ging through years and through lifetimes-estates in chancery were never dependent on lives! In the present day the examining attorney must be all that I have said, and more. It is not alone a responsibility to make good his determination before a court-it is rare that he can hope for a fair chance of that sort to defend his work. The old-fashioned ejectment suit, tried and retried, with all the varying views of different justices and courts, changes of circumstance and fact, often occuring in the lapse of time taken up in the trials, and which tossed victory first to one side, then to the other, has gone practically into history. It is the view which the next attorney, following in his footsteps, will take, that "gives him pause"-often an attorney examining for a mortgage loan, and who decides for himself upon the goodness and marketability of the title before him. Possibly nowhere outside of the profession of arms, where conduct becoming an officer and a gentleman is a subject of every one's individual and collective concern, is there a professional, unofficial court maintaining a critical standard of excellence like that of the excoram forum which is composed of members of the legal profession who devote themselves particularly to the intricacies of real estate law and the examination of titles. Not once in ten, perhaps, will a mooted point become the subject of judicial decision-no class of men are more hide-bound in precedent, or more ready to discuss and settle such points among themselves without resort to the courts. A man is greatly upheld, or discouraged, and even often completely overborne, by a very general custom or the consensus of opinion of brother specialists. This arises, very generally, from the fact that clients lack time and courage, or that the circumstances of the case will not permit a resort to the courts. A few adverse comments on the point involved by some specialists consulted on the curbstone, as it were, by the client in question, or the rejection of a title by an irresponsible counsel who is examining for a loan, without the possibility of vindication by a "day in court," may lose one his client forever. It is this very necessity for almost infallible accuracy that lends peculiar responsibilty to the ipse dixit of the real The estate counsel. He can afford to make no mistakes. seeds of error, sown by him, never fail to spring up in a crop of calamity. It has been said, "The grave conceals many mistakes of the physician, but nothing can prevent the error of an attorney in an examination of title from eventually springing up to confront him-save an early death." It is not the purpose of the writer to discourage, but to make careful painstaking the every-day and all-day-long rule of him who aspires to pass upon a title to land, so that his certificate of title will go in cases whose importance may reach far beyond the limit of the capital of a title insurance company, or even of them all in combination. EDGAR LOGAN. NOTE. For the purpose of illustration, the cases in reference in this article have been very generally confined to those in the courts of New York State. Decisions of courts of different States have been always very generally in hopeless conflict. COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW. Published monthly during the Academic Year by Columbia Law Students. 30 CENTS PER NUMBER. SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.00 PER ANNUM. Editorial Board. RUSSELL C. Leffingwell, Editor-in-Chief. HENRY R. CONger, Business Manager. CHARLES R. GANTER, PHILIP W. RUSSELL, WILLIAM E. BAIRD. JOHN W. PARKS. WALTER P. FRANK. EDWARD W. HAMILTON. In the early part of August Professor William A. Keener resigned his position as Dean of the Columbia Law School, in order that he might have more time to devote to his consulting practice and to the writing of legal works. Professor George W. Kirchwey, who succeeds him as Dean, had been elected acting Dean some months prior to Professor Keener's resignation, and served as Secretary of the Faculty of Law throughout the ten years of the latter's administration. Professor Francis M. Burdick has been elected Secre tary. Unfortunate as the necessity for any change must seem to one who recalls the growth of the past decade, it is apparent that the change of administrators involves no change of policy; and the new officers have the hearty liking and confidence of all. That Professor Keener will retain the Dwight Chair of Law and will continue to present his courses as in the past is the subject of earnest congratulation throughout the student body and among the friends of the school. It would be hard to overestimate the loss to the school which his withdrawal from this work would entail. We regret to have to announce the resignation of Mr. Philip W. Russell as Business Manager of this REVIEW, made necessary by the pressure of private business. Mr. Russell will continue to serve as one of the Board of Editors; he will be succeeded in the business managership by Mr. Henry R. Conger. NOTES. DAMAGES FOR MENTAL SUFFERING.-As a matter of principle, there is perhaps no good reason why the law should not allow damages for mental suffering caused by a wrongful act, when such suffering is unconnected with bodily injury, or physical contact. But by the great weight of authority recovery may not be had in such a case. Freedom from liability does not rest on the theory that no injury has been done, or that such mental disturbance may not follow the act as a probable consequence. Recovery is denied because distress of mind can be measured only by its physical effects; because it is impossible satisfactorily to administer any other rule. The difficulty last named has been experienced in those jurisdictions which allow recovery for mental anguish caused by negligence in the delivery of telegrams. This doctrine has given rise in those states to a great mass of speculative litigation, and has just been cast aside as impracticable by the Supreme Court of Indiana, which has applied it during the past twelve years. Telegraph Co., v. Ferguson, 60 N. E., 675. In cases where there is no immediate personal injury, but where bodily illness follows as a result of sudden fright, some of the objections urged against recovery for fright alone fall to the ground. It has often been held that an action may lie for damage done by an animal frightened by a negligent act apart from physical contact. 1 Beven on Negligence, 78. Yet in the leading case on that point it was held that there could be no recovery where a defendant's negligence caused reasonable terror, and illness ensued. R'y Com. v. Coulias, 13 App. Cas., 222 (1888). This decision was handed down by the Judicial Committee and hence is not binding on the English courts. The doctrine announced has been repudiated in Ireland, Bell v. G. N. R'y Co., 26 L. R. Ir., 428 (1890), and has not been followed in the Queens Bench Division. Wilkinson v. Dounton (1897) 2 Q. B., 57. In 1896 the rule of the Coultas case was adopted in New York, the Court declaring that such injuries were too remote to be the subject of compensation. Mitchell v. Rochester R'y, 151 N. Y., 107. But inasmuch as the illness was directly traceable to the fright caused by defendant's act, the reason given is not wholly satisfactory. In Massachusetts where damages for mental distress have been allowed in the case of a trespass upon a burying ground, Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass., 281 (1868), or of an illegal eviction from leased premises, Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass., 580 (1878), the Mitchell case has been followed, the Court limiting the application of the doctrine to cases of negligence. Spade v. Lynn, Ry., 168 Mass., 285 (1897). So in two recent New York cases the Appellate Division has held that the Mitchell case does not apply to wilful torts, and has given damages accordingly. Preiser v. Weilandt, 48 App. Div., 569; Williams v. Underhill, 63 App. Div., 224. The soundness of this alleged distinction is not apparent. Whether a wrong be wilful or only negligent, the wrongdoer is liable for such injuries as flow naturally from his act. If damages for the results of mental distress caused by him are too remote in the one case, they must be so in the other. Moreover, if it is inconvenient to award damages for injuries resulting from shock or fright caused by a negligent act, it must be equally inconvenient when the act is wilful. The objection as to the encouragement of speculative litigation applies to both classes of cases. It may be that the disposition to give punitive damages has misled the courts and brought this confusion into their decisions. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-PREJUDICE. -In City of Terre Haute v. E. & T. H. R. Co. et al., 106 Fed., 545, C. C. D., Ind., Feb., 1901, the Circuit Court of the United States has recently departed from the view ordinarily accepted of the prejudice and local influence clause of the Removal Statute. It was held that diversity of citizenship, such as would give original jurisdiction to the Circuit Courts, must exist in order that a defendant might remove from the State courts. Under the Removal Act of 1867, which was not affected by the Act of 1875, it was settled that all the plaintiffs must be citizens of different states from those of all the defendants, and that all parties, plaintiff or defendant, must join in the petition for removal. Young v. Parker's Adms., 132 U. S., 267 (1889). In the Act of 1887 it was provided that, under certain conditions, in a "controversy between a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another state, any defendant being such citizen of another state," might remove on the ground of prejudice and local influence. It was contended that, since the diversity of citizenship which is necessary to give the Circuit Court original jurisdiction was not specifically required, the phrase "being such citizen of another state" would be meaningless, unless some defendants might be of the same state as the plaintiff; Whelan v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., 35 Fed., 849 (1888); also, that this provision for remanding the suit would have little application if there were diversity of citizenship. This view was generally adopted by the Circuit Courts. Bonner v. Meikle, 77 Fed., 485 (1896); Jackson v. Pearson, 60 Fed., 113 (1892). In Fiske v. Henarie, 142 U. S., 459 (1892), the question came before the Supreme Court, but the determination of it was expressly avoided, the decision passing off on the ground that the petition for removal was too late. Inasmuch as under the Statute of 1867 diversity of citizenship was essential, Young v. Parker's Adms., supra, and the language used in the Statute of 1887, as amended in 1888, had received a settled construction, Anderson v. Bowers, 43 Fed., 321 (1890), and as, further, it was the aim of the statute to cut down the number of cases removable to the Circuit Courts, it would seem that the prin |