or as much as Adam's continuing unholy and corrupt, after he had once lost his holiness. For Adam's posterity are from him, and as it were in him, and belonging to him, ac cording to an established course of nature, as much as the branches of a tree are, according to a course of nature, from the tree, in the tree, and belonging to the tree; or (to make use of the comparison which Dr. Taylor himself chooses and makes use of from time to time, as proper to illustrate the matter*) just as the acorn is derived from the oak. And I think, the acorn is as much derived from the oak, according to the course of nature, as the buds and branches. It is true, that God, by his own almighty power, creates the soul of the infant; and it is also true, as Dr. Taylor often insists, that God, by his immediate power, forms and fashions the body of the infant in the womb; yet he does both according to that course of nature, which he has been pleased to establish. The course of nature is demonstrated, by late improvements in philosophy, to be indeed what our author himself says it is, viz. Nothing but the established order of the agency and operation of the author of nature. And though there be the im mediate agency of God in bringing the soul into existence in generation, yet it is done according to the method and order established by the author of nature, as much as his producing the bud, or the acorn of the oak; and as much as his continuing a particular person in being, after he once has existence. God's immediate agency in bringing the soul of a child into being, is as much according to an established order, as his im mediate agency in any of the works of nature whatsoever. It is agreeable to the established order of nature, that the good qualities wanting in the tree, should also be wanting in the branches and fruit. It is agreeable to the order of nature, that when a particular person is without good moral qualities in his heart, he should continue without them, till some new cause or efficiency produces them; and it is as much agreea ble to an established course and order of nature, that since Adam, the head of the race of mankind, the root of that great

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tree with many branches springing from it, was deprived of original righteousness, the branches should come forth without it. Or if any dislike the word nature, as used in this last case, and instead of it choose to call it a constitution or established order of successive events, the alteration of the name will not in the least alter the state of the present argument. Where the name, nature, is allowed without dispute, no more is meant than an established method and order of events, settled and limited by divine wisdom.

If any should object to this, that if the want of original righteousness be thus according to an established course of nature, then why are not principles of holiness, when restored by divine grace, also communicated to posterity? I answer, the divine laws and establishments of the author of nature, are precisely settled by him as he pleaseth, and limited by his wisdom. Grace is introduced among the race of mankind by a new establishment; not on the foot of the original estab lishment of God, as the head of the natural world, and author of the first creation; but by a constitution of a vastly higher kind; wherein Christ is made the root of the tree, whose branches are his spiritual seed, and he is the head of the new creation of which I need not stand now to speak particu larly.

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But here I desire it may be noted, that I do not suppose the natural depravity of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course of nature only; it is also owing to the just judgment of God. But yet I think, it is as truly and in the same manner owing to the course of nature, that Adam's posterity come into the world without original righteousness, as that Adam continued without it, after he had once lost it. That Adam continued destitute of holiness, when he had lost its and would always have so continued, had it not been restored by a Redeemer, was not only a natural consequence, according to the course of things established by God, as the Author of Nature; but it was also a penal consequence, or a punishment of his sin. God, in righteous judgment, continued to absent himself from Adam after he became a rebel; and withheld from him now those influences of the Holy Spirit.

which he before had. And just thus I suppose it to be with every natural branch of mankind : All are looked upon as sinning in and with their common root; and God righteously withholds special influences and spiritual communications from all, for this sin. But of the manner and order of these things, more may be said in the next chapter.

On the whole, this grand objection against the doctrine of men's being born corrupt, That it makes him who gave us our being, to be the cause of the being of corruption, can have no more force in it, than a like argument has to prove, that f men, by a course of nature, continue wicked, or remain without goodness, after they have by vicious acts contracted vicious habits, and so made themselves wicked, it makes him, who is the cause of their continuance in being, and the cause of the continuance of the course of nature, to be the cause of their continued wickedness. Dr. Taylor says,* "God would not make any thing that is hateful to him; because, by the very terms, he would hate to make such a thing." But if this bệ good arguing in the case to which it is applied, may I not as well say, God would not continue a thing in being, that is hateful to him, because, by the very terms, he would hate to continue such a thing in being? I think the very terms do as much (and no more) infer one of these propositions, as the other. In like manner the rest that he says on that head may be shewn to be unreasonable, by only substituting the word, continue, in the place of make and propagate. I may fairly im- itate his way of reasoning thus: "To say, God continues us according to his own original decree, or law of continuation, which obliges him to continue us in a manner he abhors, is really to make bad worse: For it is supposing him to be defective in wisdom, or by his own decree or law to lay such a constraint upon his own actions, that he cannot do what he would, but is continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and what he condemns in us, viz, continuing us sinful, when he condemns us for continuing ourselves sinful." If the reasoning be weak in the one case, it is no less so in the other.

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If any shall still insist, that there is a difference between God's so disposing things as that depravity of heart shall be continued, according to the settled course of nature, in the same person, who has by his own fault introduced it; and his so disposing as that men, according to a course of nature, should be born with depravity, in consequence of Adam's introducing sin, by his act which we had no concern in, and cannot be justly charged with. On this I would observe, that it is quite going off the objection, which we have been upon,、 from God's agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted on, that simply for him, from whose agency the course of nature and our existence derive, so to dispose things, as that we should have existence in a corrupt state, is for him to be the author of sin; but the plea now advanced is, that it is not proper and just for such an agent so to dispose, in this case, and only in consequence of Adam's sin; it not being just to charge Adam's sin to his posterity. And this matter shall be particularly considered, in answer to the next objection, to which I now proceed.

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CHAPTER III.

That great Objection against the Imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, considered, that such Imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his posterity are not one and the same. With a brief reflection subjoined of what some have supposed, of God's imputing the guilt of Adam's sin to his Posterity, but in an infinitely less degree, than to Adam himself.

THAT we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main objections against supposing the guilt of Adam's sin to be imputed to his posterity; I would pre

mise some observations with a view to the right stating of the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's first sin, and then shew the reasonableness of this doctrine, in opposition to the great clamor raised against it on this head.

I think, it would go far towards directing us to the more clear and distinct conceiving and right stating of this affair, were we steadily to bear this in mind: That God, in each step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as being one with him. (The propriety of his looking upon them so, I shall speak to afterwards.) And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, yet it was as the head of the whole body, and the root of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their root.

From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in, as head or root of the whole, and being first and most immediately dealt with, and most immediately acting and suffering. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the root had been attended, at the same instant, with the same steps and alterations throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I think this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a constituted oneness or identity of Adam and his posterity in this affair.

Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt of Adam's sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter. The guilt a man has upon his soul at his first existence, is one and simple, viz. the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the first corruption or depraved disposition of the heart, are