NEW LAW BOOKS.

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It is the intention of The Green Bag to have its book reviews written by competent reviewers. The usual custom of magazines is to confine book notices to books sent in for review. the request of subscribers, however, The Green Bag will be glad to review or notice any recently published law book, whether received for review or not.

LEGAL MASTERPIECES: Specimens of Argumen tation and Exposition, by Eminent Lawyers. Edited by Van Vechten Veeder. 2 Vols. St. Paul: Keefe-Davidson Company. 1903. (pp. xxiv+618+706.)

Law reports, text books and digests are not considered, even by the profession, as light reading. The profane, indeed, look upon them askance, as technical, dry and wearisome in the extreme. Their frame of mind and probable end are admirably sketched in a masterly way by Macaulay: "Compared with the labor of reading through these volumes [Law Reports, Text-books, Digests] all other labor, the labor of thieves on the treadmill, of children in the factories, of negroes in the sugar plantations, is an agreeable recreation. There was, it is said, a criminal in Italy, who was suffered to make his choice between Guicciardini and the galleys. He chose the history. But the war of Pisa was too much for him. He changed his mind and went to the oar."

Hence it is that the clients leave the law books to the lawyers who are, or ought to be, paid liberal fees for undergoing, as it were, vicarious punishment. But there is a limit even to the lawyer; for the man of the Green Bag when the day is done, leaves his books and papers under lock and key; betakes himself of an evening to the comforts of home, or plunges into pleasing dissipation of literature, the play, the opera, or in rare and not well authenticated instances he gives himself over to dissipation of an ignobler na

ture.

The novel, it would seem, has fascination for the legal mind, and not a few members of the bench and bar have added to the store of forgotten literature. But they may well be pardoned in any case; for the stren

uous and exacting labors of the day require a change of a quieting and restful nature. If the mind will not let up, an avocation is well nigh a necessity, and indeed a well known person in "Who's Who," states under the heading of recreations, change of employ

ment.

Admitting the need, it might be suggested that a lawyer might well find his avocation. in legal history and biography, things pleasant, refining and broadening in themselves, and of no little aid in professional life.

Mr. Van Vechten Veeder would seem to have had this end in view when the happy thought occurred to him of preparing his singularly charming and delightful collection of legal masterpieces. At any rate, it serves this purpose, and to the anxious-minded it may well serve as the basis of instruction in the art of argumentation and exposition. That law is a science, we may safely admit; that it is not necessarily divorced from literature many a well prepared argument and opinion show; but the daily experience of the practitioner shows that law and literature do not trip hand in hand through court-room, and the little world in which he "lives, moves and has his being." The verdict is the desideratum, and yet literary style and feeling may lead towards it. Erskine, for example, did not find a fine literary feeling a drawback, and Webster and Choate did not scorn a classical allusion and a well-turned phrase as an unclean thing. At any rate, the absence of literary style has made many a worthy practitioner nothing more than a name, a mere tradition at best. Bad English in a judge is admittedly no good ground for reversing the judgment. Bad opinions, however, do not read well, and if they do not read well and easily, nobody will consent to read. them unless driven to it by sheer necessity. Mr. Baron Parke lorded it in Westminster Hal, and his judgments are carefully studied. by the profession; but the layman would rather be buried alive in his Parke or go to the oar, than con the cases in Meeson & Welsby.

But to return to Mr. Veeder. His Legal

Masterpieces are made up, first, of opinions delivered from the bench by Lords Mansfield (1), Stowell (1), Bowen (4); by Chief Justice Marshall (4), and B. R. Curtis (1); second, of professional opinions as distinguished from judgments or arguments in courts: Lord Lord Mansfield (1), Alexander Hamilton (1), Horace Binney (1), and James C. Carter (1); third, of arguments and briefs, by Erskine (5), Curran (1), Brougham (1), Horace Binney (1), Webster (3), Cockburn (1), B. R. Curtis (4, including one charge to a jury), Wendell Phillips (1), Charles O'Conor (3), R. H. Dana, Jr. (1), J. S. Black (1), D. D. Field (1), Wm. M. Evarts (3), and James C. Carter (1).

That the selection is well made, no one will question, for no undeserving name appears. The judicial and professional opinions, as well as the briefs and arguments included, deserve preservation and publication as models for study and imitation. One name alone will, perhaps, surprise the profession, for Wendell Phillips is known as orator and agitator, not as a lawyer. A careful reading, however, will at once show that the platforms and a great cause deprived the law of a great and leading advocate. Phillips' argument in support of a petition for the removal of Judge Loring (1855)—“an outrageously able speech," as Rufus Choate termed it-does undoubtedly give Wendell Phillips, as Mr. Veeder states, "an honorable place in forensic annals."

But if the selection is not open to objecttion on the ground of inclusion, it may be subject to criticism on the ground of exclusion. Sir James Mackintosh's superb defense of Jean Peltier on a libel against Napoleon Bonaparte (1803), merited printing in whole or in part, both from the interest of the subject and from the rare ability and eloquence displayed by Mackintosh. Erskine, who was present at its delivery, thus expressed himself in writing: "I cannot shake off from my nerves the effect of your powerful and most wonderful speech, which so completely disqualified you for Trinidad or India. I could not help saying to myself, as you were speaking, ‘O terram illam beatam quae

hunc virum acciperit, hanc ingratam si ejicerit, miseram si amiserit. I perfectly approve the verdict, but the manner in which you opposed it I shall always consider as one of the most splendid monuments of genius, literature and eloquence."

Again, neither Rufus nor Joseph H. Choate figures in the text; but Mr. Veeder has not overlooked, although he has refused them admittance. As regards the elder, the editor certainly does justify himself in the introduction (pp. xxi-xxii), and it must be conceded that, however successful as a lawyer and advocate, Rufus Choate is not to be imitated. As Mr. Veeder says, and truly: "As compositions, his speeches (except the occasional orations revised and published by him) are by no means safe models." The case of Joseph H. Choate is different, but feeling it necessary to choose between Mr. Carter and Mr. Choate, the editor preferred the former. "As a jury advocate he [Mr. Carter] is, perhaps, surpassed by Mr. Joseph H. Choate, and others may equal him in learning or in native ability; but in the combined qualities of sterling character, breadth of mind, and varied culture, he has had few superiors among American lawyers, past or present." (p. 1197). True, but was it necessary to make the choice, or was it necessary to include two specimens from Mr. Carter, instead of dividing the crown?

A few other instances might be mentioned, but this is Mr. Veeder's selection, and it is unfair to criticise him in this minor matter. Mr. Veeder may be right and the reviewer wrong. The editor's answer is easy and conclusive, namely, that he could not well compress hundreds of volumes into two without many a sigh and sincere regret.

Passing from the purpose and the selection itself, the question remains, how has Mr. Veeder performed the editorial part of his work? And to this, there is only one reply, admirably. A short biographical note of Judge and Lawyer represented is given containing the essential facts of their careers, and this is invariably followed by an essay sometimes long and comprehensive, always

admirable and interesting, in which the importance of the lawyer, his influence, characteristics and style are pointed out and appreciated. They are remarkable examples of compression and in not a single instance has Mr. Veeder fallen short. Indeed they show the editor possessed of a rare critical faculty, of broad knowledge and culture, and of a literary style worthy of imitation. If reviewer or reader may not criticize, he may well be permitted envy.

It should be said that each selection is preceded by an adequate, and at times, elaborate statements which makes the text easy of comprehension and appreciation, and the work ends with a very satisfactory index.

Mr. Veeder, it would seem, has fallen asleep over his pen in a few instances. It is true (as stated on page 7), that Lord Mansfield was only twice directly reversed, but Perrin v. Blake (1769), 1 W. Bl. 672, dealt with the rule in Shelley's case, not with the "question of literary copyright at common, law." Mr. Veeder, confusing the two Shelleys, evidently had in mind Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr. 2303. It is not without interest to note that the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Yates in both these cases were followed on appeal. The imperious Lord Chief Justice had not had a single dissent from his judgments up to that date, and he took it so much to heart that the unfortunate justice deemed it advisable to be transferred to the Common Pleas.

Mr. Veeder ascribes the "Answer to the Prussian Memorial," 1753, to Mansfield, then solicitor general. It is true that Lord Mansfield is generally credited with the authorship of the famous and authoritative document, but it is known that Sir George Lee had a hand in it. Sir Robert Phillimore is inclined to attribute it to Lee, of whom he says: "He was the principal composer of a State paper on a great question of International Law. The Answer to the Memorial of the King of Prussia. . . To that Memorial indeed another name was affixed, the name of one who was not indeed a member of the College of Advocates, but who was destined to be among the few luminaries of jurisprudence in our island, and

able to vie with those which have shown upon the continent. . . . This great man was then Mr. Murray, afterwards Lord Mansfield." (1 Phillimore's Int. Law, xlvi-xlvii.)

In the list of distinguished judges, (p. xxiii.) Mr. Veeder places William K. McAllister as the sole glory of Illinois. Concensus of opinion in Illinois would probably assign precedence to Lawrence, Scholfield, Breese or Walker-perhaps in the order given.

Again the life of B. R. Curtis, mentioned on page 619, was by his son B. R. Curtis, Jr., not by his brother, G. T. Curtis. Slips like these are most trifling blemishes in a work replete with scholarship and a fine literary and discriminating sense.

STRUMENTS.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INBy John W. Daniel. 2 Vols. Fifth edition reëdited and enlarged with notes and references to American and English cases by John W. Daniel and Charles A. Douglass. New York: Baker, Voorhis, and Company. 1903. (clivx+936, 1004 pp.)

It seems to be well settled that when doctors disagree the patient dies; but in the present instance the Honorable John W. Daniel goes his way untroubled, and the fifth edition of his authoritative work in two volumes on Negotiable Instruments will be cited by the Supreme Court in the future as the previous editions have been in times, past.

The statement in the above paragraph is made because of the fact that Senator Daniel's work has been reviewed by two competent hands-both teachers of the subject in two leading law schools-in the May and June numbers respectively, of the Columbia and Harvard Law Review for the year 1903. The review in the Columbia Law Review is flattering and pronounces the author and his. work in excellent standing and seems to take evident satisfaction in the favorable diagnosis. A few weaknesses are pointed out, such as foisting on the back of the great Lord Mansfield, a decision of Sir James of that name (Fentum v. Pocock, Sec. 1333) and the review closes with this bit of general

commendation: "A number of errors in proof reading, also, should be corrected. For example, Edwin v. Lancaster in note 40, Sec. 1334, should be Ewin v. Lancaster. Barring this and a few other mistakes, which are not serious, the present edition is an admirable piece of work."

Not so the reviewer in the Harvard Law Review. The author and his book are flayed alive and the calf is torn from the covers of the book, although it may be said some tew patches are left to the hide of the unfortunate victim himself. The reviewer states that he examined the book prejudiced in its favor and "we have been surprised," he says, "to find how greatly we were mistaken." The gist of the onslaught consists of four charges, namely: That Mr. Daniel mistakes the law; that the cases cited often do not bear out the generalization and positive statement in the text; that many opposing authorities are not mentioned at all, although squarely in point, or are quoted for a dictum in favor of the author's view; and lastly that the omissions of important cases, whether accord or contra, seriously impair the completeness of a work on this delicate and vastly important subject. To this general statement might be added another objection of the reviewer, namely, that cases cited in the table of contents are not to be found in their proper places. "Mistakes of this kind," he says, "are so common in this edition that we forbear to give further examples." And another serious drawback arises from the fact that "this edition continues to cite many cases as reported only in law reviews, although they have been for years published in the regular reports."

A final quotation will show the value this work has in the reviewer's eyes. "We have made," he says, "no special effort to find errors in this edition. None is necessary. They sautent aux yeux. Those which we have mentioned and others have come to our notice either when we have opened the volumes at random or when we have examined them to find Mr. Daniel's views upon some controverted point."

As this latter is a detailed and extensive

review, the prospective owner of this edition may well examine it and test it for himself. The present reviewer has consulted Daniel's frequently and has at times examined paspages in which he had a present and often pressing interest. The section on Negotiable Instruments secured by Mortgage (Vol. I, pp. 842-848), discusses, in the light of the weight of authority, the theory that the mortgage is merged in the note to such an extent, that the rights of an innocent holder in course for value and without notice are those of a holder of a negotiable instrument. This ignores the fact that the transaction is a mortgage transaction and is to be regulated by the law of mortgages. On principle this is clear and unanswerable. Mr. Daniel cites many authorities for the prevailing and irrational view, and he throws in in a haphazard way, authorities contra; but in this latter list, the reviewer finds but a single Ohio case, while the leading case of Bailey v. Smith, 1863, 14 Oh. St. 396, in which Mr. Justice Ranney riddles the doctrine and refuses to follow it, is omitted from the section altogether. The case, is, however, misspelled and miscited in sects. 758a, 779a.

But it would be unfair to overlook the fact that the courts have quoted this book time and again so that it stands before the public and the practitioners invested, as it were, with a halo of judicial authority. For this reason it has had and does have substantial merits, and in this new form it will continue to decide many a law suit in the future as it has in the past. The present reviewer does not detract in any way from its practical utility; but he suggests a careful perusal of the review in the Harvard Law Review, Vol. XVI. (pp. 605-612) by way of caution to those who would or might otherwise rely upon it as a sole and unassailable authority.

THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN ARTICLES FOR TORTS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK. By J. Newton Fiero. Albany: Matthew Bender. 1903. (xviii+893 pp.)

In the modest guise of a local book here. is a work of merit, well deserving circulation

outside its professed jurisdiction. The plan includes a treatise, an abstract of New York cases, and forms. The topics covered are the general principles of liability and specific injuries to the person. Injuries to property are not covered, and it is to be hoped that they are reserved for a future volume.

The author has done his work so well that there is doubtless some excellent reason for giving such scanty notice to Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 118 (1838), cited at p. 91 on a point for which it is not very important; but lawyers outside New York would welcome a rather elaborate discussion of the present value of that celebrated case, in its home jurisdiction, as to the point on which it is greatly used-the master's responsibility for a servant's wilful acts. This is, however, a very slight omission, and the only serious shortcoming discovered is the lack of a table of cases. By way of set-off, it may fairly be pointed out that in one respect at least the author has unnecessarily, but very properly, carried his labors beyond the field usually occupied by writers on torts, in that among injuries to the person he has included breach of promise to marry.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS. By Walter Chadwick Noyes, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Connecticut. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1902. (pp. xlxii, 703)

The industrial reorganization now going on may well be set down as marking the most important epoch in the economic history of the United States. From the point of view of the lawyer, this has involved at every stage the complex problems connected with the consolidation of corporations. So much new knowledge and such need for future guidance has properly resulted in a special book dealing with the law of intercorporate relations. In respect to the greater problem of restraint of trade, there are four forms of intercorporate arrangement which have been employed: First, the poola direct agreement between the corporations. for their joint operation; second, the trustan indirect arrangement between sharehold

ers for joint management of their holdings; third, the holding corporation—a central corporation to own the shares of the constituent companies; and, fourth, the single corporation which buys the plants of the old owners outright. When this book was written the fate of the first and second had been decided; and the author set forth the whole law which led to their dissolution. But the disposition of the third and fourth was then unknown, and, indeed, is not yet settled, but the author treats the matter in the best way possible. The secret of the continuing value of the work under review is that it is based upon permanent principles, not upon transitory rules. For from beginning to end the theory of the treatise is that the validity of a combination depends upon considerations of public policy.

LITERARY NOTES.

The account of the organism and function of the Virginia County Court given in the Life and Letters of Robert Lewis Dabney,1 is of special interest to lawyers and jurists.

The old county court of Virginia which wielded unrivalled power in the early life of that State was notably the great upholder of justice, but it was also the training school of Virginia's noted orators. There lawyers of State reputation did not hesitate to put forth strenuous efforts even in cases of small importance, and it was in this old court, with his father sitting among the magistrates, that Patrick Henry leaped into fame by his great speech. "These county courts were a sort of resurrection and metamorphosis of similar courts which had obtained anciently in England, and some of which had continued to exercise their powers down to the time of Henry VII. They were established in the Virginia colony in 1623 and were first called monthly courts, but in 1642 the name was changed to county courts and by that name they are familiarly and almost exclusively known. They exercised judicial, leg