So far as this article bespeaks the freedom of the island from European domination it contemplates a condition pre. determined by the United States. Of all our policies regarding America none is so widely accepted at home and so thoroughly known abroad as our determination that Cuba shall not pass into the control of a European power. During the Spanish domination the United States declared more than once that neither by purchase or conquest should Cuba be transferred to another European state, and refused to agree with Great Britain and France to maintain the status quo, on the ground that our interest in the island was singular and paramount.

The expulsion of Spain has emphasized this policy: Our power to enforce it has been vastly increased. Is it advisable to define now this traditional policy, and seek a legal sanction of questionable value for a position hitherto developed by the flexible and convenient methods of diplomacy? The policy can gain no strength from law, and might lose some of that elasticity which should distinguish all foreign policies. Our interest in the independence of Cuba, or, to speak plainly, our concern in having a harmless neighbor on the island instead of a powerful one is essentially arbitrary, and it should be dissociated from all legal forms and obligations. And for this broad reason I would eliminate from the Treaty the provision that Cuba shall not give any lodgment to a foreign state. Instead of formally asserting our concern in this matter let Cuba follow the lead of other Spanish-American republics and forbid in her constitution any session of land to a foreign state, making the prohibition broad enough to cover the acquisition of any interest whatever, excepting, of course, for diplomatic and consular purposes.

The contingency of Cuba's seeking union with, or being invaded by another Spanish-American state need not be contemplated in a treaty. The attitude of the United States in either event may safely be left an open question.

VIII.

7. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will

sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

While the war with Spain was in progress I said, in anticipation of our victory: "Thenceforth the United States will enjoy acknowledged supremacy in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Outposts in the West Indies will be the visible signs of supremacy; and it may appear that one or more of these may be located in Cuba itself, as well to the advantage of the Cubans as our own."1 And I am still of the opinion that the promise of the Resolution of 1898 does not forbid necessarily an honorable demand for a couple of stations in Cuba. But the demand as presented in this Article is verbose and imperfect.

*

Three reasons for acquiring stations are expressed, whereas reasons are superfluous when, as here, they impose no real limitation on use. The United States occupying stations may, in fact, utilize them for making a conquest of the island as well as for the friendly purposes specified. The demand is imperfect. There is uncertainty of title"Cuba will sell or lease * * lands necessary for coaling or naval stations." Will our possession be permanent or temporary? Will land leased or even sold for a specified use pass within our jurisdiction for other purposes? May land acquired as a naval station be used as an army post? There is uncertainty of location. The number of outposts, their sites, their areas is not defined; yet in view of our promise to Cuba, the propriety of this demand depends largely upon its objective points. The island will be left substantially in the control of its people even though outposts of the United States be located at Cape Maysi and Cape Antonio, but what if they be maintained at Havana and Santiago? There is, in terms at least, uncertainty of execution-Cuba will transfer lands to the United States when it comes to an agreement with our President upon the particular tracts.

To the end that the United States may acquire full sovereignty over such tracts in Cuba as it may honorably demand, there should be substituted for this Article one

1 Notes on The Foreign Policy of the United States, June, 1898.

commencing "Cuba cedes to the United States," and describing the desired tracts. And it might be advisable to separate the possessions of the United States from Cuban territory by a neutral strip, as Gibraltar is separated from Spain.

IX.

3. That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

"Intervention" is a very broad title in international law, but it always suggests the threat or use of force, and presumably involves some derogation from the sovereignty of the state in whose dominions it is exercised. "Intervention" covers pretty much every hostile act, short of the acts of formal war-note of warning, imperative demand, armed demonstration, invasion. This vast power is now demanded by the United States over Cuba as a treaty right, and we will first consider the several purposes for which it is expressly desired.

The first cause for intervention is "the maintenance of Cuban independence." This cause need not be expressed, for the reasons already given for leaving the entire question of independence to be dealt with by the United States in accordance with time-honored policy. A formal consent in advance given by Cuba would not materially strengthen this policy in action.

Another cause for intervention is neglect to discharge "the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris upon the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba." What are these obligations?

It is argued that by virtue of the Sixteenth Article of this Treaty, the United States are in duty bound to assure performance by Cuba of the obligations which they assumed

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by the First Article.1 The First Article reads: Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may, under international law, result from the fact of its occupation for the protection of life and property." The Sixteenth Article reads: "It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will, upon the termination of such . occupancy, advise any government established in the island to assume the same obligations." The obligations of the First Article, though, under the circumstances, not improperly assumed by the United States in form, do not depend upon formal assumption for existence. They are, essentially, duties imposed by the usage of the world upon any sovereign occupant of territory in respect of all foreign persons and property within its borders; and if the installation of a Cuban government still left the United States charged with securing the performance of these obligations by the new state, we would be involved in every petty trouble arising between Cuba and a foreign country. Fortunately, this vexatious consequence is not contemplated by the Treaty of Paris. The "obligations "of the First Article are not the "obligations" of the Sixteenth, according to international law, to say nothing of the text: The former inevitably cease with the termination of our occupation; and the United States are not called upon to “advise” a Cuban government to assume formally those international obligations attributed to all governments; though in this relation it should be recalled that, by the Fourth Article of this Joint Resolution, Cuba is to respect all rights, including the rights of foreigners, lawfully acquired during our occupation.

The "obligations" referred to in the Sixteenth Article of the Treaty of Paris, and which are not already fully executed, are contained in articles respecting freedom of religion, protection of Spanish copyright, free entry of

The Solution of the Cuban Problem, by Senator O. H. Platt, in "The World's Work,” April, 1901.

Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, etc. The United States should "advise" Cuba to respect these obligations. Probably they should be recognized in the constitution of Cuba. But to "advise" is not to "compel"; and the character of these obligations does not justify a formal demand for the tremendous power of intervention on their account.

The third cause for intervention presents the most serious question in the whole Resolution. The United States. demand consent to intervene for "the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty."

In virtue of this clause any act committed in Cuba in violation of rights of life, property or liberty, seems to be an offense against the United States, whether the victim be a Cuban, or a foreigner of United States, or other nationality. It is understood that the Administration does not attach so extensive a meaning to the clause, and has informed delegates from the Cuban Constitutional Convention that the causes for actual intervention are limited to offenses of the very grossest description. Certainly this is an eminently proper anticipation, but executive comments and representations do not constitute an authoritative limitation on the words of this resolution of Congress intended to be some day embodied in a treaty.

A right of intervention is claimed in very broad, if not indeed vague, terms, and any Administration considering the question of exercising it may look to the terms for authority, and not to conversations between United States officials and Cuban delegates. Whether the right shall be exercised rarely or frequently, reasonably or unreasonably, are questions within the discretion of the United States, or, precisely, to note a point sometimes neglected, within the discretion of the President, who is charged with the execution of the treaties, as well as of the other laws of the United States. Intervention under the treaty will not necessarily be ordered by Congress.

The offenses covered by the clause may be divided roughly into two categories: Acts done in defiance of the Cuban government; e. g., the acts of bandits and revolu