among his children equally, and revoked the appointment of the second sum. The question now arose, was this testamentary revocation valid? The Court held, upon principle, that it was not, and that therefore the second sum remained a valid and subsisting charge. A somewhat similar question had been discussed, but not decided, in Cooper v. Martin (L. R., 3 Ch., Ap. 47). The Trades Disputes Act, 1906, came for the first time before the High Court in Ireland in Larkin, Appellant; Belfast Harbour Comrs., Respondents ([1908], 2 Ir. R. 214): and the point decided, though a narrow one, is important. Briefly, the case decides that the Act, in legalising "peaceful picketing," does not confer a right to enter on private property against the will of the owner. The material section was sect. 2, which enacts (in substance) that it shall be lawful for persons acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working. The appellant, in the course of a strike in Belfast, had addressed a meeting of workmen on a quay the property of the respondents. There was a bye-law prohibiting persons from addressing a crowd on a quay without permission in writing from the Secretary to the Commissioners. For a breach of this bye-law the appellant was summoned and fined by the local justices. On a case stated for the King's Bench Division, it was contended on his behalf that the bye-law in question was contrary to sect. 2 of the Act, and should be held impliedly repealed. The Court, however, construing the section strictly, decided that "at or near" was not equivalent to "in or upon," and that the bye-law was unaffected by the section. It is hard to see how the decision could have been otherwise, and the point is only noteworthy on account of the importance of the statute. Another new statute which made its first appearance in Court is the Companies Act, 1907; and again the decision (as to the effect of sect. 15) was fairly obvious. That section provides that where a company has redeemed any debentures previously issued, it shall, unless the debentures have been redeemed in pursuance of any obligation on the company so to do (not being an obligation enforceable only by the person to whom the redeemed debentures were issued), have power to keep the debentures alive for the purpose of re-issue. In Fitzgerald v. Persse Ltd. ([1908], 1 Ir. R. 279), a company had before 1907 deposited from time to time some first debentures with its bankers as security for an overdraft: the debentures were transferred from nominees of the company to a trustee for the bank, and on payment of the overdraft were re-transferred. It was held that sect. 15 preserved the original priority of these debentures. The company in 1901 invited subscriptions for second debentures by a prospectus containing the statement that the issue was made for the purpose (inter alia) of repaying a temporary loan from the company's bankers. There were also express statements in the prospectus that these second debentures were to be puisne and subject to the whole of the first issue. The loan from the bank was repaid out of the proceeds of the second issue; and some first debentures, which had been deposited with the bank as security and transferred to trustees for the bank, were re-transferred to nominees of the company. It was held that these first debentures were not "redeemed in pursuance of any obligato do so" within the meaning of sect. 15, and that their priority was not disturbed. J. S. B. 484 Reviews. [SHORT NOTICES DO NOT PRECLUDE REVIEWS AT GREATER Exterritoriality: The Law relating to Consular Jurisdiction and to Residence in Oriental Countries. By Sir F. Piggott, Kt., M.A., LL.M. London: Butterworth & Co. 1907. We have very little but praise for Sir Francis Piggott's book. The learned Chief Justice has strong opinions, and is able to express them with moderation and reserve. The Author holds firmly and in clearer terms than in his first edition to the safe doctrine, which he terms a "cardinal principle," that exterritorial jurisdiction depends entirely on the will of the sovereign within whose dominions it is exercised a will which is merely directed into peculiar channels prescribed by treaties (pp. 5, 176, 183, et passim). We cannot follow him where, as in his criticism of Carr v. Fracis, Times & Co. (the Muscat Case), he makes the extent of territorial waters dependent simply upon the good pleasure of the proprietor of the adjacent land to regard them as his own. Such a sweeping per mission would be inconsistent with the established rule of mare liberum. It is by no means the case that the three-mile limit is the creature of English law: it is the creature (even though the questioned creature) of European diplomacy. Sir Francis repeats his interesting comments on the limits of the power of the British Parliament, and hints that the Courts might refuse operation to a statute travelling outside the limits of its proper competence. This is precisely what the Scottish Court declined to do in Mortensen v. Peters (The Moray Firth Case). We do not find that sect. 687 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1898 is included in the survey of our scanty ex-territorial criminal legislation—a section which makes any recent ex-member of a British crew amenable to British law for "offences" committed abroad, whether a foreigner or not. In criticising Tootal's Trusts, the Author repudiates Chitty's theory that there cannot be an "Anglo-Chinese" or other analogous domicile, but he maintains that there cannot be a "Chinese "domicile for a British subject. He rests the latter proposition on the unnecessary and dubious ground that by acquiring such a domicile a Briton would be able to withdraw himself from the jurisdiction of the Consular Court in certain matters (notably matrimonial). Surely, by acquiring the Oriental domicile the Briton is not loosening the ties of his own jurisdiction-it would be those very ties that would bind him to accept the Chinese Courts and law in the exceptional cases where British Courts regard the Courts of the domicile as competent or the Chinese law as applicable. The true ground is submitted to be that residence as a member of a formally segregated and privileged community has no correspondence with that ordinary residence which, if sufficiently stable and prolonged, constitutes domicile. Sir F. Piggott gives excellent reasons for dissenting also from In re Bethell, but he had unfortunately no opportunity of discussing Ogden v. Ogden. The work, we should add, has practically been re-written. The discussion of Bankruptcy, for instance, has been expanded from seven to fourteen pages. Not only to persons practising or suable in the Consular Courts, but to all International lawyers, the treatise must be of the highest value. The Criminal Appeal Act 1907. By HERMAN COHEN, M.A., with an Introduction by Sir HARRY B. POLAND, K.C. London : Jordan & Sons. 1908. Criminal Appeals. By A. C. FORSTER BOULTON, M.P. London : Butterworth & Co. 1908. The Law and Practice under the Criminal Appeal Act 1907. T. W. MORGAN. London: Stevens and Haynes. 1908. By These three works each contain the text of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, the rules made thereunder and the forms, with, of course, notes, but they vary considerably in length according to the length and elaboration of the notes. Sir Harry Poland's Introduction to Mr. Cohen's book should be carefully read by all who are interested in the administration of the Criminal law. He has always been in favour of reforming the Criminal law, but he has grave misgivings as to the working of this Act, and fears that its consequences will be mischievous. He considers that the Act gives the judges far too much power, as they have the power of trying a man, and over-riding the verdict given by the jury. He is opposed to the verdict of a jury being dealt with at all by a Court of Appeal, and considers that "if the judges' recommendations" (in 1892 and 1895) "had been followed, with some modification, and the Criminal Department of the Home Office had been strengthened, there would have been ample provision for setting right the few miscarriages of justice which take place from time to time despite our admirable system of administration of the Criminal law." Mr. Cohen has examined the Act very carefully, and his comments and suggestions are valuable. In view of the recent discussion between Sir Harry Poland and Mr. Bowen Rowlands, it is worth noticing Mr. Cohen's opinion that the Court of Criminal Appeal can grant a venire de novo, though not a new trial. An interesting point discussed is whether a person who has pleaded guilty can appeal against his conviction. Mr. Cohen appears to think that the case may be covered by the words "any other ground" in sect. 3 (b), or, perhaps, as being a question "of mixed law and fact." Mr. Cohen points out a curious omission in the Rules, which is the want of any direction how a convicted person in custody is to apply for bail. Act did not empower the judge of the convicted person on bail if he saw fit. in the books we have under notice, could with advantage have been made considerably fuller. We do not quite see why the Mr. Boulton in his Introduction not unnaturally praises an enactment which as a legislator he had a part in passing. His notes are very full. An interesting conclusion he has arrived at is, that under sub-sect. 3 of sect. 5 the Court of Criminal Appeal will have the power to pass a more severe sentence than the one passed by the trial judge. This point is not noticed by Mr. Cohen or Mr. Morgan. The weak part of Mr. Boulton's work seems to us to be the Index, which is very scanty. For instance, we looked in vain for such headings as New Trial, Venire de novo, Corporal Punishment, Vacation. Mr. Morgan's work is not so full as the other two we have noticed, but the Introduction gives an useful summary of the Act, and the notes throughout are adequate. None of these Authors has noticed what seems to us to be an error in Rule 25 b., where it directs that where a judge of the Court of Appeal refuses an application "the registrar on notifying such refusal to the appellant shall forward to him Form (XIII), which Form the appellant is hereby required to fill up, &c." On looking at the Forms it appears that Form (XIII) is merely the notification to appellant of the judge's decision, and that Form (XIV) is the Notice of Appeal from the judge which the appellant has to fill up. : The Laws of England. Vol. II. London Butterworth & Co. 1908. This is the second volume of Lord Halsbury's great undertaking, and though the contents are divided into only four headings a |