the parties; secondly, on the ground of humanity, in order to stay the effusion of blood; and, thirdly, in order to put a stop to piracy and anarchy."

The treaty between France, Great Britain, and Russia, signed at London July 6, 1827, for the pacification of Greece, sets forth the specific grounds on which the three powers intervened. In the preamble the contracting parties declare that, " penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary struggle which, while it abandons the Greek provinces and the islands of the archipelago to all the disorders of anarchy, daily causes fresh impediments to the commerce of the states of Europe, and gives opportunity for acts of piracy which not only expose the subjects of the high contracting parties to grievous losses, but also render necessary measures which are burdensome for their observation and suppression"; and that two of the high contracting parties (France and Great Britain) having besides "received from the Greeks an earnest invitation to interpose their Mediation with the Ottoman Porte," and being, together with the Emperor of Russia, "animated with the desire of putting a stop to the effusion of blood, and of preventing the evils of every kind which the continuance of such a state of affairs may produce," they had all resolved to combine and regulate their efforts by a formal treaty with a view to reëstablish peace between the contending parties by means of an arrangement demanded "no less by sentiments of humanity, than by interests for the tranquillity of Europe."

178. Reply of Japan to the intervention of Russia, Germany, and France. In 1895, after the treaty of peace between China and Japan had ceded territory to the latter, Russia, Germany, and France sent a joint note to Japan politely commanding her to return the territory gained. The following extract is taken from Japan's diplomatic reply:

We recently complied with the request of China, and in consequence appointed plenipotentiaries and caused them to confer with the plenipotentiaries appointed by China and to conclude a Treaty of Peace between the two Empires.

Since then the governments of their Majesties the Emperors of Russia and Germany and of the Republic of France have united in a recommendation to our government not to permanently possess the peninsula of Feng-t'ien, our newly acquired territory, on the ground that such permanent possession would be detrimental to the lasting peace of the Orient.

Devoted as we unalterably are and ever have been to the principles of peace, we were constrained to take up arms against China for no other reason than our desire to secure for the Orient an enduring peace.

Now the friendly recommendation of the three powers was equally prompted by the same desire. Consulting, therefore, the best interests of peace and animated by a desire not to bring upon our people added hardship or to impede the progress of national destiny by creating new complications and thereby making the situation difficult and retarding the restoration of peace, we do not hesitate to accept such recommendation.

179. American statements of policy regarding nonintervention. The following extracts from the writings of leading American statesmen indicate the traditional foreign policy of the United States. Significant changes are shown in the attitude of Roosevelt.

Washington (1796)-Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Jefferson (1823)-I have ever deemed it fundamental for the United States never to take an active part in the quarrels of Europe. Their political interests are entirely distinct from ours. Their mutual jealousies, their balance of power, their complicated alliances, their forms and principles of government, are all foreign to us.

Monroe (1824)-Separated as we are from Europe by the Great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European governments nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its various vibrations, cannot affect us. It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every power and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all.

Webster (1842)—The great communities of the world are regarded as wholly independent, each entitled to maintain its own system of law and government, while all in their mutual intercourse are understood to submit to the established rules and principles governing such intercourse. And the perfecting of this system of communication among nations, requires the strictest application of the doctrine of nonintervention of any with the domestic concerns of others.

Seward (1864)-Whatever may be thought by other nations of this policy, it seems to the undersigned to be in strict conformity with those prudential principles of international law — that nations are equal in their independence and sovereignty, and that each individual state is bound to do unto all other states just what it reasonably expects those states to do unto itself.

Day (1898)-The rule of this government is to observe the most absolute impartiality in respect to questions arising between its neighbors; to refrain from forming a judgment upon the merits of the mutual recriminations which may attend such disputes; to abstain from advising either party to the difference; and to exert mediatorial offices only when acceptable to both parties.

Roosevelt (1904)-In asserting the Monroe doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, and in endeavoring to circumscribe the theater of war in the Far East, and to secure the open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large. There are, however, cases in which, while our own interests are not greatly involved, strong appeal is made to our sympathies. Ordinarily it is very much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with striving for our own moral and material betterment here at home than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations. . . . Nevertheless there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our manifest duty to endeavor at least to show our disapproval of the deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it. The cases must be extreme in which such a course is justifiable. . . . But in extreme cases action may be justifiable and proper.

180. Intervention of the United States in Cuba. The following extract from President McKinley's special message to Congress, April 11, 1898, gives the grounds on which the United States undertook forcible intervention in Cuban affairs.

First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.

Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there

can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.

Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and the business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

181. The Monroe Doctrine. The essential clauses of President Monroe's message, stating the policies of "noncolonization" and "nonintervention," follow:

. . . the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . .

In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. . . . The political system of the allied powers is essentially different, in this respect, from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered, and shall not interfere.

182. The Olney Doctrine. In 1895, at the time of the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, Secretary of State Olney, in a letter to the United States ambassador to Great Britain,

interpreted the Monroe Doctrine so broadly that his point of view has often been called the Olney Doctrine.

Is it true, then, that the safety and welfare of the United States are so concerned with the maintenance of the independence of every American state as against any European power as to justify and require the interposition of the United States whenever that independence is endangered? The question can be candidly answered in but one way. The states of America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States. To allow the subjugation of any of them by an European power is, of course, to completely reverse that situation and signifies the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations to us. . . .

To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why?... It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.

183. The Drago Doctrine. December 29, 1902, the Argentine minister at Washington was instructed to present to the United States certain views with reference to the forcible collection of public debts. From the name of their author, these principles are usually called the Drago Doctrine.

Among the fundamental principles of public international law which humanity has consecrated, one of the most precious is that which decrees that all states, whatever be the force at their disposal, are entities in law, perfectly equal one to another, and mutually entitled by virtue thereof to the same consideration and respect. . .

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Contracts between a nation and private individuals are obligatory according to the conscience of the sovereign, and may not be the object of compelling force," said the illustrious Hamilton. They confer no right of action contrary to the sovereign will."...

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This is in no wise a defense for bad faith, disorder, and deliberate and voluntary insolvency. It is intended merely to preserve the dignity of the public international entity which may not thus be dragged into war with detriment to those high ends which determine the existence and liberty of nations. . . .

The collection of loans by military means implies territorial occupation to make them effective, and territorial occupation signifies the suppression or subordination of the governments of the countries on which it is imposed.