pressed, is of course subject to any limitations which may be included in the treaty or any accompanying documents or

ince, the right of such a claimant | said land whenever he shall want is the same as it would have been if the jurisdiction had not been transferred, from which it follows that rejected claims, which had no validity at the date of the treaty, impose no obligation upon the United States as the successor of the foreign sovereign."

declarations which properly form a part of the treaty. This rule also relates particularly to those cases in which the ced

ceded, and when the treaty was finally ratified and exchanged it contained in one of the articles the following clause:

inserted in the body of the instrument. The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the whole instrument, as it stood when the ratifications were exchanged.

"All grants made since the said 24th of January, 1818, when the first. . . The treaty is therefore a law proposal, on the part of His Catholic made by the proper authority, and Majesty for the cession of the Flor- the courts of justice have no right idas was made, are hereby declared to annul or disregard any of its proand agreed to be null and void," visions, unless they violate the and all grants made before that date Constitution of the United States. were confirmed. It is their duty to interpret it and administer it according to its terms. And it would be impossible for the executive department of the government to conduct our foreign relations with any advantage to the country, and fulfil the duties which the Constitution has imposed upon it, if every court in the country was authorized to inquire and decide whether the person who ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the power, by its constitution and laws, to make the engagements into which he entered.

Prior to the exchange and ratification one of the holders of a grant gave notice that he intended to rely on a decree of December 17, 1817. The Secretary of State refused to make the ratification without a declaration that the grant in question would be void under the terms of the treaty and it was re-ratified with such a declaration by the King of Spain.

The plaintiffs in this case claimed under one of the grants in question and the Supreme Court held that the grant was null and void.

"In this case the King of Spain has by the treaty stipulated that the grant to the Duke of Alagon, previously made by him, had been and remained annulled, and that neither the Duke of Alagon nor any

The question of the understanding of parties to a treaty of the language, obligations and stipulations was fully discussed in this case and it was held on p. 656 et seq. "that where one of the parties to a treaty at the time of its ratifica-person claiming under him could tion annexes a written declaration avail himself of this grant. It was explaining ambiguous language in the instrument or adding a new and distinct stipulation, and the treaty is afterwards ratified by the other party with the declaration attached to it, and the ratifications duly exchanged the declaration thus annexed is a part of the treaty and as binding and obligatory as if it were

for the President and Senate to determine whether the king, by the constitution and laws of Spain, was authorized to make this stipulation and to ratify a treaty containing it. They have recognized his power by accepting this stipulation as a part of the compact, and ratifying the treaty which contains it. The

2 For note 2 see p. 157.

ing government transfers a part of its possessions and continues to exercise sovereignty over the balance of its dominion, although its sovereignty absolutely ceases over the portion ceded. In such cases the acquiring government does not assume the obligation of any indebtedness of the ceding government, even if contracted in connection with the territory ceded, unless specifically so stated in the treaty.

These rules do not necessarily apply in cases where terri

constituted and legitimate author- | The right of the Russian governity of the United States, therefore, has acquired and received this land as public property. In that character it became a part of the United States, and subject to and governed by their laws. And as the treaty is by the constitution the supreme law, and that law declared it public domain when it came to the possession of the United States, the courts of justice are bound so to regard it and treat it, and cannot sanction any title not derived from the United States."

ment to make disposition as to certain property was involved. Held by the Supreme Court that it would not go into the question whether the Russian government had or had not the right to make the disposition, but that the court would hold as against the United States the Russian government had no right to convey a title or any property to any person and it was held that under the stipulations of the treaty this was not private property, the title to which would be unaffected by a cession. The effect of certain schedules of property annexed to documents transferring the territory was involved in this action.

In this case prior to the ratification of the treaty the Spanish claimant made a transfer to an American citizen but it was held that this did not, in any way, affect the grant, as up to the time of the ratification of the treaty it was a part of Spanish territory and subject to the laws of Spain, and that whatever rights the American grantee might have from the Spanish claimant were extinguished by the Spanish gov- volume where the treaty of 1898 is ernment in the declarations ex-printed in full. changed in the ratifications of the treaty.

3 See the treaties of cession referred to in note 3 to § 44, p. 80, et seq., vol. I, and examine for the special stipulations affecting property; for the provisions affecting recent cessions from Spain, see TREATIES APPENDIX at end of this

4 For a full discussion of this subject see the record of the Peace Commission in Paris in which the position of the commissioners of the United States declining to assume any indebtedness of Spain on account of Cuba or the Philippines is set forth. Senate Document, No. 62, (3 parts) 55th Congress, 3d

2 Kinkead vs. United States, Ct. Claims, 1883, 18 Ct. of Clms, 504, DRAKE, Ch. J., s. c., 1889, 24 Ct. of Clms, 459, SCHOFIELD J., affirmed, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1893, 150 U. S. 483, BROWN, J. Claims to certain property conveyed by the Russian government to the United States. Session. Message of President

tory having its own government is absorbed into the United States, and, owing to the peculiar division of local and national sovereignty in this country, the local affairs can be administered under a local State constitution as in the case of Texas or of a territorial government as in the case of Hawaii. In those cases the reciprocal legislation already referred to determines many of these points. In such cases, however, the United States immediately becomes the only power having any general or national jurisdiction over the acquired or absorbed territory.5

It has also been held that in cases of acquisition of territory out of which States have subsequently been carved and admitted to the Union, that the United States meanwhile held the lands under water in trust for such States when finally admitted; this rule, however, is subject to exceptions where the land has been granted to an individual.o

McKinley transmitting treaty of peace between United States and Spain, January 4, 1899.

See the resolutions in regard to Texas and Hawaii referred to in note 2 to § 393, p. 150, ante, and as to when laws of the United States took effect in Texas. See note 3 to § 395a, p. 163, post. 6 Knight vs. United States Land Association, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1891, 142 U. S. 161, LAMAR, J. This case involved the San Francisco titles to Pueblo lands and in that respect the court held, as to tide waters, that the well-settled doctrine, that on the acquisition of territory from Mexico the United States acquired title to the lands under tide water in trust for the future States that might be erected out of the territory, does not apply to lands that had been previously granted to other parties by the former government, or had been subjected to trusts that would require their disposition in some other way.

"The patent of the United States is evidence of the title of the city of San Francisco under Mexican laws to the Pueblo lands, and is conclusive, not only as against the United States and all parties claiming under it by titles subsequently acquired, but also as against all parties, except those who have a full and complete title acquired from Mexico anterior in date to that confirmed by the decree of confirmation."

Illinois Central Railroad Company vs. Illinois, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1892, 146 U. S. 387, FIELD, J. This case involved the title to the Chicago water front on Lake Michigan. The general rule is stated in the first point of the syllabus as follows:

"The ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several States, belong to the respective States within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any por

Although sovereignty over ceded territory and the ownership of the public domain is thus transferred, the acquiring government obtains nothing by the cession that was not governmental property or prerogative at the time of the transfer. The cession does not carry with it any private property or deprive any of the inhabitants or owners of property of any private rights which they possess. Under both international and municipal law those rights are protected and must be respected by the new sovereign.

This subject will be discussed in the following sections under appropriate subdivisions. Other points, such as when treaties of cession take effect, to what extent grants can be made by the ceding, or must be recognized by the accepting, government, will be referred to in the notes.

§ 395. The effect on inhabitants of ceded territory; subdivisions of subject in this chapter.-We have seen that when one government cedes to another territory forming part of its domain, and over which it has exercised sovereignty, the consent of the inhabitants is not required to validate the transfer,1 and that as soon as the transfer has been completed, and the new sovereign has been put in possession, the inhabitants must submit to the new government; in fact, as Chief Justice Marshall said in the Florida Case, "to such conditions as the new master shall impose." 2 Change of sovereignty, however, results in so many changed conditions that it is impossible to briefly summarize its ef

ders of the sea, and the lands are held by the same right in the one case as in the other, and subject to the same trusts and limitations."

tion thereof, when that can be done | lands under tide waters on the borwithout substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of Congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the States.

See also Shively vs. Bowlby, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1894, 152 U. S. 1, GRAY, J., and the Pollard cases, cited in note to § 395a, p. 165, post. § 395.

"The same doctrine as to the dominion and sovereignty over and 1 See § 46, pp. 83, et seq., vol. I. ownership of lands under the navi- 2 American Ins. Co. vs. Canter, gable waters of the Great Lakes U. S. Sup. Ct. 1828, 1 Peters, 511, applies, which obtains at the com- MARSHALL, Ch. J.; and see exmon law as to the dominion and tracts from opinion in notes to sovereignty over and ownership of § 395a, p. 160, post.