One aim of the Panama Canal revolutionary government is to end! the existence of the Canal Zone because it has given asylum to politi cal refugees from its terror.

In the event of a countercoup in Panama, which could occur at any time, I would even predict that General Torrijos, the Castro of Panama, would be among the first to seek sanctuary in our Canal Zone notwithstanding his present effort to do away with that haven of refuge against assassination.

Under Secretary of State for Inter-Americans Affairs, Charles Meyer, is credited with saying that the time of U.S. military intervention in other countries is past. Even the most serious circumstances, not even Communist takeover of a country, would change the U.S. attitude, Meyer is reported to have said in the El Panama America newspaper for July 23, of this year. He added that if the Communists should cut off Venezuelan oil shipments or if the Santo Domingo incident should be repeated or if the Communists take over Panama, the United States would not intervene.

Eight-column headlines at the top of the front page read: "There Will Be No U.S. Military Intervention in Panama, States Under Secretary Meyer."

The Panama Canal is one of the key strategic points in the world. and a focal point for power politics. Because of its importance to the entire free world, under no circumstances should it fall under Soviet domination directly or control by a Sovietized satellite. The only way to prevent that is for the United States to continue its undiluted control. Surrendering U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone makes about as much sense as surrendering sovereignty over Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Alaska, Hawaii, or even my native State of Louisiana.

For the above and many other reasons that need not be repeated, I recommend prompt and favorable action by the subcommittee on the pending sovereignty resolutions.

Mr. Chairman, in partial substantiation of what I have briefly reviewed, I wish to include as a part of my testimony three recent statements, two by distinguished officers of the Armed Forces, and the third prepared by the interoceanic canal negotiations of the State Department on the background of the present canal treaty negotiations. This last document is a glaring example of self-contradictory and superficial double talk and evasion that is typical these days of our Government posture against the ever-increasing and continuing Communist threat.

I thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, the statements referred to will be included in the record.

(The statements follow:)

PANAMA CANAL IN GREAT DANGER

(By Ira C. Eaker, Lieutenant General, USAF, Ret.)

There are alarming and unmistakeable signs that the Panama Canal is in imminent danger from attack or sabotage.

There is a striking resemblance between the Red game plan for seizure of the Suez Canal to events now unfolding in Panama. This no doubt flows from the fact that both plans were produced in the same place the Kremlin.

= Prominent elements of the Suez seizure plan included establishment of a puppet ›r friendly government in the area; giving economic and military aid; training military and guerrilla forces; waging a supporting world-wide propaganda campaign against colonialism and imperialism; brutally suppressing all opposition; and waiting until protective Free World, western powers were heavily preoccupied elsewhere.

In Panama, many of the elements of this same plan are now in evidence. Brig. General Omar Torrijos of the Panama National Guard executed a military coup in 1968, and has since exiled a popular and freely elected President, installed a puppet President, cancelled the constitution, discharged the congress and appointed to the cabinet and judiciary close friends and fellow-revolutionaries, all members of the Communist party or dedicated Marxists.

The six daily newspapers, long since intimidated, now obediently print diatribes against "the capitalist running dogs of the imperialist U.S.," demanding immediate return of the Canal to the sovereignty and control of Panama.

Torrijos was a friend and admirer of the Cuban revolutionary Che Guevarra. He has been collaborating and conspiring with Castro and Cuban guerrilla teams have been training native sabotage teams in the Panama jungles adjacent to the Canal.

Russian technicians lately have been arriving in Panama no doubt to train Panamanians in the operation of the Canal, as they trained Egyptians in the management of the Suez Canal.

Torrijos' plan appears to involve several successive stages. First, an effort will be made diplomatically to induce the U.S. to release soverignty over the Canal Zone to Panama by negotiating a new treaty to replace that of 1903 which charged the U.S. with custody and defense of the Zone. These negotiations began last month and are now in progress, and a world-wide propaganda campaign supporting this effort is now reaching crescendo.

Appeals will also be made to the Organization of American States and ultimately to the United Nations.

If diplomacy and propaganda do not produce the desired results, an attempt will be made to seize the Canal Zone by military force or to sabotage the Canal by a guerrilla effort.

The Reds also are well aware that the U.S. has been heavily engaged in Vietnam, and that severe cuts are being made in U.S. defense budgets. They may estimate that the President, not wanting to jeopardize SALT or his pending negotiations with China, would be reluctant or hesitant to act decisively against a military or guerrilla attack on the Canal Zone. They may reckon the time ripe to accomplish the seizure or disruption of the Panama Canal, the most damaging single act, against the U.S. and the Free World, economically and militarily, short of a direct nuclear attack.

Our defense forces in the Canal Zone are at the lowest levels ever. Panama's National Guard greatly outnumbers our combat strength there.

Several concerned Congressmen, notably Daniel J. Flood (D. Pa.), have made a determined effort to warn our leadership and our people of the hazard to the Panama Canal.

The first evidence of concern from the Executive Branch was the recent and wise decision of the President to disapprove a recommendation to deactivate the Southern Command, with headquarters in the Canal Zone, as an economy

measure.

Panama Canal defenses should be heavily reinforced and completely modernized without delay.

[From Alert, July 15, 1971]

PROVIDING AID AND COMFORT TO THE ENEMY IS TREASON

(By P. A. Del Valle)

FACTS

1. The Canal Zone and Panama Canal, owned, governed and operated by the United States with full sovereign rights, power and authority, is the most strategic crossroads of the Western Hemisphere, indispensible for interoceanic commerce and the security of the United States. They were acquired by the United States under treaty with Panama following its secession from Colombia of its own free

will with terms that were the inducement to construct the Isthmian Canal i̇ Panama instead of Nicaragua.

2. Its construction and subsequent maintenance, operation, sanitation and pro tection, including defense, from 1904 to June 30, 1968, represent a net total inves ment of more than $5,000,000,000, all provided by the taxpayers of the United States.

3. The report of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission headed by Robert B. Anderson was submitted to the President on December 1 1970, and recommended the construction of a second canal of so-called sea leve design about 10 miles west of the existing canal at an estimated initial cost of $2,880,000,000, exclusive of the cost of the right-of-way and an inevitable inden nity to Panama.

4. According to Colonel John P. Sheffer, former Executive Director of the Anderson panel, the main purpose of the sea level proposal in Panama is to obtain "better treaty relationships" with that country, that if these concessions to the Panamanians are not obtained the project is "not warranted", that “it is not justified economically", and that it "may never be constructed". (Cong Record, 24 March, 1971, p. S-3879.)

5. Certain elements of Washington Officialdom are now negotiating with Panama for a new canal treaty, or treaties, which hinge upon the surrender by the United States to Panama of our treaty-based sovereign rights, power and authority over the Canal Zone and its vast installations.

6. The United States negotiators for the surrender to Panama are Robert B. Anderson and John C. Mundt, who hold the personal rank of Ambassadors, appointed by the President.

7. The time table for the negotiations calls for completion and signature of the treaty, or treaties, in August, 1971, submission to the Senate for advice and consent in October and ratification before 1972. Meanwhile our State Department negotiators have stated that no problem is expected in securing approval in the Senate.

8. These diplomatic maneuvers are being obscured from public view by barriers of secrecy that are self-imposed by officials of the State Department.

9. The U.S. Constitution (Art. 1, Sect. 3, clause 2) vests the power to dispose of territory and other property of the United States in the Congress (House and Senate).

SIGNIFICANCE

1. The continued control of the Panama Canal by the United States is absolutely necessary for the needs of both, interoceanic commerce and Hemispheric security.

2. Surrender of the canal by the United States would inevitably result in Panama becoming another Cuba and the Panama Canal another Suez Canal. both under the control of the U.S.S.R.

3. The great challenge on the Isthmus is not United States control versus Panamanian but continued U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone versus U.S.S.R. domination: and this is the challenge that should be debated in the Congress. 4. High officials of our government, without authorization of the Congress. are preparing another betrayal of the vital interests of the United States at Panama.

ACTION INDICATED

1. Write the President, your Senators and your Congressman opposing the surrender of any United States sovereign rights, power and authority over the Canal Zone or Panama Canal, or anywhere else, enclosing a copy of this ALERT. 2. Write your Congressman demanding the impeachment and punishment before the bar of any high official who makes such recommendation.

3. Write letters to editors of your local papers along the same line.

4. Urge supporting action from your local business, civic and patriotic organizations.

5. Work for the election to national political office in 1972 only of those candidates for President, Senate and House of Representatives who will support continued United States sovereign control of the Panama Canal and its indispensable protection of the Canal Zone territory.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C.

BACKGROUND OF U.S. DECISION TO RESUME PANAMA CANAL TREATY

NEGOTIATIONS

1. Panama has been discontent with the Treaty of 1903 since its inception nd has sought more generous terms with increasing intensity in recent years. Revisions were made in 1936 and 1955. But the most objectionable feature from Panama's viewpoint-U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone in perpetuity-renained unchanged. Neither did the increases in payments and other economic ›enefits for Panama in the two revisions provide what Panama considers to be ts fair share.

2. Panama's discontent led to destructive riots along the Canal Zone border in 1958 and 1964. The 1964 upheaval and subsequent criticism of U.S. policy in the OAS, the UN, and in other international forums underscored the timeliness of President Johnson's decision that the reasonable aspirations of Panama could be met in a new treaty that continued to protect vital United States interests. On December 18, 1964, the President stated:

"This Government has completed an intensive review of policy toward the present and the future of the Panama Canal. On the basis of this review, I have reached two decisions.

"First, I have decided that the United States should press forward with Panama and other interested governments, in plans and preparations for a sea-level canal in this area.

"Second, I have decided to propose to the Government of Panama the negotiation of an entirely new treaty on the existing Panama Canal.

"Today we have informed the Government of Panama that we are ready to negotiate a new treaty. In such a treaty we must retain the rights which are necessary for the effective operation and the protection to the Canal, and the administration of the areas that are necessary for those purposes. Such a treaty would replace the Treaty of 1903 and its amendments. It should recognize the sovereignty of Panama. It should provide for its own termination when a sea-level canal comes into operation. It should provide for effective discharge of our common responsibilities for hemisphere defense. Until a new agreement is reached, of course, the present treaties will remain in effect."

3. The basic U.S. treaty objectives by President Johnson in 1964 and supported by Presidents Hoover, Truman, and Eisenhower were to maintain U.S. control and defense of a canal in Panama while removing to the maximum extent possible all other causes of friction between the two countries. To this end, new treaties were negotiated between 1964 and 1967 which contained the following major provisions (as summarized in the December 1970 final report of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission):

The first of the proposed treaties, that for the continued operation of the present canal, would have abrogated the Treaty of 1903 and provided for: (a) recognition of Panamanian sovereignty and the sharing of jurisdiction in the canal area, (b) operation of the canal by a joint authority consisting of five United States citizens and four Panamanian citizens, (c) royalty payments to Panama rising from 17 cents to 22 cents per long ton of cargo through the canal, and (d) exclusive possession of the canal by Panama in 1999 if no new canal were constructed or shortly after the opening date of a sea-level canal, but no later than 2009, if one were built.

The second, for a sea-level canal, would have granted the United States an option for 20 years after ratification to start constructing a sea-level canal in Panama, 15 more years for its construction, and United States majority membership in the controlling authority for 60 years after the opening date or until 2067, whichever was earlier. It would have required additional agreements on the location, method of construction, and financial arrangements for a sea-level canal, these matters to be negotiated when the United States decided to execute its option.

The third, for the United States military bases in Panama, would ha provided for their continued use by United States forces 5 years beyond t termination date of the proposed treaty for the continued operation of the existing canal. If the United States constructed a sea-level canal in Panam the base rights treaty would have been extended for the duration of th treaty for the new canal.

The Panamanian President did not move to have these treaties ratified. Co sequently, no attempt to ratify them was made in the United States.

4. President Nixon has established negotiating objectives similar to those President Johnson in 1964, modified by developments since 1967. Continued U control and defense of the existing canal are non-negotiable US requirement in a new treaty. The rights (without obligation) to expand the existing cana or to build a sea-level canal are essential to US agreement to a new treaty, with the exact conditions to accompany these rights to be determined by negotiation The US is willing to provide greater economic benefits from the canal for Patr ama and release unneeded land areas, again with the exact terms to be develope by negotiation.

5. Panama has expressed willingness to negotiate arrangements for continued US control and defense of the existing canal though it remains to be seen what they mean by this. Panama has not indicated its specific views on the acceptabie duration of a new treaty. Panama is determined to terminate current US treat rights "as if sovereign" and extend the jurisdiction of the Government of Pakama into what is now the Canal Zone. The 1967 draft treaties would have terminated US jurisdiction in the canal area (but not control and defense of canal operations) with the construction of a sea-level canal. While the United States is now prepared to negotiate for the reduction in the extent of US jurisdiction in the canal area, it remains to be determined whether a mutually acceptable com promise can be worked out between US and Panamanian objectives in this area 6. In the area of economic benefits Panama has indicated intent to seek a greater direct payment than she now receives ($1.93 million annually), the opening of the present Canal Zone to Panamanian commercial enterprise, increased employment of Panamanian citizens, and increased use of Panamanian products and services in the canal operation. All of these objectives appear reasonable and terms for their accomplishment were agreed upon in 1967. The U.S. remains willing to negotiate new arrangements along similar lines, provided they do not hazard U.S. control of canal operations, the continuation of reasonable toll levels, and the continued financial viability of the canal enterprise. 7. Renewal of violence in Panama, possibly more extensive than experienced in 1964, might be unavoidable if the treaty objectives considered by the Panamanian people to be reasonable and just are not substantially achieved. While the United States has no intention of yielding control and defense of the canal to the threat of violence, it is certainly in the U.S. interest in Panama, in Latin America, and worldwide again to demonstrate, as in 1967, our willingness to make adjustments in our treaty relationship with Panama that do not significantly weaken the United States' rights to control and defend the canal. Inasmuch as Panama appears willing to permit these rights to continue, the United States would find it difficult to justify itself in world forums should violence develop in Panama over lesser issues, and the U.S. be forced again to commit its Armed Forces again Panamanian incursions into the Canal Zone.

8. It is our intent to show Latin America and the world that the United States as a great power can develop a fair and mutually acceptable treaty relationship with a nation as small as Panama. Such a treaty must, therefore, be founded upon common interests and mutual benefits rather than upon the unquestioned ability of the United States to enforce its 1903 treaty rights against the wishes of the Panamanian people.

9. The Provisional Junta Government of Panama has expressed intent to ratify a new treaty by plebiscite to ensure that it is acceptable to the Panamanian people.

OFFICE OF INTEROCEANIC CANAL NEGOTIATIONS.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to thank vou, Mr. Rarick.

I would like to ask you, if U.S. policy is as you have stated, what is to prevent the takeover, either directly or indirectly, of the canal now, without any changes in the treaty?

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Chairman, it is one thing to sit back and notify. our enemy that we are going to surrender or yield by taking no