in the criminal business, amounting to about 20 per cent. As regards the individual Circuits, the greatest decline in civil business has been on the South Eastern Circuit, where the average has fallen from 136 to 52. Adding civil and criminal business, the most marked decline has been on the Oxford Circuit, which shows a falling off of over 41 per cent.

As regards Chancery, Divorce, and Bankruptcy proceedings, there is not much to note; in all three branches the business seems stationary, with a slight tendency to decline. Petitions for divorce or judicial separation have diminished every year since 1897, and in 1900 were in the proportion of 2'17 per 100,000 of population in England; though in Scotland the proportion was more than double, being 452. Husbands and wives seem about equally successful in the results of their petitions. As might be expected, husbands apply more frequently for dissolution of the marriage than wives, the proportion being about 6 to 4, whereas in applications for judicial separation there are 86 applications by wives and only 3 by husbands. Only 19 decrees were granted in the latter suits, so probably in a large proportion of the cases the parties found it possible to come to terms and settle their disputes amicably. The results of the suits tried in Court were almost universally in favour of the petitioner, there being on husbands' petitions 304 verdicts or judgments for the petitioner as against 5 for the respondent, while on the wives' petitions there was no instance of a verdict for the respondent. There is a curious table showing the duration of marriages in suits commenced in 1900, when, rather to our surprise, we find the largest number of suits begun between 10 and 20 years of marriage. As might be expected, by far the greatest number of suits take place between parties who have no children.

It is interesting to note that the gross value of property admitted to Probate during the years 1900-1901 and 1899-1900, were respectively nearly 252 and 288 millions,

and payments for Death Duties in the same years were over 14 and 16 millions respectively.

The proceedings before the Railway and Canal Commissioners show an increase in the number of applications heard, though fewer applications were made; but we have been quite unable to understand many of the figures in the table.

The figures as to County Courts show a substantial increase in the number of proceedings, distributed over all the various forms, and amounting in the whole to over 32,000. It is very curious to observe that although judgments for so large an amount as £1,817,438 were obtained by plaintiffs on original hearings, it is within £24 of the amount similarly obtained the year before. As showing the nature of the cases brought in such courts, it may be noted that out of a total of 1,180,908 plaints entered, 1,166,734 were for amounts not exceeding £20, and that the average amount recovered in each case was £2: 8s. 6d.

The figures as regards proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, are interesting from more than one point of view. The total number of arbitrations in County Courts was 1,552, of which two-thirds were tried by the judge, and the amount of compensation awarded was £43,317:19s. 4d., and a weekly amount of £299: 5s. 8d. The number of memoranda registered was 1,253, and the compensation amounted to £27,528: 8s. 4d., and weekly payments £664:10s. 3d. As regards numbers of cases, the arbitrations in Court show a small, and the memoranda registered a substantial, increase on the former year. The Act, as might be expected, seems to be most in operation in manufacturing districts, as, for instance, Bow, which has had 64 arbitrations and 142 memoranda registered, as against Westminster's 8 and I respectively.

On the whole, the volume of civil business seems to be stationary, with a tendency to decline, which is most marked in the continuous and gradual decline of Circuit business.

66

VII. THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INSANE.

T°

O the ancient mythologists insanity was essentially a metaphysical problem, and they based their theories on the supposed intercourse existing between the material and spiritual worlds. The treatment of mental afflictions, therefore, was not unnaturally associated with the duties of the sacerdotal office.

It was not until the great Hippocrates appeared that any serious blow was struck at the metaphysical theories which up to then held the field. This famous physician really rescued the art of healing from the hands of priests and astrologers, and established it upon its only practical basis, the knowledge of the morbid and healthy functions of the human body.1

With the advent of the Middle Ages the old metaphysical notions of insanity returned, and it is a matter of common knowledge how important a place the doctrine of diabolical possession occupied in mediæval theology. But about the beginning of the present century the physiological treatment of the subject, based upon induction and observation, began to make rapid strides, largely owing to the influence of the French school of alienists headed by Pinel, and to-day the problem of insanity, for all practical purposes, is regarded from the standpoint of physics, not of metaphysics.

It took a Solomon, according to the fairy tale, to imprison the genie in a vase, but no Solomon-medical or legal-has yet been found, who was able to confine the subject of insanity within the narrow and arbitrary limits of a definition. Mr. Justice Blackburn, when giving evidence before a Select Committee of the House of Commons, said: "I have read every definition I could meet with and never was

2

1 Vide Pinel, Insanity, translated by D. D. Davies, M.D., 1806.

2 1874.

satisfied with one of them

I verily believe that it is not in human power to do it." It would seem well-nigh impossible, indeed, to light upon a definition which would satisfy both the physician and the lawyer, since each of these approaches the subject from a different standpoint. To the physician insanity is merely a symptom indicating disease of the highest nerve centres, whereas the lawyer regards insanity only as a question of conduct, and is not concerned with the disease except so far as it affects conduct. Primarily speaking, however, insanity of course. is a medical problem: it is only when the subject of responsibility comes into view that the lawyer steps in. And it is when the theories of scientists are brought into contact with the practical expediency required by law that we enter the dusty arena of controversy. Before discussing the relation which insanity bears to conduct, it is desirable. to make some inquiry as to the nature of the disease. What is insanity? Insanity is frequently described as a disorder of the mind, but since many disorders of mind exist which do not constitute insanity, this loose definition is clearly defective. Sane people may suffer from hallucinations or delusions; for instance, an illogical man can be fairly said to suffer from disorder of mind, but it would be a hard thing were we to stigmatize every illogical or suspicious person as insane. Hysteria certainly implies "derangement of thought, feeling and volition," but it is a nervous condition which, though not incompatible with an insane neurosis, may, and often does, exist as something quite distinct.3

Amongst the many medical definitions of insanity, that of Dr. Maudsley is, it is suggested, one of the most satis

1 Vide case of Mrs. A, cited in Sanity and Insanity (Mercier), pp. 102, 126. * A delusion is a false belief as to existing facts. An hallucination is a false perception of the senses. Vide pp. 41 (note), 42,

Or to take the most common "disorder of mind," e. g., dreams. Yet our waking consciousness corrects the disorder. The derangement is but temporary.

factory. According to him, "Insanity is a disorder of the supreme nerve centres of the brain, producing derangement of thought, feeling and volition, together or separately, of such degree or kind as to incapacitate the individual for the relations of life." This definition has the merit of indicating the existence of that hazy mental borderland where, although there is a departure from the normal, it is difficult to say there is actual insanity. And the great difficulty besetting all definers of insanity lies in the fact that there is no hard and fast line drawn between sanity and insanity. They melt into one another like the dissolving pictures of the magic lantern. Remembering this, it is easy to see that just as mental disturbance of a certain degree is wanted to constitute insanity from the physician's point of view, so a further stage of mental disturbance is required in order to constitute insanity from the lawyer's point of view. To give an imaginary example:

A is an idealist. Temperament highly imaginative, as a result of which he lives in a world of his own. Would be regarded as sane, but unpractical.

Later on his idealistic views so distract his attention from matters of every-day life that the physician accounts him medically insane, and advises his friends to watch him.

A further stage is reached when a judge voids his contracts, or perhaps appoints a guardian to look after his property. Finally, under the influence of the creatures of his imagination (expressing themselves in delusions or hallucinations), he commits some crime.

Thus from the start A may be described as a person suffering from disorder of mind such as to unfit him for the relations of life. From the first a physician would say there was present an insane neurosis, but although in subsequent stages there is more or less definite insanity of such a nature as affects conduct, it is not until the fourth stage that the question of criminal responsibility arises.