[850, Sept. 28. Pay of Superintendent, Naval Academy.7 And the pay of the superintendent of the naval school at Annapolis shall be at the rate allowed to an officer of his rank, when in service at sea.--(9 Stat. 515, ch. 80.) EDITORIAL NOTES This provision is embodied in the U. S. Code as sec. 868 of title 34. This provision was not embraced in any section of the Revised Statutes. In this connection, see the following: sec. 5596, R. S.; Lemly v. United States, 28 Ct. Cls. 468, 470-471, Nov. 13, 1893; and 6 Comp. Dec. 885, May 19, 1900. This provision was rendered obsolete by an act of June 10, 1922, ch. 212, 42 Stat. 625-633, which abolished the distinction between sea duty and shore duty for pay purposes. In this connection, see 2 Comp. Gen. 212, Sept. 19, 1922, and Comp. Gen. Dec. B-31305, Feb. 18, 1943. 1862, July 16. Conformity of wage rates at navy yards with those of private establishments in vicinity. That section eight of an act to further promote the efficiency of the navy, approved December twentyfirst, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, be amended so as to read as follows: That the hours of labor and the rate of wages of the employees in the navy yards shall conform, as nearly as is consistent with the public interest, with those of private establishments in the immediate vicinity of the respective yards, to be determined by the commandants of the navy yards, subject to the approval and revision of the Secretary of the Navy.--(12 Stat. 587, ch. 184.) EDITORIAL NOTES No part of this act was embraced in any section of the Revised Statutes, although portions of sec. 8, of the act of Dec. 21, 1861, ch. 1, 12 Stat. 330, of which it was amendatory, were carried into the revision. In this connection, see sec. 5596, R. S. So much of this act as related to hours of labor of employees in navy yards was superseded by later legislation. So much of this act as relates to wages of employees in navy yards is embodied in the U. S. Code as sec. 505 of title 34. CROSS REFERENCE Pay and number of employees at navy yards and stations: see act of Mar. 3, 1909, ch. 255, 35 Stat. 754-755, as amended. CASE NOTES Scope and operation of statute.- "In my opinion, the statute of June 25, 1868, ch. 72, 15 Stat. 77 has nothing to do with the compensation to be paid to workmen in the navy-yards, and lear that to be determined under the provisions of the act of July 16, 1862. The provision that eight hours shall constitute a day's labor has no tendency whatever to show whether the day's labor thus established shall be paid at a lower or higher rate than the day of ten hours labor, or at the same rate. The rate of compensation is still left by law to be determined under the rule prescribed by the statute of July 16, 1862, so as to conform, as nearly as is consistent with the public interest, with the rate of wages of private establishments in the immediate vicinity of the respective navy-yards, 'to be determined by the Commandants of the navy-yards, subject to the approval and revision of the Secretary of the Navy.' If the private establishments in the neighborhood employed their hands for five hours a day only, there would, obviously, be no justice in reducing the wages of those employed in the navy-yards for eight hours to the amount paid by the day in private establishments, and the law intended no such result. other hand, I find nothing in the statute which requires you to pay the same price for eight hours' labor which private establishments pay for ten or twelve, unless the amount of service rendered or the quality of the work make the fewer hours in the navyyards equivalent in value to the longer time hired in private establishments, or, for some other reason, On the make it consistent with the public interest." (13 Op. Atty. Gen. 29, 30-31, Apr. 20, 1869. See also 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 341, 344-345, Apr. 29, 1882.) "In the first place, there is a serious doubt whether the powder factory may be considered as a 'navy yard,' and whether the salary or compensation of the two scientists considered in the decision of November 20, 1926, may be considered as 'wages of employees' within the meaning of the quoted statute. But, be that as it may, there appears nothing in the provision in question tending to indicate that the authority thus vested in the Secretary of the Navy is not subject to general statutory restrictions governing the payment of compensation to civil employees, such as are imposed by sections 1764 and 1765, Revised Statutes, the act of July 31, 1894, 28 Stat. 205, and the act of May 10, 1916, 39 Stat. 120, as amended by the act of August 26, 1916, 39 Stát. 582, considered in the prior decision, prohibiting payment of additional compensation and limiting the payment of compensation to one person holding two positions. The authority thus vested in the Secretary of the Navy is clearly subject to those statutes as well as to any other statutory provision generally applicable to the payment of compensation to civil employees from appropriated funds, such as section 3 of the act of March 2, 1926, and section 3 of the act of January 26, 1927, supra. There is no difference in this regard in the authority of the Secretary of the Navy and that vested in the head of any other department or establishment of the Government under an authorization to fix rates of compensation of employees. The act of 1862 was simply for the purpose of maintaining a schedule of wages for navy-yard employees comparable with that paid in private establishments in the immediate vicinity, and could pot be construed as removing or rendering inoperative the statutory restrictions or limitations, not clearly inconsistent therewith, governing the payment of compensation of Government employees. The necessity of fixing the rates of pay of navy-yard employees in accordance with the prevailing rates in the vicinity can not operate to authorize disregarding other statutory provisions clearly applicable to the payment of compensation of civil employees, including the statutory provision here under consideration, requiring the determined value of allowances furnished in kind to be considered as a part of compensation and included in the total rate fixed for the position." (6 Comp. Gen. 588, 591, Mar. 17, 1927.) "The annual schedule of wages for civil employees in the Naval Establishment is promulgated under authority contained in the act of July 16, 1862, 12 Stat. 587, the act of March 3, 1909, 35 Stat. 754, and pursuant to the general administrative authority vested in the Secretary of the Navy to fix the compensation rates of employees under the Navy Department within available appropriations." (8 Comp. Gen. 574, 575, May 1, 1929. See also 7 Comp. Gen. 828, 829, June 27, 1928.) "The Act does not prescribe the method by which the rates shall be determined. It has been the departmental practice to have special boards on wages appointed by the commandants of the various navy yards and naval stations, which boards make inquiry of the private establishments in their vicinity and of the wages paid to workmen in the different classes in each trade or occupation similar to those in the If in the opinion of the Secretary of the Navy the public interest requires that the wages of employees in Groups I, II and III at a particular navy yard be increased above those of private establishments in the immediate vicinity thereof, so that the wages of such employees will be the same as are paid employees in similar groups in another navy yard, he may legally issue an order providing for such increase. (File NY?/L16-4 (390424), June 30, 1939, C. M. O. 1-1939, p. 26.) 1863, Mar. 3. Pay of commandant, Mare Island Navy Yard.7 That the pay of the officer of the navy assigned to the command of the navy yard at Mare Island, California, shall be the sea pay of his grade.--(12 Stat. 825, Res.No. 25.) EDITORIAL NOTES This joint resolution is embodied in the U.S. Code as sec. 869 of title 34. This joint resolution was not embraced in any section of the Revised Statutes. In this connection, see the following: sec. 5596, R. S.; Lemly v. United States, 28 Ct. Cls. 468, 470-471, Nov. 13, 1893; and 15 Comp. Dec. 36, July 16, 1908. 1874, June 20. Extra compensation or perquisites.7 This joint resolution was rendered obsolete by an act of June 10, 1922, ch. 212, 42 Stat. 625-633, which abolished the distinction between sea duty and shore duty for pay purposes. In this connection, see 2 Comp. Gen. 212, Sept. 19, 1922; and Comp. Gen. Dec. B31305, Feb. 18, 1943. Sec. 3. That no civil officer of the Government shall hereafter receive any compensation or perquisites, directly or indirectly, from the treasury or property of the United States beyond his salary or compensation allowed by law: Provided, That this shall not be construed to prevent the employment and payment by the Department of Justice of district attorneys as now allowed by law for the performance of services not covered by their salaries or fees.--(18 Stat. 109, ch. 328.) EDITORIAL NOTE This section is embodied in the U.S. Code as sec. 71 of title 5. CROSS REFERENCES Extra allowances: see sec. 1765, R. S. Payment of cash rewards to civilian employees for useful suggestions: see act of July 1, 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 718. Restriction upon payment of additional compensation to persons employed under general or. lump-sum appropriations: see act of Aug. 1, 1914, ch. 223, sec. 12, 38 Stat. 680. * CASE NOTES Scope and operation of section. - "This section clearly enacts a general stringent rule against any compensation, beyond the salary and fees specifically authorized by law as belonging to the office, and the proviso simply saved from repeal by implication any existing law which allowed the department of justice to pay district attorneys for services not covered by the salary and fees belonging to the office." (Ruhm v. United States, 66 F. 531, 533, Apr. 10, 1895. See also United States v. Ady, 76 F. 359, 362-363, Sept. 28, 1896.) "This statute must be confined to compensation or perquisites' claimed officially. The words 'compensation or perquisites' import this. The provision was, no doubt, intended to give exact ness, and confine the remuneration of officers to the fees and compensation expressly allowed by the various and appropriate statutes." (United States v. Winston, 73 F. 149, 154, Feb. 10, 1896.) "The authority of the Attorney-General or Department of Justice to employ and pay United States attorneys for services not covered by their salaries and fees is expressly recognized by Congress in section 3 of the act of June 30, 1874 (18 Stat., 109), and section 299 Revised Statutes, and the annual appropriation made by Congress for that purpose. (20 Op. Atty. Gen. 49, 50, Mar. 26, 1891.) "A simple interpretation of the terms of this later statute would lead to the conclusion that it prohibits any civil officer from receiving any compensation other than that provided by law for the office which he holds. But no doubt it is subject to precisely the same method of interpretation that has been applied to section 1763, supra, and as it is much less specific in its terms a discussion of them would lead to no useful result." (8 Comp. Dec. 901, 914, June 30, 1902.) Special legislation.- In passing a special act authorizing lease of land under naval control in Puerto Rico to a naval officer for residence purposes, Congress must be presumed to have had in contemplation this statute and sec. 1765, R. S., and such specific act must be held to show intent to make an exception to the general statutes. (Baker v. United States, 27. F.2d 863, July 30, 1928.) 1874, June 20. Unexpended balances of appropriations.7 Sec. 5. That from and after the first day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-four, and of each year thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall cause all unexpended balances of appropriations which shall have remained upon the books of the Treasury for two fiscal years to be carried to the surplus fund and covered into the Treasury: Provided, That this provision shall not apply to permanent specific appropriations, appropriations for rivers and harbors, light-houses, fortifications, public buildings, or the pay of the navy and marine corps; but the appropriations named in this proviso shall continue available until otherwise ordered by Congress.--(18 Stat. 110, ch. 328.) Purpose of section. - "The mischief intended to be remedied by the surplus fund act of June 20, 1874, was that of permitting appropriations to continue available for the payment of the debts or claims for which they provided for a long period after such appropriations were made, and was intended to fix a definite period within which the appropriations should be used or the unexpended balances carried to the surplus fund. If the disbursing officers were permitted to retain the funds which are in their hands after the arrival of such period, the object of the law would be to a certain extent defeated, as the funds would continue available for a longer period than was intended. (15 Op. Atty. Gen. 357, 358, Aug. 10, 1877. See also 3 Comp. Dec. 623, 626-627, May 25, 1897.) within such year, the appropriation must be one known as permanent or indefinite." (3 Comp. Dec. 623, 627-628, May 25, 1897. See also 7 Comp. Dec. 84, 85, Aug. 11, 1900.) "It has been the policy of Congress for many years, as indicated by general and specific legislation, to restrict the availability of appropriations to the particular fiscal year for which they are made. (Act of July 12, 1870, 16 Stat., 251, now sec. 3690, Rev. Stat., and act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat., 110.) "By the proviso to the act of June 20, 1874 (18 Stat., 110), appropriations for rivers and harbors, light-houses, fortifications, public builuings, and the pay of the Navy and Marine Corps were expressly excepted from this rule and made available until otherwise ordered by Congress. By the act of June 23, 1874 (18 Stat., 275, the provision relative to public buildings in the foregoing act was modified by providing that appropriations for the construction of public buildings should be available until their completion. Specific, appropriations are also sometimes made available until expended or by other terms for an indefinite period. And where an appropriation contained in an act making appropriations for a particular fiscal year is made for a specific object which from its nature must necessarily require several years for its completion, it must be presumed that Congress intended that the appropriation should be available until the object for which it is made can be executed. But in view of the general policy of Congress, an appropriation contained in an act making annual appropriations should not be construed to be a permanent appropriation unless the character of the object for which it is made or the language of the appropriation renders it clear beyond reasonable doubt that. such was the intention of Congress." (7 Comp. Dec. 134, 135, Sept. 15, 1900. See also 10 Comp. Dec. 281, 282-283, Sept. 24, 1903.) "I am clearly of the opinion that this act affects all appropriations not within the exceptions named, and requires that the unexpended balances of such appropriations shall be covered into the Treasury after two years, notwithstanding that there may De claims against the appropriations growing out of contracts properly made within the life of the appropriations; indeed I can see no other object in the act than to accomplish this very purpose. While, as argued, section 3690 recognizes the legality of the payment of obligations incurred during the life of the appropriation after the expiration of the time during which such obligations can be legally incurred, and, if it stood alone, would not limit the time of payment, this act does expressly limit the time in which payment can be made, except in the manner provided therein, to two years after the expiration of the time in which the obligation could have been incurred. To make section 3690 controlling would be to make the later statute meaningless." (8 Comp. Dec. 369, 373-374, Dec. 4, 1901.) "That the word, 'unexpended, ' as used in the act of June 20, 1874, supra, must be construed to mean not already applied to payment seems clear from a reading of the context of the act. It has been argued that the word was intended by Congress "The character of the exceptions contained in the proviso indicates that Congress was fully alive to the fact that no limit appropriations for rivers and harbors, lighthouses, fortifications, public buildings, and the like to the fiscal year would render it practically impossible to carry on such work with economy or efficiency. The making of such improvements avolves the acquisition of title to lands by purchase or condemnation, and the carrying on of work which from its very nature can not be completed within definite periods of time; and especially within periods corresponding with the govemmental fiscal year. The first exception, 'permanent specific appropriations,' was no doubt intended to cover cases of appropriations of the same general character, which it was impracticable to foresee and designate more definitely. The expres 1874, June 20. First edition of the Revised Statutes.7 sion should, therefore, be construed in the light "Section 5 of the act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat., 110, provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall cause all 'unexpended balances' of appropriations which shall have remained upon the books of the Treasury two fiscal years to be carried to the surplus fund and covered into the Treasury. The section relates to unexpended balances only and does not support the attempted covering in of any part of these 1919 appropriations which had been expended prior to June 30, 1921. The covering of balances of appropriations into the Treasury is a bookkeeping transaction which does not involve the actual placing of money in the Treasury, otherwise the impossibility of covering into the Treasury money which had been expended at the time would have been apparent." (1 Comp. Gen. 510, 511, Mar. 14, 1922.) Sec. 2. ✶✶✶ and when printed and promulgated as hereinafter provided, the printed volumes shall be legal evidence of the laws and treaties therein contained, in all the courts of the United States, and of the several States and Territories.--(18 Stat. 113, ch. 333.) 1874, June 20. Award of Life-Saving Medal.7 Sec. 7. That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby directed to cause to be prepared medals of honor, with suitable devices, to be distinguished as life-saving medals of the first and second class, which shall be bestowed upon any persons who shall hereafter endanger their own lives in saving, or endeavouring to save lives from perils of the sea, within the United States, or upon any American vessel: Provided, That the medal of the first class shall be confined to cases of extreme and heroic daring; and that the medal of the second class shall be given in cases not sufficiently distinguished to deserve the medal of the first class: Provided, also, That no award of either medal shall be made to any person until sufficient evidence of his deserving shall have been filed with the Secretary of the Treasury and entered upon the records of the Department.--(18 Stat. 127, ch. 344.) |