United States, and the arguments which are based upon our treaty rights are clearly fallacious. In so far I entirely agree with the views and arguments of Prof. Woolsey and the critics. But was there no other ground upon which the conduct of the administration in this affair can be defended? I think there is.

The recognition of the independence of Panama must be justified, if at all justifiable under the circumstances, as an act of political intervention. It was an interference in the internal affairs of Columbia which, although not an act of war in itself, would have justified a declaration of war by Columbia against the United States.

I believe the correct, normal, everyday rule of international law to be that of nonintervention. Although history teems with instances of intervention on various grounds and under divers pretexts, the principle of non-intervention is a necessary corollary of the Grotian doctrine of the independence and equality of sovereign States. Intervention should be regarded as an altogether abnormal and exceptional procedure which can only be justified on high political or moral grounds, and which should never be resorted to except in those rare and exceptional cases where, e. g., great crimes against humanity are being perpetrated (as in the case of Cuba), or where essential and permanent national or international interests of far-reaching importance are at stake (as in the case of Panama).

While the habit of obedience to law and custom is the essential condition of all true liberty, every nation as well as every individual certainly admits in practice, if not in theory, that there are occasions or circumstances which may furnish a justification for acting independently, if not in direct violation, of established law and custom. Just as there are essential and permanent interests of organized society before which the technical and vested rights of individuals and corporations must give way in particular and exceptional instances, so there are vested rights of "sovereignty," exercised by unscrupulous or incompetent "sovereigns,"

which must give way before the essential and permanent "interests of collective civilization."

It seems to me that critics of the type of Prof. Woolsey do not take sufficient cognizance of the fact that beyond, and in some respects above, the well-cultivated field of international law there lie vast and partially unexplored regions of national and international policy and morality where motives of interest, policy, morality, and humanity prevail. These may be in harmony with established laws and customs; but they are just as likely to be independent of, and may be directly antagonistic to, recognized rules and principles. Practical statesmen and men of the world are perhaps more apt to realize this than mere students who derive most of their knowledge from books and documents.

Might it not be pertinent for some of us. to ask ourselves such questions as these? Have the statesmen who contributed most toward the building of such modern empires as those of Russia, France, Germany and Great Britain always been governed by a scrupulous regard for established forms and precedents? Does the United States thoroughly respect the sovereignty of the unstable and revolutionary governments of Spanish America? Was not-to cite but one instance-Japan recently compelled by the force of circumstances to violate the sacred neutrality of the sovereign State of Korea? To ask such questions is to answer them.

It is but too true that the doctrine of interest, necessity, or expediency has always been the plea of the tyrant and the conqueror; but the misuse or misapplication of a doctrine does not invalidate its general truth or impair its validity for those who possess the political wisdom and sense of discrimination necessary to its proper use and application. We must learn to discriminate between essential and permanent interests and temporary or selfish expediency, to distinguish between reality and pretext; to know our friends from our enemies. AMOS S. HERSHEY.

Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana, March 7, 1904.

NEW LAW BOOKS.

It is the intention of The Green Bag to have its book reviews written by competent reviewers. The usual custom of magazines is to confine book notices to books sent in for review. At the request of subscribers, however, The Green Bag will be glad to review or notice any recently published law book, whether received for review or not.

THE JUDICIAL DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES JUDICIALLY INTERPRETED, to which has been added statutory Definitions. By F. Stroud, of Lincoln's Inn, BarristerAt-Law, Recorder of Tewkesbury. 3 Vols. Second Edition. Boston: Boston Book Company. 1903. (pp. ccxxvii+2302.)

It would perhaps be exaggeration or inaccurate and the reviewer of a Dictionary should not use his words amiss-to term Stroud's Judicial Dictionary indispensable to judge, practitioner or student of the law. Generation after generation has got on indifferently well without such a work; the Bench and the Bar have kept commonplace-books in which judicial interpretations of words and phrases have been noted or jotted down for immediate use or future reference; but no systematic survey of the field of judicial interpretation was ever made with an attempt to arrange and to bring under the eye scattered and obscure meaning of words contained in the common law, statute and judgments of the

courts.

Mr. Stroud undertook this collossal task and has accomplished it in a way to lay the profession under a deep and lasting obligation. In the first edition of 1890, he opens his preface with the statement that "This work in no sense competes with, nor does it cover the same ground as [the various law dictionaries]. As its name imports, it is a Dictionary of the English language (in its phrases as well as single words), so far as that language has received interpretation by the judges."

In the second paragraph Mr. Stroud expresses the sources and authorities upon which he has relied, and it cannot be better presented than in his own words. "The

decisions of the English judges," he says, "are, and will remain, the central source whence this authoritative exposition must come, though Irish, Scotch, and Colonial decisions should harmonize and amplify. To formulate the English judicial interpretations from the earliest times down to the end of the nineteenth century and therewith to blend the statutory definitions of the High Court of Parliament has been the endeavor of this edition; incorporating a not inconsiderable treatment of Irish decisions, and some from Scotland and the United States."

The last clause expresses the limitations of the work-necessary limitations from an English standpoint. In this one regard the American lawyer may complain, but the criticism reaches the scope, not the workmanship.

A Dictionary is a fascinating work. A. study of the definitions of words cultivates, if it does not form, the habit of exactness, and the quotations by which the meanings are illustrated often throw strange lights on the growth of usage and the change of language. If it be true, as Professor Lounsbury points out in his charming little work-The Standard of Pronunciation in English, that no one standard is possible in matters of pronunciation, the fact remains that written language is capable of exact discrimination and definition. The Dictionary registers what intelligent scholarship considers correct usage. "Nor is a Dictionary a bad book to read," says Emerson, as quoted by Mr. Stroud. "There is no cant in it, no excess of explanation, and it is full of suggestion."

The study of dictionaries has always been considered an admirable if not an indispensable preparation for the orator by profession, or indeed for the man who occasionally addresses the public. The oratorical supremacy of Chatham will not be disputed. In addition to translating the classics into English, he studied the masters of English. "As a means of acquiring copiousness of diction and an exact choice of words," says Dr. Goodrich in his excellent collection of select British eloquence, "Mr. Pitt also read and

re-read the sermons of Dr. Barrow, till he knew many of them by heart. With the same view, he performed a task to which, perhaps, no other student in oratory has ever submitted. He went twice through the folio Dictionary of Bailey (the best before that of Johnson), examining each word attentively, dwelling on its peculiar import and modes of construction, and thus endeavoring to bring the whole range of our language completely under his control."

We may safely assume therefore that the study of an English dictionary is not only interesting, but that it has peculiar advantages and compensations to the layman. The professional man must needs know the meanings. of, as well as the words for, things. "Is not the judge," says the learned Baron Martin, "bound to know the meaning of all words in the English language?" If this be so and if the judge does not derive the knowledge from descent he must by purchase, and this work is simply indispensable to him; for herein he finds not merely the word but the word as interpreted by his elders, if not betters, in solemn judgments of courts of last resort. The professional meaning he must have, and if counsel do not suggest it, he must fumble through many a volume in what often proves a painful if not wholly illusive search. The word in its technical sense is wanted; philological nicety is not required, but a knowledge of its derivation is far from useless. Sir Richard Kindersley, indeed, maintains the contrary, as quoted by Mr. Stroud, for the learned vice chancellor says: "It is not necessary to go into the derivation of words for that sort of reasoning would not assist in the administration of justice." True as a general rule, it may not be so in a particular instance. If we open Stroud (Vol. II., p. 942) at "inappreciable," we find Baron Parke taking issue with Kindersley's general statement, and the learned and fussy baron is, as always, right. "An 'inappreciable' abstraction of water from a stream, has been suggested to mean, so ‘inconsiderable an amount as to be incapable of value or price' (per Talfourd, J., Embrey v. Owen,

20 L. J. Ex. 212; 6 Ex. 353); on which Parke, B., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, said, 'We are not prepared to say that the learned judge was correct in the interpretation of 'inappreciable' when connected with 'quantity'; nor are we sure that he was not. The word 'unappreciable,' or 'inappreciable,' is one of a new coinage, not to be found in Johnson's Dictionary, Richardson's, or Webster's. word 'appreciate' first appears in the edition of Johnson by Todd, in 1827, with the explantion, 'To estimate and vale.'" (Vth., per Bowen, L. J., Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 A. B. D. 150.)

The

But conceding that Mr. Stroud's work is eminently useful, indeed indispensable, is it sufficiently full and accurate for professional purposes? It is impossible to answer this question without doing Mr. Stroud's work over again, but a careful examination of numerous passages would lead the reviewer to reply in the affirmative.

Some time ago the writer had occasion to read the case of Birmingham v. Allen (L. R.. 6 Ch. Div. 284) in which Sir George Jessel considered inter alia "the right of the adjoining owner." Stroud, Vol. I., p. 34, article "adjacent," noted the reference to Birmingham v. Allen and other references were given under the appropriate articles: adjoin, adjoining, adjoining owner, and neighboring. This is only one of many instances. that might be given. A single quotation will indicate Mr. Stroud's method and its thoroughness-the first paragraph of the heading "Keep" (Vol. II., p. 1038). “To keep in Good Repair' pre-supposes the putting into it, and means that during the whole term the premises shall be in good repair (per Rolfe, B., Payne v. Haine, 16 M. & W. 546; 16 L. J. Ex. 130; Luxmore v. Robson, 1 B. & Ald. 584; Proudfoot v. Hart, 59 L. J. A. B. 389; 25 A. B. D. 42); the meaning is the same if the phrase is 'keep in repair' (cf, Crowe v. Crisford, 17 Bea. 507; Cooke v. Cholmondeley, 4 Drew. 328; Woodf. 628; Fawcett, 314): and this ruling seems applicable not only to Buildings but also to a

Road (R. v. Kerry Jus., Ir. Rep. 9 C. L. 471)."

A word might be said in conclusion as to the book's relation to Law Dictionaries properly so called. For example, Rawle's Bouvier is really an encyclopedia in which the various topics of the law are discussed, defined, and cases cited. It is at once a dictionary, a series of short treatises and a digest. Stroud on the contrary does not supply short treatises on substantive law, but rather aims to collate and enumerate the judicial interpretation of the various words and phrases to be found in the judgments of law courts.

In short, the Stroud is a separate and distinct work as appears from the title-page, and it neither takes nor attempts to take the place of the Law Dictionary properly so called, such as Rawle's Bouvier. It does not supplant: it supplements.

The two works are valuable, but the Stroud, in its own field, is not only unrivalled and alone, but well-nigh indispensable to members of the profession.

The Mirror OF JUSTICES. By Andrew Horne. With an introduction by William C. Robinson. Washington: John Byrne and Company. 1903. (xix+337 pp.)

It is one of the problems of legal history to determine to what extent the Mirror is a fable. The book purports to give a picture of English law at ancient dates-indeed, as early as the reign of King Arthur. It summarizes statutes elsewhere unknown. It tells tales so strange as to be certainly mythical. It states as law that which never was deemed law by any other writer. Towards the end it gives a list of abuses of the law, that is to say, of departures, chiefly judicial, from what the author has been pleased to call law.

He will be a skilful person who will straighten out this puzzle. There is one key that goes a little way. It is found in the author's declared intention to correct abuses. It is no uncommon thing today to hear a lawyer, even a learned lawyer, say that some rule is "not law," when clearly enough what

he means is that it ought not to be. Still more common is it to hear a lawyer say that some established doctrine is "not equity," when it is not at all clear what he does mean. In either case, if his words were written down they would perplex such future ages as might take his statements seriously.

Yet the Mirror is not cleared up, nor its author vindicated, by pointing out that to some extent the book may partake of the innocently fictitious character of Plato's Republic and of More's Utopia. The mere device of pretending that its contents, written apparently about 1289, came largely from very ancient times, is so common a mode of gaining a respectful hearing that it is comparatively innocent; but the fables carefully elaborated with fictitious and impossible names (pp. 245-251) are often of no conceivable utility, and try the patience of even the most lenient critic; and the deliberate misstatements of law are irritating beyond forgiveness.

It is true, however, that the book contains some matter which, if carefully sifted and sparingly used, may be of value. Even if the author were a romancer with not the slightest intent to tell either past or contemporary law, he was confined within the limit of all romancers-namely, the necessity of reproducing to some extent his own environment. It happens that the date of this strange book is so early as to make it worth while to take the pains necessary for extracting here and there a grain of truth. For example, what is said of the wrongsgrotesquely called perjuries-committed by escheators (pp. 36-37), may well be used as some indication of the powers contemporaneously exercised by those not very well understood officials. Such dealing with this queer book must, however, be surrounded with precautions and suspicions. Here is no tool for the 'prentice hand.

The Mirror has had a strange history. Lying in manuscript for at least three hundred and fifty years, with slight attention from the profession, it chanced to reach the hands of the most stupendous figure in the law, Sir Edward Coke; and he accepted it as true,

spoke respectfully of it in the prefaces to the ninth and tenth parts of the Reports, and sometimes cited it in the Institutes. It is not strange that shortly afterwards, in 1642, the Law French text was printed. In 1646 came the translation by William Hughes. Yet publicity was fatal. In 1784, Reeves, the first systematic historian of the English law, cast suspicion upon the Mirror. In 1832, Sir Francis Palgrave spoke more plainly. In 1895, Pollock and Maitland's History pointedly refused to rely upon it as to any matter whatsoever; and almost simultaneously, in a delicious introduction to Mr. Whittaker's revised Law French text and new translation, published by the Selden Society, Professor Maitland demolished the Mirror to the gratification and amusement of all readers, and left open for future investigatorsthough with valuable hints-the interesting but comparatively unimportant question. whether Andrew Horn, the reputed author, a fishmonger otherwise of creditable record, can prove an alibi. Now, however, the Mirror reappears, in the familiar translation by William Hughes, and in a new place, the Legal Classic Series, beside Glanville, Britton, and Littleton; and thus the queer old book-whether romance, blunder, falsehood, or jest now stands in a worshipful company; but not even the present editor's goodnatured introduction indicates that any one has ever considered it a classic, and in truth it is simply a dangerous curiosity.

A MANUAL OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS By Charles N. Harris and Grosvenor Calkins. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1903. (xl -253 pp.)

This volume deserves, and doubtless will occupy, a place on the shelves of Massachusetts lawyers beside Smith's Probate Law and Crocker's Common Forms; and like these last named volumes it will be a useful book of reference.

The Manual contains, in full, the text of the recently enacted Business Corporation Law (St. 1903, chap. 437), which modified in important particulars the statutes of the Commonwealth relating to business corpor

mer

ations. As a help to the construction and interpretation of this Act of 1903, the various sections are followed by notes to referring to decisions bearing on forsome corresponding statutes, of these notes being quite full, as, for example, that which treats of the liability of stockholders (Section 33). Certain sections of the new act will require judicial interpretation; for instance, just what are the rights of, and the limitations upon, securities-holding corporations under Clause (F) of Section 4, which section defines corporate powers? In a note to this clause the editors express the opinion that in other sections of the Act "there are implications that a corporation may hold securities," "although there is no explicit authority to that effect."

The last half of the volume is devoted to miscellaneous statutes affecting business corporations, to forms and precedents and to an excellent index.

CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE. Edited by William Mack and Howard P. Nash. Vol. X. New York: The American Law Book Company. 1904. (1370 pp.)

Volume X. is a noteworthy publication, being, in fact, a full and valuable treatise on the law of Private Corporations (except Foreign Corporations), by Judge Seymour D. Thompson. Judge Thompson's previous work-large in amount, and varied and strong in character--has placed him in the foremost rank of American law writers; and here he is dealing with a subject which is peculiarly his own,-as witness his exhaustive Commentaries on the Law of Corporation, now out of print.

THE DECISION IN THE MERGER CASE." By J. L. Thorndike. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1903. Paper. (36 pp.)

This is a review of the decision of the Circuit Court at St. Paul in the case of United States v. Northern Securities Company, 120 Fed. R. 721. The recent decision by the Supreme Court adds, rather than detracts, from the value of this strong adverse criticism.