of the king of Roumania, and by the Bulgarian heroes, on February 18, 1878, the chains were broken which had for so many centuries enslaved Bulgaria, once a great and glorious power.

From that time until to-day, full thirty years, the Bulgarian nation, still cherishing the memory of those who had labored for its freedom, and inspired by its traditions, has worked incessantly for the development of its beautiful country, and, under my guidance and that of the late Prince Alexander, it has become a nation fit to take a place as an equal among the civilized States of the world, and has shown itself capable of progress in science, art, and industry. While advancing along this path nothing should arrest the progress of Bulgaria, nothing should hinder her success. Such is the desire of the nation, such is its will. Let that desire be fulfilled. The Bulgarian nation and its chief can have but one sentiment, one desire. Practically independent, the nation was impeded in its normal and peaceful development by certain illusory and formal limitations which resulted in a coldness in the relations of Turkey and Bulgaria. I and the nation desire to rejoice in the political development of Turkey. Turkey and Bulgaria free and entirely independent of each other may exist under conditions which will allow them to strengthen their amicable relations and devote themselves to peaceful internal development.

Inspired by the sacred purpose of satisfying national requirements and fulfilling national desires, I proclaim, with the blessing of the Almighty, Bulgaria, united since September 6, 1885, an independent kingdom.

In conjunction with the nation I believe that this act will meet the approbation of the great powers.

119. Recognition by the United States of the independence of Cuba. On April 20, 1898, after considerable debate, the following joint resolution was passed and approved. The vote in the House was 311 to 6; in the Senate, 42 to 35:

Joint Resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect. Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers

and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited: Therefore, Resolved. First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.

APPROVED, April 20, 1898

III. CIVIL LIBERTY

120. The meaning of civil liberty. Lieber explains civil liberty as protection against undue interference on the part of both individual and government.

Liberty, in its absolute sense, means the faculty of willing, and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence from any other source, or from without. It means self-determination, unrestrainedness of action.

In this absolute meaning, there is but one free Being, because there is but one Being whose will is absolutely independent upon any influence, but that which he wills himself, and whose power is adequate to his absolute will who is Almighty. . . .

If we apply the idea of self-determination to the sphere of politics, or to the state, and the relations which subsist between it and the individual, and between different states, we must remember that the following points are necessarily involved in the comprehensive idea of the state: .. The term state means a society of men, that is, of beings with individual

destinies and responsibilities, from which arise individual rights, that show themselves the clearer and become more important as man advances in political civilization. Since, then, he is obliged and destined to live in society, it is necessary to prevent these rights from being encroached upon by his associates..

Lastly, the idea of the state involving the idea of government, that is, of a certain contrivance with coercing power superior to the power of the individual, the idea of self-determination necessarily implies protection of the individual against encroaching power of the government, or checks against government interference.

We come thus to the conclusion, that liberty applied to political man practically means, in the main, protection or checks against undue interference, whether this be from individuals, from masses, or from government. The highest amount of liberty comes to signify the safest guarantees of undisturbed legitimate action, and the most efficient checks against undue interference.

121. Liberty and authority. Mill outlines the phases of the evolution of liberty and argues for a wide sphere of freedom against governmental encroachment.

The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. By liberty was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. . . . The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks; by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power.

A time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone it

seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees, this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers. . .

...

It was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the people over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "people" who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the "self-government" spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority: the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this, as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. . . . There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism. . .

The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. .

This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual follows the liberty,

within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others; the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified.

122. Civil liberty in the United States. The following is a brief classification of the individual rights specially guaranteed and protected in the United States:

The guaranties found in the state and federal constitutions which are intended for the protection of the individual in his person, his liberty, and his property have not been the result of any theorizing as to what ought to be secured to the individual by way of enjoyment; they have been the result of experience, and they relate to the supposed respects in which it has been found necessary to limit the powers of government in order that the largest practicable measure of individual freedom and opportunity may be secured. Nearly all of them may be traced more or less directly to struggles on the part of the people against the unjust exercise of powers of government in England and in this country.

The guaranty of the right to "life" seems to be intended as a safeguard against inflicting death on persons who are regarded as obnoxious to the government, otherwise than as the result of a regular and orderly procedure for the punishment of crime; hence the provisions with reference to the method of accusation, trial, and punishment may be regarded as guaranties intended for the protection of the right to life.

But liberty is equally imperiled by criminal proceedings which are not in accordance with regular and orderly methods, and by imprisonment inflicted as a punishment for crime for which there has not been a proper conviction. Therefore, the provisions with reference to the methods of criminal procedure are guaranties both as to life and liberty.

The enjoyment of the largest measure of liberty which can consistently be guaranteed by organized government to the individual involves, however, much more than protection against unlawful physical restraint. Liberty is a most comprehensive term. It suggests, not only freedom of action, but the unrestricted enjoyment of the result of beneficial activity so far as such freedom is not inconsistent with like freedom on the part of others. Civil liberty is therefore impaired when individuals are deprived of protection in the acquisition and enjoyment of property, for the accumulation of property is one of the most substantial results of the freedom of action, the desire for acquisition being one of the strongest