mended to secure a portion of the profits of the banks for the use of the state. I do not (said Mr. S.) pretend to understand this system exactly. It was first established in the state of New York, upon the recommendation of now one of the most distinguished senators in congress, a man in whose judgment in such matters, I would place as much confidence as that of any man in the United States, I mean Silas Wright, of New York. The governor has chosen to say in his message, that he does not recommend the safety fund system. But the leading principles of his substitute are the same. If they are not, I do not comprehend it nor approve it.

The next recommendation of governor Ritner is:

7. That every bank in the state shall be compelled to keep its notes at par in Harrisburg, Philadelphia and Pittsburg, the one the capital, and the others the great commercial emporiums of the commonwealth, or be summarily liable to the holder for any discount incurred.

This is Pandoras' box itself. Such a provision in a bank charter would create more shaving shops in various parts of the state, than any state has yet been cursed with. It would also introduce a spirit of litigation, heretofore unknown, by authorizing the usury of discounts paid. It would also operate most severely on the small banks, and most beneficially on the mammoth institutions. This matter should be entirely left to the character and credit of the banks themselves.

He further recommends :

8. That a law be passed fixing a period, not more distant than three four or five years from the present, for the expulsion from circulation of all notes of a lower denomination than ten dollars.

9. That the president and directors for the year during which a sus pension of specie payments shall occur in any bank, shall be individually liable for its notes, and for all other claims against it.

I would not approve of the first, because I am confident it can afford no remedy to the public for any evil or danger, and would be more injuriously felt by the people, than the banks. The next would be a matter of such monstrous injustice, in many instances, and the consequence would be that the best men would keep out of the directions of banks, and the worst and most irresponsible would manage these corporations. Suзpensions generally spring from causes not under the control of the generality of banks, or any but mammoth institutions. But for all matters within their control, directors should be answerable.

The other two propositions of the governor contain nothing new or worth notice. I had intended to have gone more fully into these propositions, to show their delusive character, but the time allowed to me will not admit of this. One grand objection to all of them, is that they are not to operate on the present banks, they are only recommended to be incorporated in charters to be granted. The present banking system is to be continued, and the present institutions are to be allowed to pursue their own course. I have no confidence in the plan of making stockholders liable, or of crippling notes under ten dollars, for circulation, or in the schemes of the govornor, as a remedy for the evils now complained of, or as a security to the public against future suspensions. I ain opposed to

all these, and for a plan which will at once strike at the root of present evils or for nothing, I am for placing a restraint in granting chaiters to banking and other corporations, which may interfere with the property, interests or liberties of the people, and for granting full authority to ree alany law heretofore passed or which may hereafter be passed, for the incorporation of powerful moneyed institutions, capable of producing panics and pressure, and of shaking the commonwealth to its very centre, when feeling power, and forgetting right, they shall attempt acts, or measures injurious to the community. If I succeed, I am sure it will satisfy public opinion-if I fail, I have the consolation of believing that the object was worthy of the effort.

Mr. Chairman, I repeat the opinion which I have before expressed, that the chatter of the United States Bank, by the legislature of Pennsylvania, was an act done in violation of the will of the people. I believe that the public interests require that it should be placed in the power of the legislature, to repeal the charter, when that repeal is called for. I would not now vote for its repeal, because I think such an act, at this time, might be attended with injurious consequences. But. I would put it upon its good behaviour; so that if it was ascertained to be injurious to the public welfare, it might be removed, and that if it was ascertained to be beneficial to these interests, it might be retained. For my own part, I regard this institution as dangerous to the liberties of the people, and as dangerous to every institution of the same character in the state.

When, in the year 1819, an investigation into the affairs of the United States Bank took place, the president of the bank declared that "there were very few banks which might not have been destroyed by the exercise of the power of this bank, that they made the banks shape their business according to their means."

If this is so, and I incline strongly to the belief that it is, it must exercise a power over the people, and the property, and the interests of the country, which is too great to be left in the hands of any twenty-five men, directors of any bank in the United States. The amount of its capital is larger than the capital of all the other seventy-seven banks in the state, put together; and the duration of its charter three times as long as that of any other institution. This will contract a combination with the other banks. the language of the legislature of 1785, such an institution is injurious to the welfare of the state, and incompatible with the public safety."

In

We have seen the career, and felt the bitter fruits of a United States Bank, chartered by congress; we have seen that, for a series of years, there have been great complaints and much excitement throughout the country, on the ground that that institution was detrimental to the public

interests.

Sir, there can be no doubt, that such an institution, established in this commonwealth, will give rise to such complaints; it must be so; it has already done so, as we are all aware, and the question now, in almost every county, of a political character, is between the advocates of that bank, and those who are opposed to it.

I am aware of the fact, that the power to repeal charters has been denied to the legislature, and also to this convention. For my own part, I do

not entertain a doubt of the right of the legislature to exercise that power, whenever it may choose to do so. I say, I do not entertain a doubt.on that point. The power has been exercised in various instances. A charter is but a law, and a law may be repealed. It has been called a contract, but while it depends on an act of assembly, which is a law, it may be repealed in the same manner as all other laws may be repealed. This doctrine has been sustained by some of the first men in the nation. It is inculcated in every book that treats upon the subject, that one legislature cannot bind another.

The legislature of this state did repeal a charter granted to the Bank of North America, which was first chartered by congress, and then by the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in the year 1782. It had a perpetual charter, with a capital of three millions of dollars. Three years afterwards, in the year 1785, the charter was repealed.

Thus we see, that one of the most valuable charters, and for a large amount of money, and unlimited in duration, was repealed, and the contest arose in regard to the right of the legislature to repeal it. It is one of the firmest principles of your government-a principle which lies at the very root of all your institutions-that when a government becomes injurious or oppressive to the people, it is the duty and the right of the people, to alter it, so as to secure their safety and their rights. If the legislature has no right to repeal a charter, this convention, whose proceedings are to be submitted to the people, that they may pass their judgment upon them, may undoubtedly settle that point beyond the possibility of further dispute. It is a most extraordinary position, and one which cannot fail to challenge our wonder, that any legislature can pass a law, granting a charter, which law cannot, at any subsequent time, be repealed. If this principle is to prevail, there is no end to the abuses which might grow up under it.

But, Mr. Chairman, this objection has been fully answeered, by the fact, to which I have referred that is to say, that the legislature of Pennsylvania actually did repeal a charter granted to the Bank of North Amer. ica-which charter was perpetual in its character, and that the power to do so was never contested. I think, looking to it as a matter of public benefit, it would be proper that this power should be given to the legislature, because every bank in the state would then be put upon the good behaviour principle-knowing, at the same time, that there would be no interference with it, so long as its affairs were properly administered, and so long as it confined its operations to the objects contemplated by the charter. There can be no fear, that such a power would be prejudicial to the banks, because we have the experience of twenty-three years, to convince us, that it could not be so.

Every bank in the commonwealth, with two exceptions, has a clause inserted in its charter, giving to the legislature the right of repeal. The banks have accepted their charters with these provisions inserted, and we have never yet discovered that it was prejudicial, either to them, or to the community in which they were placed. The manner in which the banks have conducted their business, has been such, as, generally speaking, to recommend that this provision should be inserted hereafter.

It is impossible for any administration to exist, in opposition to the will of the people. Neither can any bank exist, in opposition to the will of the people, among whom it is situated. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be a matter of policy, on the part of the banks, to have a provision of this kind placed in the constitution-because, that would restore them to the favor of the public, and remove that jealousy which exists in the public mind against them. I think gentlemen must have seen many evidences, that the feeling existing in the community, against those institutions, was very deep, indeed; and I agree with the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) that, if something of this kind is not done, before long, we will have a struggle between the banking institutions of the country, and the people of the country. Not by mobs, as the delegate from Washington, (Mr. Craig) has said, but that the legislature, operated upon and controlled by the will of their constituents, would exercise the power of repealing their charters, and, in this way, a struggle will ensue, in which the people must and will prevail, and the banking institutions will be prostrated.

I am in favor of prohibiting the legislature, in consideration of a bonus, from granting a charter to any banking institution. This had a more injurious effect, than almost any thing else. It was almost impossible for a representative to oppose a charter to a bank, when a large bonus was offered, which would, perhaps go to make some improvements in the immediate vicinity of his constituents. In such cases, a member can hardly resist the importunity of his constituents, and I know of no better manner of preventing evils being done in this way, than by prohibiting the legislature from granting charters, in consideration of bonuses to be paid. In this matter, I am happy to have the governor with me. Thus far, I think the convention ought to go,-because no action of the legis lature would be binding upon future legislatures. Before the year 1832, I believe there were but two banks (the Bank of North America, and the Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank) which had paid bonuses; and since that time, there had been upwards of six millions of dollars paid in this way. This shows that the evil is of recent origin, and has grown up in this country but very recently. The governor has seen the bad effects of it since, he has come into office, as the most of these bonuses had been paid since that time; therefore, his recommendation on this subject was entitled to some weight. If, then, we make a provision in the constitution, that no banking institution shall be incorporated, in consideration of a bonus granted, it will relieve the people from having so many of these banking institutions forced upon them, which act so injuriously to their interests.

I am, also in favor of requiring, for the passage of some charters, more than the votes of a bare majority of the members of the legislature, but, at the same time, I should be opposed to having it require two successive legislatures to agree to the passage of a law, granting a charter to a small banking institution; because, if the people, in any particular district, wanted a bank of small capital, which would be beneficial to them, it ought to be granted to them, and go into operation as soon as possible. But, where the institutions were to have large capitals, and would be able to exercise an influence over the whole state, or a considerable part of it, and beyond the state, and could control and regulate our money

affairs at pleasure, and make money scarce or plenty, at will, I would require the votes of two-thirds of the legislature to pass a charter.

Mr. S. here gave way to]

Mr. STEVENS, who moved that the committee rise. Lost. Ayes 43, noes 56.]

Mr. STERIGERE resumed:

I feel very reluctant to trespass on the time of the committee at this time of night, but as the subject was an important one, I feel it to be my duty to give my views upon it.

In stating to the convention the propositions and restrictions for which I would be disposed to vote, I am free to declare that I have as much confidence in the legislature of our commonwealth, as any man on this floor. I am by no means disposed to call in question their integrity or honesty; but there are times when the legislature do not express the public will; and erroneous legislation sometimes takes place from improper motives, and sometimes from proper motives. If one legislature act faithlessly, fraudulently, or even improvidently, there should be a remedy. I am, therefore, disposed to give a power to the legislature, to correct all bad legislation, so that the public will may be carried into effect, when it is ascertained that previous acts of the legislature have been injurious to the public interest. We cannot trust to mere restrictions in the charters of banks, for they are too easily evaded. Let them, therefore, be put upon the good behaviour principle. Every one knows the restrictions which were placed in the charter of the United States Bank, in 1816, and every one recollects its proceedings under that charter, and how little they were regarded. This is one example of the inefficiency of mere restrictions. Nothing can control these institutions so well as a visitorial power in the legislature.

not.

No man could have believed it possible that the restrictions imposed on the directors of the banks, at that time, would have been so shamefully evaded, as they were. They were most shamefully disregarded, as any one who has taken any notice of the report made on that subject, must know. I am not disposed to make charges against the directors of any bank. The remarks I make, are intended to apply to the system. I know nothing of the directors; all their proceedings are secret, and there are no means, generally, of knowing whether they are proper or How far it is proper to throw the veil of secrecy over their proceedings, is, to my mind, a matter of much doubt. We all know that there once was a time, when it was thought to be improper that any man should know any thing about bank proceedings. Such, however, is not the case at this time. All the banks are now compelled to throw open their books to the stockholders; but still they are prohibited from throwing open the private accounts of the stockholders. This, I think, is an erroneous idea; although, I am free to say, that my mind is not entirely settled on that point. There is no doubt, however, that the favors granted to individuals, have been beyond all the limits of sound discretion, and I look upon it as necessary that the amounts of the discounts to individuals, should be limited. This, I think, will be a better means of restrain