have conceived the real, though not the theoretical, character of the Imperial Chancellor of Germany..

(2) Still further examined, the chancellorship is found to be the center, not only, but also the source of all departments of the administration. Theoretically at least the chancellorship is the Administration: the various departments now existing are offshoots from it, differentiations within its all-embracing sphere.

(3) A third aspect of the Chancellor's abounding authority is his superintendency of the administration of the laws of the Empire by the states. With regard to the large number of imperial laws which are given into the hands of the several states to be administered, the Empire may not only command what is to be done, but may also prescribe the way in which it shall be done: and it is the duty of the Chancellor to superintend the states in their performance of such behests.

(4) When acting in the capacity of chairman of the Bundesrath, the Chancellor is simply a Prussian, not an imperial, official. He represents there, not the Emperor, for the Emperor as Emperor has no place in the Bundesrath, but the king of Prussia.

III. THE CIVIL SERVICE

356. Importance of subordinates in government service. The following example illustrates the important part played by minor administrative officials in every governmental system :

In our discussion of governmental affairs we often fail to realize how much work must, in fact, be left to subordinates, and in consequence how careful we should be in their selection. The necessity of trusting subordinates to a great degree is one of the weaknesses of any executive work, especially of government service, where it is more difficult to secure a personal check than in the case of a private business. Take, for example, the case of the President of the United States. He receives hundreds, even thousands of letters some days. It is utterly impossible that he can read or even know anything about a very large percentage of them. They must be read and sorted by his secretaries, and in most cases the proper action must be taken without consulting him. Likewise, he has hundreds of callers every day under such circumstances that he is compelled to see most of them even though for only a few seconds. There must therefore be a sifting through his subordinates of the people who have access to him, as well as a sifting of the material that comes before him for decision. . . . Most of this sifting must be done by subordinates; the most important cases he will decide for himself.

In most cases also the subordinate must read the letters, forecast the decision, prepare the reply, and present it to the chief for signature. In all routine matters, if the subordinates are faithful, this course of procedure is safe. Often, however, the chief has to hear a case and determine it in perhaps a minute or two. The whole case is presented, the important argument put before him in a letter written by his subordinate; he must make his decision. Under these circumstances, mistakes will of course be made. . . . In any event the subordinate is more likely to be neglectful and to do the wrong thing than is his superior; nevertheless he must usually be trusted. If people knew how much had to be left to subordinates, they would often wonder at the real success of the government of any great country.

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357. The civil service in England. In contrast to the American spoils system," the organization of the civil service in England has many advantages.1

The British civil service comprises a staff of about 80,000 officials. This includes the officers of the royal household, a large number of officials connected with the foreign, home, and colonial offices, the admiralty, the treasury, etc., officials serving under the local government board, the patent office, the emigration office, the diplomatic and consular corps, collectors of customs and excise, postmasters, etc. The fundamental principle in the conduct of the service thus constituted is permanence in office, and the dissociation of tenure of office from the changes of government caused by the cabinet system. The only officers of a political complexion are the heads of the departments, together with certain chief secretaries and assistants who are known collectively as the ministry, and who number in all about fifty persons. . . . The permanent tenure of office contributes greatly to the efficiency and integrity of the British civil service. Its origin is to be traced to the fact that in earlier times public office in England was a species of real property held by the incumbent for life or in fee. There still exist in the British civil service a few offices which are held, like the judicial positions, for life or good conduct. In the case of the great majority of official positions in the civil service the crown retains the right of dismissal. This right is exercised, however, only in cases of incompetence or dereliction of duty, and never for political reasons or to make room for a necessitous office seeker. For entry into the service use is made, in most of the British departments, of the principle of open competition.

1 By permission of Houghton Mifflin Company.

358. Patronage of office in France. The nature of the French governmental system places a premium upon extensive use of appointment for party purposes, at the same time placing a check upon wholesale removals.

The patronage of office, indeed, threatens to become even more of a menace to good government in France than it has been to good government in our own country under the federal system of appointment. The number of offices in the gift of the ministers in France is vastly greater than the number within the gift of the President of the United States; and the ministers' need to please the Chambers by favors of any and all kinds is incomparably greater than our President's need to please Congress, since they are dependent upon the good will of the Chambers for their tenure of office, while he is not dependent on Congress for his.

There have never yet been in France, however, any such wholesale removals from office upon the going out of one administration and the coming in of another as we have seen again and again in this country; because there has really been no radical change of administration in France since the days of MacMahon. In this country, as in England, there are two great national parties, and the government is now in the hands of one and again in the hands of the other. But in France a change of cabinet means nothing more than a change from the leadership of one group of Republicans to the leadership of another,—or, at most, a change from the leadership of Republicans to the leadership of Radicals, who are simply extreme republicans. One group of Republicans, therefore, succeeds another; one faction goes out of office, another comes in. Generally a new cabinet, just come in, is composed in part of men who held office also in the cabinet just thrust out. It is a change only of chief figures. And so wholesale removals from office do not take place.

359. The spoils system at its height. The following scathing denunciation of the spoils system indicates its chief evils in the United States before the civil service reform began:

It has come to pass that the work of paying political debts and discharging political obligations, of rewarding personal friends and punishing personal foes, is the first to confront each President on assuming the duties of his office, and is ever present with him even to the last moment of his official term, giving him no rest and little time for the transaction of other business, or for the study of any higher or grander problems of statesmanship. He is compelled to give daily audience to those who personally seek place, or to the army of those who backed them.

The Executive Mansion is besieged, if not sacked, and its corridors and chambers are crowded each day with the ever-changing, but neverending throng. Every Chief Magistrate, since the evil has grown to its present proportions, has cried out for deliverance. Physical endurance, even, is taxed beyond its power. More than one President is believed to have lost his life from this cause. The spectacle exhibited of the Chief Magistrate of this great nation, feeding, like a keeper, his flock, the hungry, clamorous, crowding, jostling multitude which daily gathers around the dispenser of patronage, is humiliating to the patriotic citizen interested alone in national progress and grandeur. Each President, whatever may be his political associations, however strong may be his personal characteristics, steps into a current, the force of which is constantly increasing. He can neither stem nor control it, much less direct his own course, as he is buffeted and driven hither and thither by its uncertain and unmanageable forces.

The malign influence of political domination in appointments to office is widespread, and reaches out from the President himself to all possible means of approach to the appointing power. It poisons the very air we breathe. No Congressman in accord with the dispenser of power can wholly escape it. It is ever present. When he awakes in the morning it is at his door, and when he retires at night it haunts his chamber. It goes before him, it follows after him, and it meets him on the way. It levies contributions on all the relationships of a Congressman's life, summons kinship and friendship and interest to its aid, and imposes upon him a work which is never finished and from which there is no release. Time is consumed, strength is exhausted, the mind is absorbed, and the vital forces of the legislator, mental, as well as physical, are spent in the never-ending struggle for offices.

360. The United States Civil Service Act. The act of January 16, 1883, is the basis of the present federal civil service in the United States. It removed from partisan control a large number of subordinate and clerical offices. The leading provisions of the act follow:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, three persons, not more than two of whom shall be adherents of the same party, as Civil Service Commissioners, and said three Commissioners shall constitute the United States Civil Service Commission.

SEC. 2. That it shall be the duty of said Commissioners:

First. To aid the President, as he may request, in preparing suitable rules for carrying this act into effect. . .

Second. And, among other things, said rules shall provide and declare, as nearly as the conditions of good administration will warrant, as follows:

First, for open, competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants for the public service now classified or to be classified hereunder. Such examinations shall be practical in their character, and so far as may be shall relate to those matters which will fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the duties of the service into which they seek to be appointed.

Second, that all the offices, places, and employments so arranged or to be arranged in classes shall be filled by selections according to grade from among those graded highest as the results of such competitive examinations.

Third, appointments to the public service aforesaid in the departments at Washington shall be apportioned among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia upon the basis of population as ascertained at the last preceding census. Every application for an examination shall contain, among other things, a statement, under oath, setting forth his or her actual bona fide residence at the time of making the application, as well as how long he or she has been a resident of such place.

Fourth, that there shall be a period of probation before any absolute appointment or employment aforesaid.

Fifth, that no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so.

Sixth, that no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body.

Seventh, there shall be noncompetitive examinations in all proper cases before the Commission, when competent persons do not compete, after notice has been given of the existence of the vacancy, under such rules as may be prescribed by the Commissioners as to the manner of giving notice.

Eighth, that notice shall be given in writing by the appointing power to said Commission of the persons selected for appointment or employment from among those who have been examined, of the place of residence of such persons, of the rejection of any such persons after probation, of transfers, resignations, and removals, and of the date thereof, and a record of the same shall be kept by said Commission.