and at whatever time it may be filled, so long as it remains negotiable in form. Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y., 531; Hubbard v. Harlem R. R. Co., 36 Barb., 286; 14 Abb. Pr., 275; Schultz v. Effect of want of demand on principal debtor. Present ment, how made. ARTICLE IV. PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT. SECTION 1747. Effect of want of demand on principal debtor. 1748. Presentment, how made. 1749. Apparent maturity, when. 1750. Presumptive dishonor of bill, payable after sight. 1752, 1753. Apparent maturity of note. 1754. Surrender of instrument, when a condition of payment. In the treatises upon bills of exchange, it is generally stated that they need not be presented by any one upon a day kept sacred by persons of his faith, and in like manner, that they ought not to be presented to one, upon a day sacred to him (see Story on Bills, § 293, &c). But there are no decisions to this effect, in this state, and our rule is probably otherwise. S 1747. It is not necessary to make a demand of payment upon the principal debtor in a negotiable instrument, in order to charge him; but if the instrument is by its terms payable at a specified place, and he is able and willing to pay it there at maturity, such ability and willingness are equivalent to an offer of payment upon his part. Fairchild v. Ogdensburgh R. R. Co., 15 N. Y., 337; Wol cott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns., 248. $ 1748. Presentment of a negotiable instrument for payment, when necessary, must be made as follows, as nearly as by reasonable diligence it is practicable: 1. The instrument must be presented by the holder;' 2. The instrument must be presented to the principal debtor, if he can be found at the place where presentment should be made, and if not, then it must be presented to some other person of discretion, if one can be found there, and if not, then it must be presented to a notary public within the state; 3. An instrument which specifies a place for its payment must be presented there, and if the place specified includes more than one house, then at the place of residence or business of the principal debtor, if it can be found therein;1 4. An instrument which does not specify a place for its payment, must be presented at the place of residence or business of the principal debtor, or wherever he may be found, at the option of the presentor; and, 5. The instrument must be presented upon the day of its apparent maturity, or, if it is payable on demand, at any time before its apparent maturity,7 within reasonable hours, and, if it is payable at a banking-house, within the usual banking hours of the vicinity; but, by the consent of the person to whom it should be presented, it may be presented at any hour of the day.10 1 1 Presentment must certainly be made by the holder, or by his agent (see Cooke v. Callaway, 1 Esp. N. P., 115; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns., 230; Shedd v. Brett, 1 Pick., 401). Possession of the instrument is, however, sufficient evidence of agency (Çole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y., 96). Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johns., 202. The provision in re gard to presentment to a notary is new. It is thought desirable that some record of presentment should be kept, when it is not made to the debtor or his agent. Ferner v. Williams, 14 Abb. Pr., 215; 37 Barb., 9; Stewart v. Eden, 2 Cai., 121; Saunderson v. Judge, 2 H. Bl., 509; Saul v. Jones, 1 El. & El., 59; United States Bank v. Smith, 11 Wheat., 171; Gay v. Paine, 5 How. Pr., 107; Spellman v. Weider, id., 5. See Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johns., 202; Boot v. Franklin, id., 207. See Woodworth v. Bank of America, 19 Johns., 391; Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns., 114; Spies v. Gil more, 1 N. Y., 321; Benedict v. Caffe, 5 Duer, 226. Apparent maturity, when. Presumptive dis honor of bill, payable after sight. Apparent Where the instrument has a certain time to run, a presentment made before (Griffin v. Goff, 12 Johns., 423; Bowen v. Newell, N. Y., 190; Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend., 205), or after it is due (Montgomery Bank v. Albany City Bank, 8 Barb., 396; 7 N. Y., 459), does not bind an indorser. See Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cow., 397; Van Hoesen v. Van Alstyne, 3 Wend., 75. 8 Wilkins v. Jadis, 2 B. & Ad., 188; Cayuga Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill, 635; Dana v. Sawyer, 22 Me., 244; Lunt v. Adams, 17 id., 230; Triggs v. Newnham, 1 Carr. & P., 631; Morgan v. Davison, 1 Stark., 114. Newark India Rubber Co. v. Bishop, 3 E. D. Smith, 48. 10 See Bank of Syracuse v. Hollister, 17 N. Y., 46; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns., 230; Garnett v. Woodcock, 1 Stark., 435. S1749. The apparent maturity of a negotiable instrument, payable at a particular time, is the day on which by its terms it becomes due; or, when that is a holiday, the next business day. Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend., 205; see Campbell v. International Assurance Company, 4 Bosw., 298. If the recommendation of the commissioners in regard to days of grace is not adopted (see section 1781), it will bę necessary to add to this section "The usual days of grace are to be added." $1750. A bill of exchange, payable at a specified time after sight, which is not accepted within ten days after its date, in addition to the time which would suffice, with ordinary diligence, to forward it for acceptance, is presumed to have been dishonored. It is very desirable, that the term, at the end of which a bill may be presumed to be dishonored, should be fixed. The decisions are conflicting and unsatisfactory. The commissioners have simply suggested periods which seem reasonable, but do not attach any importance to the particular terms proposed. S 1751. The apparent maturity of a bill of exchange, payable at sight or on demand, is: 1. If it bears interest, one year after its date; or, 2. If it does not bear interest, ten days after its date, in addition to the time which would suffice, with ordinary diligence, to forward it for acceptance. S1752. The apparent maturity of a promissory Apparent note, payable at sight or on demand, is: 1. If it bears interest,' one year after its date; or, 2. If it does not bear interest, six months after its date.2 It is doubtful whether a demand note bearing interest maturity of note. S 1753. Where a promissory note is payable at a 1a. certain time after sight or demand, such time is to be added to the periods mentioned in the last section. S 1754. A party to a negotiable instrument may require, as a condition concurrent to its payment by him: 1. That the instrument be surrendered to him,1 unless it is lost or destroyed, or the holder has other claims upon it; or, 2. If the holder has a right to retain the instrument, and does retain it, then that a receipt for the amount paid, or an exoneration of the party paying, be written thereon; or, 3. If the instrument is lost, then that the holder give to him a bond, executed by himself and two sufficient sureties, to indemnify him against any lawful claim thereon; or, 4. If the instrument is destroyed, then that proof of its destruction be given to him.' Wilder v. Seelye, 8 Barb., 408; Ranney v. Crowe, 1 Exch., 166; Hansard v. Robinson, 7 B. & Cr., 90; Smith v. Rockwell, 2 Hill, 482. 2 Hargous v. Lahens, 3 Sandf., 213. 4 1 R. S., 406; see Story on Notes, § 106. Des Arts v. Leggett, 16 N. Y., 582. This case does not Surrender ment, when of instru a condition of payment. ARTICLE V. Dishonor, what, Notice, by whom given. DISHONOR OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. SECTION 1755. Dishonor, what. 1756. Notice, by whom given. 1757. Form of notice. 1758. Notice, how served. 1759. Notice, how served after indorser's death. 1761. Notice, when to be given. 1762. Notice of dishonor, when to be mailed. 1764. Additional time for notice by indorser. $1755. A negotiable instrument is dishonored, when it is either not paid, or not accepted, according to its tenor, on presentment for the purpose, or without presentment, where that is excused. Story on Bills, § 228; Walker v. Bank of State of N. Y., 9 N. Y., 582. $1756. Notice of the dishonor of a negotiable instrument may be given :1 1. By a holder thereof; or, 2. By any party to the instrument who might be compelled to pay it to the holder, and who would, upon taking it up, have a right to reimbursement from the party to whom the notice is given.* 1It is, of course, a general principle that notice of a fact Notice by a mere stranger is of no effect (Chanoine ". 'Chapman v. Keane, 3 Ad. & El., 193. |