Panama without any compensation whatever of the terminal yards and passenger stations of the Panama Railroad. The last was a clear violation of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty of 1914-22 with Colombia, which gives that country important rights in the use of both the Panama Canal and the Railroad.

The 1955 Treaty completed the withdrawal of the United States from Panama to the boundaries of the Canal Zone but did not alter the basic sovereignty and perpetuity provisions of the 1903 Treaty as regards United States exclusive sovereign control in perpetuity of the Canal enterprise, which includes the Zone.

SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES DEFENDS U.S. POSITION
AT PANAMA, 1956

Following the nationalization by Egypt in 1956 of the Suez Canal, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, whose connections with the Panama Canal dated back to World War I, issued an order that no officer of the U.S. Foreign Service, in conversation, speaking or writing, was to equate the status of the Panama Canal with that of the Suez Canal, and that violators would be disciplined (Congressional Record, Vol. III, Pt. 19 (Oct. 5, 1965), p. 25974). That order was the last strong statement by a Secretary of State as regards U.S. sovereignty, over the Canal Zone. Secretary Dulles' successors, less conscious of the realities involved, gradually weakened and the aggressiveness of Panamanian radicals correspondingly increased. No high official of our government spoke out as they should have done. Thus matters took their retrogressive course.

U.S. FORMAL RECOGNITION OF PANAMA TITULAR SOVEREIGNTY LEADS TO HEAVIER DEMANDS, 1958

On May 2, 1958, there was an organized mob invasion into the Canal Zone called Operation Sovereignty. Red led Panamanian University students planted 72 Panama flags at various spots in the Zone, including some squarely in front of the Canal Administration Building. Instead of acting promptly to arrest and punish the trespassers, our responsible authorities naively ignored the incidents as youthful pranks. Instead of pranks they were probes of our government's will power to stand up for the just and indispensable rights of the United States at Panama.

Soon afterward, during a July 12-16 visitation in the Canal Zone by Dr. Milton Eisenhower, President Ernesto de la Guardia, Jr., told him that flying the Panama flag in the Zone would promote cooperation. That was a very suave statement.

Following the riots of November 3, 1959, which required the use of the U.S. Army to protect the Canal Zone from mob invasion, Under Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant visited the Isthmus and, under instructions, publicly announced that the United States recognized Panama's titular sovereignty over the Canal Zone but, quite significantly, did not define that term.

As predicted by me in the Congress at the time that disingenuous action did not beguile Panamanian radicals but simply whetted their appetites for more concessions.

U.S. CONGRESS OPPOSES SURRENDERS AT PANAMA, 1960

Reactions in the Congress were quickly forthcoming. On February 2, 1960, the House of Representatives, by the overwhelming vote of 382 to 12, opposed the formal display of the Panama flag in the Canal Zone in a House Concurrent Resolution but, unfortunately, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations did not act. As a follow up to the resolution, the House, on February 9, unanimously adopted the Gross Amendment to the 1961 Department of Commerce Appropriations Bill prohibiting the use of any funds under that appropriation for the formal display of the flag of Panama in the Zone. The Senate accepted this amendment and it became law.

As early as April 30, 1960, I predicted in an address in the House that soon after the Congress adjourned there would be an order from the President based upon the recommendation of the State Department, authorizing the display of the Panama flag in the Zone.

Later, on June 23, 1960, I addressed the House, stressing the problems that would follow as the result of the hoisting of the Panama flag in the Zone territory and warning the Congress that elements in the State Department were planning to authorize it. Next, on June 30, I wrote Secretary of State Christian A. Herter appraising him of these facts, urging him to clean out the responsible ele

ments in his department, and warning him that should the Panama flag be dis played in the Canal Zone under his authorization members of the House would press for his impeachment. His reply was evasive. (Congressional Record (86th Cong., 2d Sess.), Vol. 106, Pt. 14 (Aug. 31, 1960), p. 18872.)

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER STRIKES U.S. FLAG IN CANAL ZONE, 17 SEPTEMBER 1960 Just as predicted, on September 17, 1960, soon after adjournment of the Con gress, President Eisenhower, without Congressional sanction and using emergency funds from the Department of State, in a mistaken gesture of friendship, naively authorized the formal display of the Panama flag in one place in the Canal Zone at Shaler's Triangle as "visual evidence" of Panama's titular sovereignty over | the Zone but did not define the term, which, as already pointed out, is of purely reversionary character. Also as predicted, Panamanians took this display not aɛ evidence of titular sovereignty, but as an official admission by the United States of its recognition of Panama's full sovereignty over the Zone Territory. (G. Bernard Noble, Christian A. Herter, New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1970, p. 209.)

To avoid confusion the word sovereignty means the state of quality of having supreme power of dominion. Could there be any better status for the Panama Canal and Canal Zone than that under the full sovereign control of the United States with the avoidance of all problems of extra territoriality? For such sovereignty there can be only one flag and that is the flag of the United States.

PANAMANIAN MOBS ASSAULT CANAL ZONE, JANUARY, 1964

Did the 1960 display by President Eisenhower appease Panamanian radicals? It did not but simply served to open a Pandora Box of more unrealistic and impossible demands. The Panama flag display was extended by President Eisen hower's successors, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. They culminated in a massive Red led mob invasion of the Canal Zone during January 9-12, 1964, again requiring the use of our armed forces to protect the lives of our citizens and the Canal itself. In retaliation, Panama broke diplomatic relations with the United States and brought charges against the United States of "aggression" against Panama.

Here I would like to stress that not one United States soldier left the Canal Zone but simply defended the lives of our citizens and the Canal with the result that there was no interruption of transit despite the magnitude of the disorders. This was the highest tribute to the wisdom of our policy of having United States citizens in security positions, and having a protective strip framing the Canal,

PRESIDENT JOHNSON ACCEDES TO RADICAL PANAMANIAN DEMANDS, 1964 After President Johnson had an opportunity to get the necessary facts about the Panamanian mob attack, on January 14, 1964, he took a strong initial stand for exercising United States sovereignty over the Canal Zone stating that our Country had a "recognized treaty obligation to operate the Canal efficiently and securely, and (that) we intend to honor that obligation in the interest of all who depend upon it." (Congressional Record (88th Cong., 2d Sess.), Vol. 110, Pt. 1 (Jan. 14, 1964), p. 426.) For this candor he was widely commended at home and abroad despite the position taken by the United States in 1956 in opposition to the British-French reoccupation of the Suez Canal.

Unfortunately, after this intial policy statement he apparently fell into the clutches of Department of State miners and sappers and reversed his original position. Consequently, on December 18, 1964, after restoration of normal relations with Panama, President Johnson announced that the U.S. Government had completed an intensive policy review with respect to the present and future of the Panama Canal and that he had reached two decisions:

First, to press forward with Panama and other interested governments for a sea level canal; and second, to negotiate an entirely new canal treaty for the existing Panama Canal.

Legislation to authorize an investigation of the feasibility of a canal of sea level design was obtained-Public Law 88-609, approved September 22, 1964. Robert B. Anderson was assigned to head that study. Later, Mr. Anderson was appointed as chief U.S. Negotiator for the proposed treaty negotiations, thus holding two positions at the same time.

NEW CANAL TREATIES PROPOSED, 1967

On June 26, 1967, President Johnson and President Marco A. Robles of Panama jointly announced that agreement had been reached on three proposed new canal treaties as follows:

The first covering the operation of the present canal would have (1) abrogated the Treaty of 1903, (2) recognized Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone, (3) made Panama an active partner in the management and defense of the Canal, (4) increased toll royalties to Panama, and (5) eventually given to Panama exclusive possession in 1999 if no new canal were constructed at U.S. expense or soon after opening of a sea level canal but not later than 2009 if a new canal were built.

The second treaty for a canal of sea level design would have given the United States an option for 20 years after ratification to start construction, 15 more years for construction and a majority membership in the canal authority for 60 years after opening or until 2067, whichever was earlier. Additional agreements to fix the specific conditions for its combinations would have to be negotiated when the United States should decide to execute its option.

The third treaty for defense would have provisions for the continued use of military bases by U.S. Forces in Panama for 5 years beyond the termination date of the proposed treaty for the operation of the existing canal. If a new canal in Panama were constructed the military base rights treaty would have to be extended for the duration of the treaty for the new canal. (Background of U.S. Decision to Resume Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations," Office of Interoceanic Canal Negotiations, State Department, 1971.)

PROPOSED 1967 TREATIES OPPOSED IN BOTH PANAMA AND THE UNITED STATES

Although President Johnson did make a press release outlining the general aims of the treaties, the governments of both the United States and Panama withheld publication of the proposed treaties apparently with the hope that they would be ratified by our Senate without adequate debate.

Ferreted out through the journalistic initiative of the Chicago Tribune and published in that paper, and later quoted in addresses to the U.S. Senate by Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina in the Congressional Records of July 17, 21 and 27, 1967, they aroused a storm of protests in both Panama and the United States as well as in Great Britain and Japan, which are large users of the Panama Canal. So strong were these protests that the proposed 1967 treaties were never signed.

SEA LEVEL RECOMMENDATION HINGES ON SURRENDER OF CANAL ZONE, 1970 On December 1, 1970, the Anderson panel submitted its volumnious report recommending the construction of a new canal of so-called sea level design entirely in Panamanian territory about 10 miles west of the existing canal at an initially estimated cost of $2,888,000,000 to be borne by United States taxpayers. This figure did not include the cost of the rights of way or of the inevitable indemnity to Panama.

Meanwhile, in line with Isthmian revolutionary history, the Constitutional government of Panama was overthrown on October 11, 1968, after only 10 days in office, by a military coup and a provisional Revolutionary Government established. This eliminated the Panama National Assembly and converted its spacious building into government offices. Eventually, the revolutionary government, after declaring the discredited 1967 treaties unacceptable, sought to negotiate new ones and our government acceded, with the designation of the same Robert B. Anderson as Chief U.S. Negotiator.

Here it should be explained that the construction of a canal of sea level design at Panama for many years has been an undisclosed objective of a small professional engineering-industrial group, including manufacturers of heavy earth moving machinery. The recommendation of the 1970 Anderson Report for a sea level canal hinges upon the surrender of U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Moreover, the holding of the position of Chief Negotiator by the same person who headed the negotiations for the discredited 1967 treaties and the sea level study creates a serious conflict of interest to which the Congress should be fully alert.

One of the great purposes of United States policy of exclusive sovereign control over the Canal Zone was the avoidance of the never ending conflicts and recriminations that always accompany extra-territorial rights. To speak so bluntly as the gravity of the situation at Panama demands, the State Department in recent years has been dominated by those who timidly accept as valid every major claim of Panamanian radicals for the surrender by the United States of its sov ereignty over the canal enterprise and its transfer to Panama. Such action would undoubtedly result in the immediate dominance of the Isthmus including the Canal Zone by Soviet powers against which Panama could not cope.

LONG RANGE PANAMANIAN AIMS

Lest there be some doubt as to the long range aims of the Panama Government as to its objectives, on April 29, 1958, Ambassador Ricardo M. Arias of Panama, in a major address at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University. made this significant revelation: "The foreign policy of my country during the past 50 years has been to exert every effort in order to obtain at least for Panama, conditions similar to those granted to Colombia in January 1903." (Ho. Doc. 474, 89th Congress, p. 23.)

The blackmailing and demogogic revolutionary government of Panama would have the world forget the history of that country: the Panama Revolution under the guaranty of the United States, the reasons for the 1903 Treaty under which the United States constructed and has subsequently operated and defended the Panama Canal, the transformation of Panama from a cesspool of disease and penury into a relatively healthy land of comparative prosperity, and the vast sums provided by our government for canal purposes. The net total of these sums including defense, as of June 30, 1968, was more than $5,000,000,000, all provided by the taxpayers of the United States.

All the facts just enumerated, Mr. Chairman, the present government of Panama would remove from the memory of mankind. The United States can well stand on the record that it has made at Panama in dealing with all of these matters and trust to history for vindication.

Manifestly, Panama cannot eat its cake and have it also. After the United States built the canal and successfully operated it for more than half a century, a fly by night and sanguinary revolutionary government would have our country neglect its duty to its taxpayers and surrender the indispensably necessary protective frame of the Canal to Panama and thus enable that country to expropriate the canal itself and drive us from the Isthmus. The present Revolutionary Government of Panama has been motivated by a complete disregard of historical verities and its policy of truculence and impossible claims has undoubtedly been induced by Soviet assurances, for Soviet experts are already in Panama. This always happens prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations.

WHY NOT SURRENDER TO COLOMBIA RATHER THAN PANAMA?

In response to the officialdom in our government who seem determined to destroy the 1903 Treaty and surrender our just rights, power and authority at Panama, why should not such surrender be made to Colombia, which until November 3, 1903, was the sovereign of the Isthmus instead of Panama?

Any surrender of the Canal Zone and Canal is unthinkable; but if any surrender should be made it should be to Colombia, of which Panama was once a province, and not to Panama.

SEA LEVEL CANAL-A POLITICAL MOVE

In the light of what has taken place it is interesting to note that Colonel John P. Sheffey, former Executive Director of the recent sea level studies and now of the Office of Interoceanic Canal Negotiations in the Department of State, made the following revealing statements before a gathering of marine scientists on March 4, 1971, at the Smithsonian Institution:

1. That the canal investigation under Public Law 88-609 calling for consideration of the long range Canal program originated with the State Department following the 1964 riots as a means for improving treaty relationships with Panama.

2. That President Nixon had accepted the final 1964 Johnson canal treaty policy.

3. That the main purpose of the sea level proposal was to obtain "better treaty relationships" with Panama.

4. That if such relationships are not obtained the project is not warranted.

5. That the sea level proposal is not justified economically and that it "may never be constructed."

6. That because of opposition in both the United States and Panama the 1967 draft treaties would not be the basis for future negotiations.

7. That the sea level proposal was recognized as “ecologically dangerous."

8. That a decision to construct one would be a "political" decision.

Could there be more shocking admissions concerning a subject of such vast importance to the entire world than those just enumerated? (Congressional Record, March 24, 1971, p. 53879.)

PRESIDENT NIXON ADOPTS THE FINAL JOHNSON POLICY

The latest information on the canal treaty situation is that President Nixon, on the advice of the same appeasement officials in the State Department who advised President Johnson and whom President Nixon in his 1968 campaign had avowed to replace, has established objectives similar to those of his predecessor as modified by events since 1967. This information is that the "renewal of violence in Panama, possibly more extensive than experienced in 1964, might be unavoidable if the treaty objectives considered by the Panamanian people to be reasonable and just are not substantially achieved." This is complete blackmail on the part of the Panama Government, which today is unconstitutional under Panamanian requirements.

Though averring that the United States has "no intention of yielding control and defense of the Canal to the threat of violence," the State Department view is that it is in United States interest to demonstrate again as in 1967 our "willingness to make adjustments” which do not significantly weaken our rights to control and defend the canal and that it would be difficult for the United States to "justify itself in world forums" in the event it is again forced to "commit" its armed forces against "Panamanian incursion into the Canal Zone." (Background .., 1971, op. c.t.) Could there be any more obvious double talk? The United States did not commit its Armed Forces against anybody.

Such statements of policy, Mr. Chairman are an expression of willingness to surrender in advance. What could be more pusillanimous or unrealistic than this State Department pronouncement! No wonder the eyes of the world are watching us at Panama, for upon what we do there could well depend the freedom or the slavery of the world. Shabby sentimentality has no place in the consideration of the problems of the Canal Zone and Panama Canal. Such policy pronouncements as those just cited are about as senseless as those that involved the United States in entering the Korean and Viet Nam war.

Instead of surrendering the Canal Zone to Panama it ought to be extended so as to include the entire drainage area of the Chagres River basin as was first recommended by General Clarence R. Edwards, the Commanding General of U.S. troops on the Isthmus, as the result of World War I experience.

PANAMA NEGOTIATORS DEMAND FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER CANAL ZONE

In public statement by the Panamanian negotiators just prior to their departure for the United States on June 29, 1971, they said that they would demand full sovereignty over the Canal Zone or that there would be no treaty and that in event of failure to get such sovereignty they would return to Panama and explain matters to their people. In view of the anti-United States frenzy into which the people of that country have been whipped, this constitutes an open threat of violence comparable to that of January 9-12, 1964, which required the use of our Armed Forces to protect the lives of our citizens and the canal itself. Certainly there are few better examples of how appeasement begets blackmail than in the conduct during recent years of our policies at Panama. It must be borne in mind that those who made these threats overthrew by force and violence the Constitutional Government of Panama and are maintaining themselves in power by the same means. Why make treaties with the present Revolutionary Government which would in all likelihood be repudiated when Panama returns to a Constitutional government just as the present government repudiated the proposed 1967 treaties.

The greater part of the turmoil and bitterness that has evolved in Panama has been because Panamanian radicals and demagogs have failed to diagnose realistically the premises on which they base their policies and actions. Unfor

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