Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective

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Charles Rowley
Springer Science & Business Media, 1997 M03 31 - 324 páginas
Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world.
 

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Contenido

A survey
11
Reflections of turmoil or agents of stability?
55
Toward a new constitution for a future country
73
Clarifying the arguments
117
A natural experiment in interest group influence
139
Evidence from Californias state legislative races
165
Choosing free trade without amending the US Constitution
185
Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation
201
On the relative unimportance of a balanced budget
215
Public choice in a federal system
235
A constitutional perspective
255
A European constitutional perspective
281
Lessons for Third World countries
311
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