1813. SIMMONS V. WEALTH. countries. It would involve all the necessity of establishing the prior stealing, which would draw with it what was stealing in other countries. In that case the common or statute law COMMON- of that country must come into view. No law of this state however framed could be made to reach in the shape of a prosecution for a felony, the bringing goods into the state. It would be made a misdemeanor only. I say no law could make it felony but in affirmance of the principle which I have laid down, that the concealing stolen goods within the commonwealth is a stealing, and against its peace and dignity. I incline therefore to support the prosecution. Judgment reversed. The Court at the same time directed the prothonotary to communicate the case of the prisoner to the executive of Delaware; and made an order for his discharge in three weeks, unless in the mean time, a demand should be made agreeably to the constitution of the United States. END OF MARCH TERM, 1813. INDEX OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. ACCOUNT RENDER. J. In account render, the course of the action is to take issues before the auditors, upon all matters in discharge of the account, alleged by one party, and denied by the other; which issues are certified to the Court by the auditors, and accordingly as they are of law or fact, are decided by court or jury. The auditors then regulate their account by the result, and report it to the Court. Exceptions taken to an account reported by auditors, after the same has been returned, are irregular, and of no effect. Crousillat v. McCall, 433 2. In actions sounding merely in damages, the rule is that the plaintiff cannot recover more than the damages laid in the declaration; but this rule is not applicable to account render, in which the main object of the action is to obtain an account, and judgment for the arrearages, and in which damages are given only ratione interplacitationis. A plaintiff in account render may therefore have judgment for the arrearages to a greater amount than the damages laid in the declaration. Gratz v. Phillips, ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See DEED. VOL. V. 564 ACTION. The house of A and B at Madeira, shipped two pipes of wine to Phi ladelphia, for account and risque of S, to whom a bill of lading was sent. The wine did not arrive until after the death of S, when his executors declined taking it, and requested C, who was concerned in the Madeira house, to keep it till it was paid for. It remained in the cellar of C until after his death. It was then delivered by the agent of the executors of C to the wife of S, upon her alleging that it was her property, and that C had kept it in his cellar for her use. The wife of S sold the wine, and received the price. Held, that the executors of C could not maintain an action against the wife of S, for the proceeds of the wine. Wells v. Stewart, 325 Administrators, who for their own interest, contest the claim of persons asserting themselves to be heirs to the intestate, are not intitled in case of failure, to charge the expenses of the suit, to the intes tate's estate. It seems otherwise, il 4 L 1. A and B his wife, on the 12th of December 1797, by letter of attorney authorised C and D jointly and severally to make leases of a large estate belonging to the wife in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia. This power was recorded on the 15th of September 1799, and Cacted separately under it, making various leases for 99 years, and receiving the rents. On the 30th of November 1801, A and B executed another power to the same effect to C, D, and E, or any two of them jointly but not severally. This power was known to C on or before the 5th of May 1802; D declined acting, and E accepted the power merely to prevent C from acting alone; but the power was never recorded, nor any public notice given of it, nor was any lease or conveyance ever made under it. C resided on the estate as usual, collecting the rents, and making leases as formerly; and on the 9th of June 1802, he leased the premises in the ejectment, to the defendant, for ninety-nine years, reserving a fair rent at the time. Held that as between the principals and their attorney C, the second power was a revocation of the first; but the defendant being a bona fide purcha 2. Damages incurred by an agent, without his own fault, in the management of the principal's affairs, or in consequence of such management, must be borne by the principal. Hence, where A, the agent of B, recovered certain of B's goods in Cape Francois, by the decree of a competent court there, (the same having been attached by C for the debt of D and Co. in whose hands they were, and claimed in court by A) and then sold them and remitted the proceeds to B; and was afterwards in a suit instituted by C, and connected with the first proceeding, compelled by the threats of the president Christophe, to confess, contrary to the truth, that at the time of receiving the goods, he promised to pay C a sum of money on account of D and Co., and to let judgment go against him, It was held, that A might recover from B his principal the amount thus paid, it not exceeding the estimated value of B's goods. D'Arcy v. Lyle, 441 3. It seems that an attorney who is not authorised by writing under seal, cannot execute a deed of release under seal, in the name of his principal; but if he does execute such a deed, though it cannot be given in evidence against the principal under the issue of non est factum, yet it may be under the issue of non assumpsit as amounting to an agreement not to sue. Cooper v. Rankin, 613 two of them shall give up his nomination to the other, the appointment is illegal, and the commissioners may make another appointment. Commonwealth v. County Commissioners, 534 ARBITRATION. 1. Filing a recognisance, paying costs, and making the proper affidavit, do of themselves constitute an appeal from the award of arbitrators, without filing an order to enter the appeal, or a declaration that the party does appeal. Jones v. Badger, 461 2. A recognisance in which the defendant and his sureties join, is good, although the act requires only the sureties to enter into it. ib. 3. A recognisance of bail, to ground an appeal, is well taken before the commissioner of bail, though the act directs that the surety shall enter into it with the prothonotary. ib. 4. The rule requiring bail to justify in open court, either by affidavit taken before the commissioner, or one of the judges, does not apply to bail upon an appeal. An affidavit before the commissioner, with an offer to the opposite party to propose any questions as to the circumstances of the bail, is a sufficient justification. ib. 2. A is arrested and held to bail in Pennsylvania for a debt contracted in the District of Columbia. He is afterwards discharged under a general statute of Maryland, where he resides, from all his debts, upon the surrender of his property to trustees; and is exempted by a special statute from the necessity of giving notice to his creditors. Held that, as the state of Maryland gives effect to a discharge under the law of Pennsylvania, the same effect ought to be given to hers, and therefore the bail is intitled to an exoneretur. ib. 3. Bail are intitled to an exoneretur, where the principal has been discharged under a bankrupt law, upon paying the costs of the scire facias merely, and not those of the original suit. Boggs v. Bancker, Motion for rule to shew cause why foreign attachment should not be dissolved, is in time at December term, if the attachment was returnable at July; that term consisting 4. of but one day. Kearney v. M'Cullough, ATTAINDER. 389 The proceedings before the Supreme 507 A. contracted a debt in Pennsylvania, and then removed to Maryland, where he was discharged under a bankrupt law. He afterwards returned to Pennsylvania, and was arrested. The court discharged him on common bail. Hilliard v. Greenleaf, 336 |