I trust that the services of both officers and soldiers in these campaigns may be appreciated by a generous Government and a grateful people. I have recommended a small list of officers who have rendered conspicuous, distinguished, and gallant services for promotion and brevets, and I hope that these recommendations may be favorably considered. I may possibly desire to add a few names to the list already submitted.

It is gratifying to record that during the war not a single defeat has been met, and not a prisoner, color, gun, or rifle has been captured by the enemy. In this respect the war has been most remarkable, and, perhaps, unparalleled. Under all circumstances and in spite of many most trying difficulties the troops have maintained the fortitude of the American character and the honor of their arms.

While but a small portion of the available forces of the United States--approximately, 52,000 men-has been on foreign soil and engaged in fighting a foreign foe, those that have been in the presence of the enemy have fairly demonstrated the character and fortitude of the military forces of the United States.

The experience of the last few months, I trust, will be valuable to the people and Government of the United States. The value of proper defenses for our ports, harbors, and seaport cities, of inestimable wealth, has been demonstrated; and I trust that the system already adopted for coast defenses, the completion of which has been so long delayed, may be carried out without unnecessary delay. I have urged the importance of this in my annual reports for the last thirteen years.

For several years I have urged the importance of the Government's adopting a standard of strength for its military forces that should be commensurate with the interests of the Government in its growth and development, and proportionate to its population and wealth. Spasmodic vibration from a weak and ineffective army to one of gigantic proportions does not seem to be best for the welfare and safety of the nation, and I think it more judicious for the Government to fix a certain percentage of trained military men in proportion to the population. The Army would thereby have a more healthy growth as the nation develops. In fact, this system, if once adopted, would be as practicable for one hundred years as for a single decade. The art of war was never so much an exact science as at the present time. The appliances used in modern warfare are constantly changing, and are steadily increasing in effective force; so that it is of the utmost importance that the Government should have the most skilled and efficient forces practicable. I therefore renew my former recommendation that the Government authorize enlistments in the Army at the rate of one soldier to every 1,000 of the population. This would practically continue in service the same number as does the act of Congress approved April 26, 1898, authorizing the increase of the Regular Army, provided for, viz, 62,579 men; but unfortunately there was a provision in that act which required the Army to be reduced to its former peace basis, which was entirely inadequate to the needs and interests of the Government.

I also recommend that Congress authorize an auxiliary force of native troops, to be officered principally by United States Army officers, for service in Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippine Islands, not to exceed two soldiers to every one thousand of the population of those islands. This would give the United States a most valuable auxiliary force. It would pacify the native elements of the islands, and would be in the interests of economy and good government. This force could be used in a way similar to the mounted police in Canada and the British forces in Egypt and India.

I recommend that Congress be requested to take immediate action upon this question of increasing the Army, as I consider it of vital importance. If the system I have suggested is adopted it would give us very nearly an available force of 100,000 men, and would enable the volunteers who enlisted for the war to be returned to their homes without delay.

I desire to make special mention of the officers on my staff, Brig. Gen. J. C. Gil

more, Col. Charles R. Greenleaf, and Lieut. Col. Marion P. Maus, who rendered very important services at Santiago de Cuba and in Porto Rico, being exposed at the former place to all the dangers of yellow-fever camps; and also Brig. Gen. Roy Stone, Col. James Allen, Lieut. Col. J. W. Clous, Lieut. Col. Arthur L. Wagner, Lieut. Col. William M. Black, Lieut. Col. Francis Michler, Lieut. Col. Andrew S. Rowan, Lieut. Col. Samuel Reber, Maj. W. H. Daly, Maj. John G. Black, and Capt. Henry W. Whitney, who rendered most efficient and valuable services in Porto Rico. Accompanying this report are two maps of Cuba and one of Porto Rico. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

NELSON A. MILES, Major-General, Commanding.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL MERRITT, COMMANDING THE TROOPS IN

THE PHILIPPINES.

STEAMSHIP CHINA,

At Sea, August 31, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command in the expedition to the Philippine Islands, the campaign ending with the capture of Manila, August 13, 1898, and the subsequent occupation of the city:

In obedience to the order assigning me to the command of the Department of the Pacific, and the special instructions from the President, furnished me by the honorable Secretary of War, under date of May 28, 1898, 1 embarked with my staff from San Francisco on the steamer Newport June 29 and arrived at Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25, 1898. The military situation in Manila Bay I found to be as follows:

The American fleet of war ships, commanded by Rear-Admiral George Dewey, was anchored in line off Cavite and just outside of the transports and supply vessels engaged in the military service. The distinguished admiral above mentioned was in full control of the navigation of the bay, and his vessels passed and repassed within range of the water batteries of the town of Manila without drawing the fire of the enemy.

Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, United States Volunteers, was in command of the military forces prior to my arrival, and from his report I learned that his headquarters were in Cavite and that the troops were disposed as follows:

The Second Oregon, detachments of California Heavy Artillery, Twenty-third Infantry, and Fourteenth Infantry occupied the town of Cavite; while Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene, United States Volunteers, was encamped with his brigade, conзisting of the Eighteenth Infantry; Third United States Artillery; Company A, Engineer Battalion; First Colorado, First California, First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and Batteries A and B of the Utah Artillery, along the line of the bay shore near the village of Paranaque, about 5 miles by water and 25 miles by the roads from Cavite.

Immediately after my arrival I visited General Greene's camp and made a recon noissance of the position held by the Spanish, and also the opposing lines of the insurgent forces, hereafter to be described. I found General Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies, the greater portion of the force had shelter tents only and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season. I was at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circum

stances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American soldier, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary hardships of the work they have undertaken to do has grown and increased with every phase of the diffienlt and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion.

I discovered during my visit to General Greene that the left or north flank of his brigade camp extended to a point on the "Calle Real" about 3,200 yards from the outer line of Spanish defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched away to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, through swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the town and encircling the city completely. The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent; and on the particular road called the "Calle Real," passing along the front of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila, the insurgents had established an earthwork or trench within 800 yards of the powder-magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to the right, leading from the village of Pasay, and the approach by the beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our relations with the insurgents, which may be briefly stated as follows:

Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay the principal leader of the insurgents, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavite from Hongkong, and, with the consent of our naval authorities, began active work in raising troops and pushing the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having met with some success, and the natives flocking to his assistance, he proclaimed an independent government of republican form, with himself as president, and at the time of my arrival in the islands the entire edifice of executive and legislative departments and subdivision of territory for administrative purposes had been accomplished, at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila.

As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road, on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs.

To return to the situation of General Greene's brigade as I found it on my arrival,

it will be seen that the difficulty in gaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to withdraw from the beach and the "Calle Real," so that Greene could move forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control of the roads in their immediate front. No objection was made, and accordingly General Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on the "Calle Real" and the beach and constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the Utah batteries was placed.

The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. The behavior of our troops during this night attack was all that could be desired, and I have, in cablegrams to the War Department, taken occasion to commend by name those who deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair. (For particulars of the action see the appended reports of the brigade commander.) Our position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained. (See appended reports.) The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost duty made it imperative to reenforce General Greene's troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on the 31st of July. The difficulties of this operation can hardly be overestimated. The transports were at anchor off Cavite, 5 miles from a point on the beach where it was desired to disembark the men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies ashore was to load them from the ship's side into native lighters (called "cascos") or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then disembark them through the surf in small boats, or by running the lighters head on to the beach. The landing was finally accomplished, after days of hard work and hardship; and I desire here to express again my admiration for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands engaged in this operation.

Upon the assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's, I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of intrenchments, believing that such action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready. Now, however, the brigade of General MacArthur was in position and the Monterey had arrived, and under date of August 6 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the Captain-General notifying him that he should remove from the city all noncombatants within forty-eight hours, and that operations against the defenses of Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of that period. This letter was sent August 7 (see copy appended), and a reply was received the same date (copy hereto appended), to the effect that the Spanish were without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick women, and children now lodged within the walls. On the 9th a formal joint demand for the surrender of the city was sent in. (See copy hereto appended.) This demand was based upon the hopelessness of the struggle on the part of the Spaniards, and that every consideration of humanity demanded that the city should not be subjected to bombardment under such circumstances. The Captain-General's reply, of same date (see copy attached), stated that the council of defense had declared that the demand could not be granted; but the Captain-General offered to consult his Government if we would allow him the time strictly necessary for the communications by way of Hongkong.

This was declined on our part for the reason that it could, in the opinion of the admiral and myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to give up the town, in order to relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a bivouac during the rainy season. The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property, could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line of intrenchments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy.

It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy had made practicable breaches in the works and shaken the troops holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. This is indicated fully in the orders and memorandum of attack hereto appended. It was believed, however, as most desirable, and in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out of his intrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city.

By orders issued some time previously MacArthur's and Greene's brigades were organized as the Second Division of the Eighth Army Corps, Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson commanding; and in anticipation of the attack General Anderson moved his headquarters from Cavite to the brigade camps and assumed direct command in the field. Copies of the written and verbal instructions, referred to above and appended hereto, were given to the division and brigade commanders on the 12th, and all the troops were in position on the 13th at an early hour in the morning. About 9 a. m. on that day our fleet steamed forward from Cavite and before 10 a. m. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fire projectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powder magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in position in our trenches near the "Calle Real," began tiring with great accuracy. At 10.25, on a prearranged signal from our trenches that it was believed our troops could advance, the navy ceased firing, and immediately a light line of skirmishers from the Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another line from the same regiment from the left flank of our earthworks advancing swiftly up the beach in open order. Both these lines found the powder magazine fort and the trenches flanking it deserted, but as they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own. (See detailed report of brigade commander.)

The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidly through Malate and over the bridges to occupy Binondo and San Miguel, as contemplated in his instructions. In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing simultaneously on the Pasay road, encountered a very sharp fire, coming from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the roads and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade commander and the troops engaged these difficulties were overcome with a minimum loss (see report of brigade commander Ab. 98-19