Comentarios de la gente - Escribir un comentario
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
able according acquire actions advantage agreeable allow appear arises attended authority beauty become betwixt cause character circumstances common concerning consent consequently consider considerable contrary depends derived desire determine difficulty direct distinct duty easily easy effect emotion entirely equal established esteem evil excite experience farther feel follows force former founded give greater hatred human humility ideas imagination immediately impossible impressions influence instance interest judgment justice kind latter laws less manner means ment merit mind moral motive natural necessary necessity never object obligation observe operate opposition original ourselves pain particular pass passions perform person philosophers pleasure possession present pride principle proceed produce promises qualities reason reflection regard relation render rules sect sensation sense sensible sentiments separate sion situation society sufficient supposed sympathy thing thought tion tis evident transition uneasiness vice virtue whole
Página 172 - I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not...
Página 171 - Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object.
Página 367 - But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness.
Página 107 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Página 157 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Página 237 - ... that they will not be wanting in theirs. All of them, by concert, enter into a scheme of actions, calculated for common benefit, and agree to be true to their word; nor is...
Página 308 - We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us : With our acquaintance, than with strangers : With our countrymen, than with foreigners. But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England.
Página 171 - So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind...
Página 189 - Of all the animals, with which this globe is peopled, there is none towards whom nature seems, at first sight to have exercis'd more cruelty than towards man, in the numberless wants and necessities, with which she has loaded him, and in the slender means, which she affords to the relieving these necessities.