Mr. WILLIAMS. It is also my thinking that both canals will be maintained.

Mr. MAILLIARD. The facts don't support that because the capacity of a sea level canal carries as far into the future as we can see, so that you would not go to the expense of operating two canals.

Mr. WILLIAMS. You say the capacity of a sea level canal goes as far as we can see. The probability of this sea level canal ever being built may be as far as we can see, too.

Mr. MAILLIARD. That is possible; I agree with you on that. What I am saying is that this is a consideration that might require us to find it desirable to abrogate our present arrangement to get one that we think is more advantageous.

Mr. WILLIAMS. When we are ready to build the sea level canal. Mr. FASCELL. As Mr. Mailliard points out, we may be confronted with that issue depending on what the real expert decision is with respect to the present canal's improvement and its capacity, and how long that improvement will suffice.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Surely. Well, the time to cross that bridge is when you reach that point.

Mr. FASCELL. Except for the leadtime, Larry. We have had testimony here that the leadtime is something like 15 years if you start right now.

Mr. WILLIAMS. You mean the preparation of plans and all that? Mr. FASCELL. Yes; to get all the stuff done.

Mr. WILLIAMS. All right. So that when you start with that 15-year period, that is the time to start to get another treaty for the area across which to build another canal. Of course, one of the major reasons for a second canal is some of the supertankers that are built and some of these other ships which the Panama Canal cannot handle.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Including aircraft carriers.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Kazen.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, I just throw out this fact, that the statement was made that the United States would be the only country that would be able to put up the money for a new canal. I submit that the Russians are standing on the sidelines and it may be to their tremendous advantage to work something out with Panama on a new canal. Mr. WILLIAMS. That is right. That makes it all the more important that we insist on our present agreements being continued because what you are talking about is a situation similar to the Aswan Dam on the Nile River. We were in there, Russia was in there. Russia promised them more than we did so as a result Russia took care of most of the costs of building the Aswan Dam and they now have Egypt as a close ally.

Mr. KAZEN. Is this liable to happen if we don't negotiate a new treaty with Panama for another site?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Look, when you are ready to go ahead with that second site, the second canal, then that is the time to see what can be done in the way of acquiring permission for another second canal zone in Panama. Now, incidentally, when you are talking about leadtime I think that part of the leadtime that you are talking about is going to be spent in determining which is the best route.

Mr. MAILLIARD. That the commission has already done.

Mr. WILLIAMS. The commission has recommended which route ! Mr. FASCELL. What they call Route 10 which is west of the present canal

Mr. KAZEN. We are at that time now to do something about a ses level canal because we have stopped all the work on the Panama Canal. all the improvements, as I understand it. There is no work going on down there now and they need improvements.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well. are you saying then that part of the present negotiations is a right-of-way or a second canal zone for the sea level canal!

Mr. KAZEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILLIAMS. That is part of the present negotiations?

Mr. MAILLIARD. That was part of the 1964 to 1967 negotiations.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I didn't know it was part of this.

Mr. KAZEN. It is part of this.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Morse.

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Williams, for coming here and helping us with our deliberations. I was going to raise the very point that Mr. Kazen raised. It seems to me we are all concerned about not giving up anything that is not going to erode U.S. national security or our own national interests in any way, but let's assume that the resolution which you and many colleagues cosponsored were to become law. It might restrain the U.S. negotiators and thus could lead to a breakdown of the negotiations. This is a terribly hot political issue in Panama.

We might end up with a canal which won't accommodate our aircraft carriers and conceivably the Soviet Union would end up with control of the sea level canal. I don't see where that would help our security interests at all.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Actually some of the improvements that were being planned for the canal would greatly increase the canal's capacity and I think our nuclear powered aircraft carriers—and Lord knows I hope we get more of them in the very near future—are not as large in size as some of the nonnuclear powered aircraft carriers. I will have to make a check on that but that is what my memory tells me. So if it comes to that point, then I think that the improvement of the present Panama Canal could be continued. At the same time there is no question that Panama does not have a very stable government. There is no question at all of this propaganda campaign against the United States as being inspired, as it is in most other places.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORSE. Yes.

Mr. MAILLIARD. On the size of the canal I think we ought to get it clear that all of the improvements that are being proposed for the present canal are for expediting transit. Nobody is proposing that we build new locks which is what we would be required to do to accommodate the super tankers and these very, very large ships that are being built because the cost of that is absolutely astronomical at today's prices. I don't believe anybody seriously belives that the present canal can be improved to admit large ships; it can be improved to speed the transit of ships.

Mr. WILLIAMS. What does the commission estimate the cost of the new canal to be?

Mr. MAILLIARD. It depends if they can build it by atomic means. Mr. FASCELL. They decided in their report that they cannot use atomic energy at this time.

Mr. MAILLIARD. At this time, but if that can be done the cost is fairly moderate but if it has to be done by conventional means it is

enormous.

Mr. FASCELL. They have a guesstimate in their report.

Mr. WILLIAMS. What is this enormous cost?

Mr. FASCELL. $2.8 billion at 1970 prices.

Mr. WILLIAMS. So how much would it cost to build new locks so that they could accommodate larger ships?

Mr. MAILLIARD. I don't know the figure but much, much more. Mr. WILLIAMS. Much, much more than three and a half billion or say four and a half billion at today's prices?

Mr. MAILLIARD. Heck, this canal cost us almost $3 billion in 1903. Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes; the 9 or 10 years that it took, $2.9 billion. Mr. MAILLIARD. You have to clear it out and build it over, new locks.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I am not so sure that is true.

Mr. FASCELL. Are you finished, Mr. Morse?
Mr. MORSE. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no questions. I commend our colleague on his concern and his statement. It was my privilege to ride a ship through the canal back in World War II and I have been interested and felt that I knew something about it ever since. I felt it would be a definite mistake for our country to lose sovereignty there.

Mr. WILLIAMS. That is exactly the position that I take. If we are ever going to have to change the treaty, the time to make the change would be if we were forced into it. Who knows, some of it might change. They might get back to a democratic form of government in Panama or there might be another coup and maybe three colonels will take over the next time.

In the meantime, the time to give thought to any concessions we may have to make in order to get permission to build a sea-level canal, if that is what we decide we are going to do, that is the time to make the concessions. I would much rather see the concessions made in monetary terms and no loss of sovereignty either on the present canal or the canal that we may be going to build.

Mr. FASCELL. Any other questions?

Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming and testifying and joining us in deliberations on this very vital question.

Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee stands adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS G. ABERNATHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Mr. Chairman, as my State of Mississippi is one of the great coastal States located on the Gulf of Mexico, I have long recognized the importance of the Panama Canal to both interoceanic commerce and hemispheric security, and have tried to follow events affecting the status of that vital interoceanic link.

The Panama Canal enterprise consists of two principal parts: the canal itself and the protective strip of territory known as the Canal Zone. Recent proposals to cease sovereignty over the Canal Zone to Panama are about as sensible as separating a steam locomotive from its tender, and is unthinkable to any realistic person. Instead of talking about surrending the Canal Zone, we ought to be making plans to extend it to include the entire area of the Chagres River drainage basin.

In the early part of this century, the people of our country demanded perpetual sovereignty and ownership of the Canal Zone, and got both in accordance with constitutional requirements. In the present negotiations, we are attempting to secure better treaty relationships by agreeing to give away what is U.S. territory and property under the naive assumption that such a surrender would meet Panamanian aspirations. This is nothing but expressed readiness to submit to blackmail.

While there has been much propaganda about meeting the aspirations of Panama, there are other countries involved in the canal situation: Great Britain, Colombia, and all other nations that use the canal, and we have to pay tolls. It is unrealistic to think only of Panama.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that I reflect the view of the vast majority of the people of our country when I say that they oppose any surrender of our duly acquired rights, power, and authority over the Canal Zone and Panama Canal, which, including defense, represents a net investment of some $6 billion.

Thank you.

STATEMENT.OF HON. WALTER S. BARING, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

Mr. Chairman and members of the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee, I am in support of House Resolution 369 to maintain and protect the rights and jurisdiction of the United States over the Canal Zone and Panama Canal during the treaty negotiations.