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AMENDMENT.

See PRACTICE.

ANCIENT LIGHTS.

See EASEMENT.

ANIMALS.

1. CRUELTY TO.

II. CONTAGIOUS DISEASES.

III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF OWNER.

1. CRUELTY TO.

Domestic Animals-Decoy Bird.]-Linnets caught, kept in captivity, and trained to act as decoy birds, for the purpose of catching other birds, were treated with cruelty:-Held, that they were "domestic animals" under the tection of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, ss. 2 and 29, as amended by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60, s. 3. Colam v. Pagett, 12 Q. B. D. 66; 53 L. J., M. C. 64; 32 W. R. 289; 48 J, P. 263-D.

Operation for Purpose of Improving Animal.] -A person who, with reasonable care and skill, performs on an animal a painful operation, which is customary, and is performed bonâ fide for the purpose of benefiting the owner by increasing the value of the animal, is not guilty of the offence of cruelly ill-treating, abusing, or torturing the animal, within the meaning of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2, even though the operation is in fact unnecessary and useless. Lewis v. Fermor, 18 Q. B. D. 532; 56 L. J., M. C. 45; 56 L. T. 236; 35 W. R. 378; 51 J. P. 371; 16 Cox, C. C. 176—D.

The practice of dishorning cattle, if performed with due care and skill, and for the purpose of rendering them more profitable to farmers in the course of their trade, is not cruelty to the animals within the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2. Brady v. M'Argle (14 L. R., Ir. 174) not followed. Callaghan v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 16 Cox, C. C. 101; 16 L. R., Ir. 325-C. P. D.

Evidence.]-F. was charged with causing a sheep to be tortured. The only evidence was that he conveyed nine sheep in a waggon, and one of them broke its leg on getting out of the waggon; the drover, on driving them to a pen at the market for sale, put the sheep with the broken leg along with the others, and they trampled on it :-Held, though the facts showed carelessness, there was no evidence of causing the sheep to be tortured. Westbrook v. Field, 51 J. P. 726-D.

II. CONTAGIOUS DISEASES.

Movement of Animals in Infected District— Railway Company.]-By an Order in Council of the 23rd February, 1883, made in exercise of the powers given under the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 74, it was ordered that any local authority in England or Wales might, with the view of preventing the introduction of foot and mouth disease into their district, make regulations for prohibiting or regulating the movement by land or water of pro-animals into their district from the district of any other local authority, provided that any regulation made by a local authority under the Order shall not restrict movement of animals by railway through the district of that local authority; and that if an animal is moved in contravention of the Order, or of a regulation of a local authority thereunder, the owner of the animal, and the person for the time being in charge of the animal, and the person causing, directing, or permitting the movement, and the person or company moving or conveying the animal, shall be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1878. The local authority of the county of Glamorgan made a regulation that "no animal may be moved into the district of the local authority," except that fat animals, for immediate slaughter, might be moved in from districts free from disease, subject to the following regulation: "Before any movement into the county district, or removal from the railway truck in the county district, takes place, the owner, consignee, or person in charge shall deliver to the inspector of the local authority a declaration under the act." W. tendered fat animals to the Great Western Railway Company, in a district free from disease, for carriage into the Glamorganshire district, but the Great Western Railway Company refused to carry the said "declaracattle unless furnished by W. with a tion under the act." In an action by W. against the Great Western Railway Company to recover damages and expenses incurred by him through breach of duty on the part of the defendant company :-Held, that, notwithstanding the words of the regulation "or before removal from the railway truck in the county district takes place," the defendant company were entitled to refuse to carry the said cattle with

Dishorning Cattle.]—Upon a summons against the respondent, under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2, for dishorning cattle, evidence was given that the operation caused very great pain and suffering, and was inflicted for greater convenience in yard feeding, and because dishorned cattle would sell for about 27. a head more than those with horns. The magistrate having referred to this court the question whether the case was one of the class contemplated by the statute: Held, that the respondent did "cruelly ill-treat, abuse, and torture" animals, within the meaning of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2; and that the act could not be justified as being either necessary or reasonable for the purposes of general convenience, and that the respondent ought to have been convicted. Brady v. MArgle, 14 L. R., Ir. 174; 15 Cox, C. C. 516Ex. D.

out a declaration, and committed no breach of duty in refusing so to do. Williams v. Great Western Railway, 52 L. T. 250; 49 J. P. 439

-D.

By an Order of Council made under the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878, if an animal is moved in contravention of the regulations of any local authority, the person "causing, directing, or permitting" the movement shall be deemed guilty of an offence against the act. The local authority of the county of Dorset having by regulations prohibited the movement of animals into their district except under specified conditions, animals were consigned to a place within the district, with through bills from Cork viâ Bristol and a specified route. The appellants were no parties to the contract with the consignor, but in furtherance of the scheme of carriage carried the animals on their railway over a portion of the route to a point outside the county of Dorset, whence they were subsequently carried into that county by another company :Held, that the appellants were liable to be convicted of an offence against the act as persons "causing, directing, or permitting" the movement of the animals within the meaning of the Order of Council; and that the justices of the county of Dorset had jurisdiction to conviet. Midland Railway v. Freeman, 12 Q. B. D. 629; 53 L. J., M. C. 79; 32 W. R. 830; 48 J. P. 660-D.

Vict. c. 71, confers upon a magistrate power to order delivery of goods, under the value of 157., unlawfully detained within the limits of the Metropolitan Police District, to the owner:-Held, that the term "goods" includes a dog, and that a magistrate can entertain an application for delivery up of a dog alleged to be unlawfully detained. Reg. v. Slade, 21 Q. B. D. 433; 57 L. J., M. C. 120; 59 L. T. 640; 37 W. R. 141; 52 J. P. 599; 16 Cox, C. C. 496—D.

Liability of Owner for Injuries.]-The plaintiff was engaged in digging a hole in a garden of a house adjoining that of the defendant T. The gardens were separated from one another and the adjacent gardens by low walls. A dog belonging to the defendant T., which had been taken out by the other defendant S., in returning sprang over the wall, under which the plaintiff was working, and falling into the hole injured the plaintiff :-Held, that as the dog was not shewn to be mischievous to the knowledge of the owner, the plaintiff had no cause of action against either of the defendants, either for trespass or breach of duty. Sanders v. Teape, 51 L. T. 263; 48 J. P. 757—D.

Held, that the evidence was sufficient to justify the justices in ordering L. to pay part of the value of the whole loss. Lewis v. Jones, 49 J. P. 198-D.

Evidence-Dog Worrying Sheep.]-L.'s dog was seen with another dog on a Welsh mountain worrying two lambs. The same day the shepherd found near the place four lambs dead, and next day ten more. L. being sumNotice of Action to Constable-Local Venue.]-moned for damage under 28 & 29 Vict. c. 60:Section 19 of 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 41, by which, in all actions for anything done in pursuance of that act, the venue is to be local, and the defendant is to receive notice of action, applies only to such acts as a constable might at the date of the statute have been called upon to perform; therefore the section does not apply in the case of a constable acting under the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878. Bryson v. Russell, 14 Q. B. D. 720; 54 ·L. J., Q. B. 144; 52 L. T. 208; 33 W. R. 34; 49 J. P. 293 -C. A.

Slaughtering diseased Animals - Compensation.]-By the 42nd section of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 74), it is provided that every local authority shall, from time to time, appoint so many in spectors and other officers as they think necessary for the execution and enforcement of this act, and shall assign to those inspectors and officers such duties and salaries or allowances, and may delegate to any of them such authorities and discretion as to the local authority may seem fit, and may at any time revoke any appointment so made. The local authority failed to appoint an inspector, and disease having broken out amongst the plaintiff's cattle, some of them died. The local authority did not slaughter any of the plaintiff's cattle, nor did they pay him any compensation:-Held, that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for damages nor for a peremptory mandamus. Mulcahy v. Kilmacthomas Guardians, 18 L. R., Ir. 200—Q. B. D.

III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
OWNER.

Detention of Dog-Order for Delivery-Metropolitan Police Magistrate.]-Section 40 of 2 & 3

ANNUITY.

Under Rent-charges.]-See RENT-CHARGE.
Under Wills.]—See WILL.

Valuation-Insufficient Funds-Arrears.]— By a separation deed provision was made for the payment of an annuity by the husband to trustees for the wife. Upon the husband's death children of the marriage claimed to be entitled under the same deed to a large amount in the funds held by the trustees; such funds were, however, insufficient to satisfy their claims and also to answer the annuity, besides paying off arrears. Upon an originating summons, taken out to decide (inter alia) the mode in which the available funds should be apportioned between the widow and the children-Held, that, for the purpose of such apportionment, the amount of the arrears of the annuity to the date of the hearing of the summons must be added to the value of the annuity at the same date ascertained according to the table of values of Government annuities, and that the fund must be divided in the proportion borne by the total so arrived at to the full amount claimed by the children. Delves v. Newington, 52 L. T. 512-Pearson, J.

APPEAL.

I. TO THE HOUSE OF LORD3. II. TO THE COURT OF APPEAL. III. TO THE DIVISIONAL COURT. IV. FROM THE JUDGE IN CHAMBERS. V. FROM MASTER TO THE JUDGE. VI. FOR COSTS.-See COSTS.

VII. BANKRUPTCY APPEALS.

RUPTCY.

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by the defendants for a stay of the order pending their appeal to the House of Lords; the application was granted on their undertaking to present the appeal within a week and to duly prosecute it, and that the deeds should be deposited in court upon oath, on the ground that if the defendants produced their deeds, the appeal would be useless. Emmerson v. Ind, 55 L. J. Ch. 903; 55 L. T. 422; 34 W. R. 778-C. A.

The practice as to staying execution pending an appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords in actions in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court applies to Admiralty actions. The fact that bail has been given in an See BANK- Admiralty action in rem is not a special ground for staying execution pending an appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. The Annot Lyle, 11 P. D. 114; 55 L. J., P. 62; 55 L. T. 576; 34 W. R. 647; 6 Asp. M. C, 50—

VIII. ADMIRALTY APPEALS.-See SHIPPING.

IX. DIVORCE APPEALS.-See HUSBAND AND C. A.
WIFE.

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I. TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS. Time for-Matrimonial Cause.]-Since the Judicature Act of 1881, an appeal to the House of Lords in a matrimonial cause (where an appeal lies) can only be from a decision of the Court of Appeal; and such an appeal must be| brought within one month after the decision appealed against is pronounced by the Court of Appeal, if the House of Lords is then sitting, or if not, within fourteen days after the House of Lords next sits. Cleaver v. Cleaver, 9 App. Cas. 631-H. L. (E.)

Petition not Lodged within a Year.] The House of Lords refused to enlarge the time for presenting an appeal provided by Standing Order No. 1, which is to the effect that no petition of appeal shall be received unless the same be lodged within one year from the date of the last decree, order, judgment or interlocutor appealed from. Phillips v. Homfray, 11 App. Cas. 466-H. L. (E.).

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Bankruptcy of Appellant-Effect of.]-Where an appeal involves a question of the appellant's status, the House of Lords will allow it to be proceeded with notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the appellant. G. v. M., 10 App. Cas. 171— H. L. (Sc.).

Appeal in Formâ Pauperis-Public RightSubscriptions.]-Upon a petition for leave to prosecute an appeal in formâ pauperis, it appeared that the petitioner sought as one of the public to establish a right of fishing in a tidal river adjoining land belonging to the defender, and that subscriptions had been collected to assist the petitioner in the litigation :-Held, that in the circumstances the application could not be granted. Bowie v. Ailsa (Marquis), 13 App. Cas. 371; 58 L. J., P. C. 7; 60 L. T. 162-H. L. (Sc.)

Findings of Court of Session-How far conclusive.]-The House of Lords is bound by the facts found by the Court of Session, and cannot look at the evidence adduced by either party in that court. Mc Lean v. Clydesdale Banking Co., 9 App. Cas. 95-H. L. (Sc.).

Judicial Notice of Law of any part of the United Kingdom.]-It is not competent for the House of Lords to divest themselves of their judicial knowledge of the law of any part of the United Kingdom, though the point may arise in an appeal from another part of the United Kingdom, and may not have been argued in the court below. The appellant, a domiciled Irishwoman, being an infant without legal guardian, married in Ireland, before the passing of the Infants'

Settlement Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 43), a domiciled | to repay Costs on Reversal of Judgment.]—An Scotchman. An ante-nuptial settlement was action being dismissed at the hearing with costs, executed. After the death of her husband she a sum of money which had been paid into court commenced the present action in the Scotch as security for the defendants' costs was ordered courts to set aside the settlement. No evidence to be paid out to the solicitors for the defendants was given as to the capacity of an infant to exe-in part payment of the defendants' costs. The cute a binding contract by the law of Ireland: judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal, -Held, that the point being raised in the and the costs ordered to be paid by the defenpleadings, the House must take judicial notice dants. The plaintiffs asked for an order against that by the law of Ireland the settlement was the defendants' solicitors for repayment by not binding on the appellant, without regard to them :-Held, that the court had no jurisdiction whether any, or what, evidence of the law of on the appeal to order the defendants' solicitors Ireland, as a matter of fact, had been given in to refund the money, the solicitors not being the court below; and further, that the validity present. Nor, semble, could such an order have of the settlement was not affected by the fact been made if they had been served with notice that at the time of its execution both parties of the application. Lydney and Wigpool Iron contemplated a Scottish domicile during their Ore Co. v. Bird, 33 Ch. D. 85; 55 L. T. 558 ; married life. Cooper v. Cooper, 13 App. Cas. 34 W. R. 749—C. A. 88; 59 L. T. 1—H. L. (Sc.).

Costs-Point not raised below.]-Where an appeal succeeds upon a point not raised in the court below, the appellant will not get costs. Ib.

II. TO THE COURT OF APPEAL.

1. Jurisdiction.

2. In what Cases Appeal lies.

a. Criminal Cause or Matter.

b. In Interpleader Proceedings.

c. On Cases Stated.

d. In other Matters,

3. Parties to Appeal.

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To enter Judgment instead of ordering New Trial.]-On the appeal from the order of a divisional court, upon an application for a new trial, the Court of Appeal has power, under Ord. LVIII. r. 4, if all the facts are before the court, to give judgment for the party in whose favour the verdict ought to have been given, instead of directing a new trial. Millar v. Toulmin, 17 Q. B. D. 603; 55 L. J., Q. B. 445 ; 34 W. R. 695-C. A.

Quære, whether on appeal from an order of a divisional court upon an application for a new trial on the ground of the verdict being against the weight of evidence, the Court of Appeal has power to give judgment for the appellants instead of directing a new trial.

4. Time within which Appeal must be brought. Millar v. Toulmin (17 Q. B. D. 603) doubted.

a. In what cases.

b. From what Period Time runs.

c. Extension of Time.

5. Notice of Appeal.

6. Security for Costs.

7. Staying Proceedings pending Appeal.

8. Exidence on Appeal.

9. Hearing of the Appeal.

10. Costs of the Appeal,

1. JURISDICTION.

Toulmin v. Millar, 12 App. Cas. 746; 57 L. J.,
Q. B. 301; 58 L. T. 96.-H. L. (E.).

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Patent Certificate Particulars of Objection. In an action for infringement of a patent, the defendant disputed its validity, delivered particulars of objections, stating the grounds, and adduced evidence in support thereof. At the trial judgment was given in favour of the plaintiff, and the validity of the patent was upheld. On appeal this judgment was reversed and the patent was declared inTo Strike Solicitor off Rolls not by way of valid. The defendant, the successful appellant, Appeal.]-On the hearing of an appeal from a applied to the Court of Appeal for a certificate decision in the County Palatine Court, the at- under s. 29, sub-s. (6) of the Patents Act, 1883, tention of the Court of Appeal was called to the that the particulars of objection delivered by evidence given by a solicitor in the court below, him were reasonable and proper :-Held, that from which it appeared that he had been guilty the Court of Appeal, having power to make of gross misconduct in his character of solicitor such order as ought to have been made in the with regard to a mortgage on which a question first instance, had power to grant and under arose in the action. The Court of Appeal directed the circumstances of the case, would grantthe official solicitor to take proceedings against such certificate. Cole v. Saqui, 40 Ch. D. 132; him. The official solicitor moved the court for 58 L. J. Ch. 237; 59 L. T. 877; 37 W. R. 109 an order calling on the solicitor to explain his—C. A. conduct or that he should be struck off the roll. The solicitor took no notice of the application : -Held, that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the application; but, having regard to the a. Criminal Cause or Matter. circumstances of the case, and that the solicitor had not taken out a certificate for several years, Property obtained by False Pretences-Power the court did not order him to be struck off the to order Restitution.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, roll, or suspend him, but granted an injunctions. 100, if any person guilty (inter alia) of obtainrestraining him from renewing his certificate without the leave of the court. Whitehead, In re, 28 Ch. D. 614; 54 L. J., Ch. 796; 52 L. T. 703; 33 W. R. 601—C. A.

2. IN WHAT CASES APPEAL LIES.

ing any property by false pretences is convicted thereof, in such case the property shall be restored to the owner or his representative, and in every such case the court before whom any such person shall be tried shall have power to order To order Solicitors of successful Party below the restitution thereof in a summary manner.

Certiorari—Indictment.]-No appeal lies to

The Queen's Bench Division having discharged such refusal. Brosnan, Ex parte, 22 L. R., Ir. a rule for a certiorari to remove an order for 334-C. A. restitution made under the above section:Held, that the order of the Queen's Bench Division was a judgment "in a criminal cause the Court of Appeal from the refusal of the or matter" within s. 47 of the Judicature Act, 1873, and that there was no appeal to the Court of Appeal. Reg. v. Central Criminal Court Justices, 18 Q. B. D. 314; 56 L. J., M. C. 25; 56 L. T. 352; 35 W. R. 243; 51 J. P. 229; 16 Cox, C. C. 196-C. A.

Habeas Corpus.]-An order of the Queen's Bench Division, refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum was not a judgment in a criminal cause or matter, and therefore an appeal from the order was competent. Keller, In re, 22 L. R., Ir. 158—C. A.

Extradition Proceedings.]-The Queen's Bench Division having refused an application for a writ of habeas corpus made on behalf of a person who had been committed to prison under s. 10 of the Extradition Act, 1870, as a fugitive

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criminal accused of an extradition crime :Held, that the decision of the Queen's Bench Division was given in a "criminal cause or matter within the meaning of s. 47 of the Judicature Act, 1873, and therefore that no appeal would lie to the Court of Appeal. Woodhall, Ex parte, or Woodall, In re, 20 Q. B. D. 832; 57 L. J., M. C. 71; 59 L. T. 841; 36 W. R. 655; 52 J. P. 581-C. A.

Whether the Court of Appeal has any jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the refusal of a divisional court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, on the application of a person who has been arrested for an alleged extradition crime, quære. Reg. v. Weil, 9 Q. B. D. 701; 53 L. J., M. C. 74; 47 L. T. 630; 31 W. R. 60; 15 Cox,

Queen's Bench Division to grant a certiorari to remove an indictment to the Central Criminal Court under 19 & 20 Vict. c. 16. Reg. v. Rudge, 16 Q. B. D. 459; 55 L. J., M. C. 112; 53 L. T. 851; 34 W. R. 207; 50 J. P. 755 -C. A.

Bail.]-A prisoner applied for bail to a divisional court of the Queen's Bench Division but was refused; he then appealed to the Court of Appeal :-Held, that the decision of the divisional court was a judgment of the High Court in a criminal matter, and therefore that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Reg. v. Foote, 10 Q. B. D. 378; 52 L. J., Q. B. 528; 48 L. T. 394; 31 W. R. 490; 48 J. P. 36; 15 Cox, C. C. 240—C. A.

Special Case Non-repair of Highway.]-See Loughborough Highway Board v. Curzon, post,

col. 26.

Information by Attorney-General — Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866.] Upon the trial of an information at the suit of the Attorney-General against a member of the House of Commons for voting without having taken the oath of allegiance within the meaning of the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, as amended by the Promissory Oaths Act, 1868, judgment was given for the a rule for a new trial, on the ground of misdirecCrown, and the Divisional Court refused to grant tion and misreception of evidence. On application by the defondant to the Court of Appeal Held, that the Court of Appeal had power to hear the application and to grant a new trial in such a case.-By Brett, M.R., and Lindley, L.J., Cotton, L.J., doubting, an information at the suit of the Attorney-General to recover penalties under s. 5 of the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, Order striking Solicitor off the Rolls.]-When from a member of Parliament for voting without the High Court makes an order ordering a solicitor having taken the oath of allegiance required by to be struck off the rolls for misconduct, it does that statute, as amended by the Promissory Oaths so in exercise of a disciplinary jurisdiction over Act, 1868, is not a "criminal cause or matter" its own officers, and not of a jurisdiction in any within the meaning of the Supreme Court of criminal cause or matter within the meaning Judicature Act, s. 47, and an appeal may be of s. 47 of the Judicature Act, 1873, and there-brought from any order or judgment therein of fore an appeal lies from such order to the Court of Appeal. Hardwick, In re, 12 Q. B. D. 148; 53 L. J., Q. B. 64; 49 L. T. 584; 32 W. R. 191 -C. A.

C. C. 189-C. A.

Refusal of Justices to state Case.]---Under the Judicature Act, 1877, there is no appeal to the Court of Appeal in a criminal case, except for error on the record. B. was convicted at Petty Sessions before a court of summary jurisdiction, and sentenced to one month's imprisonment. He applied to the magistrates to state a case for the opinion of the court. Upon their refusal to do so he applied for a rule, calling upon the justices to show cause why such case should not be stated. The court refused to make the order, and B. appealed to the Court of Appeal :- Held, that the refusal of the Queen's Bench Division to make the order applied for was a judgment in a criminal cause or matter within the meaning of section 50 of the Act; and that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from

the High Court to the Court of Appeal :-By Brett, M.R., on the ground that the information is in its nature a civil proceeding, and, therefore, that an appeal lies under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, s. 19:-By Lindley, L.J., on the ground that even although the information may be to some extent of a criminal nature, nevertheless before the passing of the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, 1873, 1875, an appeal would have lain under the Crown Suits Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 104), ss. 31, 34, 35, from a decision of the Court of Exchequer to the Court of Exchequer Chamber, and that the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, 1873, 1875, do not take away any right of appeal existing before the passing of those statutes.-Semble, by Brett, M.R., that even if the information could be regarded as a criminal proceeding, nevertheless an appeal would lie, for by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, s. 47, the right of appeal is taken away only in the case of indictments, of criminal informations for indictable misdemeanors filed in the Queen's Bench Division, and

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