and regulate the issues of banks, and this was recommended to them in the governor's message; and, until he heard this called in question the other day by the highly respectable and learned judge on his left (Judge Hopkinson) he had never heard a doubt hinted as to the power of the legislature to make these regulations. It is a power which has been exercised by the legislature of every state in the Union at all times and under all circumstances, and never had he heard of a doubt being expressed in relation to it, until he heard it doubted by the gentleman from the city.

Why, sir, this was the postulate of the whole arguments of the gentleman from Beaver, who had, with a great deal of research gone, on to show us the progressive course of the legislature in placing restrictions upon banks. But, the learned judge had gone into an argument to show that we had no right to meddle with the ten dollar notes of the bank, and this gentleman was the first one he had ever heard doubt the right of the legislature to regulate the banks in this way. The first is, that the legislature to a certain extent have exercised this power, and that extent seemed to him to be such an extent as to settle the whole question. The first is, that the legists and modern philosophers, and all those who looked into the origin and source of things, would find it very difficult to reconcile these powers with reason.

But, the gentlemen from Northampton had introduced here one of the most despicable of characters, as proof upon this subject. The authority of Tom Paine, a man who was a weak politician, an infidel in religion, and a sot in old age; and, he was as weak and despicable authority as could be introduced on any subject whatever. By the subterfuges of this man, the gentleman attempts to prove and settle great political principles. Well, what does he say? Why, he says, that a law incorporating a bank is not a law, but that it is an act; and, upon this miserable distinction does his whole case rest. It is an act of sale, but it is not a law. The legislature is not acting as a legislature, when they grant or sell bank charters; but, they are contracting for them, bargaining for them, and giving a quid for a quo.

This was the argument of Tom Paine, and he would leave it with this committee whether this was an argument which was to have any weight with them. It might with some of our legislators, and it might perhaps, with his friend from Allegheny. As the gentleman from Allegheny had written a letter on this subject, he wished to call the attention of the committee to a particular passage in that letter which related to this question, which was as follows:

"Can any one give a reason why the force of a contract should depend on the numbers that may constitute one of the parties to it-why the stronger party should be allowed to say one thing and mean anothershould be permitted to keep or break its stipulations according as a majority may decide? An individual claiming this privilege, would be set down as a knave. The obligation of a contract is a moral obligation, and therefore, just as binding upon governments and communities, represented by governments, as upon individuals. A contrary doctrine substitutes force in the place of right, and however disguised, is an attack upon liberty." Again he says, "The legislature which granted they

bank charter, was clothed with limited powers; but, to the extent of those powers, it represented the people and could bind them. It is for this reason, that the charter is constitutional. In other words, the power to grant it, was delegated by the people."

Here was an assumption which he thought the American people could not consent to, and to disprove which he would refer gentlemen to the same book of reports of the arguments of the court in the case of Fletcher and Peck. The powers of legislators are limited and must be limited, and when the gentleman from Allegheny assumes that a legislator can do any thing and every thing, he assumes what he cannot prove. But, he would now concede this power. As he had before disclaimed various principles, so would he now concede the power of the legislature to grant bank charters. In this last discussion he did not wish to involve himself in any metaphysical elements, but to address himself to the body in that simple manner that every body could understand him.

Well, as to the assumption of the gentleman, what is it? The whole assumption is that a bank charter is a contract. Remember that this is an assumption and a mere assumption; and, in what he was going to say, he intended no offence. But, how dare any man assume, as fact, what he cannot prove? How dare any man assume that a bank charter was a contract, when it could not be found to be said so any where nor by any body, save the mere say so of a single individual? How then dare any man to assume that which he ought to prove?

I call upon them to prove it; it is not for me to disprove it. I cast the burden of proof upon them; let them shew what they assert to be true; let them shew by reason, as well as by proof. Sir, they can not shew it either by the one or the other. The same authority which they have for it, concedes that a marriage is not a contract; the legislature may divorce the parties, and the legislature has done so under most flagrant circumstances. They have taken the property of the wife, and given it to the husband. I need not-it is painful to me, even to refer to a recent transaction, which will suggest itself to the recollection of all who hear me. The legislature has, under circumstances of the most monstrous character, dissolved the marriage contract. They have taken private propertydespoiled one party of it, and given it to the other.

The legislature, almost every day, reduces the salaries of those in office, unless it happens to be in the constitution, that they shall not do so. And, is it not a contract that when a man undertakes to do a piece of business, whatever it may be, for five hundred dollars, the legislature shall not interpose and say, we will give you only two hundred dollars? There is no question, as a matter of salary. No one would oppose it. It is not, therefore, to be assumed--it is to be proved against these concessions, that this is a constitutional contract, that it is a contract, in view of these phrases of the constitution of this state, which uses the term "contract." It is not to be a common contract; it is to be that which the constitution contemplates, and nothing else. There is, as I have said, an obvious distinction-a palpable classification.

Our young American lawyers, in certain treatises on this subject, for which I have no great respect, do not define any charter, that I know of.

They describe two; that is to say, a public charter, such as the charter of this city, or county, or of the overseers of the poor; and, secondly, a private charter, such as that of an insurance company, and for various other private purposes.

Some of my friends in this body, are chartered libertines on this par ticular subject; such as my friend from Franklin, (Mr. Dunlop) and from Northampton, (Mr. Porter.) It appears to me, that those who have attended to this question in some degree, have not ascertained their elements. I take it there is a private charter, such as the gentleman from Northampton (Mr. Porter) holds. It matters not whether it is granted to one or more individuals—that is a private charter. Then, there is a municipal charter, such as the charter of this city.

The CHAIR here announced, that the hour allowed by the rule, had expired.

Mr. WOODWARD rose and said:

Mr. Chairman, there seems to me to be an impression abroad, that this amendment conflicts with the resolution introduced at Harrisburg, by the gentleman from the city of Philadelphia, (Mr. Meredith) and adopted by a vote of this body. I will say a single word in reply to that suggestion. That resolution affirms, that a charter granted to a bank, is a contract, and that it can be avoided only in a certain mode. I had supposed that the legislature could avoid a charter, but this resolution affirms the contrary. If it be true, that a bank charter, is a contract, and can only be avoided in the way mentioned in this resolution, is it not competent for this convention, to introduce a provision into the constitution, giving to the legislature that power, which the resolution asserts the legislature does not at this time possess?

Mr. BELL rose to a point of order. He wished to inquire from the Chair, whether this was intended by the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) as the continuation of the address, which was brought to an end yesterday, under the operation of the rule, limiting each delegate to the space of an hour?

The CHAIR said, it was not possible for him to say whether this was, or was not, intended as a continuation of that address. The gentleman from Luzerne had got the floor, according to the rules of order, and was entitled to it.

Mr. WOODWARD said, that he would very cheerfully answer the inquiry of the gentleman from Chester (Mr. Bell.)

Yesterday, said Mr. W., I submitted some observations to the committee, until I was called to order, under the operation of the new rule. I have now obtained the floor, and have, therefore, an opportunity to submit some additional remarks. I do not intend to recapitulate my observations of yesterday, I merely intend to offer some more in addition to them.

Mr. BELL said, he would then submit to the Chair, whether the gentleman from Luzerne was in order—whether he was not evading the rule?

The CHAIR said that, in the opinion of the chair, the gentleman from Luzerne (Mr. Woodward) was perfectly in order

Mr. BELL appealed from the decision.

And, the question thereon having been taken, the committee sustained the decision of the Chair.

Mr. WOODWARD,* took the floor, and made some remarks.

Mr. W. then gave way to Mr. M'CAHAN, on whose motion the committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again.

The PRESIDENT, by leave, laid before the convention, a communication from the clerk of the commissioners of the county of Philadelphia-in compliance with a resolution adopted on the 22d instant-enclosing a statement, showing the annual cost of each of the state courts of justice in the city and county of Philadelphia, for the four years prior to the first day of December, 1837, and the fees received out of the county funds, by the attorney general or his deputies, on the several criminal prosecutions therein during that period of time.

A motion was made by Mr. Doran,

That the said communication and statement be printed for the use of the delegates.

Which motion was disagreed to. And the communication and statement were ordered to lie on the table.

The convention then adjourned until half past three o'clock this after

noon.

THURSDAY AFTERNOON. DECEMBER 28, 1837.

The Convention having assembled, and the question being "Will the convention again resolve itself into a committee of the whole, on the report of the committee to whom was referred the seventh article of the constitution ?"

Mr. INGERSOLL asked for the yeas and nays on this question, and they were ordered sccordingly.

The question was then taken, and decided in the affirmative, as follows, viz:

YEAS--Messrs. Ayres, Banks, Barclay, Bedford, Bigelow, Bonham, Brown of Northampton, Brown, of Philadelphia, Carey, Clarke, of Indiana, Cleavinger, Cline, Crain, Crawford, Cummin, Curll, Darrah, Denny, Dickey, Dillinger, Doran Fleming, Foulkrod, Fry, Fuller, Gamble, Gearhart, Gilmore, Hastings, Hayhurt, Helffenstein, Henderson, of Dauphin, Hiøster, Hopkinson, Houpt, Hyde, Jenks, Keim, Kennedy, Krebs. Magee, Martin, M'Cahen, M'Dowell, M'Sherry, Merrill, Miller, Overfield, Porter, of Northampton, Purviance, Read, Riter, Ritter, Scheetz, Sellers, Seltzer, Serrill, Shellito, Smith, of Columbia, Smyth, of Centre, Sterigere, Stickel, Taggart, Weaver, Woodward-66.

*See Appendix.

NAYS-Messrs. Agnew, Barndollar, Biddle, Brown, of Lancaster, Chauncey, Clarke, of Beaver, Clark, of Dauphin, Cochran, Cope, Cox, Craig, Crum, Darlington, Dickerson, Farrelly. Harris, Hays, Kerr, Konigmacher, Martin, M'Call, Merkel, Montgomery, Pollock, Porter, of Lancaster, Reigart, Saeger, Scott, Young, Sergeant, President-30.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

The Convention again resolved itself into a committee of the whole, Mr. REIGART in the chair, on the report of the committee to whom was refered the seventh article of the constitution.

The question being on the motion of Mr. WooDWARD to amend the amendment of Mr. READ, by adding to the end thereof the words follow. ing, viz:

"And the legislature may repeal, change or modify the charters of all banks heretofore iucorporated, or which may hereafter be incorporated in this commonwealth, whether the power to repeal, change or modify be reserved in such charter or not, but when the legislature shall repeal the charter of any bank, or resume any of its corporate privileges, they shall provide adequate and sufficient compensation to the stockholders of such bank."

A quorum of members not being present, some delay took place, after which

Mr. WOODWARD* resumed the remarks he commenced on the last evening.

Mr. INGERSOLL rose and said, I have asserted Mr. Chairman, that it is absolute murder to an argument to mutitate in this way. And if it is not now the pleasure of this body to hear my argument out, I will renounce the intention of addressing it further on this subject.

Mr. PORTER of Northampton, rose and said: Mr. Chairman; the issue presented by the resolution adopted on the 21st November last, as well as that presented by the amendment now submitted by the delegate from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) is a general abstract question. Has the legislature the right to repeal a charter granted to individuals for banking purposes, and if the right exists-would it be policy to exercise it? This question I should like to hear discussed, without bringing other existing topics into the debate. In the whole course of the argument of that delegate, he has reference to one charter, the grant of which and the excitement produced in consequence, has no doubt led to the agitation of this subject.

The question is one of vast importance in principle and in its bearing upon the rights of the community and of the individual members of that community. If you establish the principle contended for it may involve in its consequences that title to every tract of land-to every house and lot--to every charter for a turnpike road--bridge-rail road--canal— church-school house,--college and academy in the country. Adopt the amendment now proposed and carry it out in its extent and you will give to your legislature, as whim, caprice, excitement or any thing else may move them, the power over every man's title and rights. This is a despotism to which I for one will never consent to submit.

* See Appendix.