The British Consul General and French Consul said that if plainclothesmen referred to in the memorandum appeared at offices in their Concessions they would be denied admission and prevented entering by police and military force if necessary pending instructions from the British and French Embassies which are being requested at once. Japanese Consul General was urged to make every effort to have Japanese military postpone action threatened for tomorrow or at least to take action only of surrounding [omission?] and not in the Concessions. It is certain, of course, that Concessions can be isolated by the Japanese military and mail stopped between station or Taku and Concessions. Japanese military have taken over central post office in third special area and seized part of the safes. Keys to the most important safes were demanded from Commissioner Caretti who asked Consular Body to take custody of them until he could get instructions from Nanking; this was refused and Commissioner today notified Consular Body the keys had been placed in foreign bank pending instructions from Nanking. I do not know which bank has accepted the keys. CALDWELL 893.0146/550a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Johnson) WASHINGTON, August 10, 1937-noon. 138. In the light of a considerable amount of apprehensive speculation in certain quarters with regard to the safety of American nationals at various points in China and of concern regarding the mission of and possible involvement of our armed forces there, we are trying to make clear, in responsible circles, this Department's concept of the mission and function of the United States armed forces in China. It should be realized and be kept in mind at all times that the mission of these forces has not been and is not one of offensive action against authorized armed forces of China or of any other country; and it is not one of coercion of the Chinese or any other foreign governments. The primary function of these forces is to provide special protection for American nationals. Incidental to protection of life comes protection of property, but protection of property as such is not a primary objective. These forces are in no sense expeditionary forces. They are not in occupation of an enemy territory nor are they defending territory of the United States. They are expected to protect lives but they are not expected to hold positions regardless of hazards. They would be expected to repel threatened incursions of mobs or of disorganized or unauthorized soldiery, but they would not be expected to hold a position against a responsibly directed operation of occupation on the part of armed forces of another country acting on express high authority. Situations may arise in which, for the protection of lives, the logical procedure will become that of evacuation. Confronted with such a situation, the function of American official agencies would become that of calling for and making possible evacuation in an orderly manner and with a maximum of safety; the function of the armed forces would become that of assisting in the making of arrangements, of providing armed escort, facilities (including, where possible, means of conveyance, etc.), and of general assistance in the activities of evacuation as such. Presumably the necessity for such action, if it develops, will be sufficiently foreseeable, as regards time factor, to permit of appropriate communication between and among the appropriate agencies of the American Government concerned. Presumably, also, such necessity as may confront any one of the foreign countries concerned will likewise confront all, and constant consultation among their representatives on the spot and with their own governments in regard to developments will contribute toward making possible common and simultaneous action if and when called for in this connection. It cannot be too often or too emphatically stated that the primary purpose for which American armed forces are maintained in China today is protection and safeguarding of the lives of our nationals. Protection of property may be incidental and in some situations directly contributory to safeguarding of life, but is a secondary objective and should in no circumstances be permitted to stand in the way of the carrying out of the primary objective. In the performance of their respective functions, officers of the various agencies of the Government, aware of the concept outlined above, will conduct the operations for which they are respectively responsible on the basis each of his own best judgment, in cooperation with other agencies, of ways and means appropriate to his agency under the circumstances with which they find themselves confronted. Please promptly repeat this telegram to Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Tsingtao, and instruct the officers in charge at those places to bring the contents of this telegram informally and in confidence to the attention of the commanding officers of American armed forces at those places, with explanation that this material is for general orientation of all American agencies concerned and is believed to be in no way inconsistent with but merely expository of existing orders 205655-54-17 or instructions from the various Departments under which the various agencies respectively function. HULL 393.11/1998a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) WASHINGTON, August 14, 1937—1 a. m. 214. In order that no possible measures of precaution may be omitted, it is suggested that you take steps towards seeing that American nationals at and around Shanghai be informed, through whatever agency you deem practicable, of sailing dates and accommodations available on merchant vessels, of which any who may desire to leave, especially women and children, might take advantage. HULL 793.94/9386: Telegram The Consul at Tsingtao (Sokobin) to the Secretary of State Following from Tsinanfu: "August 13, 4 p. m. TSINGTAO, August 14, 1937-noon. [Received 4: 50 p. m.] 1. Local manager of the British-American Tobacco Company told me this morning that he had received orders from Tientsin to move his office to Tsingtao as a precautionary measure. 2. Japanese Consul General informed me today that he believed the local situation would not be directly affected by the Shanghai incident.46 He has not yet ordered the evacuation from here of remaining Japanese but is considering doing so in the near future. The Japanese Vice Consul told me there is a possibility the Consulate General will also be closed if the situation becomes worse. 3. The Japanese Consul General also said that he does not believe the Japanese military authorities will consent to treat American schools and hospitals in the interior as neutral property because there cannot be any assurance that Chinese troops will not make use of such property and he advised me to tell Americans of this fact. 4. While I still do not believe there is immediate danger I do believe that, because of possible military activity and floods which are now threatening, communications may be cut off at any time and it will be impossible for persons to get to places from which they may be evacuated. I am therefore warning all Americans of these possibilities and again urging them to go to Tsingtao as soon as possible. Repeated to the Department and Nanking." SOKOBIN See vol. I, pp. 364-418, passim. 793.94/9351 Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs [WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1937. Texts of two priority telegrams received by the Navy Department which were read over the telephone to Mr. Ballantine by Lt. Welles Roberts at 9:05 a. m., August 14, 1937 From the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the American Embassy at Nanking. August 14, 5:15 p. m. Request you make vigorous protest Chinese Government of bombing American vessel Shanghai by Chinese planes. Two bombs dropped within 20 yards of Augusta. This bombing occurred at 4:40 p.m. August 14, 5:27 p. m. In case any further bombing of U. S. vessels will use anti-aircraft battery in self-defense. 793.94/9387: Telegram The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State SHANGHAI, August 15, 1937-11 a. m. [Received 11:15 a. m.] 485. I now repeat for information of Department the substance of telephone message sent by me late yesterday afternoon to the Embassy at Nanking. Following is substance of my telephone message communicated to Counselor Peck 47 this afternoon 47a at about 6:20. He dictated what I said to the stenographer: 2. Chinese airplanes have been bombing Shanghai constantly today. They are violating the area of foreign refuge by flying over it. They are short dropping their bombs, two of which have landed near the race course, and others have hit the Palace Hotel and the Cathay Hotel. There are hundreds killed and wounded; some of them Americans, but we cannot yet ascertain who. Two bombs were dropped near the flagship Augusta as she was coming into port. There is no question as to the identity of these planes; they are Chinese planes. I urge you most emphatically to make representations at Nanking to respect the area of foreign refuge and to stop this wanton slaughtering. 3. Ambassador Johnson then came to the telephone and told me that they had heard some of this at Nanking over the radio, and that he had already been to see Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. I then told him that I had received, with instructions to repeat to him, a message 47 47a Willys R. Peck, Counselor of Embassy in China at Nanking. from the Department 48 while assuming that most strong representations had been made to the Japanese Ambassador. I added that I had been able to get through by telephone to him only after I had informed the American owned telephone company to say to the Chinese connections that I had ordered the suspension of their facilities to Chinese until I was permitted to get through to the American Embassy. 4. It had represented that there was no telephone connection with Nanking. I knew better and instructed the American Telephone Company in the Settlement to say to the Chinese connections that if necessary I would give orders to the American company to refuse connections at the Shanghai end for Chinese officials unless I were put on immediately uninterrupted. I obtained my connection within 5 minutes. I cite this as an example of the manner in which it has become necessary to deal with the situation. GAUSS 793.94/9388: Telegram The Consul General at Shanghai (Gauss) to the Secretary of State SHANGHAI, August 15, 1937-11 a. m. [Received 2 p. m.] 486. Admiral Yarnell and staff held a conference this morning at Consulate General with Marine Commander and myself. 2. The President Taft which is off mouth of the Yangtze, homeward bound, is to come into Woosung and passengers will be sent down by tender. Advice will be given quietly that women and children should be sent away as rapidly as transportation is available. Other American ships expected in. Agents of ships will be advised to make available all possible facilities for those desiring passage. Americans to be given preference. 3. Yarnell plans to reinforce the east garrison here with what small number of men may be available from the Fleet. He also proposes to recommend that a force of about 1,000 marines stand by in the United States to be sent to Shanghai in the case of necessity to assist in defending the American sector against stragglers and to provide adequate relief for the present force. There is no thought of bringing in sufficient men to defend the foreign areas with [against?] an organized invasion by the Chinese Army. The idea is that our present forces are inadequate to carry out our obligations on the sector allocated to Americans. The increase in our force, if made, would be in proportion to what is being done by the British and French. I am thoroughly in accord with this view and heartily endorse it. * See vol. III, p. 400, footnote 95. |