A father borrowed and advanced to his son 2007., | recover against W. u to enable him to stock a farm. The father sub- indemnity arising out o sequently paid off the lender without taking any ship, in which case th acknowledgment of any kind from the son, ex- interest in his share in cept that he received interest from him for they would stand in the some years-Held, that there was a debt due the latter event the rel from the son to the father which could be set-off would be effective as be against a share of the father's residuary personal W. Whitehouse, In re, estate coming to the son as one of the next of 37 Ch. D. 683; 57 L. J. kin. Milnes v. Sherwin, 33 W. R. 927-North, J. 36 W. R. 181-Stirling, Evidence of Intention.]-After a testator had made his will, giving his son a share in his residuary estate, he purchased for such son certain farming stock, and placed him in a farm. Shortly afterwards the testator died, and the trustees of the will debited the son with a sum of money equal to the value of the farming stock, as having been advanced to him by the testator by way of loan, and as a debt due from him to the estate :-Held, that although Grave v. Earl of Salisbury (3 Bro. C. C. 425) laid down that where there had been a gift of farming stock there was no presumption that it was intended as an advance to be set-off as against a legacy receivable under a will, yet Kirk v. Eddowes (3 Hare, 509), was an authority that evidence was admissible to show that at the time of the gift, the testator expressed his intention that such gift was an advance to be set off; that in this case the court was of opinion that such an intention had been proved, and that, therefore, the value of the farming stock must be deducted from the share of the son. Turner, In re, Turner v. Turner, 53 L. T. 379-Kay, J. Contract by Son-Payment by joint and several Notes of Father and Son.]-In March, 1885, W. entered into an agreement with C. to purchase a business for 1,500l., 3007. to be paid in cash and the balance to be secured by joint and several promissory notes of W. and his father payable at various times. By his will dated in October, 1885, the father divided his residuary estate into fifths, to be held upon trust for his five children, but W.'s share was settled, and the testator declared that before any of his sons should participate under the trusts of the will they should repay all sums advanced by him in his lifetime; but if they should be unable to repay such advances, they should be treated as part of their shares. W. had no means of his own. The 3007. and the amount due on the first promissory note were paid by the father in his lifetime. After the father's death W. entered into a deed of arrangement whereby he assigned all his property for the benefit of his creditors, who released him from his debts saving their rights against sureties. C. proved under the deed for the balance of the purchase-money, but did not obtain complete satisfaction, and he recovered the residue from the father's estate :-Held, first, that all the sums paid by the father or his executors were debts due from W. to the father's estate. Secondly, that the sums recovered from the father's estate after his death (including sums in payment of notes which fell due in his lifetime) were not within the clause in the will relating to advances, but that the sums paid by the father in his lifetime were, and that the latter ought to be set off against the corpus of W.'s share. Thirdly, that as to the former sums, the executors might elect whether they would Right of Father Interest of Infant Son.]declare that sums advan benefit of his infant so perty to which the son only in the event of hi Semble, the court has n such a charge, and the order in such a case is th (14 W. R. 435). Tanne 1108; 51 L. T. 507-Kay Widowed Mother-Pers Presumption.]-An action tors for the administration intestate, a widow, against was her eldest son, and w letters of administration viously. The defendant with the intestate in giving loans which had been pro own purposes, and he clai the assets of the intestate hands as administrator, a su these loans with interest. repaid them, although he to do so. The defendant w gaged in farming, and the in time made him small advan want of money to assist hir business, or for his mainten never attempted to recover t took no acknowledgment for sought to charge the defenda so received by him. By the cate it was certified that the the claim above mentioned, v had allowed, and that the pl in the set-off above referred chief clerk had disallowed. out a summons to vary the chi -Held, that the moneys ac fendant by the intestate (who at the time) to provide for h presumably gifts to him, ar plaintiff's set-off could not b In re, Evans v. Maxwell, 50! Godmother- Transfer of Names-Intention to Benefit widow, in the year 1880, cause be transferred into the joint na the defendant, who was her g with the express intention tha the event of his surviving he Consols for his own benefit, bu have the dividends during her previously been warned that transfer she could not revoke it the defendant had of the trans from the plaintiff's solicitors 1882, claiming to have the fun the plaintiff :-Held, that the ainst W. upon the agreement for arising out of the contract of surety. ich case they might retain W.'s life is share in satisfaction, or whether stand in the place of C.; but that in went the release given by C. to W. ective as between the executors and ouse, In re, Whitehouse v. Edwards, 3; 57 L. J., Ch. 161; 57 L. T. 761; —Stirling, J. t of Father to charge on Contingent afant Son.]-The Court refused to sums advanced by a father for the s infant son were a charge on pro ch the son would become entitled event of his attaining twenty-one, court has no jurisdiction to make e, and the only proper form of a case is that in Arbuckle, In re 5). Tanner, In re, 53 L. J., Ch .507-Kay, J. other-Person in loco parentis-An action was brought by credi ministration of the estate of an Low, against the administrator, who son, and who was acting under inistration granted to him prelefendant had joined as surety te in giving a security for certain been procured by her for her d he claimed to retain out of e intestate, in or coming to his trator, a sum sufficient to repay interest. He had not, in fact, ough he was personally liable endant was at one period en and the intestate from time to all advances when he was in assist him in carrying on his maintenance. The intestate recover these moneys and she ment for them. The plaintiffs defendant with the moneys By the chief clerk's certifi hat the defendant had made ioned, which the chief clerk the plaintiffs had brought referred to, but which the wed. The plaintiffs took the chief clerk's certificate: eys advanced to the de(who was in loco parentis for his necessities, were m, and accordingly the not be allowed. Orme, ,50 L. T. 51-Kay, J. of Stock into Joint nefit.]-The plaintiff, a aused 6,000!. Consols to t names of herself and er godson. She did so that the defendant, in her, should have the but that she should er life; and she had at if she made the The first notice it. saction was a letter s about the end of d re-transferred to e legal title of the defendant as a joint tenant of the stock was complete, although he had not assented to the transfer until he was requested to join in retransferring the stock, for that the legal title of a transferee of stock is complete without acceptance. A transfer of property to a person without his knowledge, if made in proper form, vests the property in him at once, subject to his right to repudiate it when informed of the transfer. Standing v. Bowring, 31 Ch. D. 282; 55 L. J., Ch. 218; 54 L. T. 191; 34 W. R. 204-C. A. Held, further, that the plaintiff could not claim a re-transfer on equitable grounds, the evidence clearly showing that she did not, when she made the transfer, intend to make the defendant a mere trustee for her except as to the dividends. Ib. ADVERTISEMENT. For Evidence-Contempt of Court.]-A corespondent in a suit for divorce, immediately after the service of the citation, caused advertisements to be published denying the charges made in the petition, and offering a reward for information which would lead to the discovery and conviction of the authors of them :-Held, that these advertisements constituted a contempt of court. Brodribb v. Brodribb, 11 P. D. 66; 55 L. J., P. 47; 56 L. T. 672; 34 W. R. 580; 50 J. P. 407-Hannen, P. In a suit for divorce on the wife's petition on the grounds of adultery and cruelty, the husband caused to be printed and published about the district in which the wife and her family resided a notice purporting to be signed by him, offering a reward of 251. for evidence of the confinement of a young married woman of a female child," probably not registered" :-Held, that this was a contempt of court as tending to prejudice the petitioner, and discrediting her in the assertion of her rights, and a writ of attachment ordered to issue. Pool v. Sacheverel (1 P. Wm. 675) questioned. Butler v. Butler, 13 P. D. 73; 57 L. J., P. 42; 58 L. T. 563-Butt, J. ADVOWSON. See ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. AFFIDAVIT. Evidence by.]-See EVIDENCE. Accompanying Bill of Sale.]-See BILL OF SALE (REGISTRATION). AFFILIATION. See BASTARDY, AGENT. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. AGREEMENT. See CONTRACT. Of Guarantee.]-See PRINCIPAL AND SURE For Leases.]-See LANDLORD AND TENANT For Sale of Goods.]-See SALE. For Sale of Land.]-See VENDOR AND P CHASER, AIR. See EASEMENT. ALDERMAN. See CORPORATION. ALE AND BEER HOUSI See INTOXICATING LIQUORS. ALIMONY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE. ALLOTMENT. See COMMONS. Of Shares.]-See COMPANY, II. CONTAGIOUS Movement of Animals in Railway Company.]-By an the 23rd February, 1883, ma powers given under the (Animals) Act, 1878, 41 & ordered that any local auth introduction of foot and Wales might, with the view Domestic Animals-Decoy Bird.]—Linnets caught, kept in captivity, and trained to act as decoy birds, for the purpose of catching other birds, were treated with cruelty:-Held, that they were domestic animals" under the pro-animals into their district tection of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, ss. 2 and 29, as amended by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60, s. 3. Colam v. Pagett, 12 Q. B. D. 66; 53 L. J., M. C. 64; 32 W. R. 289; 48 J, P. 263-D. Operation for Purpose of Improving Animal.] -A person who, with reasonable care and skill, performs on an animal a painful operation, which is customary, and is performed bonâ fide for the purpose of benefiting the owner by increasing the value of the animal, is not guilty of the offence of cruelly ill-treating, abusing, or torturing the animal, within the meaning of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2, even though the operation is in fact unnecessary and useless. Lewis v. Fermor, 18 Q. B. D. 532; 56 L. J., M. C. 45; 56 L. T. 236; 35 W. R. 378; 51 J. P. 371; 16 Cox, C. C. 176-D. their district, make regulat or regulating the movement any other local authority, regulation made by a local Order shall not restrict move railway through the dist contravention of the Order, authority; and that if an a local authority thereunder animal, and the person for charge of the animal, and directing, or permitting the person or company moving animal, shall be deemed gu against the Act of 1878. Th the county of Glamorgan ma the local authority," except t "no animal may be moved immediate slaughter, might districts free from disease, su ing regulation: "Before an Dishorning Cattle.]-Upon a summons the county district, or remova against the respondent, under 12 & 13 Vict. c. truck in the county district 92, s. 2, for dishorning cattle, evidence was given owner, consignee, or person that the operation caused very great pain and deliver to the inspector of th suffering, and was inflicted for greater con- declaration under the act." venience in yard feeding, and because dishorned animals to the Great Western cattle would sell for about 27. a head more than in a district free from disease those with horns. The magistrate having the Glamorganshire district, b referred to this court the question whether the ern Railway Company refused case was one of the class contemplated by the cattle unless furnished by W. statute-Held, that the respondent did "cruelly tion under the act." In an ac ill-treat, abuse, and torture" animals, within the the Great Western Railway C meaning of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2; and that damages and expenses incurre the act could not be justified as being either breach of duty on the part necessary or reasonable for the purposes of company :-Held, that, not general convenience, and that the respondent words of the regulation "or ought to have been convicted. Brady v. from the railway truck in th MArgle, 14 L. R., Ir. 174; 15 Cox, C. C. 516-takes place," the defendant entitled to refuse to carry th Ex. D. of dishorning cattle, if performed '. was charged with causing TAGIOUS DISEASES. 1878. The local authority of -D. out a declaration, and committed no breach of | Vict. c. 71, confers upon a magistrate power duty in refusing so to do. Williams v. Great order delivery of goods, under the value of 15 Western Railway, 52 L. T. 250; 49 J. P. 439 unlawfully detained within the limits of t Metropolitan Police District, to the owner: Held, that the term "goods" includes a dog, a that a magistrate can entertain an applicati for delivery up of a dog alleged to be unlawful detained. Reg. v. Slade, 21 Q. B. D. 433; L. J., M. C. 120; 59 L. T. 640; 37 W. R. 14 52 J. P. 599; 16 Cox, C. C. 496—D. By an Order of Council made under the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878, if an animal is moved in contravention of the regulations of any local authority, the person" causing, directing, or permitting" the movement shall be deemed guilty of an offence against the act. The local authority of the county of Dorset having by regulations prohibited the movement Liability of Owner for Injuries.]-The plaint of animals into their district except under speci-was engaged in digging a hole in a garden of fied conditions, animals were consigned to a place house adjoining that of the defendant T. T within the district, with through bills from Cork gardens were separated from one another a A. d viâ Bristol and a specified route. The appellants the adjacent gardens by low walls. were no parties to the contract with the con- belonging to the defendant T., which had be signor, but in furtherance of the scheme of taken out by the other defendant S., in returni carriage carried the animals on their railway sprang over the wall, under which the plaint over a portion of the route to a point outside the was working, and falling into the hole injur county of Dorset, whence they were subsequently the plaintiff :-Held, that as the dog was r carried into that county by another company:- shewn to be mischievous to the knowledge Held, that the appellants were liable to be con- the owner, the plaintiff had no cause of acti victed of an offence against the act as persons against either of the defendants, either for tr "causing, directing, or permitting" the move- pass or breach of duty. Sanders v. Teape, ment of the animals within the meaning of the L. T. 263; 48 J. P. 757—D. Order of Council; and that the justices of the county of Dorset had jurisdiction to conviet. Midland Railway v. Freeman, 12 Q. B. D. 629 ; 53 L. J., M. C. 79; 32 W. R. 830; 48 J. P. 660-D. Held, that the evidence was sufficient to justi the justices in ordering L. to pay part of t value of the whole loss. Lewis v. Jones, 49 J. 198-D.. Evidence-Dog Worrying Sheep.]-I dog was seen with another dog on a We mountain worrying two lambs. The same d the shepherd found near the place four lam dead, and next day ten more. L. being su Notice of Action to Constable-Local Venue.]-moned for damage under 28 & 29 Vict. c. 60 Section 19 of 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 41, by which, in all actions for anything done in pursuance of that act, the venue is to be local, and the defendant is to receive notice of action, applies only to such acts as a constable might at the date of the statute have been called upon to perform; therefore the section does not apply in the case of a constable acting under the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878. Bryson v. Russell, 14 Q. B. D. 720; 54 L. J., Q. B. 144; 52 L. T. 208; 33 W. R. 34; 49 J. P. 293 -C. A. ANNUITY. Under Rent-charges.]-See RENT-CHARGE. Slaughtering diseased Animals - Compensation.]-By the 42nd section of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. Valuation-Insufficient Funds-Arrears. 74), it is provided that every local authority By a separation deed provision was made shall, from time to time, appoint so many in the payment of an annuity by the husband spectors and other officers as they think necessary trustees for the wife. Upon the husband's de for the execution and enforcement of this act, children of the marriage claimed to be entit and shall assign to those inspectors and officers under the same deed to a large amount in 1 such duties and salaries or allowances, and may funds held by the trustees; such funds we delegate to any of them such authorities and however, insufficient to satisfy their claims a discretion as to the local authority may seem fit, also to answer the annuity, besides paying and may at any time revoke any appointment so arrears. Upon an originating summons, tal made. The local authority failed to appoint an out to decide (inter alia) the mode in which inspector, and disease having broken out amongst available funds should be apportioned betw the plaintiff's cattle, some of them died. The the widow and the children:-Held, that, local authority did not slaughter any of the the purpose of such apportionment, the amo plaintiff's cattle, nor did they pay him any of the arrears of the annuity to the date of compensation:-Held, that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for damages nor for a peremptory mandamus. Mulcahy v. Kilmacthomas Guardians, 18 L. R., Ir. 200—Q. B. D. III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF Detention of Dog-Order for Delivery-Metro- hearing of the summons must be added to value of the annuity at the same date ascertain according to the table of values of Governm annuities, and that the fund must be divi in the proportion borne by the total so arri at to the full amount claimed by the childr Delves v. Newington, 52 L. T. 512-Pearson, APPEAL. I. TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS. II. TO THE COURT OF APPEAL. III. TO THE DIVISIONAL COURT. IV. FROM THE JUDGE IN CHAMBERS. V. FROM MASTER TO THE JUDGE, VI. FOR COSTS.-See COSTS. VII, BANKRUPTCY APPEALS. RUPTCY. by the defendants for a s their appeal to the House tion was granted on their the appeal within a week it, and that the deeds th court upon oath, on defendants produced th would be useless. Emm Ch. 903; 55 L. T. 422; 3 The practice as to stay an appeal from the Cou House of Lords in actions Division of the High Cour actions. The fact that ba See BANK- Admiralty action in rem i for staying execution per the Court of Appeal to The Annot Lyle, 11 P. D. 55 L. T. 576; 34 W. R. 6 C. A. VIII. ADMIRALTY APPEALS.-See SHIPPING. IX. DIVORCE APPEALS.-See HUSBAND AND WIFE. XIII, SEPARATION ORDER OF JUSTICES.-See HUSBAND AND WIFE, XIV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT HEALTH, BOARD. I. TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS. Security for Costs of -The amount paid into cou tiff as security for costs wi See succeeded in his action, be in court pending an appea Hamill v. Lilley, 56 L. T. 6 Time for-Matrimonial Cause.]-Since the Judicature Act of 1881, an appeal to the House of Lords in a matrimonial cause (where an appeal lies) can only be from a decision of the Court of Appeal; and such an appeal must be brought within one month after the decision appealed against is pronounced by the Court of Appeal, if the House of Lords is then sitting, or if not, within fourteen days after the House of Lords next sits. Cleaver v. Cleaver, 9 App. Cas. 631-H. L. (E.) Petition not Lodged within a Year.]The House of Lords refused to enlarge the time for presenting an appeal provided by Standing Order No. 1, which is to the effect that no petition of appeal shall be received unless the same be lodged within one year from the date of the last decree, order, judgment or interlocutor appealed from. Phillips v. Homfray, 11 App. Cas. 466-H. L. (E.). Stay of Proceedings pending Appeal-Special Grounds.] Execution for costs pending an appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords will not be stayed, unless evidence be adduced to show that the respondent to the appeal will be unable to repay the amount levied by execution, if the appellant be successful before the House of Lords. Barker v. Lavery, 14 Q. B. D. 769; 54 L. J., Q. B. 241; 33 W. R. 770-C. A. The defendants in an action had been ordered by the Court of Appeal to produce certain documents: an application was thereupon made Bankruptcy of Appellantan appeal involves a questio status, the House of Lords proceeded with notwithstand of the appellant. G. v. M., H. L. (Sc.). Appeal in Formâ Pauperi Subscriptions.]-Upon a pe prosecute an appeal in form peared that the petitioner so public to establish a right of river adjoining land belongin and that subscriptions had assist the petitioner in the that in the circumstances th not be granted. Bowie v. 13 App. Cas. 371; 58 L. J., 162-H. L. (Sc.) Findings of Court of Session sive.]-The House of Lords is found by the Court of Session at the evidence adduced by ei court. McLean v. Clydesdal App. Cas. 95-H. L. (Sc.). Judicial Notice of Law of United Kingdom.]—It is not c House of Lords to divest the judicial knowledge of the law c United Kingdom, though the p an appeal from another part of dom, and may not have been ar below. The appellant, a domic being an infant without legal g in Ireland, before the passing |