T

HE case of Pollard v. Pollard, which has engrossed public attention for some weeks, is a peculiarly pertinent illustration of the admirable way in which jurisprudence is administered in England, and of the keen oversight which is exercised by the State to prevent the abuse of processes of law designed for the relief of innocent members of the community. In the United States the statutes of the various States providing for dissolution and annulment of marriages are, without exception, wise and equitable. In England a wife cannot obtain a divorce from her husband unless she can prove that he has been guilty of adultery and desertion, or of adultery and cruelty, while the husband may divorce his wife for adultery alone. Thus, although the husband may be guilty of extreme cruelty and the wife may suffer to the limits of her endurance both physical and mental tortures, the only relief the law affords is a decree of separation. The divorce statutes of the United States are conceived in a more liberal spirit, and afford either spouse relief in cases where the other by conduct or circumstances, such as cruelty, desertion, habitual drunkenness, conviction of crime or insanity, renders proper conjugal relations impossible. It is notorious, however, that these wise laws are, in many parts of the country, so carelessly and negligently administered as to constitute a scandal. In undefended cases the judge appears to take the view that he has no right to enquire into the bona fides of the applicant, but must enter a decree if upon the face of the pleadings it appears that he has jurisdiction and the ex-parte evidence satisfies the letter of the law.

In England, on the contrary, the judge in an undefended case submits the whole proceedings to the strictest scrutiny, and, if there is the slightest suspicion of irregu

MAY, 1904.

larity, practically constitutes himself counsel for the absent respondent. Nor does the enquiry stop at the trial, for according to the English procedure there must elapse an interval of six months between the decree nisi and the decree absolute. During this time the King's Proctor takes it upon himself to enquire into every undefended case and if he discovers that there has been any irregularity in the proceedings, or any want of good faith on the part of the petitioner, or any collusion between the parties, or that anything has been kept from the knowledge of the judge at the trial, he promptly intervenes, and opposes the making of the decree absolute. He does not wait for the respondent to make complaint, or for third parties to object. On his own initiative he puts the power of the government into operation to prevent imposition upon the court and the miscarriage of justice.

In the case of Pollard v. Pollard, above referred to, Mrs. Pollard obtained a divorce decree nisi from her husband on the ground of his cruelty and adultery. There was no defence. Soon afterwards it came to the knowledge of the King's Proctor that the evidence against the husband had been obtained by a well-known detective agency called "Slaters." Although the wife was or had been, a waitress in a restaurant frequented by men in the business part of London, and the husband was living with his mother in Plymouth on a few shillings a week, sent to him by his wife, the money paid to Slaters for procuring the evidence against the husband aggregated the enormous sum of thirty thousand dollars. This was supplied by a wealthy young man, a friend of the petitioning wife. The Agency sent detectives to Plymouth to keep observation upon the husband in the hope of getting proof of his misconduct, but they were unsuccessful, and

so reported to their principals. A fresh detective was then put upon the quest, who, acting upon his instructions, took the husband, who was a dissipated, weak man to Jersey, got him intoxicated and conducted him to a house of ill-fame. He then brought him back to Plymouth, having paid the entire expenses of the trip, including those incurred in the house of ill-fame. One Osborne, the solicitor to the Agency, and who had the conduct of the divorce case, considered that it would not be safe to rely upon evidence obtained in this way, and he himself visited Plymouth to assist the detectives in getting sufficient evidence at that place. Through his exertions a woman of the town was found who was persuaded to say that she recognized Pollard as a man who had visited her. Upon this the petition for divorce was filed, with the result stated.

The trial of the case upon the King's Proctor's intervention involved the bringing to London of a large number of witnesses, from Jersey, Plymouth and elsewhere. It lasted eight or nine days, and, in addition to the Solicitor General, two leading juniors were briefed by the King's Proctor. The expenses which must have been very heavy were defrayed in the first instance by the government, although as the King's Proctor succeeded and an order for costs was made against Osborne and the proprietor of Slaters, much of the outlay was recovered from these persons. Nevertheless the government took the risk of this large expenditure in order to maintain the purity of its process.

The trial illustrates another feature in English procedure. The issue involved the gravest consequences to Slater's Agency, the profits of which, it was revealed at the trial, were very great, and also to Osborne, who if the charge of fraud was proved against him, would be struck off the rolls. It was therefore contested bitterly. Notwithstanding this not a single question was ad

It

The

dressed to the jurors who were not sworn on their voir dire, and not an objection was made to any one of them. Twelve men were called into the box and sworn, and the trial began. Furthermore, although the case lasted eight or nine days, during which no less than 8,798 questions were addressed in chief or in cross-examination to the numerous witnesses, not a single exclamation of "I object" was heard during the trial. should not be inferred from this that there were any infractions of the rules of evidence, or that less attention is paid in this country than in the United States to such rules. absence of objections is attributable to two facts, first, that counsel are punctilious in avoiding the putting of any question which from any point of view is objectionable, and, second, that no bill of exceptions is nécessary in case of appeal. A notice of appeal delivered to the other side is all that is necessary to obtain a hearing in the appellate court, and, once there, the judges will hear whatever counsel have to say as to errors at the trial, but in no case will a judgment or verdict be disturbed on the ground of the wrongful exclusion or admission of evidence, unless the appellate judges are satisfied that such evidence so admitted or excluded materially affected or might have affected the result of the trial.

The consequences of the Pollard case have, in fact, been most serious to those who were found guilty of making a fraudulent case against the husband. Slater and Osborne and three or four of the detectives have been arrested and will doubtless be shortly tried at the Old Bailey for interfering with the course of justice. Slaters' business will be ruinously affected, and Osborne will doubtless be struck from the rolls. The moral effect of the proceedings as a deterrent to those tempted to trifle with the Courts cannot be over-estimated.

STUFF GOWN.

"And God help this honorable court and these United States."

The judge did not notice the alteration, although most of the auditors did. Afterwards the matter was reported to the court by the clerk.

"Oh," said the judge, "since he did not say 'And God damn this honorable court,' it is all right."

Two peculiar sentences have recently been pronounced in State court for criminal of fences. Allen Brown, a Texas negro, convicted of attempted criminal assault, was sentenced in the district court of Cherokee county to 1,000 years in the penitentiary. If his time is reduced two months a year for good behavior Brown will be a free man in A. D. 2738. California furnishes the other instance. John H. Wood, leader of the convicts who escaped from the Folsom penitentiary last summer and who is now serving a life sentence, was recently convicted of murder in the second degree. Judge Hart did not impose another punishment, but ordered the prisoner to appear 100 years from that date to receive sentence.

Most Indiana lawyers during the past seventy years have heard the story of Cuppy's recognizance, but the tale has not travelled far out of the State, and, especially since it possesses the merit of truth, it is worthy of perpetuation in a wider field.

When, in 1835, Salamonie township in Jay, then Randolph county, was organized, one Henry H. Cuppy was chosen to sit as the local 'squire. His first case was about a dog. William Bunch had been offended by Philip Brown's dog and brought an action to require the owner to make the animal, which was reputed to be cross, keep the peace. Brown was arrested and brought to the magistrate's log cabin in the woods for a hearing. He admitted the charge, the law was laboriously examined, and an order was entered that the defendant should be bound over to the higher court.

But now the judge was in a great dilemma, for there fell upon him the necessity of draw

ing a recognizance. After long and diligent search, with the aid of the parties and witnesses, a form entitled "recognizance" was found in the vagrancy act. Cuppy, being but an indifferent scribe, invited the defendant, who had some education, to write the instrument, which he forthwith set himself to do. He soon came to the words "John Doe and Richard Roe" in the form and suggested to the 'squire that they did not seem to fit the case. Cuppy deliberated seriously for a spell and then decided.

"Them words is in the law. I didn't make the law an' I didn't put 'em thar. Ef it ain't right 'tain' my fault. You jest copy that thing like it's printed."

So John Doe was bound over to appear at the next term of court at Winchester to stand his trial for vagrancy on the charge of Richard Roe. The fictitious names of sureties employed in the printed form were solemnly written down and Brown went home. Having written the document himself Brown felt bound by it and in due season appeared for trial, but whether for his own vagrancy or that of the dog does not appear in the record.

A STORY is told of an eminent lawyer receiving a severe reprimand from a witness whom he was trying to browbeat. It was an important issue, and in order to save his cause from defeat it was necessary that the lawyer should impeach the witness. He endeavored to do it on the ground of age, in the following manner:

"How old are you?" asked the lawyer. "Seventy-two years," replied the witness. "Your memory, of course, is not so brilliant and vivid as it was twenty years ago, is it?" asked the lawyer.

"I do not know but it is," answered the witness.

"State some circumstance which occurred, say twelve years ago," said the lawyer, "and we shall be able to see how well you can re'member."

"I appeal to your Honor," said the witness, "if I am to be interrogated in this manner; it is insolent!"

"You had better answer the question," replied the Judge.

"Yes, sir; state it!" said the lawyer.

"Well, sir, if you compel me to do it, I will. About twelve years ago you studied in Judge 's office, did you not?"

"Yes," answered the lawyer.

"Well, sir, I remember your father coming into my office and saying to me. 'Mr. D——, my son is to be examined tomorrow, and I wish you would lend me $15 to buy him a suit of clothes.' I remember also, sir, that from that day to this he has never paid me that sum. That, sir, I remember as though it were yesterday."-Philadelphia Ledger.

OVER in the rookery known as the New York County Courthouse, the clock in one of the trial rooms was being repaired. George C. Barrett, long a brilliant member of the local judiciary, chanced to be in the building at the moment and wandered, for auld lang syne, into the chamber where the chronometer in question hangs and where in former years he had dispensed justice.

"That clock and the repairing of it," he remarked to the attorney who accompanied him, "reminds me of a droll experience I had in this room with the late Counselor Nolan. It occurred shortly after this handsome watch was presented to me." And the jurist rehearsed it.

Nolan, who was one of the most eccentric and plausible of Irish-Americans, had a case on Judge Barrett's calendar, but did not arrive in the court-room until it had been called twice and marked "dismissed." learning, to his consternation, what had happened, he made an earnest appeal to have the case restored.

On

"You are more than half an hour late," replied Barrett, pointing to the clock. "It is the duty of counsel who have cases on the calendar to be here when the calendar is called."

"Shure, your Honor, shure it is," said the "barrister," as he called himself, "but that clock there, your Honor, is one of the

clocks put in by the Tweed ring.' Your Honor won't trust a Tweed clock against an honest man."

When the roar of laughter, in which the judge joined heartily, had subsided, Barrett pulled his new watch from his pocket, and retorted: "But, counselor, I find the clock shows the same time exactly as my watch."

"Thin," exclaimed the counselor, in his richest brogue, "I must make my confession. The reason I was half an hour late is that I was out around the court-house trying to collect the overdue subscriptions for your Honor's beautiful watch."

Nolan's case was put back on the calendar.-New York Evening Mail.