notions and sentiments of his times. The basis of his position is—The times are perilous, the enterprise I suggest is glorious, but the task is dangerous; you must either circumvent or be circumvented.

He says that a statesman worthy of the name is like the skilful physician who detects consumption when easily curable, and when the evidence of its existence is invisible to the vulgar eye, whereas the man who only realizes danger when it is patent to everyone, and too late to be averted, is no statesman. He divides all states and governments into two classes, viz., republics and principalities. He confines his observations to principalities, and inter alia says:—

The rational exercise of ordinary faculties is sufficient for the hereditary prince who merely takes the place of his predecessor. One change ever produces an increasing inclination for another. To that fact he ascribes the difficulty of governing newly acquired principalities, and contends that in order to obtain a firm footing, the new comer must engage the favour and interests of the inhabitants.

Where a neighbouring country is annexed, the inhabitants of which speak the same language as the conqueror, little more is required than to extirpate the family of the prince who last ruled over them, and that is especially so where the people had not been accustomed to liberty.

Conquerors should not make alterations in the law, or increases in the taxes.

Where the language, the manners, the intellectual organization of the conquered differ from those of the conqueror, the difficulties of the conqueror are proportionally increased.

A wise prince anticipates possible evil.

Nothing is so natural, or so common, as the thirst for conquest, and when it can be satisfied, men deserve praise rather than censure.

Disgrace is the inevitable consequence of attempting more than one has ability to execute.

An evil should never be submitted to merely to prevent a war, for wars are not so averted, they are only deferred, and that to the detriment of the submissive.

I told Cardinal D'Ambois that the French knew nothing of politics, otherwise they would not have suffered the Church to grow so powerful.

The prince who contributes to the advancement of the power of another, damages his own.

There are three ways of maintaining newly-conquered states that have been accustomed to liberty and self-government, viz., I. To ruin them. II. To inhabit them. III. To leave them in the enjoyment of their laws, merely rendering them tributary, and establishing in their midst a small council to form a government, which may keep the country in peace.

Men generally follow the beaten paths which others have formed. Their conduct is merely imitation.

A wise man follows the paths traced by superior genius, and imitates those only who have excelled. If he cannot equal, he may, at least, in some respects, resemble.

Nothing is more difficult or dangerous, or the success of which is more doubtful, than the introduction of new laws.

Those who from a private station have ascended to the dignity of princes by the favour of fortune alone, meet with few difficulties in their passage, but encounter many in maintaining themselves on the throne.

Unless a man possesses superior genius or courage, how can he, who has always been accustomed to a private station, know how to govern others.

If the measures Cæsar Borgia adopted to make his position secure did not suffice, it was not his fault, but the perversity of fortune.*

* He explains the dangers of the duke's position, and says:-The duke determined therefore neither to depend on fortune nor on the arms of another prince. He began by weakening the party of the Orsini, and that of the Colonni at Rome, by corrupting all the persons of distinction who adhered to

Mankind injure others from motives either of hatred or fear. It is an error to suppose that new obligations will extinguish the memory of former injuries in the minds of great men.

It must not be called virtue to murder one's fellow citizen, or to sacrifice one's friends, or to be insensible to the voice of faith, pity, or religion. These qualities may lead to sovereignty, but not to glory.

Cruelty may be well or ill applied—I say well applied, if we may indeed say well of that which is evil-when it is only once exercised, and that when it is dictated by the absolute necessity of self preservation; and even then it should be converted as much as possible to the benefit of the public.

Above all things a prince should live with his subjects on such terms that no change of fortune may oblige him to alter his conduct towards them.

The only resource upon which a prince can rely in adversity is the affection of his people. Let no one quote the old proverb against me- "That he who relies on the people builds on a sandy foundation."

A wise prince should at all times so conduct himself that at all times and under every change of circumstances his subjects may feel the want of his directing hand, and then he may rely on their unshaken fidelity.

them, either by bribes, appointments, or commands suited to their respective qualities, so that in a few months a complete revolution was effected in their attachments. They all came over to the duke. Having thus humbled the Colonni, he waited his opportunity to destroy the Orsini. It was not long before one offered, of which he did not fail to avail himself. By artifice and dissimulation the Orsini were induced to attend the duke at Sinigaglia, where they were all put to death. Having thus exterminated the chiefs and converted their partisans into his friends, the duke placed his power on a solid basis. To establish order in Romagno the duke made Ramiro d'Arco, a cruel but active man, governor. When Ramiro had accomplished his task, the duke sent a worthy and upright magistrate to administer the law, and, to appease the discontent excited by the conduct of Ramiro, secured his assassination in the market place, &c., &c. Whoever finds himself situated as the duke was, cannot have a better model than Borgia.

Men are naturally cautious of engaging in difficult enter

prises without some appearance of success. It is never prudent to attack a prince whose capital is in a good state of defence, and who is on good terms with his subjects.

Such is the nature of mankind that they become as strongly attached to others by the benefits they render, as by the favours they receive.

Ecclesiastical princes are the happiest and most secure princes in the world. As they are under the superintendence and direction of an Almighty Being whose dispensations are beyond our weak understandings, it would be presumptuous in me to discuss these matters.

We may safely aver that the discord between the barons always originated in the ambition of the prelates.

The principal foundations of all states, whether ancient, modern, or mixed, are good laws and a proper military force to support them.

Experience has shown that either princes or republics can effect great achievements of themselves, and that mercenary soldiers must inevitably injure them.

Auxiliary troops, borrowed from allies, may perhaps be useful to the state by whom they are provided, but are always injurious to the prince by whom they are employed.

The first cause of the decline of the Roman Empire arose from taking the Goths into their pay, which brought those barbarians into repute at the expense of the Roman soldiery.

It is a generally received maxim that there is nothing so weak as a power that is not supported by itself; that is to say, that is not defended by its own citizens or subjects, but by foreigners, whether allies or mercenaries.

Princes ought to make the art of war their sole study and occupation, for it is peculiarly the science of those who govern. It is by the neglect of this art that states are lost, and, by cultivating it, they are acquired.

The prince should take the utmost care that his troops are

well disciplined, and regularly exercised. Alexander the Great immortalised himself by following the example of Achilles, Cæsar by imitating Alexander, and Scipio by copying Cyrus.

The manner in which men now live is so different from the manner in which they ought to live, that he who deviates from the common course of practice, and endeavours to act as duty dictates, necessarily ensures his own destruction. Thus a good man, and one who wishes to prove himself so in all respects, must be undone in a contest with so many who are evilly disposed.

It is for the interest of a prince to be accounted liberal, but dangerous so to exercise his liberality that he is thereby neither feared nor respected.

A prince who cannot be liberal without prejudicing his state should not trouble himself much about the imputation of being

covetous.

He who is too liberal cannot long continue so; he will become poor and contemptible, unless he grinds his subjects with new taxes, which cannot fail to render him odious to them.

A prince ought unquestionably to be merciful, but should take care how he executes his clemency.

When it is necessary for a prince to restrain his subjects within the bounds of duty, he should not regard the imputations of cruelty, because, by making a few examples, he will find that he really shows more humanity in the end than he who, by too great indulgence, suffers disorders to arise, which commonly terminate in rapine and murder.

There is a medium between a foolish security and unreasonable distrust.

I think, if it is necessary to make a selection, that it is safer to be feared than loved.

A prince ought to make himself feared in such a manner that, if he cannot gain the love, he may at least avoid the hatred of his subjects; and he may attain this object by respecting his subjects' property and the honour of their wives.