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rights thereunder by an action without either | bank adopted by arrangement with the Postjoining the attorney-general as a party or showing that he has sustained any particular damage. Devonport (Mayor) v. Plymouth Tramways Company, 52 L. T. 161; 49 J. P. 405—C. A.

II. CAUSES OF ACTION.

"Cause of Action."]- A cause of action includes every fact which it would be necessary to prove, if traversed, in order to enable a plaintiff to sustain his action. Read v. Brown, 22 Q. B. D. 128; 58 L. J., Q. B. 120; 60 L. T. 250; 37 W. R. 131-C. A.

Felony disclosed Action whether maintainable.]-In an action for the seduction of the plaintiff's daughter a paragraph of the state ment of claim alleged that the defendant administered noxious drugs to the daughter for the purpose of procuring abortion :-Held, that the paragraph could not be struck out as disclosing a felony for which the defendant ought to have been prosecuted, inasmuch as the plaintiff was not the person upon whom the felonious act was committed, and had no duty to prosecute. Appleby v. Franklin, 17 Q. B. D. 93; 55 L. J., Q. B. 129; 54 L. T. 135 ; 34 W. R. 231; 50 J. P.

359-D.

Waiver of Tort-Action on Contract.]-After the death of a sheriff and before the appointment of his successor, the under-sheriff sold goods under a writ delivered to him before the death of the sheriff. He did not pay over all the proceeds to the execution creditor, who more than six months after the death of the undersheriff and also more than six months after they had undertaken administration, sued his executors for money had and received and also for the tort-Held, that the action for money had and received would lie; and that as that action did not require the same evidence to support it as the action for tort, it was not necessary to waive the tort. Gloucestershire Banking Co. v. Edwards, 19 Q. B. D. 575; 56 L. J., Q. B. 514; 35 W. R. 842-D.

Remedy for Breach of Statutory Duty.]—— There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established by statute :-(1) Where a liability existed at common law and was only re-enacted by the statute with a special form of remedy, in such cases the plaintiff had his election unless the statute contained words necessarily excluding the common law remedy; (2) where a statute has created a liability but given no remedy, then the party may adopt an action of debt or other remedy at common law to enforce it; (3) where the statute creates a liability not existing at common law and gives a particular remedy, here the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute. Vallance v. Falle, 13 Q. B. D. 109; 35 L. J., Q. B. 459; 51 L. T. 158; 32 W. R. 770; 48 J. P. 519; 5 Asp. M. C. 280-Per Mathew, J.

office the phrase "Street, London," as a cypher address for telegrams from abroad to themselves :-Held, that the court had no jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the bank from using such address, as there was no attempt to interfere with trade, no legal injury done, but simply a matter of inconvenience. Street v. Union Bank of Spain and England, 30 Ch. D. 156; 55 L. J., Ch. 31; 53 L. T. 262; 33 W. R. 901-Pearson, J.

Real Action-Action for Debt.]—The defendant was the owner and occupier of certain lands in the parish of P., which by a private act were charged with the payment to the vicar of 2701. in lieu of all tithes. The act provided that if the annual rents were in arrear, the vicar was for recovering the same as by the laws and to have such and the same powers and remedies statutes of the realm are provided for the recovery of rent in arrear; and also that if no sufficient distress was found on the premises, the vicar might enter and take possession of the same Four years'

until the arrears were satisfied.
the whole of the lands charged, during the whole
arrears of the annual rent accrued in respect of
of which period the defendant was the owner
and occupier of a portion only of such lands :-
Held, that the vicar might maintain an action

of debt against the defendant for the whole
amount in arrear, the remedy by real action,
which was a higher remedy than the action by
debt, having been abolished by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c.
27, s. 36. Christie v. Barker, 53 L. J., Q. B.
537-C. A.

the winding-up of a company, the defendant, Balance Order.]-By a balance order made in who was a shareholder and director of the company, was ordered to pay a sum of 2521. due in respect of calls to the official liquidator of the company. The liquidator brought an action against the defendant for the sum due under the balance order and the defendant claimed to set off a sum due to him from the company :-Held, that no action can be brought upon a balance order. Chalk & Co. v. Tennent, 57 L. T. 598; 36 W. R. 263-North, J. See Mackay, Ex parte, Shirley, In re, 58 L. T. 237-D.

Action for Costs-Appeal to Quarter Sessions.] -An action lies to recover costs which have been taxed by the clerk of the peace, and which arise out of an order made by justices in the case of a pauper lunatic under 16 & 17 Vict. c. 97, s. 97, and subsequently abandoned after notice of appeal to sessions has been given. Dewsbury Union v. West Ham Union, 56 L. J., M. C. 89; 52 J. P. 151-D.

the High Court claiming relief which, before the High Court-Not below £10.]-An action in Judicature Act, could have been given only in tained if the subject-matter is below 107. in the Court of Chancery, cannot now be mainvalue. The old rule of the Court of Chancery in this respect still remains in force. Westbury-onSevern Rural Sanitary Authority v. Meredith, Damnum absque Injuria-Assuming Business 30 Ch. D. 387; 55 L. J., Ch. 744; 52 L. T. 839; Name. The short address "Street, London," 34 W. R. 217-C. A. [By Rules of Supreme was used for many years in sending telegrams Court, 1883, the Chancery Consolidated General from abroad to Street & Co., of Cornhill. A Orders of 1860 are repealed.]

III, NOTICE OF ACTION. Constable Contagious Diseases (Animals).] Section 19 of 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 41, by which, in all actions for anything done in pursuance of that act, the venue is to be local, and the defendant to receive notice of action, applies only to such acts as a constable might at the date of the statute have been called upon to perform; therefore the section does not apply in the case of a constable acting under the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878. Bryson v. Russell, 14 Q. B. D. 720; 54 L. J., Q. B. 144; 52 L. T, 208; 33 W. R. 34; 49 J. P. 293-C. A.

Highways Act-Injunction.]-The provision of section 109 of the Highways Act, 1835, as to notice of action, does not apply where the principal object of the action is an injunction. Phelips v. Hadham District Board, 1 C, & E. 67-Coleridge, C. J.

Public Health Act-Act "done under the provisions of this Act."]-The effect of the Public Health Act, 1875, which makes improvement commissioners under local acts urban sanitary authorities, is to reconstitute them as new bodies under the act, vesting in them as such new bodies the powers given by the local acts as well as those given by the Public Health Act; and such commissioners in subsequently doing any act in the exercise of the powers originally conferred by their local acts are acting under the Public Health Act, 1875, and consequently are entitled in respect of such act to any protection or privilege given by that act to members of local authorities acting under its provisions. Lea v. Facey, 19 Q. B. D. 352; 56 L. J., Q. B. 536; 58 L. T. 32; 35 W. R. 721; 51 J. P. 756C. A.

Metropolis Management-Actions in Equity— Injunction.]-Section 106 of the Metropolis Local Management Acts Amendment Act, 1862, which requires that before any proceeding is instituted against a district board a month's notice shall be served on them by the person intending to take the proceeding, does not apply to actions in equity-per North, J. That section does not apply to an action for an injunction to restrain a nuisance-per Lopes, L.J. (Cotton and Lindley, L.JJ., not dissenting). Bateman v. Poplar Board of Works, 33 Ch. D. 360; 56 L. J., Ch. 149; 55 L, T. 374-C. A.

General Requirements.]—An action against the Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners is an action brought against a "person" within the meaning of s. 46 of the Melbourne Harbour Trust Act; and notice in writing thereof complying in form or in substance with the requirements of the section is necessary. Union Steamship Company of New Zealand v. Melbourne Harbour Commissioners, 9 App. Cas. 365; 53 L. J., P. C. 59; 50 L. T. 337; 5 Asp. M. C, 222— P. C.

IV. CHOSES IN ACTION,

What are.]-Choses in action include all personal chattels not in possession. Shares in a railway company are choses in action. Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 11 App. Cas. 426; 56 L. J., Ch. 43; 55 L. T. 362; 34 W. R. 705;3 M. B. R. 207—H. L. (E.).

Voluntary Assignment — Incomplete Gift Intention of Donor.]-A. held certain bank shares in trust for his father B., under a written acknowledgment of the trust. B. indorsed on the acknowledgment: "I transfer these shares A local board, assuming to act under the to my daughter C. for her sole use and benefit," authority of s. 39 of the Public Health Act, 1875-B. also held two I O U's, one from A., the (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), erected a public urinal second from another person indebted to him. partly upon a highway and partly upon a strip Upon each of these B. indorsed: "I transfer the of land belonging to the plaintiff, and so near to debt of £ to my daughter C., for her sole other adjoining land of the plaintiff as to be a use and benefit." B. signed these indorsements, nuisance to her and her tenants, and to depreciate and handed the acknowledgment and I O U's to the value of her property :-Held, that the plain-C. There was no consideration for the transfer. tiff was entitled to a mandatory injunction to restrain the board from continuing the urinal upon her land or so near thereto as to cause injury or annoyance to her or her tenants, and that in such a case notice of action under s. 264 is not required. Sellors v. Matlock Bath Local Board, 14 Q. B. D. 928; 52 L. T. 762-Denman, J.

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B. did not give any notice of it to A. or the debtor upon the second IO U, and continued till his death, five years later, to receive the dividends on the shares and the interest on A.'s I O U-Held, that, although the indorsements, accompanied by the delivery of the acknowledgment and I OU's were capable, if followed by notice to the trustees and debtors, of operating as equitable assignments, yet as it appeared, having regard to the evidence and especially to B.'s receipt of the subsequent dividends and interest, that he did not intend at the time of the indorsement to divest himself absolutely of his property in the shares or debts, but attempted at most to effect a disposition to become operative only at his death, and in the meanwhile to be ambulatory and revocable, they did not constitute a complete gift enforceable in equity. Gason v. Rich, 19 L. R., Ir. 391-C. A.

Marriage-Severance of Wife's Joint Tenancy. Marriage does not operate as a severance of the wife's joint tenancy in a chose in action (Bank stock) which has not been reduced into possession by the husband. Baillie v. Treharne,

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See SHIPPING.

ADMISSIONS.

In Pleadings.]-See PRACTICE.
As Evidence.]-See EVIDENCE.

ADULTERATION.

See HEALTH.

ADVANCEMENT.

What is.]-Advancement is a payment to persons who are presumably entitled to, or have a vested or contingent interest in, an estate or a legacy before the time fixed by the trust instrument for their obtaining the absolute interest in a portion or a whole of that to which they would be entitled. (Per Cotton, L. J.) Aldridge, In re, Abram v. Aldridge, 55 L. T. 554-C. A. Reversing 50 J. P. 723-Kay, J.

Absence of express Words-Power whether inferred.]-In the absence of express words authorising the payment, by way of advancement, of part of the corpus of an estate to a person who, under the trust instrument, can never become absolutely entitled to a share of the corpus, the court will not infer a power to the trustees to advance a sum out of the corpus from the mere fact that the instrument contains a power of advancement simpliciter. Ib.

In favour of Children-Gift of Income to Children and Corpus to Grandchildren.]—A testator directed his trustees to invest the proceeds of sale of his residuary estate, and to pay the income to his eight sons and daughters in equal shares. The will then contained the following clause: "And I give a power of advancement to my trustees." After the death of the survivor of the children, the corpus of the estate was directed to be paid to the testator's grandchildren. The will contained a special power of advancement out of corpus in the case of grandchildren and a clause of forfeiture in case a child or other object of the trusts should attempt to anticipate his share :-Held, that the trustees had no power to make advances out of the corpus to the children. Ib.

Power of, exercisable with Consent of Life Tenant-Bankruptcy.]-A testatrix, who died in 1884, gave a moiety of a trust fund to trustees upon trust to pay the income to J. C., during his life, and after his death in trust for W. J. (an infant), empowering the trustees to raise any part not exceeding one-half of W. J.'s share for his advancement, subject to the consent in writing of J. C. during his life. The trustees were desirous of exercising the power, but J. C. had become a bankrupt, and was still undischarged :-Held, that J. C.'s power of consenting to the advancement was not extinguished by his bankruptcy, but could not be exercised without the sanction of his trustee in bankruptcy acting under the direction of the Court of Bankruptcy. Cooper, In re, Cooper v. Slight, 27 Ch. D. 565; 51 L. T. 113; 32 W. R. 1015-Kay, J.

Father and Child-"Advancement by portion."]-A gift was made by a father to a son to enable the son to pay a debt :-Held, on the Mixing Beers of different Strengths.]-See death of the father intestate, to be an "advanceREVENUE (EXCISE).

ADULTERY.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE

ment by portion " of the son, within sect. 5 of the Statute of Distributions. The opinion expressed by Jessel, M.R., in Taylor v. Taylor, (20 L. R., Eq., 155) dissented from. Blockley, In re, Blockley v. Blockley, 29 Ch. D. 250; 54 L. J., Ch. 722; 33 W. R. 777—Pearson, J.

Set-off-Debt due to Father from Son.]—

A father borrowed and advanced to his son 2007., | recover against W. upon the agreement for to enable him to stock a farm. The father sub- indemnity arising out of the contract of suretysequently paid off the lender without taking any ship, in which case they might retain W.'s life acknowledgment of any kind from the son, ex- interest in his share in satisfaction, or whether cept that he received interest from him for they would stand in the place of C.; but that in some years -Held, that there was a debt due the latter event the release given by C. to W. from the son to the father which could be set-off would be effective as between the executors and against a share of the father's residuary personal W. Whitehouse, I re, Whitehouse v. Edwards, estate coming to the son as one of the next of 37 Ch. D. 683; 57 L. J., Ch. 161; 57 L. T. 761; kin. Milnes v. Sherwin, 33 W. R. 927-North, J. 36 W. R. 181-Stirling, J.

Right of Father to charge on Contingent Interest of Infant Son.]-The Court refused to declare that sums advanced by a father for the benefit of his infant son were a charge on property to which the son would become entitled only in the event of his attaining twenty-one. Semble, the court has no jurisdiction to make such a charge, and the only proper form of order in such a case is that in Arbuckle, In re (14 W. R. 435). Tanner, In re, 53 L. J., Ch. 1108; 51 L. T. 507-Kay, J.

Evidence of Intention.]-After a testator had made his will, giving his son a share in his residuary estate, he purchased for such son certain farming stock, and placed him in a farm. Shortly afterwards the testator died, and the trustees of the will debited the son with a sum of money equal to the value of the farming stock, as having been advanced to him by the testator by way of loan, and as a debt due from him to the estate :-Held, that although Grave v. Earl of Salisbury (3 Bro. C. C. 425) laid down that where there had been a gift of farming stock there was no presumption that it was intended as an advance to be set-off as against a legacy receivable under a will, yet Kirk v. Eddowes (3 Hare, 509), was an authority that evidence was admissible to show that at the time of the gift, the testator expressed his intention that such gift was an advance to be set off; that in this case the court was of opinion that such an intention had been proved, and that, there-loans which had been procured by her for her fore, the value of the farming stock must be deducted from the share of the son. Turner, In re, Turner v. Turner, 53 L. T. 379—Kay, J.

Widowed Mother-Person in loco parentisPresumption.]—An action was brought by creditors for the administration of the estate of an intestate, a widow, against the administrator, who was her eldest son, and who was acting under letters of administration granted to him previously. The defendant had joined as surety with the intestate in giving a security for certain

own purposes, and he claimed to retain out of the assets of the intestate, in or coming to his hands as administrator, a sum sufficient to repay these loans with interest. He had not, in fact, Contract by Son-Payment by joint and repaid them, although he was personally liable several Notes of Father and Son.]-In March, to do so. The defendant was at one period en1885, W. entered into an agreement with C. to gaged in farming, and the intestate from time to purchase a business for 1,500l., 3007. to be paid time made him small advances when he was in in cash and the balance to be secured by joint want of money to assist him in carrying on his and several promissory notes of W. and his business, or for his maintenance. The intestate father payable at various times. By his will never attempted to recover these moneys and she dated in October, 1885, the father divided his took no acknowledgment for them. The plaintiffs residuary estate into fifths, to be held upon sought to charge the defendant with the moneys trust for his five children, but W.'s share was so received by him. By the chief clerk's certifisettled, and the testator declared that before cate it was certified that the defendant had made any of his sons should participate under the the claim above mentioned, which the chief clerk trusts of the will they should repay all sums had allowed, and that the plaintiffs had brought advanced by him in his lifetime; but if they in the set-off above referred to, but which the should be unable to repay such advances, they chief clerk had disallowed. The plaintiffs took should be treated as part of their shares. W. out a summons to vary the chief clerk's certificate: had no means of his own. The 3001. and the-Held, that the moneys advanced to the deamount due on the first promissory note were paid by the father in his lifetime. After the father's death W. entered into a deed of arrangement whereby he assigned all his property for the benefit of his creditors, who released him from his debts saving their rights against sureties. C. proved under the deed for the balance of the purchase-money, but did not obtain complete satisfaction, and he recovered the residue from the father's estate :-Held, first, that all the sums paid by the father or his executors were debts due from W. to the father's estate. Secondly, that the sums recovered from the father's estate after his death (including sums in payment of notes which fell due in his lifetime) were not within the clause in the will relating to advances, but that the sums paid by the father in his lifetime were, and that the latter ought to be set off against the corpus of W.'s share. Thirdly, that as to the former sums, the executors might elect whether they would

fendant by the intestate (who was in loco parentis at the time) to provide for his necessities, were presumably gifts to him, and accordingly the plaintiff's set-off could not be allowed. Orme, In re, Evans v. Maxwell, 50 L. T. 51—Kay, J,

Godmother - Transfer of Stock into Joint Names-Intention to Benefit.]-The plaintiff, a widow, in the year 1880, caused 6,0007. Consols to be transferred into the joint names of herself and the defendant, who was her godson. She did so with the express intention that the defendant, in the event of his surviving her, should have the Consols for his own benefit, but that she should have the dividends during her life; and she had previously been warned that if she made the transfer she could not revoke it. The first notice the defendant had of the transaction was a letter from the plaintiff's solicitors about the end of 1882, claiming to have the fund re-transferred to the plaintiff :-Held, that the legal title of the

defendant as a joint tenant of the stock was complete, although he had not assented to the transfer until he was requested to join in retransferring the stock, for that the legal title of a transferee of stock is complete without acceptance. A transfer of property to a person without his knowledge, if made in proper form, vests the property in him at once, subject to his right to repudiate it when informed of the transfer. Standing v. Bowring, 31 Ch. D. 282; 55 L. J., Ch. 218; 54 L. T. 191; 34 W. R. 204-C. A.

Held, further, that the plaintiff could not claim a re-transfer on equitable grounds, the evidence clearly showing that she did not, when she made the transfer, intend to make the defendant a mere trustee for her except as to the dividends. Ib.

AFFILIATION.

See BASTARDY,

AGENT.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

ADVERTISEMENT.

AGREEMENT.

See CONTRACT.

Of Guarantee.]-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY,
For Leases.]-See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
For Sale of Goods.]-See SALE.

For Evidence-Contempt of Court.]-A corespondent in a suit for divorce, immediately after the service of the citation, caused advertisements to be published denying the charges made in the petition, and offering a reward for information which would lead to the discovery and conviction of the authors of them :-Held, | CHASER, that these advertisements constituted a contempt of court. Brodribb v. Brodribb, 11 P. D. 66 ; 55 L. J., P. 47; 56 L. T. 672; 34 W. R. 580; 50 J. P. 407-Hannen, P.

In a suit for divorce on the wife's petition on the grounds of adultery and cruelty, the husband caused to be printed and published about the district in which the wife and her family resided a notice purporting to be signed by him, offering a reward of 251. for evidence of the confinement of a young married woman of a female child, "probably not registered" :-Held, that this was a contempt of court as tending to prejudice the petitioner, and discrediting her in the assertion of her rights, and a writ of attachment ordered to issue. Pool v. Sacheverel (1 P. Wm. 675) questioned. Butler v. Butler, 13 P. D. 73; 57 L. J., P. 42; 58 L. T. 563-Butt, J.

For Sale of Land.]-See Vendor and PUR

AIR.

See EASEMENT.

ALDERMAN.

See CORPORATION.

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