Chairman GILMAN. I would like to address Mr. Hastings' concern about considering the murders as political violence.

Mr. HASTINGS. I didn't say that. If you are going to address me, say what I said. I said you said political killings and political murders. I did not say what you just said.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hastings, I refer you to a letter that has been distributed from Wendy Sherman, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, dated January 3rd, in which she states, "The reemergence of political violence in Haiti, and the possible implication of senior officials in the Haitian security apparatus has been and remains at the top of our bilateral agenda with Haiti. The President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and National Security Advisor, and other senior American officials have dealt directly and forcefully with this issue in their conversations with President Aristide and we will do so with his successor. We are confident that, as the committee reviews the telegrams and other material requested and being made available, you will recognize the priority this issue has received."

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement I would like to insert in the record.

As chairman of the Western Hemisphere

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Burton, I am going to ask that the January 3 letter be made part of the record and be distributed fully to our committee.

[The January 3 letter appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BURTON. As chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, we had hearings on October 12, and we have looked into these allegations of whether or not there were political killings.

I would like to say to my colleague from Florida, I suggest he get the CIA and FBI briefings in his office, because I think when you get that information it will illuminate this issue much further.

It is my belief that there were connections between, if not Mr. Aristide, members of the Aristide administration, in these political assassinations. One of my biggest concerns is that on October 12 we had Ambassador Dobbins testify before this committee and he indicated he didn't know anything about the assassination of Ms. Bertin, who was a leading political opponent, and that he had not been notified of anything.

It is hard for me to believe that the FBI was down there investigating this and had information concerning this political killing and others and did not share that information with the Ambassador. That is why I am very happy today that we are going to put everyone under oath to make sure there is no misunderstanding about what went on, because I will tell you, if the FBI did communicate information to the Ambassador and other members of this administration and they did not tell our committee or subcommittee about it, deliberately misled us, that is something I don't think this Congress can tolerate.

Regarding it being an unqualified success, Mr. Aristide promised that there would be privatization down there. I will tell you, privatization is not taking place. There have been one or two industries where there have been some attempts at it, but there have been

many people who wanted to do business in Haiti who have contacted me and said there has been roadblock after roadblock and there is no real attempt to privatize as Mr. Aristide promised he would do to Haiti.

One of the primary objectives was to bring the free market system into Haiti so that they could control their unemployment rate, which is totally out of control. Haiti is never going to have a longterm stable economy or stable governmental structure when we leave unless they get the Haitians back to work.

When you have 50 percent or more of the people unemployed, you will have chaos. You are going to have crime, drugs, all those things. These free market objectives have not been accomplished, and the major impediment has been the Aristide administration.

Let's talk about the law enforcement agencies. I talked to President Aristide personally, and he promised me that they weren't going to have members of the Lavalas Party or the military involved in the police force. They were going to have totally new people involved.

We brought an expert in from New York to train the new force, and now we find out that a lot of people connected to Aristide are going to be in positions of leadership in law enforcement agencies, which I believe will lead to further chaos, further political killings, and further corruption. That does not lead to a truly democratic government.

So I say that I do not believe Haiti is an unqualified success. I believe we have been pouring millions of dollars and probably will end up pouring billions of dollars into a situation down there that is not going to solve the problem. I also believe once the troops leave you are going to see the same chaotic conditions we have seen in the past unless the new government starts living up to the commitments the Aristide Government made previously. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss.

Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. I will wait.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss.

Mr. Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you for having this hearing and issuing an invitation for me to participate. As a member of this committee on leave, I appreciate very much the opportunity to be back here. Chairman GILMAN. Welcome.

Mr. Goss. It is my understanding that there is a likelihood that we will take this subject into closed hearings at some point in conjunction with other committees here. I know that some of the questions would be more appropriate for that day.

I wanted to comment to my friend from Florida, I am also from Florida, and we are very concerned about the economic situation in the country of Haiti because there has been a reemergence of the refugees. Fortunately, the U.S. Coast Guard is doing a superior job of intercepting at sea and returning to Haiti those people. But it is a signal that is out there for us at this time. But it is not the subject of these hearings.

One of the points I hope that the witnesses will speak to is something that I think is of great concern in terms of our investment

in democracy in Haiti, which is very, very sizable, and it is this: After the unfortunate incident of the assassination of the parliamentarian, Mr. Feuille, in early November, President Aristide made a speech which was widely interpreted by the press and observers as an invitation to incite mob violence (if not giving his blessing to class warfare), which led to disorder, disturbance, and death. The concern is that shortly after that the police force, that we are all counting on to provide law and order and stability after the departure of the international force, was loaded up with what might be considered political hacks or loyalists or people who have not gone through the vetting process that we had envisaged.

I would hope that we would have some commentary and discussion on the connection between those 13 or 14 hundred members being added to the police force at a time of great emotion and after a bad series of events in Haiti, and the question of whether or not that is reparable or even something that the Administration regards as being of significance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Goss.

Any other members-Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.

I would certainly like to commend you for holding this very important hearing dealing with the police issue. I am anxious to hear the testimony.

I, too, have been critical of the U.S. policy preceding the return of President Aristide. I also have questioned some of the reports of the CIA, as you may recall, and I hope there is a person from the CIA on the panel-but we heard these stories about the illnesses of Mr. Aristide that were circulated widely by the CIA. He was hospitalized in Canada somewhere, and as we went to send people to where these sites were supposed to be, there were no such institutions or records; doctors that were mentioned did not exist.

So it makes it very difficult to put much faith in what some of our agencies are projecting because of the credibility or the lack of credibility of the past.

I think that the whole question of privatization should certainly proceed in a more rapid fashion. I think that the revolution is very difficult. We are witnessing a revolution here in the United States, with this big change in the government, but it is difficult to do a revolution, especially in 4 or 5 months.

We have to recall that President Aristide has not been back for very long. It is very difficult to create a police force and ensure that there are no Lavallasse in the police force. That is like trying to have a police department in Washington saying there could be no Republicans or Democrats.

Everyone has-if they are not Lavallasse, they are probably old Ton-Tons, or maybe the old FRAPH, or maybe the military of Haiti. You are something even if you are not a card carrier.

When my friend Mr. Burton talked about, he can't call this an unqualified success, that is the first time I have heard that term used. I haven't heard anybody characterize Haiti as an unqualified success other than my colleague. I understand that Mr. Hastings did. But I think that unqualified success, if you look at what has

happened and as you look at the accomplishments, I think it is extremely successful.

I would also hope that we could really get down to the bottom of what is going on. Any kind of killing does not necessarily have to be politically motivated. We have, as you know, many homicides in this country, and you don't first look to see whether it is politically motivated or not. I think that perhaps there are homicides all around the world, unfortunately, but any time there is one in Haiti we try to find out whether this was a political situation.

So I would just look forward to hearing our witnesses and appreciate you once again, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing at this time.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ballenger.

Mr. BALLENGER. I don't have a CIA report or an FBI report, but surprisingly I got a Christmas card from Haiti from a long-time friend, resident of Haiti, but a U.S. citizen. He says, in part, "Good to hear from you. We are all fine. Our government, however, has made a big mess of this place, and the press and the U.S. Embassy here just spread disinformation."

That is an unsolicited statement from a friend of mine in Haiti. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ballenger.

If there are no further statements, our witnesses this morning are Ambassador Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Legal Affairs; Ambassador James Dobbins, State Department Special Coordinator for Haiti; Bill Perry, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI; and Seth Waxman, Associate Deputy Attorney General of our Department of Justice.

Will the witnesses please rise to be sworn in?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. You are now under oath. We will proceed. We will start with Ambassador Gelbard.

TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. GELBARD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; JAMES DOBBINS, SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR HAITI, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; BILL PERRY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND SETH P. WAXMAN, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. GELBARD

Mr. GELBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss our role in the establishment of a professional civilian law enforcement authority in Haiti. Such a force is essential to a secure environment in the country, one in which fundamental human rights and freedoms are fully respected.

Our assuring that the Government of Haiti has the ability to maintain such an environment-after the departure of U.N. forces in 2 months' time-is a fundamental element of our policy in Haiti.

I would like to begin by underscoring an achievement of which the governments of the United States and Haiti can both be proud. In about 1 year's time, in a nation whose institutional development generally is very weak and where the establishment of professional institutions independent of political influence is almost unheard of, we the United States and Haiti together-have built a new national police force which is in the process of becoming the capable, apolitical, professional force required to help buttress this newly democratic nation.

As we will discuss today, Mr. Chairman, much still needs to be done to accomplish this goal in full. But we would be very harsh judges indeed not to acknowledge that the Haitian National Police has made tremendous progress in the year since its founding.

The force that has been deployed to date is not perfect-given the weak institutional environment that exists throughout Haiti, it is difficult to imagine that it might ever be perfect but it is perfectable, in my view, and to this end, continued U.S. engagement within strictly defined requirements for HNP performanceis key.

Mr. Chairman, I believe we can ensure the new police force meets at least minimal operational standards within the next 2 months, a level of capability that will allow for the withdrawal of U.N. and U.S. forces on time and in full, provided two criteria are met:

First, the United States must complete the basic training of the students now enrolled at the National Police Academy in Port-auPrince. Second, the Government of Haiti must take action to ensure that the HNP remains a nonpolitical, professional force.

What I propose to do in my testimony is to give this committee an overview of U.S. actions in support of the establishment of a new civilian public security structure in Haiti; lay out our objectives, and what we have done to meet them; describe for you some of the obstacles that have arisen which could impact on our goals, and how we are addressing them.

Our interest in helping the Haitian Government build a new civilian police force predates the restoration of democracy to Haiti. For example, after the coup removed the legitimate government of President Aristide, we worked with the Haitian Government-inexile to develop a conceptual plan for a new civilian police force, which was completed in March 1993.

ICITAP worked with exiled GOH members and with the Haitian Parliament to draft new police legislation, which eventually was enacted into law in December 1994 after the reestablishment of the legitimate government in Port-au-Prince.

In the summer of 1994, we initiated a program in four phases to get a new police force up and running:

First, before the September 1994 Multinational Force-MNFdeployment, we helped the then-exiled Government of Haiti to interview and select 1,000 persons from the Haitian migrant community living at Guantanamo to assist the MNF in performance of its initial public safety duties. The Guantanamo group was given minimal training, designed only to allow them to perform supporting roles for the MNF. The group has not been trained, nor is it qualified, to carry out the full range of police work.