titled to be acquitted. The presumption itself does not tell the amount of evidence necessary to overcome it. In criminal cases it is accompanied by another rule, which is that the proof against the prisoner must exclude every reasonable doubt, and in civil cases that the crime must be established by a preponderance of testimony. In each case the natural presumption of innocence may be considered as among the defendant's evidence. But I confess myself unable to see how a presumption of law which is a mere. legal rule can be "weighed," how it can convince the understanding and make a man believe what he might otherwise disbelieve.

If the presumption of law is not an arbitrary one, devoid of probative force, why is it stronger in criminal cases than in civil cases? Why is the innocence of a party presumed rather than the innocence of a third person? Why should the presumption be stronger "evidence" in the one case than in the other? Is the understanding convinced in the one case more than in the other?

I do not wish to be understood as saying that the presumption of innocence should not be charged, even though the jury is correctly instructed as to the burden of proof and reasonable doubt, and though logically it adds nothing. It may tend to disabuse the jury of any prejudice against the prisoner on account of the position in which he stands, even though an instruction that the burden of proof is on the State to prove every allegation against the prisoner would be substantially the same.

WRITING Concerning "Reckless Automobilists," Case and Comment for September says: A supposition that automobiles can run with impunity anywhere up to the limit fixed by statute or ordinance seems to be somewhat common. Of course, it is entirely erroneous. An enactment that the speed shall not exceed a fixed maximum is by no means a license to run at that speed under all circumstances. The general principles of the law of negligence necessarily require that the speed under particular circumstances should be far less than that maxi

mum, or indeed that the machine must be entirely stopped, if common prudence demands it in order to avoid a threatened injury to another person. There is a surprising lack of adjudications in the courts, up to the present time, in respect to the use of these machines, but the principles applicable to the subject are the same as those which govern all vehicles on highways. Outside of specific enactments, the question is simply one of negligence, and in most instances this will, of course, be a matter for the jury. It is important for the public to have the relative rights of automobilists and others very sharply defined by specific precedents, though there can be little dispute as to the general principles applicable.

UNDER the title, "Church Law and Trust Law," the Juridical Review for September has the following interesting note on the recent important Free Church of Scotland case (Bannatyne v. Lord Overtoun):

The judgment of the House of Lords in this great leading case was, in the first place, a verdict on a twofold issue of fact. It found not only that the Free Church of Scotland, at its origin in 1843, held certain articles of creed, or at least of doctrine-notably the doctrine of Church Establishment-but, secondly, that having originally accepted these articles, it had retained no power to revise them. These mere findings, in fact, applied to property accumulating and to views changing during sixty years, and to a Scottish Church known to the world chiefly by its initial sacrifices for freedom, were sufficient of themselves to convulse our ecclesiastically-minded population. But what the importance of the decision is to the law is a different question

Has this decision changed our general Church Law or Trust Law? . . . It may, probably, be laid down, to begin with, that while the judgment denies that the Free Church had in its constitution a right to change doctrine (or, at least, denies that such a right had been proved), it does not deny that a church may put exactly such a claim into its memorandum of association,

and may prove it. But it certainly goes this length-that the church must prove it. The presumption is henceforth against it, even in the case of a Scottish church, which claims in its creed a Christ-given government, and has once in its history given up everything for freedom. But does not the presumption against it go further still? Some parts of the Lord Chancellor's opinion might suggest that a creed or confession, being the foundation of a church, cannot be revised even by a body which originally claimed the right to do it. And Lord Robertson repeatedly hints, even while dealing with a church which from its birth had ear-marked its churches and manses for a future "united body," that there may be much in the view taken in the old cases of Kirkintilloch and Thurso, that unless a church is absolutely unanimous, it may be prevented from uniting with another, even when no difference in doctrine or principle is alleged between the two. But probably neither judge is quite committed to either extreme position. And neither made part of the judgment of the House. The privilege or latitude of Scottish churches may be henceforth no greater than But it is, at any that of ordinary trusts. rate, no less. And it is by no means restricted to that of statutory companies with their memorandum and prospectus.

But it is doubtful whether this judgment of our highest tribunal, assuming it to be exactly just as to all the past, has sufficient illumination for the guidance of such a future. It does not even give (as was expected, and as the Lord Chancellor's luminous opening seemed to promise) a clear decision on what has been called, in the narrowest sense, the Law of Creeds. It probably rules that these solemn documents are for ever unrevisable. But this formidable quality is apparently made common to them with some of those casual or annual "testimonies" which Presbyterian Churches put in a far lower place than the Confessions they revere and revise. What are the documents which bind a church, is at least as doubtful after this judgment as before.

Yet, with all deductions, this was a great

decision on the law, as well as on the facts. For it rules that Westminster Confession. Churches (and no doubt, therefore, all churches under the law of Scotland), so far as law can compel them, must not at their own hand change the form-in particular, the doctrinal form-in which they took origin, unless they have reserved powers of change far more explicit than have hitherto been thought necessary.

IN The Commonwealth Law Review (Australia) for August, C. E. Weigall discusses "Industrial Arbitration and Common Law Rights," under the Australian labor laws. Of the "preference clause" he says:

Under what is known as the preference clause, s. 36 of the Act, the Court is given power to direct that preference shall be given to members of an industrial union of employés, who offer their services to an employer at the same time as a non-unionist workman, other things being equal. The Arbitration Court has held, in the Breadcarters' case, that this provision does not restrict the general powers which are given in the definition of industrial matters. In that case the Court ordered that any non-unionist employé who was engaged must join the union within a certain time after he entered upon his employment. The effect of such an order is to prohibit altogether the employment of a non-unionist workman, as such. This, it is submitted, the Court has no power to do, the general power given to the Court by the definition of industrial matters being in this respect subject to the conditions laid down in s. 36 of the Act specifically dealing with such orders. The right of an employer to employ non-unionist workmen has been further restricted by the interpretation placed by the Court upon its awards which contain a preference clause. Thus, on a summons against an employer who had engaged a non-unionist workman because he said he thought him the most suitable for his requirements, the Court, in In re Wild, held the employer guilty of a breach of the preference clause, and laid

down the principle that an employer bound by such a clause who employs a non-unionist is liable to a penalty, if in the opinion of the Court there are at any time during the existence of the employment competent unionists available to do the work required to be performed, and that the question of the relative competency of the workman is a matter not for the employer, but for the Court, to decide. An employer bound by such a preference clause, therefore, cannot safely employ a non-unionist unless he has applied to the secretary of, the employers' union and been informed that none of his members are available, and is liable if he does not discharge the non-unionist directly a unionist is available. The secretray of the employés union is therefore clearly master of the situation, and the employer, while bound to pay the wage fixed by the award or do the work himself, cannot choose the man whom he thinks will give him the best value for his money. Further, the advances must be made by the employer, the employés union being under no obligation to see that their men are on the spot and apply for the work.

Like the prohibited immigrant, the nonunionist is "not wanted" by the ruling class, and it seems safe to predict that in a short time he will be as rare a phenomenon as, for instance, a baby.

IN the American Law Review for September-October, Rudolf Dulon praises the decision of the Arbitration Tribunal at The Hague, which held that Great Britain, Germany and Italy-the blockading powers"had preferential rights over the other claimant nations in the settlement of the claims against Venezuela," and states the facts in the case more fully than they have been stated heretofore. He says:

After the Venezuelan ports had been placed under blockade Venezuela asked the United States to convey to Germany and Great Britain a proposal for an arbitration. This was done. Germany and Great Britain replied that arbitration seemed to them a satisfactory basis for arriving at a settlement of

their claims, but that they considered it necessary to make certain reservations. Thereupon the President of Venezuela telegraphed that he recognized in principle the justice of the claims which the allied powers had presented to Venezuela; that these claims would already have been settled if it had not been for the Civil War, and that today the Venezuelan government bowed to superior force and would send Mr. Bowen, who would be authorized to settle the whole question as the representative of Venezuela, to Washington to confer with the representatives of the powers which had claims against Venezuela in order to arrange an immediate settlement or for reference to The Hague Tribunal or other arbitrator. The German government then informed the United States that before entering into further negotiations with Venezuela it appeared necessary that President Castro should give a definite declaration that he accepted unconditionally the reservations contained in a previous communication, besides which he must specially make clear in what manner he intended to pay the demands contained in that memorandum, or to give security for the amount. In reply to this demand President Castro telegraphed to Mr. Bowen that the Venezuelan government accepted the conditions of Great Britain and Germany, and requested him to go immediately to Washington for the purpose of conferring with the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain and Germany and with the diplomatic representatives of the other nations which had claims against Venezuela and to arrange either an immediate settlement of the claims or for their submission to arbitration. This telegram was transmitted by Mr. Bowen to the Secretary of State at Washington and by the United States ambassador at Berlin by instruction communicated to the German government a part of a letter from Mr. Bowen to the Secretary of State of the United States, which was marked confidential, and in which Mr. Bowen requested that if, as he understood, Great Britain and Germany wanted to know what guaranty they would

have, they be informed that it would be the customs houses, consequently, he, Mr. Bowen, begged that the blockade be raised

at once.

It was seriously claimed in the proceedings before The Hague Tribunal by Venezuela and by others of the creditor nations that the agreement of Venezuela that the blockade powers should have the customs houses as a guaranty was void because it was obtained under duress. This contention might as well apply to the protocols of February 13, 1903, and even to the submission to arbitration, because both were entered into in order to induce the three powers to raise the blockade. The contention refutes itself. . . .

Notwithstanding the pledge under his hand on January 9, 1903, Mr. Bowen, as the Venezuelan representative, at Washington on January 23, 1903, proposed to Great Britain, Germany and Italy, to the surprise of their representatives, that all claims against Venezuela should be paid out of the 30 per cent. of the customs revenues of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello. When this proposal was made, Mr. Bowen considered the assent of the three powers necessary. Such assent was not given. However, in the course of later negotiations on January 25 and 27, Mr. Bowen (notwithstanding the pledge) stated definitely that the 30 per cent. were destined not only for the blockading powers, but for all the creditor nations. The representatives of the blockading powers replied that the 30 per cent. could not be accepted as a sufficient security unless they were to be employed exclusively for the benefit of the blockading powers, and protested against the assignment of the 30 per cent. to all the creditor powers. As Mr. Bowen adhered to the position taken by him, the three powers, in the interests of peace, consented to the submission of the question to arbitration.

THE Central Law Journal has this to say concerning "Right of Boarder to Receive Friends at his Boarding House for Immoral Purposes or at Unusual Hours:"

Until a man or woman lodges under his

own vine and fig tree, no place where he may happen to abide is secure from intrusion. Further than that, it seems to be the law that a boarder's room may be broken into on suspicion and his friends or visitors be held liable as trespassers, depending upon the moral or immoral purpose of their visit. This latter rule of law was forcibly illustrated by the recent case of Watson v. Dilts, 100 N. W. Rep 50, where the Supreme Court of Iowa held that where a defendant went to plaintiff's house between 9 and 12 o'clock in the evening for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with a female boarder, and was admitted to the house by her, he was a trespasser.

This decision raises several important questions: First: What purposes are so immoral as to change an invited guest of a boarder into a trespasser? Second: In such cases does not the boarder himself become a trespasser, or is he only an accessory before the fact? Third: To what length may a landlord go to discover the purpose of any visitors who may happen to call upon any of his boarders? Fourth: What facts are sufficient to raise a just suspicion in the landlord that the purposes of his guest are immoral or illegal? Fifth: Must a social call on a female boarder in rural communities occur before nine o'clock in the evening to be above suspicion? Sixth: If such is the case, what is the time limit for social calls in a populous metropolis? All these questions, fraught with such tremendous importance, are called forth by the decision of the court, but left, unfortunately, in the most perplexing uncertainty.

On the "Restriction of Book Sales to One Price," the National Corporation Reporter

says:

The law which has been asserted in Edison Phonograph Company v. Pike, 116 Fed. Rep., 863, and in Victor Talking Machine Company . The Fair, 118 Fed. Rep., 609, is spreading, and at least one publisher has resorted to the expedient of controlling the price of his publication by printing on the page immediately following the title-page,

the following: "The price of this book at retail is $1.00 net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and the sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright."

In Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Snellenbrug, 131 Fed. Rep., 530, it was held in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, that such a notice did not entitle the publishers to control the retail price of the book so as to render the sale of the book at a reduced price an infringement of the copyright.

District Judge Holland pointed out that the result of all the decisions in cases of this kind is to the effect that when the owner of a copyright transfers title to a copyrighted book, although under an agreement restricting its use, or price at which it can be sold at retail, and the book is sold in violation of this agreement, his only remedy is for breach of contract, and cannot be restrained by virtue of the copyright statutes.

But does a notice inserted in the books of a publisher amount to the retention by him of such an ownership, when the copy is transferred, as would entitle him to protection under the copyright law? This question was answered in the negative, and it was held that the copyright statutes cannot be invoked to control the retailing trade of books, the title to which the copyright owner has transferred. When a book publisher transfers his title to a copy of a book, either to reader, subscriber or retailer, he has exercised his sole liberty of vending that particular copy, and it is the only right the exercise of which is protected by the copyright law.

It is suggested by the court that if it is desirable to further control the matter of sale at retail in the possession of the retailer, it must be by agreement with the seller and his vendees, and that such a notice in the book cannot work an infringement. It would simply be a violation of contract with a purchaser, and the publisher must look for his remedy to their contract.

The attempted restriction will no doubt be fought to the bitter end, and it may require

the decision of the highest court in the land to settle it.

ONE result of the Beck case (says The Law Journal, London) has been to revive the demand for the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal-a demand to which further force has been given by the release of Isaac da Costa. These two cases of mistaken identity go to show-what, of course, needed no demonstration-that the administration of justice is not free from error. That they are to be regarded as proving the necessity of a Court of Criminal Appeal is by no means so certain. Apart from the main ground on which the formation of such a tribunal is to be opposed-that it would, in destroying the finality of their decisions, tend to weaken the sense of responsibility under which juries now discharge their duties there are numerous points to be disposed of before an unlimited right of appeal in criminal cases can be shown to be desirable. The great majority of prisoners are poor. A petition to the Home Office is an inexpensive thing, but an appeal to a Court of Criminal Appeal would be costly. "The door of appeal is open to the rich man, closed to the poor. In practice the result of the right of criminal appeal is that there is one law for the rich, another for the poor." That is the view expressed of the American system in a recent number of THE GREEN BAG, and it is difficult to see how a similar result could be avoided here. Not less instructive is the experience of America in regard to delay. In New York County, during the five years from 1898 to 1902, the average interval between a conviction and the decision on appeal was fourteen months. Any considerable delay in the determination of criminal cases is bound to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Another point to be considered is that a Court of Criminal Appeal, like any other judicial tribunal, would be compelled to act according to the settled rules of evidence. The Home Office is unfettered in this respect; it can act on evidence which could not properly be brought before a Court of