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He believed this principle had been asserted by his friend on his left, (Judge Hopkinson) which gave it the weight of his authority. But he (Mr. I.) disclaimed it altogether, and it seemed to him that the argument of Judge Marshall, in the case of Fletcher and Peck, was irresistible, and not to be set aside by the assertions of gentlemen on this floor. It was imputed to two members on this floor, and two or three other gentlemen who were not members of this body, that they voted for the charter of the Bank of the United States from corrupt motives. He only introduced this for the sake of the argument. But granting that to be the fact, which has been disproved, he denied that in consequence thereof any judicial or collateral body could repeal that act, unless it could be shown that every man of the majority, who voted for it, or, at least, a sufficient number to carry it, had been so influenced.

He denied, that an act could be repealed in consequence of this corruption, and in support of his position, he would avouch the argument of the supreme court, in the case he had before alluded to. He avouched that argument as being irresistible and conclusive, that even though Mr. A. B. C. and D. may be proved to have voted from corrupt motivesyou may place it in the most gross and offensive manner which you can, still he denied that that made the act a nullity. Because any two, three, or four members of the senate of Pennsylvania, voted for any particular measure from corrupt motives, that did not make the law which they voted upon a nullity. He denied and disclaimed all this matter and produced in support of his opinion, the argument of the supreme court in the case of Fletcher and Peck, as being altogether conclusive. There it is written in such manner that no gentleman can mistake it, and every gentleman who desires to consult that authority, has an opportunity of doing so.

Having disposed of these premises, he came to the main question which he intended to discuss. He denied entirely, that a bank charter was a contract, and he would pledge himself to show to the satisfaction of every dispassionate hearer, that this assertion was correct. He pledged himself further, to show that it never has been adjudged a contract, and that it seldom or never has been called a contract; but that all the common sense, all the moral philosophy, all the political law, and all the adjudication on the subject had determined it otherwise. It had been taken for granted by some, from the decision of the Dartmouth college case, which was a totally different kind of case, it being a private contract of an eleemosynary character, altogether different in all its circumstances. He acknowledged that one judge of the supreme court of the United States, whom he might be permitted to call his friend, and who, for twenty-five years, he had been on terms of intimacy with, had said that a bank charter was a contract; but he (Mr. I.) pledged himself to show to this body that, except the say so of this judge, for it was but his say so, as a judicial opinion had never been given on the subject, and it might be doing injustice to the judge alluded to, for him to introduce this opinion of his here, no judge, no legist, no moral philosopher, no philologist, had ever given an opinion that a bank charter was a contract. On the contrary, all the authorities were on the other side. He was not so sure, but what some of those who compile books, had this in their books, for there are books making every day by young lawyers, who have nothing else to do; who have but little experience, and who, the moment they find any thing

said by some one, write it down as facts, and matter of authority; and it may be, that in such compilations as these, some such assertion may be found. But here again, he demurred from their authority.

He wished gentlemen now to remember that he was merely speaking of a bank charter, and he did not wish to place all charters together on the same footing, as the gentleman from Allegheny had done in his letter. He wished to be understood as speaking of no other than a bank charter. He was speaking of that kind of an institution which makes a currency for the country, which makes a substitute for money. He was speaking of that and of nothing else; and, he did not think that any man who will bring his mind to that single point, will see any very great reason for being shocked at the assertion he was about to submit to the consideration of the committee. He held in his hand, the strictures upon a letter, published by himself, of some anonymous gentleman he did not know, but whose work was written in a very able and eloquent manner; and accompanying it he found certain letters of the gentleman from Allegheny, (Mr. Forward) Mr. Dallas, Mr. Biddle, &c. And he wished to read a few lines from the letter of his friend from Allegheny, to show what he says on this subject. "It is conceded" (he says) that the anulling of a charter is the destruction of contracts, by the annihilation of vested rights of property. The question, therefore, in its plain and naked terms, is just this-can a majority of the people appoint a body of delegates with the power to annul contracts and destroy vested private rights. I take the negative side of this question for the following reasons. Now, this was all very fully laid down, but the truth is, that he speaks of these vested rights, and annihilation of vested rights of property, apart from the question we were now discussing.

Mr. FORWARD said that the gentleman would find that he was there referring to the concessions of Mr. Dallas.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Mr. Dallas concedes the whole case. It was not necessary then for him to pursue this matter any farther as the argument of the gentleman is predicated on the concessions of Mr. Dallas. Mr. I. was speaking of a bank charter, and of nothing else, and he wished gentlemen to do him the justice to recollect that he had nothing else in view, but a bank charter. There was an obvious difference, too, between an ancient charter and a modern charter, and there was still as great a difference between the different kinds of modern charters. An ancient charter was a grant of liberty. It was separating a few men from the oppression of the then rulers. A modern charter is a grant of privileges. It is separating a few men from the general mass of the community, and conferring a portion of the liberty of the community upon them in the shape of special privileges. You must not, therefore, look upon ancient and modern charters in the same light, neither must you confound all modern charters. These charters are almost altogether peculiar to this country, and this was a matter which is almost always lost sight of. Did the learned gentleman from Erie, (Mr. Sill) who had told us so much about these corporations doing wonders, suppose that the wonders which had been worked in England were the offspring of corporations? Mr. I. spoke not now of what the spirit of liberty and labor-saving machinery, had done; but, does the gentleman from Erie suppose, that the canals,

PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION, 1837.

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the rail roads and other improvements of England, were completed by the aid of corporate bodies? If so, the gentleman labors under a very great mistake. They are not made by incorporated companies. There are but very few of these companies incorporated in that country, and corporations such as we have in this country are altogether peculiar to this country. They were formerly the asylums of liberty, but now they have become the strong hold of property. He would here, however, disclaim all idea, even the most remote, of interfering with any man's property, real or personal. When he spoke of a bank charter, he spoke of it as a power conveyed to a certain number of individuals, or the same power might be conferred upon a single individual, to make a public currency, which is a substitute for money. Now, he would ask, in the first place, and it was a very curious question too, which he did not mean to concede, nor altogether to affirm. But, he would ask whether the power to make this species of grant was a legislative power at all? This was a very interesting and a very serious question. It had, to be sure, been always taken for granted, but he would ask, whether under the institutions of our state, when an individual was elected a member of the legislature, he is by that authority, for there is no express grant, empowered to give up to one or more individuals, a portion of the sovereignty of the people? He desired an answer to this question soberly and dispassionately. Looking into the nature and origin of things, he would ask what is the social compact? Most modern philosophers, and among them he might name Mr. Paley, as standing among the first of themascribe the origin of society either to parentage or force. The United States government was unquestionably a government of consent; and, whether the state governments were the same is perhaps a question which it is hardly necessary to argue much about. But, sir, looking to the origin of society, let us inquire whether these powers, which are claimed, exist at all. If any American legislator was to answer him in the affirmative, it must be by a tacit commission, for there is no express grant to be found any where, which gives power to a member to grant these charters. He knew very well that a large proportion of those who were elected to the legislature, suppose they are elected to do any thing which is not morally wrong, and they believe that there is no limit to their authority. He, however, denied this altogether. The American legislator holds by a limited trust. He holds by none of that parliamentary immor tality which exists in England. He asked gentlemen to turn their attention to the acquisition of power, and show him where it was to be found. He would refer gentlemen to the very able views of the gentleman from Erie, (Mr. Sill) on this subject. He bestowed a large portion of his argument in an effort to show that corporations were not a monopoly. Mr. I. did not say whether they were or whether they were not, but he took it for granted, and the argument of the gentleman went to show this, that if they were a monopoly, the legislatnre had no power to grant a monopoly ; and this was bringing the matter down to narrow grounds. Suppose a charter was not a monopoly. Suppose it was a perpetuity. He should like the lawyers of this house to tell him whether the legislature had a right to grant a perpetuity. Does not every lawyer know that a perpetuity is against the common law itself, and a judge sitting in our court, can uproot any kind of property received as a perpetuity? A monopoly is questionable, but a perpetuity is unquestionable.

Now, the largest portion of stock which he held in any thing he held in perpetuity. He held as a stockholder stock in an institution which was perpetual. But, he questioned the right; he questioned the power of the legislature to confer any thing like a monopoly; and, he denied their power to grant any thing like a perpetuity. That the government of the United States has no power to grant charters is certain. We know that. We know that the Bank of the United States was sustained on a totally different principle. It was sustained on the ground of its being a fiscal agent of the government for a given end; but, we know very well that while the convention which framed the constitution of the United States was in session, an attempt was made to give the power to congress to confer charters, and that attempt totally failed, and was defeated. He was not now speaking of the United States Bank charter, but he was speaking of charters at large, and upon this subject he wished to be permitted to call the attention of the members of this body to the consitutions of our own state, from which a lesson of restriction was to be learned. In the constitution of 1776, chapter one, and section three and four, which is the bill of rights of that constitution, he found the following language:

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"That the people of this state have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police of the same. That all power being originally inherent in, and consequently derived from the people; therefore, all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them." And in chapter second, section nine, he found the following: The members of the house of representatives, shall be chosen annually by ballot; they shall have power to choose their speaker and other officers; sit on their own adjournments; propose bills, and enact them into laws; judge of the election and qualifications of their own members; they may expel a member, but not a second time for the same cause; they may administer oaths or affirmations on examination of witnesses; redress grievances, impeach state criminals; and, grant charters of incorporation."

The framers of that constitution deemed it indispensible that this power, which is a mere assumption of power on the part of the legislature under the present constitution, should be given in express terms, and they certainly considered that the legislature would not have had the power, if it had not been given to them in this way.

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Again, in section ten, of the same chapter, the oath of the members was as follows: "I- do swear (or affirm) that as a member of this assembly, I will not propose or assent to any bill, vote or resolution, which shall appear to me injurious to the people, nor do or consent to any act or thing whatever, that shall have a tendency to lessen or abridge their rights and privileges, as declared in the constitution of this state; but will, in all things conduct myself as a faithful, honest, representative and guardian of the people, according to the best of my judgment and abilities."

Upon the constitution of the United States then, and upon the constitution of 1776, he founded this argument, and when he founded it upon such authorities he thought he stood upon imprenigable ground. In

the convention to form the constitution of the United States it was proposed to give this power to congress, and was refused. And, in the constitution of 1776, they had this right conferred upon them, but in the constitution of 1790, it was omitted. If this was an open question, then, (and we had not the experience of near fifty years in this state,) he was free to say, that he should declare that unless this power was conferred by a direct grant of the people, that it could not be assumed under any tacit authority, and for the simple reason, that no member of the legislature sits by any omipotent power.

Let gentlemen never forget that in England, the parliament hold all power in their hands, and are the sovereigns. Here, however, the representative has the constitution as his guide, and alone, and beyond, and superior to that, was the people themselves. They do not elect representatives for the purpose of doing any thing they pleased, which was not morally wrong. They do not elect them upon any such principles. The people look back to first principles and elect representatives to do that which is for the benefit of the mass of the people. The power to grant charters, and especially bank charters, was to say the least of it, a questionable power; it was a power which it was doubtful whether the people ever conferred upon their representatives. Sir, let us look into the present constitution of Pennsylvania, and see what can be drawn from it on this subject. He would beg leave to call the attention of gentlemen to the ninth article, first section, and there was to be found words that ought to have some meaning, and which any judge of a court in the state, would feel himself bound to give some meaning to. That first section was in the following words : "That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happi

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This is not merely that all men possess inherent and equal rights, and that they shall enjoy personal liberty, but that they shall enjoy the right to property, and the right to transmit property. They are to have an equal right. Well, will any man pretend to say that the rights of individuals incorporated and unincorporated are equal? He again looks att he twenty-fourth clause of this same article; "the legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction, nor create any office, the appointment to which shall be for a longer term than good behaviour." Now, would any gentleman tell him that the stock which he held in a charter, which is perpetual, is not a hereditary distinction, by which he might enjoy the acquisition, possession and transmission of property, which those who did not hold in the same way, were deprived from enjoying? It seemed so to him at all events.

Well, sir, what is the civil law upon this subject from which we get many of our corporations? Why, the civil law is that all the corporators are liable for the debts of the corporation. An inquiry on this subject, on the part of gentlemen, would be no less curious than profitable; and, it was worth while to look into this matter, and see how these laws have been incorporated with our laws, for all the laws we have, are drawn from these fountains. Certain it is, that the legislature have the power to limit

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