Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a KnifeBloomsbury Academic, 2002 M10 30 - 249 páginas Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. |
Referencias a este libro
The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century Charles Reed,David Ryall Vista previa limitada - 2007 |
Armee in der Demokratie: Zum Verhältnis von zivilen und militärischen Prinzipien Ulrich Hagen Vista previa limitada - 2006 |