is no defense that defendant did not know of the ordinance, or did not know that an order of the mayor to the city marshal to arrest persons violating it, was meant to embrace defendant's own back yard. Finally, it is no defense that the fourth of July celebration had been advertised by the citi zens and defendant thought that shooting firecrackers was in keeping with the occasion. That such an ordinance would tend to stifle the exuberant patriotism of Young America does not seem, strangely enough, to have been relied on as a ground of attack.

FORGERY. (OF WILL DURING TESTATOR'S LIFETIME.)

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS.

In Huckaby v. State, 78 Southwestern Reporter, 942, it is held that a will is not an instrument subject to forgery during a lifetime of the purported testator. The holding depends on the construction of Penal Code 1895, Arts. 530, 536, 537, which declare guilty of forgery one who forges an instrument which, if genuine, would "have created, increased, diminished, discharged, or defeated, any pecuniary obligation or would have transferred or in any manner have affected any property whatever;" which defined "pecuniary obligation, as every instrument having money for its object and every obligation for the breach of which a civil action for damages may be brought; and which provide that by an instrument which would "have transferred or in any manner have affected" property, is meant every species of conveyance or undertaking in writing which supposes a right in the person purporting to execute it to dispose of or change the character of property of every kind and which could have such effect when genuine. The case is distinguished from the English rule under which an instrument to be the subject of forgery must be such as would have some legal efficacy, if genuine. The court says: "Now, can it be held that the will, if genuine, during the lifetime of the testator would have the effect, in

praesenti, to create or discharge any pecuniary obligation, or to transfer or affect any property whatever? It is essentially ambulatory during the lifetime of the declarant, subject to his revocation at any time, and cannot possibly take effect until his death. Being such an instrument, we hold that it is not the subject of forgery, where the making of the instrument occurs during the life of the testator."

INTOXICATING LIQUORS. (SALE ON SUNDAY— WHAT CONSTITUTES.)

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS.

In Wallis v. State, 78 Southwestern Reporter 231, it is held a violation of the Sunday liquor law for a saloon keeper to sell beer on Saturday under an agreement to keep it on ice for the purchaser until Sunday, and then on Sunday hand it out to him. through a broken glass in the door.

The court says that if the saloon keeper could do this in one instance, he could do it in other instances, and if he could make a sufficient number of sales for delivery on the next day, his house might be kept open the entire day to consummate deliveries. An essential part of the business of a saloon keeper is the keeping of his drinks cool, and if he can make sales on Saturday, and keep the goods in his refrigerator for delivery on Sunday, he will be compelled to keep his place open for that purpose, though he can make no sale on Sunday, nor receive any money on that day for goods previously sold.

No cases are referred to.

care with respect to him after he began his efforts to sustain the wall. As to whether there was any negligence of the employer toward himself, the court says: "Undoubtedly Parsons owed the moral duty of protecting his own person from harm. But the love of life is regarded as a sufficient inducement to self-preservation; all that is deemed essential for the government of persons in matters affecting themselves alone. Where no one else is concerned, the individual may incur dangers and risks as he may choose, and in doing so he violates no legal duty. He cannot be guilty legally, though he may be morally, of neglecting himself. . . . It may be said, however, that Parsons ought, in placing himself in peril, to have anticipated that some one would, upon discovering his danger, undertake to shield him from harm. But this was a contingency which, as it seems to us, would not be likely to be contemplated. Men do not expose their lives to danger with the idea that others will protect them from harm by risking their own lives. Though history teems with accounts of heroic conduct and self-sacrifice, deeds of this kind have not become so common that they are to be anticipated as likely to occur whenever opportunity is afforded. The instincts of self-preservation still so dominate human conduct that acts like that under consideration, in which life itself was risked for the protection of another, are of such rare occurrence as always to commend the special attention and admiration of the entire community, and by the common voice of mankind those who do them are singled out as worthy of enrollment on the scroll of heroes. Because of their infrequency, however, it cannot be said that they should enter into the calculations of men as at all likely in the ordinary transactions of life. As they spring from magnanimity, magnanimity must be relied upon in cases like this for reparation."

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

(ACT OF OFFICER -PROSECUTION UNDER VOID ORDINANCE-LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITY.)

WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT.

In Simpson v. City of Whatcom, 74 Paci

fic Reporter 577, the question was whether a city was liable for damages for prosecutions conducted by its officers for the violation of a void ordinance requiring a license fee to be paid into its treasury, for the use of bicycles on its streets. The ordinance was enacted in conformity with Laws 1899. p. 41, authorizing cities to regulate and license the riding of bicycles. The court says that the question has never been presented to it, and an exhaustive examination of the authorities discloses that they are bewildering, both in numbers and lack of harmony. The two cases particularly discussed are McGraw v. Marion, 98 Ky. 673, 34 S. W. Rep. 18, 47 L. R. A. 593, and Taylor v. Owensboro, 98 Ky. 271, 32 S. W. Rep. 948, 57 Am. St. Rep. 361, the doctrine of the latter casethat a municipal corporation is not liable for the acts of its officers in enforcing a penal ordinance or while engaged in duties relating to the public safety and in the maintenance of public order being the one finally followed. As the ordinance in question was enacted under legislative authority, the city is regarded as a governmental agency, notwithstanding the license fee went into its treasury, and its officers acted as agents of the State or general public. Other cases are: Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171, 50 Am. Rep. 289, Lawson v Seattle, 6 Wash. 184, 33 Pac. 347, Worley v. Columbia, 88 Mo. 106, Nisbet v. Atlanta, 97 Ga. 650, 25 S. E. 173, Bartlett v. Columbus, 101. Ga. 300, 28 S. E. 599, 44 L. R. A. 795, McFadin v. San Antonio, 22 Tex. Citv App. 140, 54 S. W. 48, Caldwell v. Prunelle, 57 Kan. 511, 46 Pac. 949, Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172, 79 Am. Dec. 721, Trescott v. Waterloo (C. C.) 26 Fed. 592, and Town of Laurel v. Blue (Ind.) 27 N. E. 301.

a personal liability claimed to have arisen because they had incurred for the city a bonded debt in excess of the constitutional limitation, which by reason of the transfer of the bonds to innocent holders the city was precluded from contesting. The proposition is said by the Court to be unique and in discussing it no authorities are cited. In the opinion of the Court the defendants are not liable. The following quotations will illustrate the Court's views: "Counsel for appellant does not cite any case holding that the mayor and the respective members of the council of a city may be held personally liable in damages because that municipal indebtedness in excess of the constitutional limit has been contracted or permitted. We know of no such case, and we cannot say that there is anything in reason or the spirit of our system of government that dictates the promulgation of any such rule at our hands. While a violation of the Constitution in the respect in question is to be condemned, and the courts should interfere to prevent such violation whenever called upon so to do, yet we are not prepared to adopt the suggestion that an action for damages may be resorted to, as affording a proper means of redress, where a violation has been accomplished."

His

"It has always been the law that a public officer who acts either in a judicial or legislative capacity cannot be held to respond in damages on account of any act done by him in his official capacity. act may be void, as in excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise without authority of law, and he may be subject to impeachment and removal from office for corrupt practices, but he cannot be mulcted in damages."

NURSE. (VAlue of ServiceS-OPINION EVidence -TESTIMONY OF PHYSICIAN.)

TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS. In Cameron Mill & Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 78 Southwestern Reporter, 971, it is held that a physician who is not a nurse, and who has never employed one, and who has no personal knowledge as to the compensation of professional nurses in the city be

yond what a few of them told him, is not qualified to testify as to their reasonable and customary compensation. The court says, that while hearsay may form the basis of a receivable opinion as to value, the inquiries or statements relied upon should be of such extent and character as will afford a fair inference that the witness had knowledge of the subject.

PARDON. (VALIDITY SUFFICIENCY OF FILINGGOVERNOR'S SIGNATURE-PRACTICE.)

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT.

In Spafford v. Benzie Circuit Judge, 98 Northwestern Reporter 741, various questions of practice connected with the pardoning of a convicted person are discussed. It is held that the fact that a pardon is not addressed to the court having custody of the prisoner, and does not state the date of his conviction, and erroneously recites that he has been sentenced, do not affect its validity, and that the fact that a pardon was delivered directly to the prisoner concerned is immaterial. A formal motion to the court to discharge the prisoner because he has been pardoned is said to be the proper method of bringing the pardon to the court's attention. Where the original pardon is delivered to the court having custody of the prisoner several days before the hearing of such a motion, there is a sufficient filing of the pardon, though no copy was filed with the clerk until after the motion was made. People v. Marsh, 125 Mich. 410, 84 N. W. 472, 51 L. R. A. 461, 84 Am. Rep. 584, is cited as conclusive of the governor's power to pardon before sentence. Finally, it is held that the fact that only the initials of the governor's Christian names are used in his signature to the pardon, which is duly attested by the Secretary of State and is otherwise regular in form and substance, does not affect the pardon's validity.

PUBLIC BUILDINGS. (UNAUTHORIZED USE RIGHT TO COMPLAIN.)

KANSAS SUPREME COURT.

In Amusement Syndicate Co. v. City of

Topeka, 74 Pacific 606, a private citizen is denied the right to maintain an action enjoining city officers from allowing the use of the city auditorium for entertainments for private profit, even though such use may be wrongful. The court says that it has been repeatedly held that a private party cannot maintain an action against a public officer where the acts complained of affect merely the interests of the public generally. Before he can maintain such an action and challenge the conduct of public business, he must allege an interest personal and peculiar to himself, that is not shared by and does not affect the general public. The fact that the plaintiff in this case was a large taxpayer and was the proprietor of places of amusement which were injured by the competition thus created by the city fathers, is held not to give him such a standing as to sustain the action.

STRIKES. (INTERFERENCE WITH PICKETS-RIGHT TO ENJOIN.)

NEW JERSEY COURT OF CHANCERY. In Atkins v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., 55 Atlantic Reporter 1074, striking machinists sought to enjoin interference by their former employer and an association to which it belonged, with pickets maintained by them in an orderly manner. The interference was alleged to be by intimidation, threats, violence, arrests, etc.

In an oral opinion, the chancellor says that complainants are before the court as employers, and not as employés, the pickets being their servants. That the former employer of the complainants had the right to combine with other employers to refuse employment to any class of workmen, as fully as employés have the right to combine to refuse to be employed. The mere fact that defendants, by intimidation or criminal violence, interfere with the free flow of labor to complainants, does not give them the right to equitable relief, since the complainant employer must show substantial money damages, for which no adequate legal remedy exists. "The injunction, at the instance of

an employer, in these strike cases, was forced out of courts of equity because the situation presented was one where, without injunctive relief, ruinous losses to the complainant would be inevitable. Railroads and large plants of machinery were paralyzed, aggregations of capital lay idle, while the persons acting in combination, who by their interference with the free labor market had caused and were continuing this great pecuniary loss, were themselves irresponsible pecuniarily. It is to this class of cases, in my judgment, that the strike injunction should, under present social and business conditions, as far as possible, be confined." In conclusion, the court holds that the right of a voluntary association engaged in supporting a strike to freedom in the labor market, so that it can readily employ pickets. and other agents in carrying on its industrial warfare, is not a proper subject of protection by injunction.

But one authority is cited, Jersey Printing Company v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 Atl. Rep. 230, and that is on the point that the complainants appear in court as employers whose right to have labor flow freely to them is being interfered with.

TICKET BROKERS. (WORLD'S FAIR TICKETSINJUNCTION TO PREVENT TRAFFIC.)

MISSOURI SUPREME COURT..

In Schubach v. McDonald, 78 Southwestern Reporter, 1020, writs of prohibition were applied for by a number of St. Louis ticket brokers to prevent the St. Louis Circuit Court from further entertaining injunction suits brought by railroad companies to prevent the plaintiffs from trafficing in World's Fair tickets issued by the railroad companies at reduced rates and made non-transferable. While the case turns on the sufficiency of the pleadings below, and the propriety of the injunction is not directly determined, its atmosphere is significant of a possible holding that the traffic in question can be enjoined, the jurisdiction of the lower court being upheld and the writs denied.