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they desire but are likewise very mutable, so that the same thing does not please them long. They are ambitious of praise, and quick in their resentments; lavish of their money, as not having experienced the want of it: frank and open, because they have not often been deceived; and credulous for the same reason. They readily hope the best, because they have not suffered much, and are therefore not so sensible of the uncertainty of human affairs; for which reason they are likewise more easily deceived. They are modest from their little acquaintance with the world. They love company and cheerfulness, from the briskness of their spirits; and think well of their friends. They imagine they know more than they do, and for that reason are apt to be too positive. In a word, they generally exceed in what they do, love violently, hate violently, and act in the same manner through the rest of their conduct.
The disposition of old men is generally contrary to the former. They are cautious, and enter upon nothing hastily; having in the course of many years been often imposed upon, having often erred, and experienced the prevailing corruption of human affairs; for which reason they are likewise suspicious, and moderate in their affections, either of love or hatred. They pursue nothing great and noble, and regard only the necessaries of life. They love money, having learnt by experience the difficulty of getting it, and how easily it is lost. They are fearful, which makes them provident-commonly full of complaints from bodily infirmities, and a deficiency of spirits—please themselves rather with the memory of what is past than any future prospect, having so short a view of
life before them, in comparison of what is already gone; for which reason also they love to talk of things past, and prefer them to what is present, of which they have but little relish, and know they must shortly leave them. They are soon angry, but not to excess. Lastly, they are compassionate, from a sense of their own infirmities, which makes them think themselves of all persons most exposed.
Persons of a middle age, betwixt these two extremes, as they are freed from the rashness and temerity of youth, so they have not yet suffered the decays of old age. Hence in every thing they generally observe a better conduct. They are neither so hasty in their assent as the one, nor so minutely scrupulous as the other, but weigh the reasons of things. They regard a decency in their actions, are careful and industrious; and, as they undertake what appears just and laudable upon better and more deliberate consideration than young persons, so they pursue them with more vigor and resolution than those who are older.
As to the different fortunes of mankind, they may be considered as noble, rich, or powerful; and the contrary to these. Those of high birth, and noble extraction, are generally very tender of their honour, and ambitious to increase it; it being natural for all persons to desire an addition to those advantages, of which they find themselves already possessed. And they are apt to consider all others as much their inferiors, and therefore expect great regard and deference should be shown them. Riches, when accompanied with a generous temper, command respect from the opportunities they give of being useful to others; but they usually elate the mind, and occasion pride. For
as money is commonly said to command all things, those who are possessed of a large share of it expect others should be at their beck; since they enjoy that which all desire, and most persons make the main pursuit of their lives to obtain. But nothing is more apt to swell the mind than power. This is what all men naturally covet, even when perhaps they would not use it. But the views of such persons are generally more noble and generous than of those who only pursue riches, and the heaping up of money. A state contrary to these gives a contrary turn of mind; and, in lower life, persons' dispositions usually differ according to their stations and circumstances. A citizen and a courtier, a merchant and a soldier, a scholar and a peasant, as their pursuits are different, so is generally their turn and disposition of mind.
It is the orator's business, therefore, to consider these several characters and circumstances of life, with the different bias and way of thinking they give to the mind; that he may so conduct himself in his behaviour and manner of speaking, as will render him most acceptable, and gain him the good esteem of those whom he addresses.
Of the Passions.
The third and last part of rhetorical invention relates to the passions, of which I am now to discourse. And as it is often highly necessary for the orator, so it requires his greatest skill to engage these in his interest. Quintilian calls this, The soul and spirit of his art. And, doubtless, nothing more discovers its empire over the minds of men than this power to ex
eite, appease, and sway their passions, agreeably to the design of the speaker. Hence we meet with the characters of admirable, divine, and other splendid titles ascribed to eloquence by ancient writers. There is nothing great or noble to be performed in life, wherein the passions are not concerned. The stoics, therefore, who were for eradicating the passions, both maintained a thing in itself impossible; and which, if it was possible, would be of the greatest prejudice to mankind. For while they appeared such zealous asserters of the government of reason, they scarce left it any thing to govern; for the authority of reason is principally exercised in ruling and moderating the passions, which, when kept in a due regulation, are the springs and motives to virtue. Thus hope produces patience, and fear industry, and the like might be shown of the rest. The passions, therefore, are not to be extirpated, as the stoics asserted, but put under the direction and conduct of reason. Indeed, where they are ungovernable, and, instead of obeying, command, they are, as some have fitly called them, disease of the mind, and frequently hurry men into vice, the greatest misfortunes of life. Just as the wind, when it blows moderately, earries on the ship; t blows but if it be too boisterous and violent, may overset her. The charge, therefore, brought against this art, for giving rules to influence the passions, appears groundless and unjust; since the proper use of the passions is not to hinder the exercise of reason, but to engage men to act agreeably to reason: and if an ill use be sometimes made of this, it is not the fault of the art but of the artist. So moralists explain the nature both of virtues and vices, that men may know
better how to practise one, and avoid the other; but if their precepts happen to have a different effect, they are not answerable for that.
But that an orator may be enabled to manage this part of his province to the best advantage, it is necessary he should, in some measure, be acquainted with the nature, causes, and objects of the passions. Now the passions, as defined by Aristotle, are, Commotions of the mind, under the influence of which men think differently concerning the same things. Thus a thing appears good to him who desires it; though it may not appear so to another, or to the same person at a different time. Writers are not agreed as to the number of the passions. But I shall wave this dispute, as the more proper business of philosophy, and only consider them as they come under the cognizance of the orator. And that I may proceed in some order, I shall treat of them as they may be separately referred, either to demonstrative, deliberative, or judicial discourses; though they are not wholly confined to any of them.
To the demonstrative kind we may refer joy and sorrow, love and hatred, emulation and contempt.
Joy is an elation of the mind, arising from a sense of some present good. Such a reflection naturally creates a pleasant and agreeable sensation, which ends in a delightful calm and serenity. This is heightened by a description of former evils, and a comparison between them and the present felicity. Thus Cicero endeavours to excite in the minds of his fellow citizens the highest sense of joy and delight at Catiline's departure from Rome, by representing to them the im