a view to call your attention to it, and to obtain from you such information as you may be able to impart. Should it be determined that the main army should invade Mexico at some other point than the Rio Grande-say the vicinity of Vera Cruz-a large and sufficient number of transport vessels could be placed at the mouth of the Rio Grande by the time the healthy season sets in-say early in November. The main ́ army, with all its munitions, could be transported, leaving a sufficient force behind to hold and occupy the Rio Grande, and all the towns and provinces which you may have conquered before that time. In the event of such being the plan of operations, your opinion is desired what increased force, if any, will be required to carry it out with success. We learn that the army could be disembarked a few miles distant from Vera Cruz, and readily invest the town in its rear, without coming within the range of the guns of the fortress of San Juan d'Ulloa. The town could be readily taken by land, while the fortress, being invested by land and sea, and all communication cut off, must soon fall. From Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico there is a fine road, upon which the diligences or stage coaches run daily. The distance from Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico is not more than one-third of that from the Rio Grande to the city of Mexico. Upon these important points, in addition to those mentioned in my letter of the 8th of June, your opinion and views are desired at the earliest period your duties will permit you to give them. In the mean time the department confidently relies on you to press forward your operations vigorously to the extent

of your means, so as to occupy the important points within your reach on the Rio Grande, and in the interior. It is presumed that Monterey, Chihuahua, and other places in your direction, will be taken and held. If in your power to give the information, the department desires to be informed of the distance from Chihuahua to Guaymas, on the gulf of California; whether there be a road over which ordnance and baggage wagons could be taken, and whether it be practicable for an army to march from the former to the latter place, and what time would probably be required for mounted men, and what time for infantry or artillery, to do so. This information

is desired before the department can be prepared to decide upon the propriety of sending forward such an expedition.

Your answer to this communication you will please to address directly to the President of the United States.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Major General Z. TAYLOR,

W. L. MARCY.

Commanding, &c.

HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,

Matamoras, August 1, 1846.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the confidential communication of the Secretary of War, dated July 9, and to present the following remarks in relation to the several poin's embraced in it. Agreeably to the injunction of the Secretary, this communication is addressed directly to the President of the United States.

1st. As to the intercourse with the enemy, and means of obtaining information with regard to his movements, &c., I fear that no very satisfactory results will be obtained in the way proposed. The Mexican generals and other officers have exhibited, since the commencement of hostilities, a determination to hold with us as little intercourse as possible. A most rigid non intercourse has been observed throughout, and since the 17th of June no communication whatever has passed between the head-quarters of the two armies. I shall not fail to improve such occasions, when they present themselves, in the manner pointed out by the Secretary. Since crossing the Rio Grande, it has been my constant aim to conciliate the people of the country; and I have the satisfaction of believing that much has been done towards that object, not only here, but at Reinosa, Camargo, and other towns higher up the river. The only obstacle I encounter in carrying out this desirable policy, arises from the employment of volunteer troops. Some excesses have been committed by them upon the people and their property, and more, I fear, are to be apprehended. With every exertion, it is impossible effectually to control these troops, unaccustomed as they are to the discipline of camps, and losing in bodies the restraining

sense of individual responsibility. With increased length of service, these evils, it is hoped, will diminish.

2d. In regard to availing ourselves of internal divisions and discords among the Mexicans, it is hardly time yet to say how far this may be relied upon as an element of success. I have good reason to believe that the country lying between the Rio Grande and Sierra Madra is disposed to throw of the yoke of the central government, and will, perhaps, do so as soon as it finds a strong American force between it and the capital. I shall do all in my power to encourage this movement, of which I received indications from many quarters, and shall comply fully with the instructions of the Secretary on that point.

3d. As to the military operations best calculated to secure an early and honorable peace, my report of 2d July will have put the department in possession of my views touching operations in this quarter, and I have now little to add to that report. Whether a large force can be subsisted beyond Monterey, must be determined by actual experiment, and will depend much upon the disposition of the inhabitants towards us. If a column (say, 10,000 men) can be sustained in provisions at Saltillo, it may advance thence upon. San Luis Potosi, and I doubt not would speedily bring proposals for peace. If, on the other hand, a column cannot be sustained beyond Monterey, it will be for the government to determine, from considerations of state, whether a simple occupation of the frontier departments, (including Chihuahua and New Mexico,) or, in addition to such occupation, an expedition against the capital, (by way of Vera Cruz,) be most expedient. I cannot give a positive opinion as to the practicability of an expedition against Vera Cruz, or the amount of force that would probably be required for it. The Department of War must be much better informed than I am on that point. From the impracticable character of the routes from Tampico, particularly that leading to Mexico, I should judge an expedition against the capital from that point to be out of the question. The simultaneous embarkation of a large body of troops at Brazos Santiago, as proposed in the Secretary's communication, would be attended with great difficulty, if we may judge from the delays and danger which accompany the unloading of single transports, owing to the almost perpetual roughness of the bar and boisterous character of the anchorage. It may also well be questioned whether a force of volunteers, without much instruction, more than those now here can receive in season for such an expedition, can prudently be allowed to form the bulk of an army destined for so delicate an operation as a descent upon a foreign coast, where it can have no proper base of operations or supplies.

I have already had occasion to represent to the department that the volunteer force ordered to report to me here is much greater than I can possibly employ-at any rate in the first instance; the influx of twelve-months volunteers has even impeded my forward movement by engrossing all the resources of the quartermaster's department to land them and transport them to healthy positions. This circumstance, in connexion with the possibility of an expedi