uction which, as I appreciate it, is what the Panamanian people are being told by Mr. Meyer, a representative of our Government, in their newspapers. It is another thing to come out unambigiously and say we are going to maintain the sovereignty, that this is a necessity in the defense of our country and the free world. I recently received word that the dictator, Mr. Torrijos, and his underground organization are planning violent demonstrations on October 11, apparently figuring in this way they can effect American public opinion to help foster the utterances of Mr. Meyer that we would do nothing. This morning all Members received this written report or briefing on canal negotiations from Mr. Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations of the Department of State, reviewing the position of our diplomatic experts. Paragraphs 7 and 8, I would like to read for the record: 7. Renewal of violence in Panama, possibly more extensive than experienced in 1964, might be unavoidable if the treaty objectives considered by the Panamanian people to be reasonable and just are not substantially achieved. While the U.S. has no intention of yielding control and defense of the canal to the threat of violence, it is certainly in the U.S. interest in Panama, in Latin America, and worldwide again to demonstrate, as in 1967, our willingness to make adjustments in our treaty relationship with Panama that do not significantly weaken the United States' rights to control and defend the canal. 8. It is our intent to show Latin America and the world that the United States as a great power can develop a fair and mutually acceptable treaty relationship with a nation as small as Panama. Such a treaty must, therefore, be founded upon common interests and mutual benefits. Apparently the suggestion of violence by State is to frighten us into acquiescing in the surrender of sovereignty over the canal. If the word received from the Canal Zone by wire is correct, it suggests there may be a liaison between the mis-named nationalists or the Communists-I don't think you could call them Panamanians-and some people in our State Department. Here we have U.S. diplomatic people again pushing the surrender line to get negotiations underway because there may be a renewal of violence. On the other hand, from Panama we learn that there is already a plan to create the violence. Just by coincidence, I am sure, both the telegram and the briefing material from our State Department right here in Washington bear the same date. My feelings are that we can take a positive approach to this matter. We do not have to telegraph our plans before the crisis arises, nor do we need encourage attack by blowing retreat before the battle commences. Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, the telegram you referred to will be included in the record. (The telegram follows :) Hon. DANIEL FLOOD, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. [Telegram] September 22, 1971. There is every indication that Omar Torrijos, the leftist dictator of Panama and the reds are planning violent demonstrations on October 11, to mark the third anniversary of the overthrow of President Arnulfo Arias' constitutional government. These demonstrations do not represent the people of Panama who along with President Arias who is in exile in Florida are gravely worried over these possible riots that could exceed those of 1964. Every effort should be made to prevent this useless violence whereby many innocent victims in the Cana Zone and Panama could be injured and possibly killed. PHILLIP HARMAN, Mr. FASCELL. It seems to me, just as a matter of personal opinion that any such action would be entirely counterproductive. I do not believe anybody would negotiate with a gun at his head, but that is a matter of opinion. Mr. Morse. Mr. MORSE. I would like to thank Mr. Rarick for his contribution to the subcommittee's study. What were the provisions of the 1967 treaty which went to the question of dilution of sovereignty? Mr. RARICK. First, you will remember, Mr. Morse, was the flying of the Panamanian flag. Then the agreement on a gradual dilution by a binational commission. Mr. MORSE. On which the United States would have had a majority? Mr. RARICK. Yes; this was the start. This was merely opening the door *** and from past experience we would negotiate away any advantage. Mr. MORSE. Are there specific provisions in the 1967 treaty that ceded sovereignty to the Panamanians? Mr. RARICK. Yes; they would have abrogated the 1903 treaty and ceded sovereignty over the Canal Zone to Panama, and shared the operation and defense of the canal with Panama. You will remember the public uprising. The idea that we were giving up the Panama Canal did not go with the American people. The Panama Canal to our people is like the Statue of Liberty or the Constitution. In itself, it is a hallmark of freedom and a symbol of the United States itself. Mr. MORSE. In the original 1903 treaty, sir, was sovereignty over the zone granted to the United States? I remember the phrase "as if sovereign" being used. Do you recall the exact language? Mr. RARICK. Yes; it granted to the United States in perpetuity all the rights, power, and authority as if we were sovereign of the isthmus to the entire exclusion of the exercise by Panama of any such rights, power, or authority. In addition, the United States acquired title to all privately owned land and property in the Canal Zone by purchase from individual property owners. Our foreign policy is childish. Every time a vocal minority screams that they have become unhappy or they threaten possible violence, we act as if guilty of some wrong and give in. Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Rarick. Mr. RARICK. Thank you. Mr. FASCELL. Our next distinguished witness is the Honorable Leonor K. Sullivan, of the State of Missouri, who has a long and deep interest in the canal from her vantage point on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and from the jurisdiction of her own subcommittee. We shall be pleased to hear from you today. STATEMENT OF HON. LEONOR K. SULLIVAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI Mrs. SULLIVAN. I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to thank you for allowing me to present this statement to your committee concerning the current negotiations between our Government and the Government of the Republic of Panama, which are intended to lead to new treaties governing the Canal Zone and defense facilities in Panama and the canal itself. As far as I am concerned, there is not a more crucial matter facing the administration and the Congress in the coming months than the present treaty negotiations concerning Panama. I served as chairman of the Panama Canal Subcommittee for 14 years, until this year because the new rules of the 92d Congress prohibited the chairing of two subcommittees, and my interest in Panama goes even much further beyond that time. In light of my deep involvement with the affairs of Panama over this extended period and my intense interest in the canal and the surrounding region, I cannot help but be anxious and apprehensive over the new round of treaty negotiations which have begun between the negotiators of our country and the Republic of Panama. It is for these reasons, Mr. Chairman, that I have requested this opportunity to present my views to your committee concerning these critical matters. Before I get into the substance of my remarks, I would like to ask the committee's permission to submit the following documents as part of the hearing record. These documents are identified as follows: (a) A report issued in December, 1970, on the "Problems Concerning the Panama Canal." This comprehensive report was from the Subcommittee on Panama Canal to the full House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. This report has enjoyed wide circulation and favorable comment. (A copy of this report may be found in the subcommittee files. Also, copies may be obtained from the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.) (b) A speech which I made on the floor of the House on April 1, 1971, when word first reached the House concerning the opening of negotiations for a new set of treaties. (Congressional Record, p. E-2656.) (c) A letter of May 20, 1971, from me to the President of the United States, respectfully urging that the administration not begin these new treaty negotiations. Also attached to this letter are copies of two replies which I have received. (A part of the Congressional Record pages E-7728-E-7731) (d) A speech to the House dated July 14, 1971 (Congressional Record pages E-7728-E-7731), in which I inserted certain news stories related to the speeches and promises of Gen. Omar Torrijos and other officials of the Panamanian Government to the people of Panama. Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, the documents identified will be included in the record. (The documents referred to may be found on pp. 41-55.) Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, it is pertinent to note that the pattern of Panamanian behavior which led to the 1964-67 negotiations and treaties is being repeated by the Panamanians. This activist behavior is undoubtedly being undertaken as a lever to force new nego tiations and treaties which give every indication of being even more retrograde to the interests of the United States than were the last round of abortive negotiations and treaties. My basic objection, of course, to the present round of treaty negotiations is that they appear to have as their basic purpose the abrogation of U.S. jurisdiction and sovereignty in the Canal Zone. This is ba sically objectionable because it is contrary to the best interests of the United States. However, the recent activity of the present Panamanian nonconstitutional provisional military government makes such treaty negotiations all the more inappropriate at this time. It truly seems unwise to negotiate with this nonconstitutional provisional military government at a time when it has terminated cur Rio Hato Military Base lease, continually alleged in the news media of Panama improper U.S. conduct, acted illegally and discriminatorily against Canal Zone residents, and kept up a constant drumfire of anti-American propaganda publicly. In order to view the present treaty negotiations in proper perspective, I believe it is necessary to examine some of the premises which led to the pricr 1964-67 treaty negotiations and some of the disabilities which were inherent in those treaties. At the time the 1967 treaties were drafted and negotiated, it was thought that the canal was inadequate to meet the requirements of commerce and should be replaced. Subsequent investigation has indicated that there is little in the record to support this conclusion, and General Leber, the former Governor of the Canal Zone Government, testified in 1970 that the existing canal with certain improvements should be able to handle all foreseeable traffic to the end of the century. At the time the 1967 treaties were drafted and negotiated it was thought that a sea-level canal was economically feasible and could be inexpensively constructed by nuclear excavation. The Atlantic-Pacific Inter-Oceanic Canal Study Commission report of December, 1970. eliminates the possibility of nuclear construction for the foreseeable future. As to the cost of constructing a new sea-level canal by conventional means, it would appear to be in the range of $2 to $3 billion, although the total cost cannot be known because financial arrangements for such construction are inseparably bound to negotiations between the United States and Panama. It may be concluded, therefore, that treaty negotiations such as those now under way cannot be premised on the assumption that Congress will authorize the construction of a new sea-level canal or enact legislation to transfer the existing canal to any other country. Aside from the fact that the 1967 draft treaties were based on erroneous premises, they were also unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the United States for a number of reasons. For example, they would have resulted in the United States relinquishing its sovereignty over the canal and would have operated in such a way that the United States would have been unable to provide for its defense. In addition, those treaties contemplated unrealistic and unreasonable increases in toll rates and revenues, and failed to take into account the constitutional authority of Congress over the disposal of U.S. property. Those treaties would have transferred control of the canal from the Congress to a nine-man governing authority with the five American members being appointed by the President and ubject to confirmation by the Senate and responsible to the Execuive, not the Congress. Any arrangements such as this would, in itself, e sufficient to make the treaties unacceptable to the Congress. It is clear that these 1967 treaties were totally unacceptable to us for he reasons I have just mentioned. On the other hand, the nonconstituional provisional military government of Panama rejected these reaties outright because they did not go far enough. Thus, it seems lementary that any developments in the new treaty negotiations which would satisfy Panama's predatory and totalitarian demands would be objectionable and unacceptable to the United States. In addition to the basic objection to any treaty surrendering our sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Canal Zone since it is contrary to the best interests of the United States, I also regard these present negotiations as creating a most unfortunate and dangerous climate in Panama. I say this because General Torrijos and Foreign Minister Tack have made any number of promises to the people of Panama in recent weeks concerning what they intend to get from the United States in these present negotiations. I do not believe the officials of Panama will be able to deliver on these promises to the people of Panama, and when these people are frustrated and disappointed in the results, I fear the outlet for their frustrations and anger will be manifested in riot and anarchy, which will be directed, unfortunately, against the U.S. presence in Panama. Although I believe I have made my position abundantly clear with respect to the inadvisability of our relinquishing our sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Canal Zone, I do not want you to think that I view this situation in a completely negative fashion. There is a middle ground for consideration and there are concessions which may be made. For example, after a trip to Panama in early 1969, and at the urging of certain commercial Panamanian interests, I suggested in a letter to the President that a portion of the Old France Field which is on the Atlantic side of the Canal Zone might be given over to the Panamanians for use in its free zone. The use of this parcel of land in the free zone by the Panamanians would increase Panamanian commerce and employment considerably. We might also allow Panama to bring its own supermarkets within the Canal Zone to compete with our commissaries. Also, I have continually suggested over the years that the President appoint one or two Panamanians to the board of directors of the Panama Canal Co. so that they may see how the funds received from tolls are poured back into the improvements and upkeep of the Panama Canal itself. These are just a few suggestions of a number of more moderate steps which may be taken and perhaps should have been taken in the past. However, I most strongly urge my colleagues, in both the House and the Senate, to resist any efforts to force us to relinquish our Sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Canal Zone which is so vital and necessary to our commercial and national security interests. In a recent conversation with Ambassador Mundt, he informed me that they are contemplating an arrangement whereby we would surrender our sovereign control over the 10-mile strip of the Canal |