the injury is solely to the feelings the intent cannot be presumed. The conversation which the court holds warranted the belief that the prosecutrix was willing defendant should kiss her was of a highly salacious character. The court cites Fuller v. State, 72 Southwestern Reporter 184, where it was held that the giving of a kissing sign without any attempt to commit a battery did not evidence an assault.

In conclusion it is held that even had a conviction been warranted, a punishment of a fine of one thousand dollars and two years in jail was excessive, the only possible injury which the prosecutrix could have suffered being to her feelings.

AUTOMOBILE STATION. (MAINTENANCE IN RESIDENCE DISTRICT-NUISANCE.)

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.

In Stein v. Lyon, 87 New York Supplement 125, it is held that the construction and maintenance of an automobile station or garage, for the entertainment of chauffeurs and their friends, in a neighborhood occupied by expensive summer residences, does not constitute a common law nuisance, the court saying that the business appeared perfectly lawful and legitimate.

BANKRUPTCY. (EFFECT OF

DISCHARGE-JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION.)

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

In Tinker v. Colwell, 24 Supreme Court Reporter 505, a judgment for damages for 'criminal conversation is held not to be affected by a discharge in bankruptcy, the decision resting on the construction of section 17, subdivision 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that a discharge shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, "except judgments in actions for frauds or for wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another."

A number of English cases are cited on the point that trespass vi et armis will lie to recover damages for committing adultery with plaintiff's wife; and such conduct is held to be an injury both to the person of the husband and to his property rights. Cregin v.

Brooklyn Crosstown Railroad Company, 75 N. Y. 192, 31 Am. Rep. 459, Id. 83 N. Y. 595, 38 Am. Rep. 474, in which the right to the wife's society was held not to be property within the meaning of a statute providing for the survival of a cause of action for her injuries, is distinguished. It is then held that the injury to the husband in committing adultery with his wife is of a malicious character within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, though no personal malevolence towards the husband is involved. The court says, "It is also argued that, as the fraud referred to in the exception is not one which the law implies, but is a particular fraud involving moral turpitude or intentional wrongdoing. so the malice referred to is not a malice implied in law, but a positive and special malice upon which the cause of action is founded, and without proof of which the action could not be maintained. . . . The implied fraud which the court in the above-cited cases released was of such a nature that it did not impute either bad faith or immorality to the debtor, while in a judgment founded upon a cause of action such as the one before us, the malice which is implied is of that very kind which does involve moral turpitude."

Leicester v. Hoadley, 66 Kans. 172, 71 Pacific Reporter 318, is more nearly in point than any of the cases cited, it being there held that a judgment obtained by a wife against another woman for alienating her husband's affection was not released by the discharge of the judgment-debtor in bankruptcy.

CONSPIRACY. (COMMISSION OF ADULTERY-EXISTENCE OF CRIME-FEMALE'S MARRIAGEKNOWLEDGE OF CO-CONSPIRATOR.)

IOWA SUPREME COURT.

In State v. Clemenson, 99 Northwestern Reporter 139, it is held under the Iowa Code, Sections 5059, 5093, that there is such a crime as conspiracy to commit adultery. These sections provide that if two or more conspire to do any illegal act injurious to public morals or to commit a felony they are guilty of a conspiracy; and define a felony as a public offence punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, adultery being so pun

ishable. Adultery is said to be a public offence, notwithstanding the requirement of the Iowa Code that the prosecution can only be instituted on the complaint of the injured husband or wife. The court distinguishes this case from Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226, and Miles v. State, 58 Ala. 390, in which the agreement of a married woman to have intercourse with a man other than her husband was held not to amount to a conspiracy to commit adultery because the consent involved was a part of the offence itself. The court says that one may aid and abet in adultery without actually participating in the act and it can discover no ground for saying that a combination to commit the unlawful act, which is not an agreement between the immediate parties to the intended crime. may not constitute a conspiracy.

But the defendant in this case escaped punishment on a most peculiar ground. While he, himself, was aware that the female with whom he contemplated intercourse was a married woman, his co-conspirators were not apprised of that fact and hence contemplated nothing more than fornication, which is not a criminal offence in Iowa. On this account the court held there was no conspiracy. It says, "While these parties may be presumed to have intended the natural consequences of their acts this does not involve knowledge concerning the status of this woman. Without such knowledge it is not perceived how they could have conspired with defendant to have committed this particular crime. . . . In the absence of any evidence of knowledge on the part of either of the co-defendants the accused should have been acquitted."

FELLOW SERVANT RULE. (STATUTE OF SISTER STATE-WHAT LAW GOVERNS.)

MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS.

In Williams . Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 79 Southwestern Reporter 1167, it is held that the Iowa Code of 1873. section 1307, abrogating the fellow-servant rule as applied to railroad employés, while governing a right of action in Missouri for regligent injury inflicted in Iowa, must be

In MacDonald . Bayard Savings Bank. 98 Northwestern Reporter 1025, the court holds that the recording of a deed, attacked by the grantors therein as having been procured from them by fraud, is sufficient to start limitations running on the cause of action. How the grantee's act of tendering. the deed for record and its entry in the official records could apprise the grantors of any facts not known before to them, or arouse any suspicion or provoke any inquiry which they did not already entertain or purpose, is not discussed. Two Iowa cases, Bishop v. Knowles, 53 Iowa 268, 5 Northwestern Reporter 139, and Gebhard v. Sattler, 40 Iowa 152, are cited, but in both the facts were radically different. In each of these it was held that the grantor of a deed of trust was charged with notice of fraud in . the trustee's sale by the recording of the deed given by the trustee to the purchaser. In such a holding there is some show of reason, but the extention of the doctrine now made seems to be a judicial inadver

tence.

HOMICIDE. (EFFECT ON Jus Mariti-FORfeiture OF ESTATE-BILLS OF ATTAINDER-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS-ESCHEAT.)

TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT.

In Box v. Lanier, 79 Southwestern Reporter 1042, a controversy arose between the personal representatives of a wife and those of her husband over the proceeds of an insurance policy upon the husband's life. The policy had been made payable to the wife if she survived, otherwise to the husband's personal representatives. The husband delivered the policy to the wife with the statement

that it was hers and that she must pay the premiums on it which she did. The husband killed the wife and afterwards committed suicide. It was first held that the parol assignment of the policy to the wife vested in her the contingent interest remaining in the husband.

arose,

The important question then whether the husband, having murdered the wife, could take her chose in action by virtue of the jus mariti. After an elaborate review of the authorities, the court holds that he could not. It concedes that the case of Riggs . Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 Northeastern Reporter 188, 5 L. R. A. 240, 12 Am. St. Rep. 819, in which it was held that the general laws for the devolution of property by will or descent did not operate in favor of a murderer whether he claimed as devisee, legatee or heir-at-law, has been overruled by the later cases of Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 Southeastern Reporter 794; Deem v. Milliken, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 357m, affirmed in 53 Ohio St. 668, 44 Northeastern Reporter 1134; Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 Northwestern Reporter 935, 25 L. R. A. 564; Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atlantic Reporter 637, 29 L. R. A. 145, 50 Am. St. Rep. 765. The court relies on the case of Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 Supreme Court Reporter 139, 47 L. Ed. 216, in which it is held that the assignees of a life policy could not recover where the insured was hung for murder. It says: "It is true in the present case that the insurance company made no contest, but, conceding its liability, paid over the proceeds of the policy, and they await the determination of this suit. But can it be successfully contended that a claim resting upon a felonious act which might have been resisted by the insurance company has acquired more virtue when it is now asserted by the representative of the murderer to the proceeds of the policy? Can those who represent the husband, who first by the felonious destruction of the life of his wife, and then as a felo de se has accelerated the maturity of the policy, take the fruits of his crime under the doctrine of

jure mariti?" Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 147, in which the assignee of Mrs. Maybrick sought to recover on a policy on the life of Maybrick and in which the company successfully resisted the suit on account of Maybrick's death at the hands of his wife, is also relied

on.

The provision of the Tennessee constitution (article 1, section 12) that no conviction shall work forfeiture of an estate, as well as that of the Federal constitution (article 1, sections 9 and 10) prohibiting bills of attainder, are held not to apply, since the proceeds of the policy never became a portion of the husband's estate. It is finally held that a refusal to permit a husband who murdered his wife to take the proceeds of a life policy which belonged to her, does not escheat the property to the State, but the title passes to her administrator.

ILLEGAL CONTRACT. (SALE OF COUNTERFEIT MONEY.)

COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY.

In the case of Chapman v. Haley, 80 Southwestern Reporter 190, action was brought to recover $300 paid to defendant to be invested, as the plaintiff testified in $3,000 worth of "good money." Plaintiff testified that the defendant told him that he was a member of the firm in Cincinnati that had this money, and that he could get $3000 for his $300. "He showed me some new bills, one, two and a twenty, and I think a five and a ten, and he had plenty others, apparently. The money I was to get was to be just like those he showed me, silver certificates, and not counterfeit. He told me to sit down here on the walls of the waterworks, and he would step right across the street and get it and be back in twenty minutes, and he never returned." The plaintiff protested that he did not intend to purchase counterfeit money, but that the defendant had told him that it was good money, and said that "there was one one trouble about it, and that when deposited in a bank two numbers running of the same date might be

detected." The court remarks that as the plaintiff did not seem to require the supervising care of a committee to conduct his case, his statement that he believed he was to get $3000 in good money for $300 in old, worn government bills, seems beyond belief. and they state that they doubt whether the law books contain a case which will parallel in audacity this case, excepting, perhaps, the famous case of Everett v. Williams, 9 L. Q. R. 197, which was a bill for an accounting of the partnership business of highwaymen, though the true nature of the partnership was veiled in ambiguous language. This bill set up the partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant, "who was skilled in dealing in several sorts of commodities; that they proceeded jointly in the said dealing with good success in Houndslow Heath, where they dealt with a gentleman for a gold watch; that the defendant informed plaintiff' that F. was a good and convenient place to deal in, such commodities being very plenty there, and if they were to deal there, it would be almost all gain to them; that they accordingly dealt with several gentlemen for divers watches, rings, swords, canes, hats, clocks, etc., to the value of 200 pounds and upwards; that a gentleman at Black Heath had several articles which defendant thought might be had for little or no money in case they could prevail on the said gentleman to part with said things; and that after some little discourse with said gentleman such things were dealt for at a very cheap rate. The dealings were alleged to have amounted to 2000 pounds and upwards." This bill was dismissed for scandal and impertinence. The solitictors were taken into custody and fined 50 pounds each for reflècting upon the honor and dignity of the court. The counsel whose name was signed to the bill was required to pay the costs, and both the litigants. were subsequently hanged. It is pointed out that the fact that a like judgment did not overtake the parties litigant in this case marks the lapse of our modern procedure from that vigorous integrity with which the ancient judges administered the common law in its primitive virtue.

INDIANS.

(SALE OF LIQUOR SCOPE OF PROHIBITIVE STATUTE-CARLISLE STUDENTS.) UNITED DISTRICT COURT FOR THE Middle DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

In United States v. Belt, 128 Federal Reporter 168, the defendant was indicted for selling liquor to Indian boys attending the United States Indian School at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. On a ruling for a new trial, the court held that the Act of Congress of January 30, 1897, c. 109, 29 St. 506, prohibiting the sale of liquor to "any Indian, a ward of the Government, under the charge of an Indian agent or superintendent, or any Indian, including mixedbloods, over whom the government-through its departments exercises guardianship," extends to Indian students at a school which is maintained at the expense of the Government under the direction of the Interior Department. The court says that there can be no doubt that this language extends to the Indian boys at Carlisle. "Temporarily transferred from the reservations to which they belong, which are themselves in the nature of schools, they are potentially if not actually under the superintendent or agent there in charge. And, maintained and educated as they thus are, at the expense of the government, under the direction of the Interior Department, they are the unquestioned wards of the nation which has as much concern to protect them from the debasing influence of liquor as if they were on the Western Plains."

The Act of May 20, 1886, c. 362, 24 St. 69, requiring the nature and hygienic effects of alcoholic drinks, etc., to be specially taught to Indian pupils, is referred to as evidence of the concern the government has in this matter. Previous legislation on the subject of selling liquor to Indians is reviewed and the following cases cited: United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 18 L. Ed. 182, United States v. Osborne (D. C.), 2 Fed. 58; United States v. Earl (C.C.). 17 Fed. 75: United States v. Hurshman (D. C.) 53 Fed. 543; United States v. Flynn, 1 Dull. 451, Fed. Cas. No. 15124: United States v. Burdick, 1 Dak. 142, 46 N. W. 571; Renfrow v. U. S. 3 Ok!. 170, 41 Pac. 88.

INNKEEPER'S LIABILITY. (STATUTORY REGULATIONS-DEFINITION OF JEWELRY.)

SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE.

In the case of Rains v. Maxwell House Co., 79 Southwestern Reporter 114, a question arose as to the liability of the proprietor of a hotel for the loss of a watch and fob which a guest had left under his pillow. The Tennessee act provides that whenever the proprietor of a hotel shall provide a safe place for the keeping of any jewels and ornaments belonging to a guest, and the guest has not deposited them, the proprietor shall not be liable for their loss, provided he has posted a notice stating the fact that a safe and convenient place in which money, jewels, ornaments, etc., may be deposited, has been provided. The court, after stating that the wellknown common-law rule is that an innkeeper is absolute insurer of the property of his transient guest, reviews at length the decisions bearing upon the point in those States where the liability has been regulated by a statute similar to that in force in Tennessee. The earlier cases all hold that such statutes contemplate that a reasonable amount of money for traveling expenses and articles for personal use and convenience, although within the terms of the statute, are not to be considered as within its spirit, and that a guest by retaining such articles in his own possession instead of depositing them with the innkeeper, does not absolve the innkeeper from his liability. The first case to overthrow this doctrine was that of Hyatt 2. Taylor, 42 N. Y. 258, in which the court held that the statute must be strictly enforced. The later case of Rosenplanter v. Rossette. 54 N. Y. 255, sustains the doctrine pronounced in the Hyatt case, as does also the case of Stewart v. Parsons, 24 Wis. 242. The Tennessee court holds that a watch and fob must be considered as embraced in the term "jewels and ornaments." The court says that Webster defines the word "jewel" as an ornament of dress, usually made of a precious metal having enamel or precious stones as a part of its design. They are of the opinion, however, that the sense in which it was used by the Legislature is the common meaning attributed to it as an ornament or

useful article of value, and embraces a watch and fob used as a timekeeper and in which precious stones may or may not form a part. If a guest sees proper to keep his watch and money upon his person, he does so at his own risk, just as he does when he keeps it upon his person and in his possession when not in the hotel. In no prior Tennessee. case does this point seem to have been squarely raised.

INSURANCE. (EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-ACCIDENT -INFECTION WITH DISEASE.)

MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

In Columbia Paper Stock Co. . Fidelity & Casualty Co., 78 Southwestern Reporter 320, the plaintiff sued on an employers' liability policy reciting that one of its employés had recovered judgment against it for injuries from accidental blood poisoning, caused by contact with material used in its business. The question was thus raised whether kidney disease produced in a servant by handling infected rags in the discharge of duties connected with her employment was within a policy which insured against loss from liability on account of bodily injuries accidentally suffered. The defendant's contention was that as the disease was produced by a known cause, it could not be accidental. After a somewhat extensive review of the authorities, the court rejects this view and holds that the disease was an accidental injury. Dezell v. Casualty Co., 75 Southwestern Reporter 1102; Lovelace v. Travellers' Protective Ass'n, 126 Mo. 104, 28 Southwestern Reporter 877. 30 L. R. A. 209, 47 Am. St. Rep. 638; Isitt v. Railway Passengers' Assur. Co., 22 Queen's Bench Division, 504; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Melick, 65 Federal Reporter 178, 12 C. C. A. 544, 27 L. R. A. 629; Peck v. Equitable, etc., Ass'n, 52 Hun. 255, 5 New York Supplement 215; Freeman . Mercantile, etc., Ass'n, 156 Mass. 351, 351, 30 Northeastern Reporter 1013, 17 L. R. A. 753; McCarthy v. Travelers', etc., Co., 8 Biss. 362, Fed. Cas. No. 8682; United States etc., Ass'n 2'. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Supreme Court Reporter 755, 33 L. Ed. 60; Young