confess and forsake our sins, that we may obtain

mercy.

This, we observe, is the most safe, as well rational and scriptural course. That repentance is a commanded duty, is most obvious. It is a duty addressed to men, not under the influence of conviction, not under the influence of a change of feelings, only, but also, under the prevailing, and overpowering influence of moral corruption, under the control of a heart at total enmity against God. In the possession of a totally sinful character, and whilst indulging feelings of direct hostility to all that is good, does God command all men, every where to repent. Now what must we conclude from this state of facts? Are we ready to go in the very face of our own consciousness, in the face of the Bible, and charge the holy God with injustice and cruelty, by affirming, that he requires us to do, what he knows we are in no sense able to do? Shall we not rather submit to the just, though afflicting conclusion, that we might all have exercised the most ingenuous godly sorrow for our sins, long ago, if we had been inclined to acknowledge the claims of our Maker, and to submit to his authority? And that we are in our sins to-day, exposed to his righteous judgements, because we have hated instruction, and did not choose the fear of the Lord?

The attempt to avoid this conclusion, is to little purpose, by endeavouring to show, that it seems to be inconsistent with those great and important truths of revelation, that exhibit man as wholly depraved and dependent, and God as the sole efficient in the work of regeneration. It is in full view of these interesting truths, that God requires all men, every

where to repent. It is to be apprehended, however, that some, at least in the legitimate tendency of their views, when speaking of the disability and dependence of sinners, in connexion with the sovereignty of God in the dispensation of mercy, in labouring to avoid the unscriptural ground of Arminius, have, unhappily, carried their points so far, as to fall upon the border ground of Fatality and Antinomianism.— Whilst it should be the devout study, and faithful labour of every good man, to avoid, on the one hand, by any sentiments he may adopt, invading the prerogative of the Most High; he should be equally careful, on the other, not to exhibit any such views, as may lead the sinner to justify himself in impenitency, and enable him, successfully, to resist the most powerful and pungent appeals that may be made, to his sense of right and wrong.

The doctrine of man's depravity, and disability, has been carried to a dangerous, and we have reason to fear, in many instances, to a fatal extreme. The human family have, by some, been considered, as having sustained such a peculiar relation to their great progenitor, that in him they lost, not only the inclination, but the natural ability, also, of complying with what God requires. The advocates of these views, when pressed to reconcile the idea of a transfer of guilt, which they undeniably involve, with the moral rectitude of God, in holding his creatures personally responsible, and in demanding of them present obedience, have been far from lessening the obscurities attending their scheme, by replying, that, although, by reason of the defection of Adam, mankind

lost their power to obey, yet, God has not lost his right to command. 'Tis true, God's right to the services of his creatures cannot be vacated, so long as they possess those capabilities that are necessary to constitute them moral agents; but justice revolts at the sentiment, that there may be responsibility, where there is no capacity for moral action. If men, by the fall, lost their physical power, as well as their inclination to obey God, then, since the fall, they have not been moral agents; and what claims soever the Divine Being may be supposed to have had upon them, anteriour to that afflicting event, must have become vacated, so soon as that event took place. It matters not by what means they became dispossessed of the capabilities of moral agents; the fact that they are dispossessed, and not the means by which they became so, is all that justice inquires after, to determine the great question, with regard to their individual and personal responsibility. It is not the manner in which creatures become moral agents, that constitutes the basis of obligation, but the fact that they are moral agents. Let the man who has taken the life of another, be proved a maniac, and no one is prepared to sentence him to execution as a murderer. Let it be determined, that men are as destitute of the physical power, as they are of the inclination to obey God, and the ground of their responsibility, by a master-stroke, is swept away at once; and the whole system of human actions becomes like the movement of an immense machine. It is not sufficient, that, in a more happy state, and under a more happy order of things, men once possessed the ability to obey God: To con

stitute them the proper subjects of praise, or blame, reward, or punishment, it is necessary that they should have a present capacity for obedience. Whilst it is strictly just, that men should be held to do, what they have a capacity to do, it is, at the same time, obviously unjust, that they should still be held, when that capacity is lost, no matter by what means.

It is difficult to perceive, how a consciousness of obligation can exist, where there does not exist, at the same time, a consciousness of ability: And I do not know that I should trespass against revealed truth, to say, that it would be incompatible with the moral rectitude of God, to create a consciousness of obligation, where there does not exist, in fact, and for the time being, an ability to perform commanded duty.

It has been observed, that a present capacity for obedience is necessary to constitute man a proper subject of moral discipline. This is evident, for the plain reason, that the end, both of reward and punishment, must be lost, when there ceases to be a personal, present consciousness of the desert, both of past, and present praise, or blame: But it is contrary to the constitution of our nature to feel either praise, or blame, for the good, or evil deeds of others. To affirm that we may feel either praise, or blameworthy for the conduct of others, by what means soever the feeling might be supposed to have been induced, involves the annihilation of personal, and individual consciousness; and throws a darkness that may be felt, over the whole system of creature responsibility, as well as over the whole moral administration of God. The sentiment, therefore, that man has lost the physical

power, as well as his inclination, to comply with the requirements of his righteous Sovereign, must be abandoned.

If what has been said be true, then, whatever disability the fall has brought upon man, one thing is certain; that it is not of such a character, as to put it out of his power, if he were inclined, to repent of sin, to love God with all his heart, and to live a life of holy obedience.

The command given in the text, has respect to men, and contemplates them, in their fallen condition, and character, and does not look at what they were, or might have been, in Adam, when he was in a state of innocency. It cannot be supposed to have any relation to the powers, which his posterity might have possessed, previous to the fall. All was then innocency and holiness; and to such a state, repentance was neither necessary, nor possible. The command to repent, therefore, must have respect to the capabilities of man in his fallen state, and not to those which he might have had previous to the fall.

Keep the fact in view, that the command to repent is addressed to man, contemplated in the character and condition of a fallen creature, and is without meaning, or force, in any other point of light; and then, place by the side of this fact, the common sense notions of mankind on the subject of obligation, that there must be a capacity to obey, where there is a right to command, and we have evidence that cannot be resisted, but as we are prepared to implicate the moral rectitude of God, from the fact that he does command all men, every where to repent, that they are both able and bound to repent, and bound, because they are able.

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