chequer (Mr. Disraeli) objected to the motion as an unprecedented attempt to obtain a parliamentary investigation into matters with which the House of Commons has no connection or concern. Mr. Gladstone agreed that the mover had no locus standi for such a proposition. He added, that the motion might perhaps be justified on the ground that railway companies solicit special parliamentary powers, and that Parliament itself claims greater powers over railway companies than it does over other companies.' Still, as a question of policy, he admitted that the objection was unanswerable, and that, if the motion were acceded to, it would probably occasion very considerable embarrassment, in the conduct of the enquiry, and undoubtedly great future embarrassment as a precedent applicable to other companies in positions more or less analogous. Whereupon the motion was withdrawn.k Again, no motion for papers should contain argumentative matter, or should assume facts of which the House was not officially cognisant.' mentary It is ordering papers. It is the rule of Parliament, that no papers shall be Parlialaid on the table of either House, unless some sufficient ground for reason have been stated for their production.'" irregular to move for the production of papers merely to further the interests or views of private persons, or except for the purpose of founding, or facilitating, parliamentary proceedings." Government have refused to grant papers, unless it be intended to found some proceedings upon them.' in regard The foregoing precedents, it is hoped, will serve to Summary explain more clearly the constitutional position of to this Parliament in regard to the prerogative of administra- preroga tion. Without denying the abstract right of either * Hans. D. v. 186, pp. 1339-1349. And see the debate on a motion, afterwards withdrawn, in relation to the refusal of the Salters' Company to grant a site for a Roman Catholic church on one of their estates in Ireland, upon the ground that they were obliged by their charter 'to encourage Protestantism and to discourage Popery in the North of Ireland.' Ib. v. 187, p. 891. Hans. D. v. 218, p. 2023. m Ld. Melbourne, Mir. of Parl. 1838, p. 5387. n 16. 1831, p. 2248; 1833, p. 547. • Ib. 1839, p. 4422. But see the following cases, wherein members of Parliament, being in possession of valuable statistical or other information, obtained orders, or addresses, for the production of the same, to one or other of the Houses of Parliament.-Ib. 1830, Sess. 2, p. 416; 1838, p. 5273; 1839, p. 4372. tive. --- House to address the crown, or to institute enquiries by select committees, upon any matter, they will show the great public inconvenience attending an attempt on the part of Parliament to interfere with the ministers of the crown in the details of government, the inexpediency of applications for documents which the responsible advisers of the crown consider it imperative to withhold, and the unwarrantable nature of any intrusion by Parliament into the private affairs either of individuals or of corporate bodies, without just cause. So long as any existing government retain the confidence of Parliament, it is unsafe and unwise, as a general principle, to interfere with them in matters of administration. Those who are directly responsible for the conduct of public affairs are they who possess the necessary information for the proper discharge of the same. Parliament exercises a direct control over the ministers by whom all public affairs are transacted. It has a right to enquire into every grievance or abuse of power, whether on the part of those ministers or of any other public functionary. It may also express its opinion in regard to any act of the government; and it not unfrequently happens that the mere declaration of opinion in Parliament upon some objectionable departmental regulation, unaccompanied by any formal motion, suffices to induce the government to modify their plans, conformably to the views entertained by the House. But all this is very different from an attempt on the part of the legislature to usurp the functions of the executive, or from the endeavour by the House of Commons to compel the adoption of their opinions upon a question of administration, irrespective of those of the government or of the other Chamber; See the case of the Treasury discussed in the House of Lords on February 22 and 24, 1859. a proceeding which must tend to destroy the harmony which should exist between the different powers in the state, and to transfer the executive authority from the hands of responsible ministers into those of an irresponsible and uncontrollable democracy. See remarks on this head in Stockmar's Mem, v. 2, pp. 449, 545. executive CHAPTER VIII. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PARLIAMENT HAS A RIGHT Abuse of WHILE Parliament is constitutionally debarred from authority. interfering, by order or resolution, with the ordinary routine of government, except for the purpose of expressing an opinion as to the expediency of any particular proceeding, or line of policy-it is otherwise if the crown itself attempts to encroach upon the functions of Parliament, and endeavours to accomplish by its own action that which cannot lawfully be effected, except with the sanction and co-operation of Parliament. It is then the duty of Parliament to interpose, and to call to account the ministers of the crown who are responsible for the abuse or excess of executive authority. In like manner, if any individual minister is guilty, in his official capacity, of any illegal or oppressive act, it is the privilege of the injured party to apply to Parliament for redress; and the matter of complaint being substantiated, Parliament will hold the offending minister personally responsible for his misconduct. There are certain forms of procedure, of ordinary occurrence in the administration of public affairs by the ministers of the crown, which need to be strictly confined within constitutional limits, lest they should become the instruments of oppression or misgovernment. These are The Issue of Orders in Council and Royal Proclamations; and of Minutes of Committees of Council, and other Departmental Regulations; and (in the next chapter) Legislation by Public Departments; and the entering into Contracts by Government Departments for the public service. The proper limits of executive authority in relation to each of these administrative acts will be briefly explained. We shall then proceed to define the responsibility which attaches to individual ministers of state for personal acts of misconduct in their official capacity. Authority of the Crown in the Issue of Orders in Council and Royal Proclamations. authority The legislative function properly belongs to Parlia- Limited ment, and no single branch thereof may legislate without of the exthe concurrence of the other two." The executive has ecutive. a limited power of legislation by Order in Council, and rules framed by departments of state, but only where the exercise of such power has been authorised or sanctioned by Parliament. It is a fundamental law of the English constitution, that the sovereign can neither alter, add to, nor dispense with, any existing law of the realm.b council. This important point was first established beyond Orders in dispute in the reign of James I., by the proceedings in Parliament upon the case of Bates, an English merchant, who refused to pay a duty on currants imported into the country from abroad, which duty was sought to be levied by the sole authority of the king. The Court of Exchequer, in 1606, sustained the claim of the crown; but when the matter was discussed in the House of Commons, it was shown that this decision was contrary to the provisions of the Great Charter, and therefore void. It was further alleged that the sovereign could |