PART III.

FALL OF MAN.

1. Two views of Human Nature. 2. Man not his own Judge. 3. The Divine Law. 4. God's Judgment. 5. Adam in Paradise. 6. The Deluge. 7. The Postdiluvians. 8. The Jews. 9. The Reception of the Saviour. 10. The Reception of Christianity. 11. The Prevalence of Evil admitted. 12 The Opposers of the Doctrine of the Fall of Man. 13. Imitation of Evil, and transmitted Depravity. 14. Difficulties. 15. Difficulties become Proofs. 16. Religion Natural and Revealed. 17. Revelation adapted to the condition of Man.

I. HAVING Considered the proofs on which revelation is founded, and the internal structure of revelation when viewed within itself, the next inquiry is, what is the present state of man, to whom that revelation is addressed? Two views have been taken of human nature, the one favorable, the other the reverse. The first considers the mind of man as "" a sheet of white paper," capable of receiving impressions, but itself without any innate impression or bias; well disposed to whatever is right, as being agreeable to its nature, and conducive to its interests, but, from its very susceptibility, liable to receive impulses of evil as well as of good, and easily led astray by example; yet, when undeceived, recovering itself by the force of its own native rectitude; expanding itself to the sun of truth, and flourishing beneath the smile of Heaven. A pleasant theory, and willingly to be received, if it were not at vari

ance with the testimony of conscience, the express declarations of God, and the perpetual tenor of human affairs.

The other view of human nature represents man in more gloomy colors; as a creature indeed adapted to a higher state of being, with powers that find no adequate sphere of action here below; but who, far from aspiring after that high end, or lamenting his present low condition, clings to his chains, and to his prison house. An exile, and in love with banishment; a winged creature, according to Plato, with moulting wings, who yet would rather creep than soar; and who, born for the glorious freedom which God bestows upon his sons, is willing to remain in bondage to sin and death.

II. It might be no difficult matter to decide between these two jarring opinions by the light of reason alone, or rather the question is already decided by the acknowledged convictions of mankind; and by the admissions of the contending parties themselves; but it is a small thing for man to be judged of man's judgment; "yea," says the apostle, I judge not mine own self." Human nature cannot be the right judge of itself; it is too much swayed by interest and by fear, by self-love and self-complacence. The mind cannot escape from itself so as to behold its own nature from an eminence, and at a distance. When the accused becomes also his own judge, the sentence he passes must be both partial and lenient. Nor is man, when judging of himself, blinded by self-interest alone, but by the very darkness which his vices have created. There is an awful law of his nature which casts a deep veil over his eyes; the most guilty have the least sense of guilt. Conscience is the finest and most fugitive part of our being. Man during his life is in a state of probation, yet before this life ends, his probation may be virtually terminated. Conscience, often opposed, may at length become silent, and man may continue to sin without being

conscious of sinning, till his career of iniquity is closed; till his passions can no longer be satiated; till nothing remains to him but the past, and of the past nothing but remorse-that worm within us which never dies.

God alone can be the judge of man; he has made and he observes all his springs of action; he looks through his nature, and its inmost operations. Men, when judging each other, can only judge of actions and divine their motives, and of these actions they are most affected by their results, as contributing to human happiness or misery; but God has a perpetual and unerring rule of judgment in his own eternal laws, which are the expression of his everlasting will. These laws, by which all human creatures must finally be judged, are the only test of the merit and demerit of rational agents, and from the revealed will and express declarations of God, we alone can learn what sentence to pass upon ourselves, and upon our fellow men.

III. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment, and the second is like unto it, thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself; on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."

What God requires of his creatures is therefore love, supreme love to himself and love to all his creation. Tried by this rule, it is evident that the whole of mankind come immeasurably short of the glory of God. Far from loving God supremely, they do not even "like to retain God in their knowledge," but have invented for themselves deities and religions the very opposite of the true God and of his spiritual worship. The state of religion in the ancient world is a sufficient index of the state of man.

They must be ignorant, indeed, of the law by which we are to be tried, who could doubt for a moment of the fallen

condition of mankind. Indeed, if love to God were alone considered as the rule, the question would be acknowledged by all as decided. The alienation of the mind from God, or at least its forgetfulness of him, is too great to escape the notice of the most superficial observer, and love to God being the centre of morality, the source from which love to our neighbor should proceed, the want of it is a sufficient evidence that man is a depraved and fallen

creature.

But however deficient in love towards God, it is frequently believed that man abounds in natural benevolence towards his fellow. men, that his first and native feelings prompt him to desire the welfare of others, and that under the second head of the law man could stand the test of a severe examination when not corrupted by evil customs, or by a selfishness derived from evil example. And so many parts of human nature are wisely formed to co-operate in promoting the welfare of society, that much may be urged on this partial view of the question, though it is to be regretted that most of the kindly feelings of men are instinctive rather than rational, and natural more than moral. Though man is certainly not a malevolent creature, it is but too clear that he is ready in many instances to sacrifice the happiness of others not only to his interest, but even to his passions.

There is no need, however, for inquiring as to the degrees of benevolence or selfishness existing at any period in different individuals or in different forms of society; the great question is not in what relation does man stand to his fellow men, but what is his condition in the eyes of his holy and all-seeing Judge? Now it is manifest, he comes infinitely short of that pure and holy law of love, according to which all intelligent creatures must stand or fall at the bar of the Almighty, and having

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broken the law he is subject also to its penalty, the loss of the favor of God, and consequently of life, for "in God's favor is life," the only life worthy of the name.

The law of God is simply the will of God, and his will is the holiness of his nature; as his nature is unchangeable so is his will, and so are his laws. It is thus in vain to suppose that the commandments of God can bend, or relax from their infinite purity; like their author they are the same yesterday, to-day, and forever,"

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Very different from the true law of God are those imaginary moral laws which men shape out for themselves, which either accommodate their rigor to the sinful weaknesses of fallen creatures, or are considered as temporary, promulgated for some particular object or end, and transitory as the partial dispensations with which they are connected. There are two sects, the Pharisee and the Antinomian, which are continually appearing, (not, indeed, under the same names, but at least with similar principles,) and who, though they seem to oppose each other vehemently, yet agree in many essential particulars; both are ignorant of the true law of God, and instead of the divine and eternal rule, substitute a chimera of their own, differing widely from the infinity and excellency of God's commandments.

The Pharisee, though he pretends to be justified by the works of the law, yet it is merely by fulfilling a rule of his own invention, which comes as far short of the divine law as the formality of a self-righteous sinner does of the infinite purity of God. He seeks after righteousness, "as it were," by the deeds of the law; his, indeed, is but a mere pretence, it is not the divine righteousness, but his own righteousness which he goes about to establish.

The Antinomian is in still deeper and more palpable error, while he dreams of the law being done away by the death of Christ; he might as well dream that the divine