whence their authority had been derived was defunct." Thus ignominiously expired the famous Council of State, which had ruled England with singular vigilance and success for about four years and a quarter. Lacking the stability which the authority and influence of a constitutional monarchy can alone convey, the statesmanship and fidelity to the trust committed to them displayed by these eminent men failed to preserve them from overthrow, and they became the easy prey of an unscrupulous usurper. well's In lieu of this able and influential body, that had Cromsteadily refused to co-operate with Cromwell in his am- council. bitious designs, a phantom council was set up, consisting of seven members, six of whom were military men, to act as Cromwell's nominal advisers. But this was a mere 'barrack-room council,' entirely dependent upon Cromwell himself." Subsequently the dictator convened a Council of State, which included eight officers of high rank and four civilians; but the latter served merely as a convenient screen, and the body continued to be, to all intents and purposes, a military council. When, in December 1653, Cromwell accepted the office of Protector of the Commonwealth, he consented to receive from Parliament a council of fifteen persons, to be appointed by statute, with power, by advice of the Council, to increase their number to twenty-one. But he only waited until he was firmly seated upon the presidential chair, to proceed to act, in most important matters, without an order of council, and without, as it would seem, even consulting his legal advisers." The several Parliaments convened by Cromwell during his protectorate proved for the most part refractory and unmanageable; and it was entirely owing to his own extraordinary vigour and administrative skill that his government achieved the measure of success which, especially in the foreign relations of England, has been generally and deservedly associated with his name.* Cromwell's dictatorship lasted for five years, when it was ended by his death, which occurred on September 3, 1658. After a brief period of anarchy, the nation, monarchy. tired of intestine strife, gladly welcomed the restoration. of the monarchy. Restora tion of the Revolu tion of 1688. Development of our national polity. With the accession of Charles II. a new and transition period began, during which the Parliament continued to increase in strength and influence, while the old antagonisms between the ministers of the Crown and the House of Commons were revived with all their former bitterness. The inveterate misgovernment of the restored line of Stuarts finally brought about the Revolution of 1688, an event which not only produced a change of dynasty, but was the means of confirming our national liberties, and placing them upon a more secure foundation. By the introduction of the king's ministers into Parliament at this epoch harmonious relations were at length established between the crown and the legislative bodies, and the old abuses of prerogative government were abolished for ever. In reviewing the history of the English Constitution from the Norman Conquest until the accession of William of Orange, certain points appear deserving of especial mention. Firstly, that the seeds of the present political system of Great Britain were sown in the earliest days of our national existence, begetting fruit which has since continuously matured. Secondly, that the responsibility of advising the crown in all affairs of state belonged originally to the Privy Council, an insti * See Goldwin Smith's lecture on Cromwell in his 'Three Eng. Statesmen' (London, 1867). Cox's Walpole (Pownall's Pap.), v. 3, p. 616. tution which is as old as the monarchy itself. Thirdly, that the reigning sovereign has always, and especially when the Privy Council was a numerous body, selected, and by his prerogative had a right to select, certain persons of that council, in whom he could especially confide, and by whose advice he more particularly acted. So that it may be said that at no period has the king of England been without sworn advisers who could be held responsible for all his public acts. Fourthly, that the authority and jurisdiction of the Privy Council have been made from time to time the subject of parliamentary regulation; but that, nevertheless, under prerogative government, such was the difficulty of enforcing the responsibility of ministers to Parliament that, except in case of high crimes and misdemeanours, which could be punished by impeachment, it was virtually inoperative; and therefore the principle of responsibility could only be applied to the ordinary conduct of public affairs by a resort to the extreme measure of withholding the supplies. Fifthly, that the want of a cordial understanding between the sovereign and the legislative assemblies was the fruitful source of dissension and misgovernment, which led, in 1649, to the overthrow of the monarchy, and in 1688 to the transference of the crown to a prince of the House of Orange, who was called in to vindicate practically those maxims of liberty for which, in good and evil days, England had contended through so many centuries. And, lastly, that the attempt under the Commonwealth to establish a Council of State which should reflect the opinions of the House of Commons, and be composed of the most prominent and influential members of that body, however promising at the outset, speedily and entirely failed, from the lack of that element of stability which the authority and influence of a constitutional monarch can alone supply. Taylor, Book of Rights, p. 211. Growth of It is also noticeable, that even during the reign of constitu- the Tudor sovereigns, when the power of the crown vernment. was predominant over everything, and Parliament was tional go weak and subservient, principles were at work which ultimately tended to the further advancement of constitutional government. It was then that the great offices of state began first to assume form and method, and the complex machinery of administration to settle into something like its modern aspect. The Secretaries of State, originally mere clerks appointed to do the king's bidding, became by degrees potent functionaries, with certain defined powers and responsibilities. The office of Chancellor, too, was at this period brought nearly to its present shape. That of Lord High Treasurer, or First Commissioner of the Treasury, and that of Lord High Admiral, or First Commissioner of the Admiralty, came to be then of fixed appointment and establishment. Thus, instead of the arbitrary and irregular selection of early times, the principal officers of state were duly appointed to discharge the functions of administration, and to advise the sovereign in the government of the realm. The persons appointed by the king to fill these posts, if not already of the Privy Council, were invariably added to that dignified assembly; and as the most trusted servants and advisers of the crown, they formed the nucleus of the confidential council, which was afterwards known as the The Cabi- Cabinet.' This powerful governing body, heretofore a pliant instrument in the hands of the reigning monarch, ble to Par- was made responsible to Parliament by the Revolution. of 1688. The Bill of Rights, while it left unimpaired the just rights and privileges of the crown, rebuked the excessive claims of prerogative, redressed the grievances of the people, gave vigour and certainty to the efforts of Parliament, secured its independence, and recognised its inquisitorial functions, so that henceforth it was free net made responsi liament. |