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wishes opened in connection with its naval buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Thus, the real issue at Panama, dramatized by the Communist take over of strategically located Cuba and Chile, is not United States control versus Panamanian but United States control versus Soviet control. This is the issue that should be debated in the Congress, especially in the Senate. Panama is a small, weak country occuping a strategic geographical position that is the objective of predatory power, requiring the presence of the United States on the Isthmus in the interest of Hemispheric security and international order. (17) In view of all the foregoing, the undersigned urge prompt action as follows:

(1) Adoption by the House of Representatives of pending Panama Canal sovereignty resolutions and,

(2) Enactment by the Congress of pending measures for the major modernization of the existing Panama Canal.

To these ends, we respectfully urge that hearings be promptly held on the indicated measures and that Congressional policy thereon be determined for early prosecution of the vital work of modernizing the Panama Canal, now approaching saturation capacity.

Dr. Karl Brandt, Palo Alto, Calif., Economist, Hoover Institute, Stanford, CA. Former Chairman, President's Council of Economic Advisers.

Comdr. Homer Brett, Jr., Chevy Chase, Md., Former Intelligence Officer, Caribbean Area.

Hon. Ellis O. Briggs, Hanover, N.H., U.S. Ambassador retired and Author.
Dr. John C. Briggs, Tampa, Florida, Professor of Biology, University of South
Florida, Tampa.

William B. Collier, Santa Barbara, Calif., Business Executive with Engineering and Naval Experience.

Lt. Gen. Pedro del Valle, Annapolis, Maryland, Intelligence Analyst; Former Commanding General, 1st Marine Div.

Herman H. Dinsmore, New York, N.Y., Former Associate Foreign Editor, New York Times, Editorialist.

Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, Alexandria, Va., Professor of Economics, Georgetown Univ.

Dr. Donald M. Dozer, Sta. Barbara, Calif., Historian, University of Calif., Sta. Barbara; Authority on Latin America.

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Baker, Washington, D.C., Former Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces, Mediterranean; Analyst and Commentator on National Security Questions.

K. V. Hoffman, Richmond, Va., Editor and Author.

Dr. Walter D. Jacobs, College Park, Md., Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland.

Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane, McLean, Va., Engineer and Author.

Edwin J. B. Lewis, Washington, D.C., Professor of Accounting, George Washington University, Past President, Panama Canal Society of Washington, D.C. Dr. Leonard B. Loeb, Berkely, Calif., Professor of Physics Emeritus, University of California.

William Loeb, Manchester, N.H., Publisher and Author.

Lt. Col. Matthew P. McKeon, Springfield, Va., Intelligence Analyst, Editor and Publisher.

Dr. Howard A. Meyerhoff, Tulsa, Okla., Consulting geologist; Formerly Head of Department of Geology, University of Pennsylvania.

Richard B. O'Keefe, Asst. Professor, George Mason College, University of Virginia; Research Consultant on Panama Canal, The American Legion. Capt. C. H. Schildhauer, Owings Mills, Md., Aviation Executive. rol-808 V. Adm. T. G. W. Settle, Washington, D.C., Former Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific. bride sn

Jon P. Speller, New York, N.Y., Author and Editor. being fed to bably Harold Lord Varney, New York, N.Y., President, Committee on Pan American Policy, New York; Authority on Latin American Policy, Editor. 31 Jan Capt. Franz O. Willenbucher, Bethesda, Md., Lawyer and Executive. blogw Dr. Francis G. Wilson, Washington, TX Professor of Political Science Emeritus,

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BACKGROUND ON PANAMA CANAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

1. Panama has been discontent with the Treaty of 1903 since its inception and has sought more generous terms with increasing intensity in recent years, Revisions were made in 1936 and 1955. But the most objectionable feature from Panama's viewpoint-US sovereignty over the Canal Zone in perpetuity-remained unchanged. Neither did the increases in payments and other economic benefits for Panama in the two revisions provide what Panama considers to be its fair share.

2. Panama's discontent led to destructive riots along the Canal Zone border in 1958 and 1964. The 1964 upheaval and subsequent criticism of US policy in the OAS, the UN, and in other international forums underscored the timeliness of President Johnson's decision that the reasonable aspirations of Panama could be met in a new treaty that continued to protect vital United States interests. On December 18, 1964, the President stated:

"This Government has completed an intensive review of policy toward the present and the future of the Panama Canal. On the basis of this review, I have reached two decisions.

"First, I have decided that the United States should press forward with Panama and other interested governments, in plans and preparations for a sealevel canal in this area.

"Second, I have decided to propose to the Government of Panama the negotiation of an entirely new treaty on the existing Panama Canal.

"Today we have informed the Government of Panama that we are ready to negotiate a new treaty. In such a treaty we must retain the rights which are necessary for the effective operation and the protection to the Canal, and the administration of the areas that are necessary for these purposes. Such a treaty would replace the Treaty of 1903 and its amendments. It should recognize the sovereignty of Panama. It should provide for its own termination when a sea-level canal comes into operation. It should provide for effective discharge of our common responsibilities for hemispheric defense. Until a new agreement is reached, of course, the present treaties will remain in effect."

3.

The basic US treaty objectives established by President Johnson in 1964 and supported by Presidents Hoover, Truman, and Eisenhower were to maintain US control and defense of a canal in Panama while removing to the maximum extent possible all other causes of friction between the two countries. To this end, new treaties were negotiated between 1964 and 1967 which contained the following major provisions (as summarized in the December 1970 final report of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission):

The first of the proposed treaties, that for the continued operation of the present canal, would have abrogated the Treaty of 1903 and provided for: (a) recognition of Panamanian sovereignty and the sharing of jurisdiction in the canal area, (b) operation of the canal by a joint authority consisting of five United States citizens and four Panamanian citizens, (c) royalty payments to Panama rising from 17 cents to 22 cents per long ton of cargo through the canal, and (d) exclusive possession of the canal by Panama in 1999 if no new canal were constructed or shortly after the opening date of a sea-level canal, but no later than 2009, if one were built.

The second, for a sea-level canal, would have granted the United States an option for 20 years after ratification to start constructing a sea-level canal in Panama, 15 more years for its construction, and United States majority membership in the controlling authority for 60 years after the opening date or until 2067, whichever was earlier. It would have required additional agreements on the location, method of construction, and financial arrangements for a sea-level canal, these matters to be negotiated when the United States decided to execute its option.

The third, for the United States military bases in Panama, would have provided for their continued use by United States forces 5 years beyond the termination date of the proposed treaty for the continued operation of the existing canal. If the US constructed a sea-level canal in Panama, the base rights treaty would have been extended for the duration of the treaty for the new canal. The Panamanian President did not move to have these treaties ratified. Consequently, no attempt to ratify them was made in the United States.

4. President Nixon has established negotiating objectives similar to those of President Johnson in 1964, modified by developments since 1967. Primary US objectives are continued US control and defense of the existing canal. The rights

(without obligation) to expand the existing canal or to build a sea-level canal are essential to U.S. agreement to a new treaty, with the exact conditions to accompany these rights to be determined by negotiation. The U.S. is willing to provide greater economic benefits from the canal from Panama and release unneeded land areas, again with the exact terms to be developed by negotiation. 5. Panama has expressed willingness to negotiate arrangements for continued US control and defense of the existing canal though it remains to be seen what they mean by this. Panama has not indicated its specific views on the acceptable duration of a new treaty. Panama is determined to terminate current US treaty rights "as if sovereign" and extend the jurisdiction of the Government of Panama into what is now the Canal Zone. The 1967 draft treaties would have terminated US jurisdiction in the canal area (but not control and defense of canal operations) with the construction of a sea-level canal. While the United States is now prepared to negotiate for the reduction in the extent of US jurisdiction in the canal area, it remains to be determined whether a mutually acceptable compromise can be worked out between US and Panamanian objectives in this area.

6. In the area of economic benefits Panama has indicated intent to seek a greater direct payment than it now receives ($1.93 million annually), the opening of the present Canal Zone to Panamanian commercial enterprise, increased employment of Panamanian citizens, and increased use of Panamanian products and services in the canal operation. All of these points were agreed upon in 1967, and the US remains willing to negotiate new arrangements along similar lines, provided they do not hazard US control of canal operations, the continuation of reasonable toll levels, and the continued financial viability of the canal enterprise.

7. Renewal of violence in Panama, possibly more extensive than experienced in 1964, might be unavoidable if the treaty objectives considered by the Panamanian people to be reasonable and just are not substantially achieved. While the U.S. has no intention of yielding control and defense of the canal to the threat of violence, it is certainly in the US interest in Panama, in Latin America, and worldwide again to demonstrate, as in 1967, our willingness to make adjustments in our treaty reationship with Panama that do not significantly weaken the United States' rights to control and defend the canal.

8. It is our intent to show Latin America and the world that the United States as a great power can develop a fair and mutually acceptable treaty relationship with a nation as small as Panama. Such a treaty must, therefore, be founded upon common interests and mutual benefits.

9. The Provisional Government Junta of Panama has expressed intent to ratify a new treaty by plebicite to ensure that it is acceptable to the Panamanian people.

10. The negotiators for the United States are Ambassador Robert B. Anderson, former Seretary of the Treasury and Secretary of the Navy. Ambassador Anderson is chief negotiator. His deputy is Ambassador John C. Mundt, formerly a senior vice president of Lone Star Industries and presently on leave from the State of Washington as State Director for Community College Education.

The Panamanian negotiators are Ambassador Jose Antonio de la Ossa (Panamanian Ambassador to the United States), Carlos Lopez Guevara, and Fernando Manfredo.

OFFICE OF INTEROCEANIC CANAL NEGOTIATIONS.

AUGUST 1971.

FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION
HOUSTON, TEXAS, AUGUST 31-SEPTEMBER 1, 2, 1971

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Committee: Foreign Relations.

Subject: Panama Canal.

RESOLUTION NO. 494

Whereas, under the 1903 Treaty with Panama, the United States obtained the

grant in perpetuity of the use, occupation, and
tory with all sovereign rights, power, and auto
the exercise by Panama of any such sovereign
well as the ownership of all privately held land and
chase from individual owners; and

of the Canal Zone terrientire exclusion of er, or authority as in the Zone by pur

Whereas, the United States has an overriding national security interest in maintaining undiluted control over the Canal Zone and Canal and its treaties with Great Britain and Colombia for the efficient operation of the Canal; and

Whereas, the United States Government is currently engaged in negotiations with the government of Panama to grant greater rights to Panama both in the Canal Zone and with respect to the Canal itself without authorization of the Congress, which will diminish, if not absolutely abrogate, the present U.S. treaty-based sovereignty and ownership of the Zone; and

Whereas, these negotiations are being utilized by the U.S. Government in an effort to persuade Panama to agree to the construction of a "sea-level" canal eventually to replace the present canal, and by the Panamanian government in an attempt to gain sovereign control and jurisdiction over the Canal Zone and effective control over the operation of the Canal itself; and

Whereas, Similar concessional negotiations by the U.S. in 1967 resulted in three draft treaties that were frustrated by the will of the Congress of the United States because they would have gravely weakened U.S. control over the Canal and the Canal Zone; and

Whereas, The American people have consistently opposed further concessions to any Panamanian government that would further weaken U.S. control; and Whereas, The American Legion believes that a treaty or contract is a solemn obligation binding on the parties and has consistently opposed the abrogation, modification, or weakening of the treaty of 1903 by which the rights of the United States thereunder would be weakened, limited, or surrended, the United States having fully performed its obligations under such treaty since its adoption: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, By the American Legion in National Convention assembled in Houston, Texas, August 31-September 1, 2, 1971, that the Legion reiterates its uncompromising opposition to any new treaties or executive agreements with Panama that would in any way reduce our indispensable control over the Panama Canal or the Panama Canol Zone: And be it further

Resolved, That the American Legion opposes the construction of a new "sealevel" canal, as advocated by the recently completed study of the Atlantic-Pacific Canal Study Commission as needlessly expensive, diplomatically hazardous, ecologically dangerous, and subject to the irresponsible control of a weak Panamanian government: And be it finally

Resolved, That the American Legion reiterates its strong support for resuming the modernization of the present Panama Canal as provided in the Third Locks-Terminal Lake plan advocated by so many Members of Congress.

Mr. FASCELL. You may proceed extemporaneously or as you wish. STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL J. FLOOD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. FLOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I must say that I extend to you, sir, and to your subcommittee, my compliments and the compliments of the people who feel as I do on this question, because certainly you have not been derelict and certainly we do not expect any chairman to give more attention to a subject than you and your subcommittee have given to this one.

As you say, I have a lengthy statement, and you have now placed that in the record. With the statement will be attached a memorial to the Congress from the Committee for Continued U.S. Control of the Panama Canal, and a very interesting and typical Department of State memo to the Members of Congress dated September 20, 1971. In the very best tradition of the State Department, because they had so many inquiries from Members about this thing, they finally got around to doing something. The "something" I put in, because my words could not possibly explain how they handled this subject there. Their own letter speaks for itself eloquently. Also, a resolution of the American Legion in support of our position.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, the documents referred to will also be included in the record.

Mr. FLOOD. I have here, Mr. Chairman, several editions of the Panama American, an English-language paper published in Panama. Keeping in mind your introductory remarks, just to show you what the temper and the atmosphere is in that area, I hold in my hand an issue of the Panama American for Thursday, May 20, 1971. Here is the scare headline: "Sovereignty or Death"-I read that in my best Shakespearean tradition.

Mr. FASCELL. You did very well.

Mr. FLOOD. "Sovereignty or Death' becoming the new byword in Panama."

Just to show you how fantastic this thing is becoming, I have as well several other editions of this paper in which they are analyzing U.S. unilateral interpretations and impositions suffered by the young Republic of Panama. I would like just to include the headlines, not the entire matter.

The three referred to are here. These simply go to show what is deliberately being done there. It is not casual. It has been going on for quite some time, as you know. Those are merely physical exhibits of what we are confronted with. That is in the Republic, not in the

zone.

(The material follows:)

HEADLINES REFERRED TO BY MR. FLOOD

[The Panama American, Thursday, May 29, 1971]

""SOVEREIGNTY OR DEATH' BECOMING NEW BYWORD IN PANAMA” [The Panama American, Tuesday, August 17, 1971]

"U.S. UNILATERAL INTERPRETATIONS, IMPOSITIONS SUFFERED BY THE YOUNG REPUBLIC OF PANAMA"

[The Panama American, Tuesday, August 10, 1971]

"FIRST UNILATERAL INTERPRETATION OF ISTHMIAN CANAL CONVENTION"-(TREATY SIGNED NOVEMBER 1903-FIRST VIOLATION

1904)

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, as you know, as a former member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs when I first came here in 1945, Sol Bloom was chairman, and I wound up on this very subcommittee that you chair. My interest continues in this phase.

Then when the Department of Defense was created, we created the Appropriations Subcommittee for the Department of Defense, and I have been on that subcommittee since it was created at the end of the war. Hemispheric defense was one of my assignments in that jurisdiction. Of course, hemispheric defense automatically brings in the canal, because I use the phrase that the canal is the jugular vein of Western Hemispheric defense. So, again I get into the act, you see. I am happy to be with you on this vital interoceanic canal question. It is a subject of world importance now. I mentioned there lies the body of an American in the Kremlin wall was he who suggested that one of the prime things for the

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