FOURTH ARTICLE.

The Convention then proceeded to take up the unfinished business, viz: the fourth article of the Constitution.

Mr. CLARKE, of Indiana, moved to postpone the further consideration of this article, as many members desired time to see what other amendments were proposed, before they voted on this report: and the question being taken on his motion, it was decided in the negative.

The Convention then resolved itself into committee of the whole. Mr. DENNY in the Chair, and the reports of the majority and minority of the committee were taken up for consideration.

The question being on agreeing to the amendment reported by the committee,

Mr. BIDDLE moved to amend the report, by striking out the word "majority", and inserting the words "two thirds".

Mr. STEVENS suggested, that the better course would be to disagree to the amendment of the committee.

Mr. BIDLLE acquiesced in the suggestion, and withdrew his motion. Mr. CHAMBERS rose and addressed the committee. The question (said he) is to agree to the report of the committee, which strikes out from the Constitution the words "two thirds", and substitutes "a majority". The more I reflect on the subject, the more am I satisfied, that we ought to retain the provision as it stands in the present Constitution. It ought not to be overlooked, that the officers of the Commonwealth, from the Governor down to the lowest subordinate, are exposed to impeachment; and it behoves the committee to hesitate, and reflect long, before they withdraw the shield which protects them against malicious or unfounded accusations. I am disposed to look at this question without reference to the tenure of office, whether it be for a term of years, or during good behaviour. I will not agree, that the public servants, officers of upright conduct and high reputation, in whom the public confidence reposes, shall be exposed, without any protection, to infamous conviction and the most degrading punishment, when the most profligate citizen is not liable to be affected in his rights, his character and his property, without that protection which it is now proposed to withdraw from the public officer. As was remarked, yesterday, the meanest criminal, charged with the most petty offence, has a right not only to his trial by an impartial tribunal, raised from his own county, but also of knowing who are his accusers, what is his crime, and who are the witnesses to testify against him; and no conviction can ensue unless the jury shall be unanimous in their opinion of his guilt. Again, so cautiously is he guarded in the possession of liberty and life, that, in reference to his trial, he has even a choice in the selection of his jury. He is to be tried by a jury selected impartially and when so selected, he has the right of challenging a certain number without cause, and also others for cause. And after throwing before him this "seven-fold shield", the law then requires that there shall be unanimity in the jury before he can be convicted. He knows too what is the charge he has to meet, the offence being stated with precision as one which was to be found in the statute book, or adjudged by the decisions of the courts, in a way which cannot be mistaken by the tribunal before which he is to be tried. But the public officer is arraigned, and for what? For misdemeanors in office. And what are misdemeanors in

office? Are they a class of crimes recorded in the statute book? No. They are mere political offences, to be tried by a political tribunal. They are crimes by construction; and may be crimes to-day, but not crimes tomorrow, according to the temper of the times, the fluctuations of political opinion, and the ascendancy of political parties. I do not know, with any certainty, to what class these offences can be refered. There are but few instances of impeachment. There may be, now and then, instances of corruption and unfaithfulness about which there can be no mistake, but there are thousands which depend entirely on circumstances for their criminal stamp. In all times, public opinion has varied as to what are misdemeanors in office. Great offenders have in all ages been brought to the punishment they deserved. But, in times of high political excitement, the power of impeachment has been carried to the most discreditable extent. A public officer has been impeached for giving opinions to his sovereign. Another has been impeached and convicted, for signing what was called a prejudicial peace. Another, for presenting medicine to the king, without consulting his physician. These are extreme cases, it is true, but they are on record among the impeachments of officers, of whom public opinion afterwards pronounced that they did not deserve punishment. We, of this republic, are liable to the same prejudices, and influenced by the same passions, which have operated on human action in all ages. Men are not to be regarded, for practical purposes, as what they ought to be, but as what they are. Time has been, even among ourselves, when an honest and faithful officer may have been impeached, who would have been degraded and disqualified for office, had the judgment depended on a mere majority of the Senate. The public interests are sufficiently protected by the provision as it now stands. If a public officer should be guilty of offence so flagrant, as to call down upon him the animadversion of law, there is little doubt that sufficient evidence would be produced to satisfy two thirds of the Senate of his guilt. And if such amount of evidence could not be produced, it would be better to acquit the person charged, according to the established maxim, that it is better that ten, or a hundred guilty, should escape, than that a single deserving officer should be degraded and rendered infamous, by a partial or unjust sentence. The object of public justice would be sufficiently secured, if the present provision in the Constitution were retained. It had been said, that public officers have escaped justice. If so, we have no right to suppose that they were guilty; or, if they were, the tribunal must be liable to the charge of having been unfaithful in the discharge of their duty. But as those by whom they were tried are the representatives of the people, the fair presumption is, that they did discharge their duty, and that the evidence was insufficient.

Again, what is public opinion on the subject? Throughout the United States, every where, I believe it is in favor of retaining two thirds as necessary to convict. This provision forms a part of the Constitution of the United States, and is, I believe, embodied in the Constitution of every other State, without exception. So far as a general examination entitles me to speak, I believe, it pervades them all. Another ground which suggests itself, is this: the power of conviction, by less than two thirds, will be, with all competent, qualified and honorable men, an objection to taking office. Will men who stand high in public confidence

for their integrity of life and purity of purpose, consent to enter upon a public office, when they may be liable to be swept away in a moment of political excitement, by the preponderance of a mere majority, acting under the influence of political prejudice? What greater misfortune can fall upon a man, high in office, elevated in feelings and in character, than, by a single blow, to be stricken down to the lowest point of degradation ? What is the spared life to him who is degraded and disqualified for ever? We may go along safely, as we have hitherto done, with the Constitution. in this respect, as it stands, and thus afford to the public officer the same protection which is secured to the meanest culprit. And, powerful, indeed, should be the reasons which would induce us to withdraw the shield, and leave the public servant ezposed to the hazard of unmerited shame and disqualification, whenever the eye of political malignity shall mark him for its victim.

Mr. PURVIANCE said, before I give my vote on the question before the committee, I will ask a moment's attention whilst I assign my reasons; as I intend to vote against what might be considered the popular view of the subject, I am anxious that my reasons should accompany that vote. In one particular, at least, I agree with the respectable gentleman from the city, (Mr. BIDDLE) that no alterations should be made in the existing Constitution, unless some strong and cogent reason is assigned for the change, and on this ground, I predicate my opposition to the report made by a majority of the committee on impeachments. I cannot believe, that it is such an amendment as the people at this time require, nor do I believe, that at any time, any particular anxiety has been manifested upon the subject. I would appeal to the friends of reform, of judicious reform, whether it is not better at this time, to be satisfied with such amendments as will secure the certain approval of the people, and leave others less important, to be inserted hereafter, under the provision for future amendments. As yet, sir, we are uncertain in what shape the amendments will be submitted to the people, whether in distinct propositions or as a whole. If the latter course should be adopted, are we not risking the reforms we have so much at heart, by connecting with them others not required by the people, nor demanded by any public exigency whatever? If the amendments are to be submitted in distinct proportions, by having too many, it may but tend to confusion, and thereby occasion a loss of perhaps one or more of our most favorite measures. So far as my observation has extended, no dissatisfaction has prevailed in relation to the article under consideration. But, sir, I am influenced by other and stronger reasons in the vote I am about to give. The proceeding in cases of impeachment, as has been clearly and eloquently shown by the distinguished gentleman from the city, (Mr. SERGEANT) is closely allied to that of trial by jury. They are kindred proceedings, equally to be regarded as sacred and inviolable. The reason which should induce us to dispense with the one, should operate with equal force in relation to the other— and were we now forming a new Constitution, instead of amending an old one, the concurrence of the whole Senate in the conviction of the accused, would strike me as a much more reasonable provision, than that of a bare majority. This argument would acquire additional force, should any reduction be made in the Senatorial term. Instead of four years, suppose the Senate were elected for but two, one half to go out each year; this,

sir, would bring the party accused before a body, one half of which had been newly chosen, and perhaps participated in, and owed their election to the excitement which originates the very accusation. That I may be clearly understood, I beg leave to illustrate my position: suppose an officer of government, (for all are embraced within the impeachment provision) should be charged with a high offence; a judge, for instance, charged with the offence of bribery, and that the public mind on the subject had become, to a very great extent, highly inflamed; the party accused müst appear before a tribunal, a majority of whom have been elected at the same time, the same place, and in the same manner, prescribed for the election of those who originate the impeachment. This, sir, would be converting what is intended to be a judicial tribunal, into one purely political. Gentlemen have spoken of this question in reference alone to its effects upon the judiciary, as if no other officers of government could become the subjects of impeachment. The very article provides for the impeachment of the Governor, and annexes as the penalty removal from office, and certain disqualifications in future. In times of high political excitement, even two thirds might be found in both Houses, willing to avail themselves of the slightest pretext for ousting a political opponent from the Executive chair, and yet we are called upon by gentlemen to permit this great principle of protection to be frittered down to a bare majority-to invest that majority with the power, not only of removing from office, but of disqualifying the convict forever afterwards from holding any office of honor, trust or profit, under this Commonwealth. I say convict, because the article declares him such, and yet gentlemen would say, that one half instead of two thirds of the jury who try him, (I mean the Senate, which is the same thing) shall fix upon him that odious character, alike destructive of his reputation, peace of mind, and future standing in society. Sir, if there is a principle for which I have been taught an early reverence-if there is any one principle in the government, to which my affections can be said to cling with an ardent fondness, it is the right of trial by jury. Amidst any and every conflict, which may arise in our government, I should desire to stand by and watch over the sacred right. Sir, if at any time, through blind delusion and political heat, a dissolution of the elements of our social compact should ensue, and this most cherished principle shall be torn from us, then, and not till then, will I be willing to abate my confidence in the stability of government, and bid farewell to the liberties of the country. I hope, therefore, the report of the majority of the committee may not be sustained, as it would innovate upon the principle of trial by jury, and introduce to the notice of the people, an amendment which they neither originally contemplated nor now require.

Mr. AGNEW said he would not have troubled the committee with any remarks, had it not been, that he considered the amendment proposed by the report as tending to effect a change of an important principle in our Government. It was not with a hope of adding much that is new to the arguments advanced and so eloquently urged by the distinguished gentleman who had preceded him, that he claimed their attention, but he considered it not only his privilege, but his duty to raise his voice against the proposed change was a change of principle, a change in the Constitution of a high judicial tribunal, which had been instituted for the purpose of trying more than the ordinary offences against society. That tribunal was established for

great purposes, not simply as had been intimated, to overrule or to awe the judiciary, but to check and restrain the whole class of civil officers from the chief Executive, down to the lowest officer in a civil station. What was the Constitution of this tribunal? How was it formed, and what restraints were imposed upon it to prevent an infringement of the rights of the citizens, as well as to preserve the purity of the Government? It is, sir, a political body, composed of men with all the passions, prejudices and weaknesses of men, coming, one fourth of them, every year, into office, with the feelings and views of partizans, laboring under excitement, and often pledged to the support of certain measures. This, sir, is the tribunal to which is committed the decision of the honor or infamy of every officer in the Commonwealth. Its sentence involves the highest punishment to be inflicted upon an honorable and a feeling mind-removal, and a total disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit. What guards are imposed upon this mode of trial to secure impartiality and justice? Was it chosen by an impartial power? Or might it not be chosen by the very faction from whom the accusation would come, and might not some of the very accusers be chosen to sit, and pronounce judgment in a case which they themselves had been instrumental in having brought up for impeachment? Whatever feelings of enmity or political hostility may have entered the heart of a Senator, however he may have prejudged the question, or have been elected with regard to the very occasion which made him a judge and juror, the accused had no right of challenge, no right to object. In the ordinary administration of justice, no matter how light the offence, a jury must sit, apart from all communication, suffered neither to speak with others, nor to separate from each other-every precaution used to secure an upright decision, uncontrolled by external bias. On the other hand, the Senate meets, adjourns, meets again, mixes with the crowd, hears its opinions, marks its decisions, and, perhaps, finally yields to the unhallowed cravings, of party appetite. This is the body, to the arbitrament of a mere majority of whom is sought to be given the weal and woe of every officer of the Government. The Declaration of Rights, that solemn and sacred charter of the rights of citizens-rights which should ever remain inviolable, has proclaimed the sacred character of the trial by jury, esteeming it the best safeguard of liberty, and the strongest shield against oppression. The humblest citizen, when reproached by the tongue of slander, and attempted to be justified against him, finds his reputation, dearer to him than life, guarded, protected and preserved by the verdict of his peers; and only their unanimous voice can fix upon him the stamp of infamy. Yet this report calls upon us to submit our reputations, our most cherished interests to the decision of a mere majority of a body, chosen without regard to impartiality, restrained by no salutary checks, animated by party warmth, and perhaps prompted by ulterior objects. The Bill of Rights has declared that no ex post facto law shall be passed. But what law has ever defined official misconduct-indeed, what law can ever with certainty define it? What law fixes the punishment, when thus defined? The meanest, vilest, offender cannot be condemned to punishment, unless there has been a law defining the crime and declaring the punishment, which shall await the commission of it. But the Senate, sir, in cases of impeachment, sits not only to decide the facts, but to determine