LESSON CL. AIDS IN ARGUMENTATIVE WRITING. The Topics of our Arguments, that is, the places or sources whence they may be taken, are either external to the subject treated of, or included in it. Of the former are : I. Experiment and Testimony are the sources of proof whenever an audience cannot be convinced by directing their attention to the subject as it exists in their own minds. Thus if we have to prove the proposition that the air we breathe is a combination of two fluids, oxygen and nitrogen, our proof must either be experiment addressed to the senses, or the argumentum ad verecundiam derived from the testimony of scientific men. Thus, again, if we desire to make out against a man the charge of theft, we must either detect him in the act before the eyes of those who are to judge of it, or we must bring credible witnesses of his guilt, to support our charge. II. Of the internal sources of argument—those which the subject itself supplies, when attentively considered, are (1) Definition; (2), Etymology; (3), Enumeration; (4), Genus; (5), Species. Thus, for instance, if a writer, for some reserved end, should think fit to enlarge on the subject of Generosity, he might, in the first place, urge the nobleness of this sentiment, by an argument derived from the nature or definition of generosity; which argument would likewise be an argument from Enumeration, if it contained a detail of particulars constituting the thing. He might say, for instance, that generosity is a readiness to share with others advantages which the possessor has the power to keep to himself; a disposition to give and to forgive; candor, forbearance, and the absence of all envy; that these are the characteristics of a noble nature, and prove the nobleness of the virtue which includes them. From this argument from Definition and Enumeration, another might be added from Etymology. It might be said, generous originally meant well-born, and the transfer of the word from its first to its present meaning, is an evidence that as it forn.erly meant nobility of blood, it must now mean nobility of soul. It is a rule that the Genus can always be asserted of each species. Thus we can say, an oak is a tree, and an elm is a tree, and a vine is a tree. This shows that tree is a genus, and that oak, elm, and vine are species under that particular genus. Genus and species have reference to moral ideas as well as physical. Thus we may say, industry is a virtue, frugality is a virtue, temperance is a virtue. This shows that virtue is a genus, and that industry, frugality, and temperance are its species. While a genus may be divided into species, each species may be subdivided into individuals. The mode of reasoning from genus and species is merely to show that a certain species is properly classed under a certain genus, and then to affirm or deny of the species what you may affirm or deny of the genus. Thus you may say: All fruit is useful to health; the apple is a kind of fruit; therefore the apple is useful to health. This principle of reasoning, from genus to species, is the only kind of reasoning in which you gain any thing by placing it (as above) in the form of what is called a Syllogism. And even here the argument gains nothing in point of strength, but sometimes it gains a little in point of clearness, or at least it gives a clearer statement of the meaning of the reasoner. The following are the examples given in the Logic of Dr. Watts: "Every wicked man is truly miserable; All tyrants are wicked men; Therefore all tyrants are truly miserable. He that's always in fear is not happy; Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us: Some afflictions further our salvation; Therefore some afflictions are good for us. Nothing that must be repented of is truly desirable; Some pleasures must be repented of; Therefore there are some pleasures which are not truly desirable." In the first syllogism, the genus is, "Every wicked man," and the species, "all tyrants." In the second syllogism, "He that's always in fear," is the genus, "and covetous man" is the species under that genus. In the third syllogism, "Whatever furthers our salvation," is the genus, and " some afflictions" is the species. In the fourth syllogism, "Nothing that must be repented of," is the genus, and “some pleasures" is the species. In natural logic, we do not use these syllogisms. We should, in the above cases, express our reasons in the following manner: All tyrants, are truly miserable, because they are wicked men. LESSON CLI. AIDS IN ARGUMENTATIVE WRITING. Cause, Effect, Antecedents, Consequents, Adjuncts, are other topics whence internal arguments are derived. Let it be imagined that a speaker has to recommend to his auditors the particular act of generosity already supposed, namely, a grant of relief to one who has been unfriendly to them and their interests, he might reason from the act itself as a cause of certain effects that must follow: we may expect a priori, or independently of experience, he would say, that we shall be rewarded by the respect and esteem of men, and the favor of heaven. The opportunity of yielding relief under such circumstances, he might atfirm to be the work of heaven in order to try their generosity; an argument which is taken from the final cause, or that which affirms a purpose as the cause of what is stated to exist. This also is an a priori argument. The orator then calling the attention of his auditors to the man's distressful state, might argue from that as an effect for which a cause was to be found; which cause he might say, is not merely to try their generosity, but to punish the man for his former unfriendly conduct to them. But this a posteriori conclusion becomes, when stated, an antecedent, that is to say, a statement connected with probable consequents. Among these consequents, the orator might assuine this to be included; that if Providence punishes, he does not call on man to punish also. But shall we not interfere with the punishment of heaven if we relieve this man? No: there is the clear command, "Do good to them that hate you," which forbids such a consequent to be derived from the antecedent. Further, in order to combat an inclination not to relieve the man, the orator might argue from the topic consequents, thus: this man's prosperity may revive without your help, and he may be again a powerful enemy; heaven may punish the neglect of your present opportunity, by visiting you in your turn with dis tress. And these arguments from consequents might be enforced by some from the topic adjuncts: from the adjuncts of the man,-namely, his talents, his power to conciliate friends, to injure enemies; from the adjuncts of the auditors,-namely, the dangers that in some quarters threaten their interests; the persons opposed to those interests, who already abound. In regard to physical and moral causes, there are four methods of reasoning: First, from the existence of the cause, we may infer the existence of the effect. The Second mode of reasoning, is from the existence of the effect to infer the existence of the cause. All theories or systems are founded on this mode of reasoning. The Third mode of reasoning, is from the non-existence of the cause to infer the non-existence of the effect. The Fourth mode of reasoning, is from the non-existence of the effect to infer the non-existence of the cause. In reasoning upon moral causes, we are exposed to much difficulty, from the circumstance that one effect is often produced by a variety of causes, and the greatest sophistry arises from imputing to one particular cause an effect which results from the joint operation of many causes. We shall also fall into error, if we deny the existence of any one cause, because other causes contributed to produce the effect. We should also fall into error, were we to infer that of two events one is the cause of the other, merely because it occurred first in the order of time. This fallacy is often ridiculed by a reference to the building of Tenterden steeple being the cause of the Goodwin Sands. The story is told by old Bishop Latimer. There was a time when the Goodwin Sands, which lie in the neighborhood of Dover, were not there. Some time after they had collected, commissioners were appointed to ascertain the cause. They proceeded to the spot and examined witnesses. Among others, an old man assured them that the cause of the Goodwin Sands being there, was the Tenterden steeple. They asked him how this could be?" He stated that he "could not tell how, but he knew it was so; for he recollected that when there was no steeple, there were no sands, but soon after the building of the steeple, in came the sands. He therefore inferred that the building of the steeple was the cause of the sands." In order to prove that two events sustain the relation to each other of cause and effect, it is necessary to show, first, that the two events did actually occur; secondly, that the event which we call the cause, occurred in the order of time before the effect; and thirdly, that there was an adaptation in the cause to produce the effect. We sometimes attempt to refute a doctrine by tracing the absurd or injurious consequences that must result from it. This mode of argument is called reductio ad absurdum. Akin to this is an exposure of the fallacy of proving too much. This fallacy in an argument, which, if admitted to prove the point in dispute, would, if carried out to all its legitimate consequences, also prove other points which neither of the disputants admits to be true. Arguments founded on the advantages or disadvantages that may result from any measure under consideration, come under the head of reasonings from the relation of cause and effect. FINAL CAUSES. The actions of intelligent beings are the effects of motives or feelings. Hence, the motive or design of an action is called its final cause. Moral causes refer to habits, events, and institutions. Final causes refer generally to individual acts. EXAMPLES. "The gentleman travels for pleasure." "The lady rides for exercise." "The soldier fights for glory." The doctrine of Final Causes enters largely into the science of Natural Theology. |