the crown was no longer problematical, we see him step forward to defend the sovereign, with the same boldness that he had displayed on behalf of the subject. Such conduct adds new lustre to the name of JUNIUS, and stamps him for a genuine Englishman. This elucidation of his real character should for ever silence those, who pretend that he was a factious demagogue; and who always fancy they see, in every friend of the people, an enemy of the crown.

In the conclusion of his Essay, Sir PHILIP professes to go much beyond his first propositions; and in doing so, he observes, "I stand on the constitution of my country, which I have studied as long, and I believe as carefully, as any man in it: words applicable in the highest degree to JUNIUS. "I affirm," he continues, " because I am convinced of it, that if every man in the three kingdoms could be called upon to give his vote for doing that which I say cannot be done by the Lords and Commons, or otherwise than in full parliament, and gave it so accordingly, no consequent act could of right be founded on that vote. Why? Because the laws and constitution of England forbid it." And he adds, "The moment the people did these things, they would cease to be a nation. To destroy their constitution is beyond their competence: it is the inheritance of the unborn, as well as theirs. What we have received from our ancestors,

we are morally and religiously bound, as well as by our laws, to transmit to posterity." But, far as Sir PHILIP goes, he does not carry his principles beyond the line drawn by JUNIUS. The latter concludes his argument on the Middlesex question with sentiments, and even language, resembling the above. "We owe it to our ancestors to preserve entire those rights, which they have delivered to our care: we owe it to our posterity, not to suffer their dearest inheritance to be destroyed. But if it were possible for us to be insensible of these sacred claims, there is yet an obligation binding upon ourselves, from which nothing can acquit us; a personal interest, which we cannot surrender*" Both writers consider, that the constitution of the country is a settled, sacred thing, consisting of many relative parts, each having certain rights and that none of these component parts have power to abridge or destroy the rights of themselves, or of any of the rest, without a virtual dissolution of all government. Consistently with this view both of them maintain, that there are many particular things which "cannot be done by King, Lords, and Commons." They cannot disfranchise a borough with a general view to improvement. They cannot take the trial by jury out of the English constitution. They

JUNIUS, i. 223.

+ JUNIUS, i. *288.

cannot limit the constitutional powers of Juries, to return a general verdict in all cases whatsoever. "These are rights, my lord, which you can no more annihilate, than you can the soil to which they are annexed." Nor can the people, on their part, exercise despotic power. They cannot annul their own privileges or those of the government; as is stated in the Essay, and the quotations following. But by these restrictions, we are not to conclude that all improvement is prevented. They operate negatively; and while they secure to every branch of the constitution its proper advantages, they leave an indeterminate field for promoting that which is the true object of all government-the happiness of the people.

CHAPTER XIV.

OUR last chapter, containing an entire Essay from the pen of Sir PHILIP FRANCIS, presents a full and unmutilated specimen of his style of writing. Whatever resemblance it may bear to JUNIUS, is thence shewn to be a fair one; and while so many instances of likeness are seen in a certain given space, not selected for the purpose of setting them off to greater advantage, but introduced for a dif ferent and a definite object, some idea may be formed of the relation which exists between other productions of the same author and JUNIUS. But still it may be urged, that instances of verbal agreement would be found in those other works which, from their singularity, would add strength to the general effect; and that if so many are met with in one Essay, numberless associations both in sentiment and language, worthy of particular enumeration, would occur to the inquiring eye, in works of a larger kind. The remark is just; and in order to answer this common expectation as satisfactorily as possible, we shall lay before the

reader some strong parallel passages which chance has thrown in our way, in addition to those which have been already noticed. As it seldom happens that others attribute to proofs of this kind the authority they possess in the estimation of him who first meets with them, and as the present cause rests on better evidence than even similar ideas in corresponding forms of language, regard will be had to worth, rather than number, in making the selection.

But the circumstance from which many of the following quotations derive their chief title to consideration is this: that they are very nearly coeval in their origin with the Letters of JUNIUS; that they are the ordinary expressions of the writer at a great distance from England, when, having no expectation that they would ever tend to illustrate the present or any other literary question, he could have had no motive either to imitate the style of JUNIUS, or to depart from that which was natural to himself.

The peculiarity of our first example is heightened by the fact of its being not only varied from in many instances by JUNIUS, but also by Sir PHILIP. In the former, it might be supposed to favour the opinion that two persons were concerned in writing the Letters; but what shall we infer from the equally fluctuating practice of the latter?