country of the nature of our laws and its application to citizens of the foreign country. In some instances exchanges of notes between the United States and the foreign country took place. None of these were labeled executive agreements or numbered in the executive agreement series. JOHN A. MARZALL, Commissioner. Exhibit No. 8 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY, To: The Solicitor. Subject: Senate Joint Resolutions 122 and 130. This is in response to your verbal request for information regarding international activities of this bureau under executive agreements. Our international activities may be divided into four general categories: (1) Those specifically authorized by law, (2) continuing programs involving exchange of information, (3) occasional survey projects of a limited nature and for a specific purpose, and (4) participation as a member of international conferences. More specifically, these activities are- (1) Authorized by law for (a) Economic Cooperation Administration; (b) Mutual Security Agency; (c) International boundary surveys. (2) Continuing programs: The act of August 6, 1947 (61 Stat. 787), authorizes the Coast and Geodetic Survey to engage in a number of activities which are generally restricted to the United States, its territories, and possessions. (a) The law authorizes the collection of geomagnetic data from domestic and foreign sources. This is accomplished by informal exchange agreements with foreign governments and privately endowed observatories. These data are used to compile world isogonic charts which are published by the Hydrographic Office. (b) The bureau is authorized to make seismological observations and investigations. A study of earthquakes involves the collection of earthquake data from all available sources. Although the law does not specifically authorize such activity, we believe it is inherent in the authorization for investigation and that to attempt to restrict such a study to our own country would be a most impractical approach to the problem. Under informal agreement with foreign observers, both governmental and private, we exchange information on earthquakes and have been assisted by the communication system of the Department of State. The seismic sea wave warning system in the Pacific Basin also involves a continuing cooperative service between all Pacific maritime nations. (c) Since this bureau is the only one in this country which publishes predictions of tides and currents, it has been our practice for many years to exchange tide prediction data with foreign maritime nations for the benefit of our merchant marine and Navy. These exchanges are accomplished by informal correspondence between the bureau and its counterpart in foreign governments. (d) The bureau operates two observatories for the purpose of determining the variation of latitude. These observatories are part of a system which encircles the earth. The program is sponsored by the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics which is financed by participating members. The data are assembled and the computations are made in Italy. This activity is authorized by law to the extent that the Congress authorizes appropriations for the work. (3) Occasional survey projects: (a) The geodetic control surveys of Canada and Mexico are based on the North American Datum of 1927 which has its center point in Kansas. There have been several boundary survey operations conducted jointly under agreements made through the State Department. Various other informal agreements of this kind have been made. The Arctic TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS Field Party has been authorized to enter on Canadian soil this summer (b) During World War II the Coast and Geodetic Survey established (4) The bureau participates in or is affected by international conferences such as (a) The International Hydrographic Bureau; (b) The International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics; (c) The International Society of Photogrammetry; (d) The International Civil Aviation Organization. The activities enumerated above are efficient and productive of valuable scientific data which are used in many ways for the benefit of this country. We would oppose any threat to curtail these activities or to complicate the system of exchange by needless red tape and expensive formality. R. F. A. STUDDS, Director. Exhibit No. 9 Office memorandum To: Mr. Kenneth F. McClure, Office of the Solicitor. JUNE 2, 1952. Under the Mutual Security Pact we are engaged upon a joint defense effort with the free nations of Europe. As a part of the pact it is contemplated that much production of defense equipment will be undertaken in Europe. This in turn will require the transfer of production information from United States firms to European industries. Naturally, many domestic firms will be reluctant to share such important "know-how" without assurance that legitimate private rights will be respected and they will be afforded reasonable opportunity to deal directly with their "opposite number" abroad. The State and Commerce Departments, working with a competent group of industry advisers, are engaged in drafting suitable agreements under which we and the several European countries concerned agree to honor these general principles. This endeavor will result in negotiations "piloted" by State to obtain If these agreements should be nullified, it ratifying executive agreements. would retard the defense of Europe, make void this section of NATO, and jeopardize private rights of United States manufacturers of defense equipment. JCG/hs. Hon. PAT MCCARRAN, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I appreciate the opportunity extended in your letter of June 10 to present to you and the committee my views on the effect which enactment of Senate Joint Resolution 130 would have upon the type of mobilization activity in which the Defense Production Administration is now engaged, and The urgent nature of upon the complete mobilization necessary in time of war. mobilization programs makes the negotiation of formal treaties generally unnecessary and inappropriate, but those activities frequently require undertakings with foreign governments which might be considered executive agreements within the meaning of Senate Joint Resolution 130. The proposed amendment to the Constitution would prohibit or at least seriously delay consummation of international agreements of vital importance to industrial mobilization in time of serious national emergency. The amendment is clearly intended to limit the present constitutional authority of the Executive to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. It prohibits certain types of foreign agreements and requires that many others, now the concern of the Executive, be subject to Senate ratification. In my opinion, there is no time when flexible authority to negotiate with foreign governments is more important than in time of war or national emergency arising from the threat of war. With the economic and military interdependence of the nations of the free world constantly increasing, it is clear that mobilization of our economic and military resources for national defense is unavoidably interwoven with similar activities of the other nations and can be efficiently achieved only on the basis of mutual undertakings among allies. Negotiation of agreements of this kind would be a day-to-day activity in the event of all-out war and is important to emergency mobilization at any time. During World War II various international agreements were entered into to meet mobilization problems. In the emergency period before Pearl Harbor, by joint announcement of the President and the Canadian Prime Minister, we set up the Permanent Joint Board on Defense to coordinate plans for military, naval, and air defense of North America. This agreement was soon followed by the Hyde Park Agreement with Canada in which the two nations declared that each should provide the other with defense articles which it could best produce quickly and that the production programs of each should be coordinated toward that end. This pooling of the productive resources of the two countries was of great importance to our mobilization program and an appropriate exercise of the authority given the President to direct production for national defense. The agreement, of course, was implemented by the use of statutory powers granted to the President by the Congress, but the agreement itself was essential to the program. As you know, a similar agreement with Canada was entered into to meet the needs of the present national emergency. Other agreements were entered into during the war with respect to other resources and with other countries. You will remember, I am sure, the Combined Shipping Board which made possible the maximum utilization of merchant vessels for the common purpose. Shipments of strategic materials and weapons of war, as well as the use of port facilities, were thus coordinated without regard to the nationality of the vessels concerned. In their own areas, the Combined Raw Materials Board and the Combined Production and Resources Board did much to coordinate expansion and production programs in order to achieve the balanced military effort that was essential to successful prosecution of the war. All of these cooperative wartime activities were rooted in international agreement. Although they depended upon the exercise of internal authority of the countries involved and may not have been strictly binding on the participants under the principles of international law, the agreements resulted, at least, in moral commitments arising from our common objective. I am not sure that the term "executive agreements" as used in Senate Joint Resolution 130 would include mutual undertakings of the type referred to, but since the clear purpose of the amendment is to limit the President's authority to negotiate with foreign governments, serious doubts as to the constitutionality of such undertakings would arise and would detract from their effectiveness and diminish the enthusiasm of our allies for attempting cooperative action. Agreements of this type would sometimes effect the rights of citizens of the United States referred to in section 1 of the proposed amendment to the Constitution, and it might be argued that the joint boards or commissions necessary in such cases were international organizations under section 2 of the article. Furthermore it is difficult to predict the form or scope of international agreements which may be necessary to the national safety in time of war. The limitations proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 130 might completely bar some undertaking vital to our defense. Because of my present position I have confined my principal remarks to the field of mobilization for war or national defense. Beyond that area of concern, it does seem that the amendment contravenes the theory of separation of powers in removing from the President a portion of the authority which according to political and legal history should reside in the Executive. I feel most sincerely that the conduct of our defense arrangements through foreign relations in time of emergency would be greatly hampered by the proposed amendment to the Constitution. Sincerely yours, HENRY H. FOWLER, Administrator. TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS Hon. PAT MCCARRAN, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Reference is made to your letter of June 3, 1952, in response to my letter of May 29, 1952, requesting an opportunity to testify on Senate Joint Resolution 130, a proposal to amend the Constitution relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements. In accordance with the wishes expressed in your letter, my views on Senate Joint Resolution 130 are contained herein in lieu of presentation in the form of oral testimony before the subcommittee considering the resolution. Your letter indicates that these comments will be incorporated into the record of the hearings on this resolution. First I desire to express my whole-hearted concurrence in the views of the Under Secretary of State who has appeared before the subcommittee in As he stated, this proposal "conopposition to Senate Joint Resolution 130. cerns every agency of the Government which operates in the foreign field." It is of concern to the Department of Labor because this Department is responsible for United States Government participation in the International Labor Organization, subject, of course, to the over-all foreign policy guidance I am particularly anxious to present my views of the Department of State. to the subcommittee considering Senate Joint Resolution 130 because it appears that some of the momentum for the proposed amendment has been provided by charges that ILO conventions may be used, under the treaty-making power of Such the United States, to usurp the legislative powers of the Congress and to enable the Federal Government to encroach upon the powers of the States. charges are evidently based upon serious misconceptions of our participation in the International Labor Organization and they should not be permitted to remain unchallenged on the record of the hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 130. I might point out that similar charges, based upon similar misconceptions, have been made by Senator Bricker in connection with his introduction of Senate Concurrent Resolution 83 on June 5, 1952 (Congressional Record, p. 6700). The efforts of the ILO to improve living and working conditions through international cooperation are in accord with the positive approach of United States foreign policy, as exemplified by the Marshall plan and the point 4 program, to remove the economic and social climates which breed communism. During this period of world affairs, in which there has been a determined effort on the part of totalitarian regimes to spread their ideologies and encroach upon the democratic world, there nevertheless appears to be in this country an increasing and unwarranted concern with the possibility that, through our association with other countries in the activities of the ILO and other international organizations, we may be committing ourselves to certain obligations with respect to matters which are foreign to our democratic institutions. I want to point out that with respect to the International Labor Organization the United States is under no obligation whatsoever to take any actions which are not in accord with our social and economic philosophy and with our national and international objectives. On the contrary, we are in a position to use our influence in the ILO to promote concepts which will serve our fundamental objectives of strengthening democracy and economic stability throughout the world. We have no better opportunity to do this than in the ILO, where independent representatives of American industry and labor are present, with full participating and voting rights, to present the American way and to promote our interests. As a member of the International Labor Organization, we are completely free to determine what implementing action, if any, we shall undertake with respect to the standards adopted by the ILO at its annual conferences. As you know, these standards are adopted by a two-thirds vote of the conference, at which delegates representing management and labor, as well as governments, from the member countries have a vote, and they are in the form either of conventions or Conventions are proposed-and I stress the word "prorecommendations. posed"-treaties. Recommendations are not proposed treaties, but are statements of objectives or principles. There appears to be some misunderstanding as to our obligations, as a member of the ILO, with respect to these matters. First, let me say emphatically that we are under no compulsion to ratify any of the conventions that are adopted at ILO conferences. The fact that out of the total of 54 conventions adopted since we became a member, the United States has ratified only 6, should be persuasive evidence that the adoption of a convention by the conference does not impose that convention upon a member government of the ILO. Under the ILO constitution we do have an obligation to follow certain procedures with respect to conventions, but this involves no obligation as to the decisions this country will make concerning ratification or other action to implement the convention in the United States. We do have an obligation to refer the conventions, within a specified time period, to the "competent authorities" to consider the enactment of legislation or other action. Conventions which are appropriate for Federal action under cur constitutional system are submitted either to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification or to the Congress for such action as Congress itself considers appropriate. In the case of recommendations, we have the same obligation to refer them to the "competent authorities" for their consideration of legislative or other action. It should be emphasized that each convention and recommendation is referred to the appropriate Federal or State authorities for consideration as to the action to be taken toward implementation of the standards proposed therein. Decisions to make any changes in Federal or State legislation to give effect to any of the provisions of these standards are taken in each case by the legislative bodies of the Federal Government or of the State governments. There is full freedom of determination on the question of the action that we may or may not take to implement the standards in the United States; and these determinations and actions are made in accordance with our constitutional system. There is another obligation we have as a member of the ILO; and this is an opportunity as well as a duty. This Government, under the amended International Labor Organization constitution, has a duty to report at appropriate intervals as requested by the governing body of the ILO on the position of the law and practice of the Federal Government and of the States, in regard to the matters dealt with in recommendations and unratified conventions. The United States strongly supported the changed requirements in the amended ILO constitution with respect to reporting on recommendations and unratified conventions for the reason that in many instances State and Federal legislation has already surpassed the standards set in these various International Labor Organization conventions and recommendations. Consequently, we believe that the present provisions which do not limit such reporting to conventions which have been ratified, make it possible more accurately to reflect the position of the United States with respect to the subject matter of these conventions and recommendations; and thereby to benefit to the extent that this may encourage other countries to meet these standards. In short, in our consideration of any convention adopted by the International Labor Organization, the United States has complete freedom of action to determine under our constitutional system how it may best take action with respect to such convention in order to promote the best interests of the United States. The testimony before this subcommittee of Mr. McGrath, who has been for several years a member of the employers' delegation to the annual conference of the ILO, is an example of the misconceptions which exist with respect to the implications of our participation in the ILO. He charges among other things that "the ILO has gone far beyond the field of labor and is seeking to set itself up as a form of international legislature to formulate uniform domestic socialistic laws which it hopes, by the vehicle of treaty ratification, can eventually be imposed upon most of the countries of the world." The ILO. Mr. McGrath says, "seeks to inject the principle of internationalism into domestic legislation and destroy the principal of local self-government." These statements are completely incorrect. The fact, as described in detail above, is that our membership in, and participation in the activities of, the ILO create no obligation in the United States to enact or change any legislation. Our action depends on what we consider to be our best interests. As a general rule, labor standards in the United States are as high or higher than those provided in ILO conventions and recommendations. A major objective of our participation in the ILO is to let the rest of the world know of the high standards prevailing in this country. I think all of us are aware of the desirability of improving the conditions of labor in other countries in order to advance democratic institutions, to provide the social and economic foundations for a peaceful world, and to protect our own industry from the competition of low labor standards in other countries. The development of international labor standards, whether in the form of conventions or recom |