Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a line of questioning, Mr. Dobbins, related to the death of Madam Durocher Bertin. If you could answer as concisely as you can, consistent with accuracy, I would appreciate it. The media reported and the State Department has confirmed that before Madam Bertin was killed, the U.S. military uncovered a plot to kill her. As a matter of fact, the committee now has obtained a letter dated March 22, 6 days before the killing, in which Major General George Fisher informed Haiti's defense-Haiti's justice minister about a credible plot to kill Madam Bertin. My first question: Did the Embassy consider the Interior Minister Beaubrun to be seriously implicated in the plot? Mr. DOBBINS. They thought that the allegation was a very serious one that needed to be looked into. So I think the answer is potentially yes. Mr. BEREUTER. And it was specifically concern about the Interior Minister? Mr. DOBBINS. At that stage, as I recall, the only government official that was alleged to be implicated was the Minister of the Inte rior. Mr. BEREUTER. Did President Aristide look into the Interior Minister's Mr. Beaubrun's-role in the foiled plot? Mr. DOBBINS. He told us that he had looked into it and that he believed that the charge was unsubstantiated. Mr. BEREUTER. And in fact that is true, that on March 23, the day after the Major General Fisher sent the letter, according to a chronology of events, President Aristide tells Major General Fisher and Ambassador William Swing that he has looked into Beaubrun's involvement in the Bertin plot and concluded that the Interior Ministry was not involved. The Justice Minister, who was supposed to be investigating, apparently didn't know that the Moise brothers were being held in a police station at the time, and so that day Ambassador Swing cabled the State Department suggesting calls to Aristide from senior Washington officials to press for an inquiry. Are you aware, Ambassador Dobbins, that Madam Bertin's husband has said that his murdered wife was never warned explicitly of the murder plot against her? Mr. DOBBINS. Yes. Mr. BEREUTER. A fact that was recently confirmed before members of this committee staff by a U.N. official who met with Madam Bertin several days before she was killed. Did the Embassy or the Multinational Force, Ambassador Dobbins, confirm with Mrs. Bertin directly that the Haitian officials had warned her of a plot to kill her? Mr. DOBBINS. I believe that the force commander, in consultation with the Ambassador, decided that it was the Government of Haiti's responsibility to convey the warning, that they asked them to do so, were told that they would do so. I believe they were also told that they had done so, and there's clearly a conflict there. Mrs. Bertin's husband and I believe another relative-there were subsequent conversations between Bertin and the Minister of Justice. No one else was present at them. I think there were two. The Minister of Justice maintained he conveyed the warning. Mrs. Bertin's relatives, who were not present but who talked to her afterward, say that he didn't. Mr. BEREUTER. If in fact a witness suggested to the U.S. military that in fact the Interior Minister was implicated, directly ordering assassination of Madam Bertin, doesn't it seem strange and derelict in our responsibilities that we didn't convey that warning directly to Madam Bertin rather than going through the government, a high public official of which it was said was the assassination implicator? Mr. DOBBINS. I think in the aftermath of the incident, instructions were sent to make sure that any-in similar situations the warning was conveyed directly as well as through the government. Mr. BEREUTER. I think that is an understatement. Did any U.S. agency inquire whether the Interior Minister or the Justice Minister, who failed to fully warn Madam Bertin of the impending assassination, were involved in the conspiracy to murder Madam Bertin? Have we investigated whether or not the Interior Ministry or the Justice Minister, the Justice Minister having failed to warn Mrs. Bertin of the impending assassination, whether or not they were implicated in the assassination plot? Mr. PERRY. The conspiracy to assassinate, the one you talked about, Congressman, before the Bertin investigation, was not an investigation which we conducted in the FBI. We actually conducted the investigation of the subsequent murder. Mr. BEREUTER. In fact, Mr. Perry, did you polygraph the people who were implicated in the assassination attempt? Mr. PERRY. There were polygraphs conducted, Congressman. Mr. PERRY. To polygraph, yes, sir. Mr. BEREUTER. And in fact did you polygraph the Justice Minister? Mr. PERRY. No, Congressman, we did not. Mr. BEREUTER. Did you polygraph the Interior Minister? Mr. PERRY. No, Congressman, we did not. Mr. BEREUTER. Why not, when they were implicated by the letter and information coming to Major General Fisher, the commanding general of the multilateral force? Mr. PERRY. We had made attempts to interview the Justice Minister or the Minister of the Interior early on in the investigation, but we did not do that because of conditions that were set up by the government, by government officials in Haiti regarding that interview. We conducted interviews of the people that were incarcerated in that conspiracy plot to see if there was any connection with the subsequent murder of Bertin. Mr. BEREUTER. I should correct my statement; the letter to Major General Fisher implicated only the Interior Ministry, not the Justice Minister. But if the Interior Minister, Mr. Beaubrun's role, was an FBI lead in March, why wasn't this explained to Mr. Burton's subcommittee in October when he asked if there were any leads? Mr. DOBBINS. You're asking me? Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Dobbins. Mr. DOBBINS. The fact of the plot that the minister was allegedly involved in was a matter of public knowledge which had been commented on in the open by the State Department, among others, as I recall, and there was no subsequent information other than what was in the public record, that I was aware of, that linked that to the actual murder. Mr. BEREUTER. But, Ambassador Dobbins, cables were sent to the State Department on March 22 and then on March 23 about the letter that Major General Fisher had sent. In addition, Ambassador Swing suggested to the State Department on March 23 that high-level calls be made to Aristide by senior Washington officials to press for an inquiry. So you knew, it seems to me, by reading those cables Mr. DOBBINS. I guess, Congressman, let me say, the FBI was sent down there because the murder had taken place in the context of an already existing alleged plot, which potentially involved the Minister of Interior and which, within 24 hours of the FBI's dispatch, was a matter of public record; in other words, that the Minister of Interior had potentially been involved in a plot to murder this woman a week before she was murdered was then public knowledge. Now, my understanding is that the FBI's investigation did not turn up any information which linked the minister or that earlier plot to the actual plot which killed her. So I had no new information on that minister and his involvement at that time, and indeed today. I didn't have any information that hadn't been put out to the press in March. Mr. BEREUTER. I do think that one result of-whether or not Congress has been fully informed, it is clear that a woman is dead in Haiti because we didn't inform the proper people, including the lady, about the alleged assassination attempt. Mr. DOBBINS. Mr. Congressman, that may be true, but it depends on whether you believe the Minister of Justice or Madam Bertin's relatives or whether Madam Bertin told her relatives. It may be true, I'm not disputing that it may be true, and because it may be true, it's not going to happen that way again. Mr. BEREUTER. Of course it is not just the relatives. We have a man who gives the details of the person who was a triggerman, hired by the Interior Minister to make the assassination, that came to the attention of Major General Fisher. General Fisher relayed that properly, and Ambassador Swing seems to have properly conveyed that information to the State Department and made suggestions about what should happen thereafter. Mr. DOBBINS. And that happened; all of that happened. Mr. BEREUTER. But the target for the assassination we notified through the Government of Haiti, of all things. I cannot pursue cable traffic any further without violating classification, Mr. Chairman, so I yield my time. Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say that I appreciate the work that some of my colleagues on the other side and this side are doing to try and make sure that the process toward improving the democracy in Haiti moves forward. And clearly any government or government officials involved in political murders threatens a democracy. But, you know, I think I am somewhat stunned at times, and I remember what happened in the debate in Congress when the democracy in Chile was removed by a general, a number of people died and disappeared, and that was kind of defended as the process toward ending communism in Chile, moving toward democracy. I wouldn't do that here. But I do think that it is important to look at this record and understand a couple of things. I sometimes get the sense from some of my colleagues on the other side, not Mr. Bereuter, but some of my other colleagues on the other side, that they are frustrated that there was actually an election in Haiti. Am I correct, Haiti has been free from about 1800, became independent early 1800's; is that correct? Mr. DOBBINS. 1804, I think. Mr. GEJDENSON. And how many times has been there a free election where the same individual didn't just get reelected or reappointed-has it ever happened before? Mr. DOBBINS. 1990. Mr. GEJDENSON. 1990. So now we have had another election, and prior to that, from 1800, it never happened. Mr. DOBBINS. Don't believe so. Mr. GEJDENSON. So we had Mr. Aristide get elected in what you consider basically a fair election? Mr. DOBBINS. Right. Mr. GEJDENSON. And you believe that this election was basically a fair election? Mr. DOBBINS. It wasn't perfect, but it was free and as fair asMr. GEJDENSON. Elections here aren't perfect either. There is now an investigation into whether the Speaker of the House_used his resources from a nonprofit to aid his political process. So no elections are perfect. Let me ask you this. The other question then becomes, it seems to me, do we ensure a greater likelihood of a better process in the future by terminating the police training funds and ending the program, or do we improve the likelihood of a better election in the future by continuing the police training funds? Mr. DOBBINS. I think we need to continue the funds, but I think we need to continue them based on an understanding with the Government of Haiti of what they're going to be used for, and I think in my testimony, and Bob Gelbard's, we made clear that that understanding has to be fairly clear and fairly carefully drawn, and it certainly excludes harboring criminals in that police department. Mr. GEJDENSON. And you think you can get that agreement? Mr. DOBBINS. I hope so. I think we've made a good deal of progress in this direction over the last year. I think we can continue to do so. Mr. GEJDENSON. And the other thing I look for here is alternatives to the current path. I mean if we are going to establish democracy over the long haul here, it seems to me the most important thing in this process, obviously, is to make sure that political assassinations end, that there is a political process where people who get elected and finish their term then stand down. So this was actually a significant step this time, because the past President could have made the argument he didn't get his whole term because he was removed and could have tried to argue for a longer period. He didn't do that at our request, I'm sure. Are there other things we can do to help try to ensure the democratic institutions are built in Haiti? I understand the need to focus on those who have been killed, whether it was in Haiti or Chile or Cuba or any place else. We are against political assassinations. I think that is a bipartisan desire. What are the things we can do to make sure that democratic institutions are furthered? We took a step forward here because of the courage of the President of the United States. That shouldn't be diminished. What can we do more? Mr. DOBBINS. Maybe my colleagues want to add something. I think by this intervention and by the assistance we provided, we've given Haiti a chance to turn a corner, make a difference and change its society. We can't do more than that. We can continue to do that, but that's all we can do, and it's going to be their decisions which determine whether they take that opportunity. Mr. GELBARD. If I could add to that, Congressman, as I've said earlier on various occasions in the course of this hearing, historically there are no democratic institutions in Haiti. We are working really from the ground up. We have only been training the police for 1 year. The idea of establishing an apolitical, objectively selected, carefully selected police force, is innovative in Haiti. There is no justice sector, per se. I believe that the core of any democracy is really the justice sector. Democratic, community-oriented police, judiciary, penal institutions, and the kind of legal framework that allows for those entities to operate in, it gives the people confidence that they can operate in. We are just beginning to work with the Haitian people and the Haitian Government to try to make these things a reality. So are other countries and other multilateral institutions. Time is obviously required. But-and this goes back to what I was hoping to answer to Congressman Moran's question-Haiti is a neighbor of the United States, literally. It borders on the U.S. territorial sea. We need to be able to have democratic prosperous neighbors. To do that, we need to be engaged over the long haul. We need to be able to assure that they have the kinds of democratic, political, social, economic institutions that allow that country to prosper. It's in our interest in every way possible, so we need to stay engaged. Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you. Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Leach. Mr. LEACH. I just want to return to one old point and raise a new one. There is a distinction raised at a particular meeting that the Ambassador was apparently excluded from because he didn't need to know, and it was his term of art. Frankly, in American law enforcement there is a lot of confidentiality, that is always the case, and it is a very important precept. Now, in law enforcement in another country where you are brought in as another party, it is a very different circumstance. |