Lastly, all four of these typical constitutions agree substantially upon the principle of uninstructed representation. The contrary principle is adopted in but a single case, viz.; in that of the German Federal Council. 322. Advantages of the bicameral system. The idea of a lawmaking body composed of two chambers has been almost universally accepted. The following extract indicates some of the reasons for its success: The advantages of a second chamber may be summarized as follows: First, it serves as a check upon hasty, rash, and ill-considered legislation. Legislative assemblies are often subject to strong passions and excitements and are sometimes impatient, impetuous, and careless. The function of a second chamber is to restrain such tendencies and to compel careful consideration of legislative projects. It interposes delay between the introduction and final adoption of a measure and thus permits time for reflection and deliberation. ... In the second place, the bicameral principle not only serves to protect the legislature against its own errors of haste and impulse, but it also affords a protection to the individual against the despotism of a single chamber. The existence of a second chamber is thus a guarantee of liberty as well as to some extent a safeguard against tyranny. A third advantage of the bicameral system is that it affords a convenient means of giving representation to special interests or classes in the state and particularly to the aristocratic portion of society, in order to counterbalance the undue preponderance of the popular element in one of the chambers, thus introducing into the legislature a conservative force to curb the radicalism of the popular chamber. The bicameral system also affords a means of giving separate representation to the somewhat dissimilar interests of capital and labor. Finally, the bicameral system affords an opportunity, in states having the federal form of government, of giving representation to the political units composing the federation. 323. Apportionment of representatives in the United States. After the census of 1900 the following act fixed the number of members in the House of Representatives and apportioned them among the commonwealths: 1 An Act making the apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States under the Twelfth Census. 1 The admission of Oklahoma in 1907 added five members to the House. Be it enacted That after the third day of March, nineteen hundred and three, the House of Representatives shall be composed of three hundred and eighty-six members to be apportioned among the several States as follows: Alabama 9; Arkansas 7; California 8; Colorado 3 ; (etc.). SECTION 2. That whenever a new State is admitted to the Union the Representative or Representatives assigned to it shall be in addition to the number three hundred and eighty-six. SECTION 3. That in each State . . . the number to which such State may be entitled in the Fifty-eighth and each subsequent Congress shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous and compact territory containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. The said districts shall be equal to the number of Representatives to which such State shall be entitled in Congress, no one district electing more than one Representative. SECTION 4. That in case of an increase in the number of Representatives which may be given any State under this apportionment, such additional Representatives shall be elected by the State at large and the other Representatives by the districts now prescribed by law until the legislature of such State in the manner herein prescribed shall redistrict such State; . . . and if the number hereby provided for shall in any State be less than it was before . . . then the whole number shall be elected at large unless the legislatures of said States have provided or shall otherwise provide before the time fixed by law for the next election of Representatives therein. . 324. Advantages and disadvantages of indirect election. Indirect election, in frequent use for selecting at least one legislative chamber, has the following advantages: The principal argument in favor of the system of indirect election is that it eliminates to some extent, as has been said, the evils of universal suffrage by confining the ultimate choice to a body of select persons possessing a higher average of ability and necessarily feeling a keener sense of responsibility. Moreover, it tends to diminish the evils of party passion and struggle by removing the object of the popular choice one degree and confining the function of the electorate as a whole to the choice of those upon whom the ultimate responsibility must rest. "This contrivance," says John Stuart Mill,1" was probably intended as a slight impediment to the full sweep of popular feeling; giving the suffrage and with it the complete ultimate power to the many, but compelling 1 "Representative Government," chap. ix, p. 180. them to exercise it through the agency of a comparatively few, who, it was supposed, would be less moved than the Demos by the gust of popular passion. . . ." But experience with the indirect system of election has never worked out in practice satisfactorily. ... Where the party system is well developed, the indirect scheme is likely to degenerate into a cumbrous formality, since the intermediate electors will be chosen under party pledges to vote for particular candidates. . . . Manifestly, whatever may be the advantages of indirect election, a suffrage which limits the power of the voter merely to the selection of those who are to choose instead of those who are to represent him will not satisfy the masses in the present state of the world's opinion concerning the nature of representative government. The idea is out of harmony with the spirit of modern democracy. One of the chief merits of popular government comes from the fact that it stimulates interest in public affairs and increases the political intelligence of the masses. If a middleman is interposed between the voter and the object of his choice, his interest is necessarily diminished and his opportunity for political education weakened. Finally, the indirect system tends to increase the evils of bribery, because the ultimate electoral body is much less numerous and consequently more easily reached by corrupt influences than the whole mass of voters. 325. Results of election by majority in France. The evil results caused by the French law requiring an absolute majority for election to the Chamber of Deputies are thus stated by Wilson: The law governing the election of Deputies provides against choice by plurality on the first ballot; and the result is unfortunate. If there are more than two candidates in an electoral district, an election on the first ballot is possible only if one of the candidates receives an absolute majority of all the votes cast not only, but also at least one fourth as many votes as there are registered voters in the district. If no one receives such a majority, another vote must be taken two weeks later, and at this a plurality is sufficient to elect. The result is, that the multiplication of parties, or rather the multiplication of groups and factions within the larger party lines, from which France naturally suffers overmuch, is directly encouraged. Rival groups are tempted to show their strength on the first ballot in an election, for the purpose of winning a place or exchanging favor for favor in the second. They lose nothing by failing in the first; they may gain concessions or be more regarded another time by showing a little strength; and rivalry is encouraged, instead of consolidation. France cannot afford to foster factions. II. COMPARATIVE POWER OF THE Two HOUSES 326. Relations of the two Houses in the United States. Bryce discusses the general nature of the two American Houses and their attitude to each other as follows: 1 The respective characters of the two bodies are wholly unlike those of the so-called upper and lower chambers of Europe. In Europe there is always a difference of political complexion, generally resting on a difference in personal composition. There the upper chamber represents the aristocracy of the country, or the men of wealth, or the high officials, or the influence of the Crown and Court; while the lower chamber represents the multitude. Between the Senate and the House there is no such difference. Both equally represent the people . . . both have been formed by the same social influences: and the social pretensions of a senator expire with his term of office. Both are possessed by the same ideas, governed by the same sentiments, equally conscious of their dependence on public opinion. The one has never been, like the English House of Commons, a popular pet, the other never, like the English House of Lords, a popular bugbear. . . The real differences between the two bodies have been indicated in speaking of the Senate. They are due to the smaller size of the latter, to the somewhat superior capacity of its members, to the habits which its executive functions form in individual senators, and have formed in the whole body. . . . Collisions between the two Houses are frequent. Each is jealous and combative. Each is prone to alter the bills that come from the other; and the Senate in particular knocks about remorselessly those favorite children of the House, the appropriation bills. The fact that one House has passed a bill goes but a little way in inducing the other to pass it. The Senate would reject twenty House bills as readily as one. Deadlocks, however, disagreements over serious issues which stop the machinery of administration, are not common. When each chamber persists in its own view, the regular proceeding is to appoint a committee of conference, consisting of three members of the Senate and three of the House. These six meet in secret, and generally settle matters by a compromise, which enables each side to retire with honor. In a contest the Senate usually, though not invariably, gets the better of the House. It is smaller, and can therefore more easily keep its majority together; its members are more experienced; and it has the 1 By permission of The Macmillan Company. great advantage of being permanent, whereas the House is a transient body. The Senate can hold out, because if it does not get its way at once against the House, it may do so when a new House comes up to Washington. The House cannot afford to wait, because the hour of its own dissolution is at hand. Besides, while the House does not know the Senate from inside, the Senate, many of whose members have sat in the House, knows all the "ins and outs" of its rival, can gauge its strength and play upon its weaknesses. 327. The House of Lords and money bills. The following discussion of the authority of the House of Lords over finance is especially pertinent in view of the recent crisis over the Budget in England:1 Since the House of Lords is a coördinate branch of the legislature, every act of Parliament requires its assent, and although in practice it is far less powerful than the House of Commons, the only subject on which the limitations of its authority can be stated with precision is that of finance. As far back as 1671 the Commons resolved "That, in all aids given to the King, by the Commons, the Rate or Tax ought not to be altered by the Lords"; and in 1678 they adopted another resolution that all bills granting supplies "ought to begin with the Commons. And that it is the undoubted and sole right of the Commons, to direct, limit, and appoint, in such Bills, the Ends, Purposes, Considerations, Conditions, Limitations, and Qualifications of such Grants; which ought not to be changed, or altered by the House of Lords." The Commons have clung to this principle ever since, enforcing it by a refusal to consider bills in which the Lords have inserted or amended financial provisions; and although the Lords have never expressly admitted the claim, they have in fact submitted to it. . . It might be supposed that the Commons could carry any piece of legislation by tacking it to a money bill. This was formerly done; but the Lords have long had a standing order forbidding such a practice, and no attempt has been made of late years to revive it. Moreover the rule about money bills is not strictly enforced where the financial provision is merely incidental to general legislation. The Lords are free to omit such a clause altogether, or if it is so interwoven with the rest of the measure that it cannot be treated separately, the Commons have often waived their rights and taken into consideration amendments made by the Lords. . . . The rule about money bills applies only to measures actually before Parliament. It does not prevent the House of Lords from expressing 1 Copyright, 1908, by The Macmillan Company. |