tracted for is inherently dangerous; and this properly covers cases where the resulting injury was anticipated by the employee. Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 42 Atl. 942 (Md., 1899). The reason is not altogether apparent for separating, in legal effect, the act itself from its foreseen consequences, unless the duty of the State to provide compensation for the taking of property is directly involved; nor does this necessarily result from Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 144 N. Y. 156 (1892). This holding does not of course at all lessen the city's responsibility for obstructions in the highway of which it has notice. Schumacher v. New York, N. Y. Law Jour. (March 9, 1901).

TRUSTS GIFT ATTEMPTED WITHOUT DELIVERY. X with his own money bought stock certificates and made a bank deposit, both in his wife's name, but did not communicate the fact to her, and himself retained the certificates and pass books and received the dividends. After the wife's death the bank reissued the certificates in X's name and paid the deposit to him. Held, the wife's administrator cannot recover from the bank. Getchell v. Biddeford Sav. Bank, 47 Atl. 895 (Me., Dec. 18, 1900).

The want of delivery to or acceptance by the supposed donee is fatal. Beaver v. Beaver, 137 N. Y. 59, 67 (1893); Sherman v. Bank, 138 Mass. 541 (1885). The contrary ruling as to bank shares in Standing v. Bouring, 31 Ch. Div. 282 (1885), was based on the ground that control had, in fact, passed out of the donor (p. 290), and that and the similar case of Read v. Roberts, 85 Pa. 84 (1877), if they are to be supported, may be distinguished from the present on the ground that in them the intention, at least, to make a gift was shown. While notice to the cestui que trust is unnecessary: Farleigh v. Cadman, 159 N. Y. 169 (1899); Robertson v. McCarty, 54 App. Div. 103 (N. Y., 1900), no intention on the part of the husband to become trustee, as in those cases, existed here, and he could not be so regarded if "he had the stocks and money put in his wife's name thereby to become her property in case she should survive him." Sullivan v. Sullivan, 161 Ñ. Y. 554 (1900). But, assuming that the husband might have been charged as trustee, no liability existed on the part of the bank after payment to him. Thomassen v. Van Wyngaarden, 65 Ia. 687 (1885).

TRUSTS-LIFE TENANT US. REMAINDERMAN-SINKING FUND TO OFFSET PREMIUM PAID FOR BONDS. Devise to trustee "to collect and receive the rents, income in dividends, and profits, and apply same to use of A for life," with remainder over. Full power given trustee to invest in U. S. bonds. Held, trustee should have retained so much of interest during life of A as was necessary to offset premium paid for bonds, meet loss on their being paid off at maturity, and keep principal intact. O'BRIEN, J., dissenting. N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Baker, 59 N. E. 257 (Ct. of App., N. Y., Feb. 5, 1901).

The authorities agree any clear expression of intention in the will is controlling, but in absence of such expression decisions are conflicting and unsatisfactory. In England, no part of the annual income is to be set aside to indemnify the remainderman. 2 Perry on Trusts, § 547; Lewin on Trusts, 9th Eng. ed., 318-326, Mass. in general accords, though preferring to deal with each case as it arises rather than lay down a universal rule. Hemenway v. Hemenway, 134 Mass. 447 (1883); Shaw v. Cordis, 143 Mass. 443 (1887). But cf. Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532 (1886), semble contra. In McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N. Y. 179 (1897), decision by O'BRIEN, J., in favor of life tenant, proceeded on intent as shown in will. But Matter of Hoyt, 160 N. Y. 607 (1899), appears squarely contra to the case at bar. Wording similar, yet held clearly impossible, in giving language of will its plain meaning, to spell out intent to provide a sinking fund." PARKER, C. J., GRAY and HAIGHT, JJ., dissenting. In absence of contrary intention in will, on principle, loss should be borne by remaindermen, the increased security of investment being for his benefit. See Hemenway v. Hemenway, supra; and cf. Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257 (1892), favoring life tenant.

46

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE. Its bearings on International Law and Policy. By F. W. Holls, D. C. L. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1900. pp. xxiv, 572.

In writing this account of the Peace Conference, at The Hague, Mr. Hollis has endeavored to meet the demands of two classes of people, viz., the specialist in International Law and the general reader. The needs of these two, it need hardly be said, are in some respects divergent, if not actually antagonistic, the former desiring a fullness of detail not sought by the latter. The result, therefore, of an attempt to meet the requirements of both in one work must inevitably partake somewhat of the nature of a compromise. It may be said without hesitation that Mr. Holls has been eminently successful in reconciling the conflicting demands. thus made upon him, with the result of producing a work which should find a place in the library of every student of international relations, whether specialist in International Law or not. Apparently the author was led to undertake the work, not merely because of the need for an accurate account of the Conference within the limits of a single volume of moderate size, but also in the hope of correcting the misunderstanding which still exists among the general public, both as to the purposes for which the Conference was called and as what it actually accomplished. As he points out, the title of "Disarmament Conference" generally applied in public print was based on a misinterpretation of the proposals of the Russian government, which, so far as they dealt with this subject at all, aimed at the most at putting an end to "the progressive increase of military and naval armaments," and not at all at any general disarmament. In view of this misapprehension of the objects of the Conference, the fact that it was found that the subject of disarmament could not even be discussed at the Conference, has undoubtedly left on the public mind an impression that the Conference was a failure. Whether or not we can agree with Mr. Holls in the high estimate which he makes of the value of the results attained, the Conference certainly was not in any sense a failure, but accomplished much which will undoubtedly be of lasting benefit to the civilized world.

The larger part of the volume is, of course, devoted to an account of the Conference. It gives accurately and without unnecessary detail the facts concerning the calling, opening and organization of the Conference, together with a full list of the members. Mr. Holls has wisely refrained from attempting any extended comment upon the provisions of the treaties agreed upon, confining himself to such remarks as seem necessary to elucidate the text or to show the motives which led to the adoption of any project. The

discussions of the various proposals in the committees, before they were laid before the Conference as a whole, are given with a fullness sufficient to indicate the reasons which led the delegates to adopt one plan or reject another. The same may be said of the report of the proceedings in the Conference itself. As the book has been written primarily for American and English readers, particular attention is properly paid to the action of the American and British representatives.

Probably the chapter which will most provoke discussion is the one in which Mr. Holls attempts to indicate the bearings of the Conference upon International Law and Policy. It is to be feared that most students of international affairs will not share the enthusiasm which leads the author to apply to the treaty of The Hague for the Pacific Adjustment of International Differences the title of "Magna Charta of International Law." Nevertheless, the chapter is not the least interesting in the book, and the question is one the decision of which must be left to the future.

The last two hundred pages of the volume are devoted to three appendices. The first of these contains the full text of the final act, treaties and declarations adopted by the Conference, the French text being printed on the left hand, and an English translation on the right-hand pages; the second gives the general report of the Commission of the United States made to the Secretary of State; and the third, an account of the Grotius celebration held at Delft July 4, 1898. The value of the book as a work of reference for the student of International Law would be enhanced were the index made somewhat more full. It is impossible, for example, to find by means of it what powers have ratified the different treaties. This, however, is but a slight blemish on a work which it is to be hoped will have a wide circulation and thus be the means of producing on the part of the world at large a more just estimate of the achievements of the Hague Conference.

THE LAW OF TORTS.-By Melville Madison Bigelow, Ph. D. Seventh Edition. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901. pp. xxxi, 438.

This is an admirable book in every respect. In appearance, as well as in substance, the present edition is superior to either of the six editions which have preceded it. For this marked improvement both the publishers and the author are entitled to credit.

In the preface, Mr. Bigelow frankly admits that none of the earlier editions covered the whole field of tort; and he refers the reader, who cares to see the starting point of this work, to the preface of his leading cases on torts, published in 1875. A comparison of the two books is interesting and instructive. It shows not only that the author's conception of his subject has been enlarged and systematized during this quarter of a century, but also that the subject has received careful and scientific treatment by writers and judges. In his earliest book Mr. Bigelow dealt with various kinds of torts, and stated the rules appertaining to them with

clearness and accuracy, but he made no attempt to show that there was a law of torts. The first effective attempt of that sort was made by Sir Frederick Pollock a decade later. The present edition opens, however, with a full and lucid discussion of the principles underlying the English law of torts, and a statement of their application to the different classes of torts. Still, he does not essay the task of formulating a definition of tort which shall be complete in itself. Such a task, he declares, is hopeless. "Indeed no definition," to quote his language, "helped out however much by explanation, can convey an adequate notion of the meaning of the word; nothing short of careful study of the specific torts of the law will answer, for there is no such thing as a typical tort, an actual tort, that is to say, which contains all the elements entering into the rest. But they all have this in common, that there must be a breach of duty paramount, or, as we shall now put it, established by municipal law; and they all lead to an action for damages." Dealing with the subject in this practical, English-lawyer-like way, he does not fall into the error of declaring that a tort is a violation of a right in rem only, or that one can always avoid committing a tort by forbearing to act.

Perhaps in no respect is the superiority of the present edition over its predecessors more marked than in its notes. Not only do they contain more references, but the citations are from a wider field than formerly, and are brought down to the latest possible date. This is notable, especially, in the chapters on Maliciously Procuring Refusal to Contract, and on Procuring Breach of Contract.

MAY ON INSURANCE. Fourth Edition. By John M. Gould. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1900. pp. Vol. I, xciv, 1-711. vol. II, 712-1510.

Extended criticism of a work first published in 1873 and now appearing in a fourth edition is obviously uncalled for. The only suggestion which we have to offer, with reference to the revision, ought to be equally obvious, though, unfortunately for student and practitioner alike, it seems not always to be apparent to the writers and publishers of legal text books.

It is far too often the case that author or reviser, as the case may be, regards his task as one of compilation only, and deems it complete when he has digested some thousands of decided cases and arranged his digests in more or less connected narrative form.

The comparison and analysis of decisions with reference to fundamental principles is hastily or imperfectly done, or, perhaps, what is preferable in such case, not done at all.

In dealing with a subject which is undergoing rapid development, the reviser, quite as much as the author, requires some ingredient other than citations and digests of decisions in order to compound a scientific treatise on the law. Of no branch of the law can this be said with greater truth than of the law of Insurance, and few books could offer a more satisfactory basis for a revision which should discuss with skill and learning recent development in the law, than Mr. May's well-known work.

The reviser in this instance would have done a more creditable work and one more consistent with the high standard set by the earlier editions had he devoted his attention to the intelligent and systematic discussion of the principles of the law, newly developed or to which a new application has been given in the past ten years, instead of limiting himself, as he has, to the mechanical work of collecting and digesting decisions.

The title page introduces the present edition as being "revised, analyzed and greatly enlarged," and the reviser's preface informs us that many new topics not before referred to in this index have been discussed. "These new topics include standard policies, incontestable clauses, proofs of death and of loss, addition to buildings, adjacent buildings, removal of goods, duty of the insured to read his policy, etc."

Careful examination discloses the fact, that, making due allowance for condensation of portions of the Third Edition, the reviser has added approximately seventy pages of new matter, of which not exceeding sixteen pages are devoted to the important topics which he enumerates. The new matter is collected in foot notes, and is composed wholly of citations and digests of decisions. The reader may search in vain for any comprehensive discussion of these new topics or of the old, in the material thus added. The use of the book has been facilitated by enlarging the index but in all other particulars, the style and arrangement of earlier editions remains unchanged. In short the reviser has dealt in the usual manner with a book which is quite unusual and deserving of better treatment.

While the result is somewhat disappointing to one familiar with the earlier editions, it is only fair to say that the work attempted to be done has been done with painstaking and thoroughness. In all, some three thousand cases have been added. In many instances the decisions have been given, sometimes accompanied with extracts from the opinions. Mr. Gould's labors will save many a wearying journey in search for authorities, and the value of a case when cited may generally be determined without appealing from the text to the reported case.

In fact, it may be said that the usefulness of the work which was becoming somewhat impaired by lapse of time has been fully revived in the present edition. We wish its usefulness might have been extended in a manner commensurate with the opportunity afforded by the development of the law and the absence in the field of really satisfactory works on the subject.

Reviews to follow:

THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE AND DECISIONS THEREON AS ILLUSTRATING THE DEVELOPMENT AND VALUE OF CASE LAW. By Alfred Russell, of the Detroit Bar. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 1900. pp. xvii, 204.

CLERK'S ASSISTANT. By Austin Abbott, LL.D. Revised Edition. By Clarence F. Birdseye. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1900. pp. x, 1091.