tions; that they were false and that the party making them knew they were false when he made them. As the insurance company in this case refused to believe that the assured was dead and as the beneficiary had to resort to the courts to compel a payment of the policy the court says that there could be no connection between the false representations and the obtaining of the property unless the court in which the judgment against the insurance company was obtained could be deemed the agent of the company. But in regard to this the court says: "If the principle of agency here contended for shall come to be the law, it may, as a result, deter much litigation, as an honest man with a good cause might hesitate to invoke the action of a court, for, although successful, he might find himself imperiled in the toils of a criminal prosecution. The doctrine contended for would in a measure destroy the integrity of judgments in civil cases when they could thus be attacked by a criminal prosecution. We do not believe the doctrine of agency here contended for accords with sound legal principle. The courts of the country are not to be thus involved in private prosecutions, nor can the integrity of their judgments be jeopardized by characterizing them as a part of the machinery in the consummation of a fraud. The courts of the country are independent agencies of the government, and their judgments are presumed to speak the truth. Nor will it be permitted that their judgments be assailed as the instruments of fraud, or as an agency in the perpetration of a swindle. In the very nature of things, they must stand aloof from any connection with the parties as their agent, save as a function of government-as the final arbiter between all parties, for the determination of the right and the truth as between them. We hold that, whenever their power is invoked between the attempt and execution of the purpose to swindle, it is the intervention of an independent moral agent, which cuts off any criminal prosecution assumed to be consummated in the judgment."

TELEPHONES. (DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE FOR NON-PAYMENT OF TOLL-SET-OFF.)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

In Irvin v. Rushville Co-operative Telephone Co., 69 Northeastern Reporter 258, it was contended that a telephone company could not discontinue its service to a patron for the non-payment of tolls if the patron had a claim against the telephone company. This contention the court regards as untenable and quotes the opinion of the appellate court on a former appeal of the case: "It cannot be denied that a rule of the company requiring these monthly payments to be made in advance would have been a reasonable rule, and that upon refusal so to pay service could be denied. The company must protect its plant, and keep up its efficiency, and may enfore a rule that insures a reasonable revenue and its prompt receipt. It can maintain an efficient service only through prompt payments of its dues and tolls, and because of that fact it may use the summary remedy of denying service for non-payment. It cannot be said it may be denied the benefit of this rule because a patron claims the company is indebted to him. It cannot be required to stop and adjudicate claims held against it. The law compels it to furnish service. A patron may take service or not, as he chooses. It must furnish efficient service to all alike, who are alike situated, and must not discriminate in favor of or against any For failure the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and injunction may be successfully invoked. It may be said that the courts are open to the company to collect its claim, but as to this the company and the patrons are on an equal footing. The fact that the patron is solvent aids nothing in determining a rule which must apply to solvent patrons alike. Keeping in view the nature of the company's duties, and the services it may be compelled to render, it must be held that the company may enforce the payment of its current dues and tolls by the summary remedy of denying service regardless of the fact that the subscriber claims the company is indebted to him."

one.

VOL. XVI. No. 10.

OCTOBER, 1904.

THE

acquired as United States Senator, as Secretary of State, as Minister to England, and as President of the United States dimmed, if it did not totally eclipse, his early fame as a lawyer. The persevering industry of his father enabled him to give the future President a classical education, and he graduated with high honors at Dickinson College, Pennsylvania, in 1809. Within a few months of his leaving college he began the study of the law, and was admitted to the bar on November 17, 1812. He had been a hard student, and he was fully equipped for the practice of his chosen profession. The War of 1812, in which he volunteered for the defence of Baltimore, interfered with his professional business; also, the two terms in the legislature of Pennsylvania, 1814-15, during which he was a zealous supporter of every measure of national defence. At the close of his second legislative term, he retired from public life with the determination to devote himself exclusively to the law.

His practice increased rapidly, and, considering the time and place, was quite lucrative. From a memorandum kept by him, it appears that the first year he was at the bar, his fees were nine hundred and thirtysix dollars. They continued to increase steadily, year after year, excepting in 1820, until they reached $11,297, in 1821, when he had been at the bar only eight years. After he went into politics, in 1820, his professional income fell off rapidly, and, in 1829,

his last year at the bar, his fees amounted to a little more than $3000. Once only after his retirement did he appear again at the bar, and that was to defend a poor widow who was threatened with ejectment from her only piece of property. He succeeded, after considerable difficulty, in establishing her claim, much to the astonishment of every one, and to the great joy of the poor woman, who overwhelmed her benefactor with thanks, and with offers of money, but Mr. Buchanan declined to accept any pay for his services.

In 1816-17, Mr. Buchanan gained great distinction by his able defence of the Honorable Walter Franklin and his associates on the bench of the Court of Common Pleas, in the district comprising the counties of York, Lancaster and Lebanon, who were brought before the Senate of Pennsylvania on articles of impeachment. The case, which attracted great attention at the time, was, in brief, this: In July, 1814, the President of the United States made a requisition on the Governor of Pennsylvania for the services of certain regiments of the State militia. The troops were accordingly mustered into the service of the United States. One Houston, a citizen of Lancaster, refused to serve, and was tried by a court martial under the State authority, and fined. He brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas against the members of the court martial, and the officer who had collccted the fine. On the trial, Judge Franklin, who was the only lawyer on the bench,

ruled that when the militia had been mustered into the service of the United States, the control of the State and the power to punish ceased. The plaintiff, therefore, recovered a verdict. Then followed the impeachment of Judge Franklin. A gentleman who was present at the trial, and who watched the proceedings with great attention, said that Mr. Buchanan's argument was conducted with great ingenuity, eloquence, and address, and the effect of the impression produced by the argument was so strong that the managers of the impeachment asked for an adjournment before they replied to it. Judge Franklin was acquitted. In reference to this case, Mr. Buchanan afterwards wrote: "I alone defended Judge Franklin and his associates. I never felt the responsibility of my position more sensibly than when, a young man between twentyfive and twenty-six years of age, I undertook alone to defend Judge Franklin."

When James Buchanan had reached the age of thirty he showed that he possessed a legal mind of the first order, and it is said. that, even at that early age he commanded a practice more enviable and more extensive than that of any other lawyer in the State. It should be remembered that he came to the bar when Pennsylvania was distinguished through the United States for the ability and high standing of its members. It included such great names as the Gibsons, the Dallasses, the Duncans, the Semples, and others, who were not only an honor to their State, but whose fame extended through the country. With such eminent lawyers James Buchanan. was obliged to cope in the struggle for success at the bar. His rise was rapid and brilliant. Triumph followed triumph, from the time of his admission until, at the early age of forty, he retired from the legal profession. Elected to Congress in 1820, Mr. Buchan

diciary Committee of the House of Representatives, and, in the performance of the important duties of the position, displayed remarkable ability, especially in introducing and advocating a bill to amend and extend the judiciary system of the United States. Daniel Webster had been the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee when he was a member of the House.

While Mr. Buchanan held the position, a matter came before it which was regarded as one of the most important that can fall to the consideration of a legislative body. This was the celebrated impeachment case of James H. Peck, Judge of the District Court of the United States for the District of Missouri. To impeach a judge is one of the most solemn duties that a legislative body is ever called upon to perform, embracing as it does points of constitutional law of the most delicate character. Mr. Buchanan was the chairman of the managers; the others were George McDuffie of South Carolina, Ambrose Spencer of New York, Charles Wickliffe of Kentucky, and Henry R. Storrs of New York. The case involved the liberty of the press, and has been briefly stated as follows: In December, 1825, Judge Peck decided against the claims of the widow and children of one Antoine Soulard to certain lands in the State of Missouri and the then territory of Arkansas. Luke E. Lawless, of St. Louis, had been one of the counsel for prosecuting the claim, and when the decision was rendered, he published an article in a newspaper, citing, in respectful language, certain errors into which Judge Peck had fallen. Upon this the judge had him summoned, and not only deprived him of the right to act in his profession, but actually committed him to prison. Mr. Lawless made complaint to the House of Representatives, and the impeachment of Judge Peck followed. William Wirt and Jonathan Meredith of Baltimore